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A:OSTRi!.CT of 
J. F. Little, 'The Theme of Mediation in the writings of 
Simone ~ieil' • 
A study of the theme of mediation necessarily involves a 
consideration of the two poles between which mediation takes 
place. '~his study therefore begin's ,.,rith an investie;ation 
of what 3imone l·leil saw to be man's exile in this world, and 
his desire for the Good which is God. Since God is unknown 
and unknowable, this desire cannot be focussed on any partic-
ular object, and the soul must experience a void in which 
there is no compensation for spiritual energy expended. 'rllis 
process is unnatural, however, and painful to man, and he is 
frequently tempted to focus his desire for the Good on some 
earthly object; society, by creating the illusion of being 
greater than the individual, often fulfils this role, and 
becomes the object of man's idolatry. If man refuses this 
idolatry and is willing to hold the contradiction posed by 
his dual nature he will find that all earthly creatures and 
objects can be mediators behteen himself and the God \'lhom he 
desires. In this way exile becomes a fulfilment, and the 
whole natural realm can speak to man of his supernat1;.ral home. 
All mediation-themes reach their culmination in Christ, whose 
suffering is seen as a perpetual cosmic process reconciling 
the universe with its creator. 
The study is therefore presented in three sections: 
dualism, idolatry (false mediation), and mediation proper. 
These are fully illustrated by reference to the whole sphere 
of Simone ~eil's meditations, religious, political and philo-
sophical. 
Appendices include previously unpublished material, 
to~ether with relatively inaccessible articles and letters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Qu'est-ce qu 1il est mal de 
detruire? Non pas ce qui 
est bas, car cela n'a pas 
d'importance. Non pas ce 
qui est haut, car on ne peut 
y toucher quand on le voud-
rai t. Lea IJE'tCX(b • Les 
IJE'tCX(b sont la region du 
bien et du mal. (Cl 80) 
2 
1 In Simone ~ieil's interpretation of Plato's cave-myth, man in 
his natural condition is deprived of any direct perception of 
the Good, since he lives in a \-rorld of shado1trs where only re-
flections are visible. He is chained in such a way that he 
cannot move to seek the reality behind the reflections, and 
is therefore led to believe that the reflections are reality, 
are rightful objects of his love. But if, by inspiration 
or by the testimony of those who have mana~ed to leave the 
cave and have seen the oun outside, he realises that there 
may be something better than the images he has before him, 
then he embarks on the painful and difficult journey out of 
the cave, releasing himself from his chains. Conditions in 
the cave and the sunlight outside form for Simone Weil two 
totally opposed realms, the natural and the supernatural, and 
the ascent from one to the other is not achieved automatic-
ally. 'Pour le passage des tenebres a la contemplation du 
soleil, il faut des intermediaires, des IJE'tCX~t7' (SG 106). 
'l'he nature of these 1JE'tCX~t7 , these intermediaries, \'lill be the 
subject of this study, and their precise nature will be anal-
ysed in the course of it. For the present it will suffice 
1Republic, VII, 514-516. See SG 98-100. 
3 
to say that they represent for Simone Weil the means of man's 
return to God, the way of his salvation. 
It is not mediators as such, however, but rather the 
theme of mediation which is under discussion. By 'theme' 
we mean neither the childhood trauma of J.-P. \11"eber, 1 nor the 
2 literary topics and motifs of Eugene Falk, but rather a patt-
ern of ideas and images centred on and therefore revelatory 
of a salient feature of the writer's view of existence. This 
pattern will be found to extend over the whole range of Simone 
religious, 
Weil's writing,/politicul and literary, and our concern will 
be to trace the pattern, both in its broad outlines and in 
the details which compose it, rather than to examine exhaust-
i vely any one aspect of Simone t·ieil' s thought. 
If we define mediation as the process of man's return 
to God, it is immediately obvious that an initial division 
is implied for this process to be necessary. Hediation is 
impossible without the assumption of two extreme terms, and 
it would be no exa~~eration to say that these three terms 
together form the basis of Simone ;i!eil 1 s concept of religion. 
David Raper has noted that the key to this concept is to be 
1Domaines thematigues (Paris 1963), P• 9. 
2 Types of Thematic Structure (Chicago 1967), PP• 2-3· 
4 
found in 'the recognition of three things--man's bondage to 
necessity, the reality of absolute good, and the principle 
of mediation between the two•. 1 
The consideration of mediation must therefore be pre-
ceded by a consideration of dualism, and of what this can 
mean in relation to Simone Weil's thought. After a general 
survey of dualistic thought (I, §1), there will be a study of 
the two poles of the opposition, God (I, §2) and the realm of 
necessity (I, §3), with a consideration of the dualism inher-
ent within man (I, ~4). It lvill be noted that the vthole 
concept of mediation depends on the purity with which the 
two poles are kept apart; a mediator relates one term of 
the opposition to the other, but compromises the integrity 
of neither. It must partake in some \vay of the nature of 
both extremes, being expressible in the formula a : b = b : c. 
In the religious sense, a mediator is a passage, a means for 
two-way communication between the natural and the supernatural, 
but to perform this function it must be absolutely pure, strip-
ped of the desires and hopes which man, in his natural urge to 
expand himaelf, projects into every being and object he en-
1
•Simone vleil's Critique of the Uld Testament', unpubl. 
thesis (Hamilton, Ont. 1968), p. 164. 
5 
counters. Mediation thus depends on man's retreat from his 
illusory position at the centre of the universe, on a renunc-
ia tion of power \-Thich is extremely painful (I, §5). Since 
man in his natural state is unwilling to make this renunciation 
and to undergo the suffering whiCh it entails, most of his life 
is spent in idolatry, that is, in projecting into the universe 
his individual or collective desires for the present and future, 
or, in the terms of the cave-image, in the belief that the 
shadows on the wall before him a.re the absolute Good, to be 
worshipped as objects of love. Having established the basic 
dualism of Simone Weil's position, therefore, it will be nee-
essary in the second section to consider 1r1hat results when 
these opposites are brought into a 1 \-rrong' relationship, when 
earthly creatures and phenomena are used not as mediators but 
as objects which are good in themselves. The ge~al defin-
ition of Simone Weil's use of the term 'idolatry', and its 
implications for society, will be considered in II, §1, and 
froru there we ahall pass to a more detailed analysis of various 
manifestations of social idolatry, including those societies, 
from Rome to Nazi Germany, which Simone iJeil considered to be 
totalitarian (II §§2= 3) the social implications of Judaism I I . , 
(II, §4) and of the Roman Catholic Church (II, §5). 
6 
It is only in the third and final section that mediation 
proper will be considered, as the 'correct' way to resolve 
the basic contradiction of man's existence. This mediatory 
function can be performed by a vision of the beauty of the 
world (III, §1), a beauty which frequently implies suffering 
(III, §2), orb~ individual redemptive figures who have suff-
ered for humanity (III, §3). It can also be performed by 
perfectly pure objects, by matter which has become transparent 
so that grace can operate through it (III, §4). Society too 
can be a mediator, when it is no longer worshipped as a means 
of collective power and prestige (III, §5). A more theoretical 
form of mediation is considered in III, §6, 11rhere Simone \A/eil's 
preoccupation with the spiritual symbolism of Greek geometry 
is analysed. The final chapter concerns the figure of Christ, 
1rrho uni tea in himself all mediation-themes. 
This study will thus evolve in apparently dialectical 
form, with the positing of the thesis (dualism), antithesis 
(idolatry) and synthesis (mediation). But this is in many 
ways a false dialectic, and certainly bears little res•emblance 
to its Hegelian variety. Idolatry, ra·ther than being an anti-
thesis of dualism, is a false synthesis of tlle terms of oppos-
ition within that dualism. There is no real antithesis of 
7 
dualism, which bears within itself its own dialectic, and to 
speak of its 'resultion' by mediation is true only in a limited 
sense. The elements of duality are 'resolved' only in a very 
special sense, as will be shown. Any dialectic is thus one 
of form only, and the three parts of this study can be better 
understood in the terms 'dilemma', 'false solution', 'true 
solution 1 • 
The scheme of man's salvation involves, clearly, the 
salvation of the l"Jhole man, and no consideration of the theme 
of mediation could afford to neglect the psychological and 
social aspects of man, his reactions to the universe in which 
he finds himself, as well as the individual history which 
makes him a unique being. And so bioBraphical details con-
cerning Simone Weil's life will be considered wherever necess-
ary, in order to put into human perspective the intellectual 
and spiritual problems which she faced. For the concept of 
mediation evolved only gradually within her; chronol~gically, 
her dualism preceded her consciousness of mediation, even if 
the former was never lost. This consciousness was bought at 
the price of an agonised confrontation with what she sa\'1 to 
be man 1 s dilemma, and \·las never an easy way of reconciling 
the apparently irreconcilable. 'rha t the dilemma was never 
8 
finally resolved is indicated by the fact that even in the 
last months of her life she was able to write to Maurice 
Schumann: 
J'eprouve un dechirement qui s'aggrave sans cesse, 
a la fois dans !'intelligence et au centre du coeur, par 
l'incapacite ou je suis de penser ensemble dans la verite 
le malheur des hommes, la perfection de Dieu et le lien 




ASPECTS OF DUALISM 
lJ2 
When considering elements of dualism to be found in Simone 
Weil 1 s writings, the first problem which presents itself is 
the very nature of that dualism. For the adjective 'dualist• 
when applied to philosophical or religious modes of thinking 
has vast implications, and covers a great range of phenomena. 
Man from earliest times has been conscious of forces outside 
himself, of a •natural' world of which he is a part, and a 
'supernatural' world, whose connexion with the natural is 
experienced to a certain degree as the 1 numihous•,1 but is 
generally incomprehensible and inexplicable in terms of 
ordinary thought-processes. Then there is the sense, also 
present early in man's history, that the social order of man 
merely reflects a higher, macrocosmic order, so that society 
is constructed after the supposed order of the cosmos. 2 
In the field of religious speculation there are the 
great dualistic faiths such as Manicheism, exalting the 
1 See Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. J. W. 
Harvey (London 1923). 
2
see Marcel Griaule & Germaine Dieterlen, 'The Dogon•, 
African Worlds, ed. Daryll Forde (London 1954), for an example 
of this. It is of course a feature of Chinese and Indian 
organisation of space in architecture. See Nelson I. Wu, 
Chinese and Indian Architecture (London & New York 1963), esp. 
P• 11. 
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distance and opposition between God and creation and positing 
two separate, if unequal, principles. Some critics have 
seen a definite, though unavowed, link between Simone Weil's 
thought and the dualism of Gnosticism which was responsible 
1 for much of the heresy in the early Church. Philosophical 
speculation has also produced dualistic concepts, such as the 
dualism of mind and matter elaborated by Kant, or Descartes' 
distinction between body and soul. Simone Weil was undoubt-
edly influenced by Cartesian thought; not only through the 
obvious fact that it is difficult for any French thinker to 
escape ita influence, but also through Alain, and her choice 
of Descartes as the subject for he~ 'these de diplome d'etudes 
• • I 2 super1eures • Descartes is important too as representative 
1E.g. Charles Moeller, Litterature du XXe siecle et 
christianisme, t. I: Silence de Dieu (Paris 1954), 2e partie, 
§2, 'Simone Weil et l'incroyance des croyants•. 
~' 'Simone Weil devant l'Eglise et l'Ancien Testament', 
Cahiers aioniena, VI, 2 (1952), 104 ff. 
Marcel More, 'La Pensee religieuse de Simone Weil', ~ 
vivant, 1? (1950), 35-68. 
Mention will be made from time to time of Simone Weil's 
affinities with certain aspects of Gnostic thought, but no 
attempt will be made to assess exhaustively the extent to which 
she was 'a Gnostic', since such an assessment would be meaning-
less, given the unsystematic anduundogmatic nature of her 
thought. Her expressed affinity with the Cathars will be 
treated in III, §5. · 
2
•science et perception dans Descartes', SS 9-99· 
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of a certain dualism within the Christian tradition, the 
body-and-soul, flesh-and-spirit dualism first emphasised 
within Christianity by St. Paul, and which has remained a 
permanent feature of Christian theology to the present day. 
That a form of dualism is essential to our intellectual 
existence is readily observable by the fact that thought 
itself implies a division between subject and ob.ject, thinker 
and thought. Whereas this division is generally unconscious, 
however, the dualist can be said to be one who is aware of it.1 
One fundamental and comparatively unsophisticated form of 
duality which may prove relevant to our purpose is the primitive. 
and widespread categorisation of phenomena into two opposite 
groups. The importance of pairs of objects in primitive and 
not-so-primitive society has long been remarked upon by anthro-
pologists--for example the veneration or abhorrence of twins, 
according to the particular traditions of the society concerned. 
In the same field, Roger Caillois has studied the dualistic 
1
simone Petrement, Le Dualisme dans l'histoire de la 
hiloso hie et des reli ions (Paris 1946), p. 92. (Referred 
to hereafter as DB. The present writer's debt to Simone 
Petrement's study of dualism will become obvious in the follow~ 
ing pages. Not only is· her work of great value in itself, but 
it is particularly relevant to our purpose, since she was a 
close friend of Simone Weil's during their student days and 
later, and, like her, a pupil of Alain. 
16 
A well-known example of opposition at the beginnings of 
Western philosophy, and one used by Simone Weil, is the 
Pythagorean table of opposites, though here already the list 
is somewhat sophisticated by its inclusion of abstr~ct notions, 
odd and even, limit and unlimited etc.1 An associated form 
of dualism is to be found in Chinese philosophy, with the pre-
-Taoist notion of the polarity of the yin and the ~' dev.e-
loped from the basic opposition-between light and darkness. 
It could be said however that these oppositions are not 
really a manifestation of dualism but rather an instance of 
rhythmic alternation, and not of a fundamental difference 
between the two categories. 2 Granet puts clearly the basic 
concept of yin and ~: 
A l'idee de couple demeure associee 1 1 idee de 
communion, et la notion de totalite commande la regle 
de bipartition. L'opposition du Yin et du Yang n'est 
pas con~ue en principe (et n'a jamais ete con~ue) comme 
une opposition absolue comparable a celles de l'Etre 
et du Non-Etre, du Bien et du lwial·. C' est une opposi-
tion relative et de nature rythmique, entre deux 
groupements rivaux et solidaires complementaires et au 
1
see G. S. Kirk & J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers 
(Cambridge 1962), P• 240, and Lloyd, op.cit., P• 94. · 
2In the case of the Pythagorean opposites, however, Simone 
Weil seems to take limit and unlimited as expressions of an 
absolute opposition exterior to the physical world. See III, 
§6. 
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mime titre que deux corporations sexu-elles, alternant 
comme elles a la besogne et passant tour a tour au 
premier plan.l 
Simone Petrement discusses this same concept and concludes 
that the cyclic nature of these oppositions is in a sense 
quite foreign to dualism. 2 And indeed, the essence of 
dualism is surely a sense of two utterly opposed realms or 
categories, each completely independent of the other, whereas 
alternating opposites are in a sense relative, do not really 
exist one without the other. To begin our discussion of 
Simone Weil 1 s dualism with a consideration of this type of 
opposition may thus seem perverse. That it is a form of 
dualism within reality, an immanent dualism, there can be no 
doubt, however; Jung uses the term without hesitation to 
designate the various oppositions which together form the 
alchemists• Coniunctio, or synthesis of psychic opposites. 3 
But our real justification must be that it forms the basis 
of many of Simone Weil's speculations on the nature of this 
world, in its subjection to time and necessity. This 
~arcel Granet, La Pensee chinoise (Paris 1950), pp. 
144-5. 
2DH, P• 58. 
3c. G. Jung, 1Mysterium coniunctionis', Collected Works 
(London 1963), XIV, 38. 
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immanent duality is the substance of the creaturely element 
in the dualism man/God which will form the main subject of 
this section, and can thus be considered conveniently at this 
point. 
* 
1 L1 existence, c'est le lieu des contraires' (C2 285). 
This affirmation can readily be deduced even from a cursory 
view of human existence. Our century has no need of Hera-
clitus to remind us that 'la guerre est mere de toutes choses~ 
1 
reine de toutes choses' --not only are there differences 
between phenomena, but these phenomena appear to be in perpetual 
conflict. Although this conflict may be experienced as painful 
by the individual man, it is capable of resolution on the 
temporal plane, since it is merely a statement of the relativity 
~~ 
of earthly things, of the JBO ta• nature of the seasons, for 
example. The early Greeks seem to have been acutely conscious 
of the laws regulating change, and the fact that the 'warring' 
within phenomena was not merely a disordered jumble. Simone 
1Heraclitus, frag. 53 
laT~, w&vTwv dk paa~AE~, 
(SG 153), following Diels' 
(1st part): rrbAE~O~ K&V~V ~kv Ka~p 
trans. Simone Weil 
classification. 
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'\.'leil too has this same feeling for .s.ltern::-,ting rhythm, for the 
constant oscillation bet\-Jeen extremes which forms the law of 
nature. .She frequently quotes Anaximander•s formula on the 
origin and destiny of phenomena: 
Tel est le point de depart de la naissance pour les 
chases, et le terme de leur destruction, qui se produit 
conforrn6ment ~ lu necessit6; car elles subissent un 
chatiment et une expiation les unes de la part des autres, 
a cause de leur injustice, selon 1 1 ordre du temps.l 
In this Simone ;ieil finds a formula applicable to all 
phenomena, an essential law in scientific investigation: 
Formule d 1 i.naximandre, fondemen t de toute science. 
D~finir partout un 'quilibre tel que les ruptures com-
pensees constituent les phinom~nes. Aussi dans une ime 
hulllaine; quand un mobile va trop loin, il se :produit une 
compensation. Dans la soci,te de m~me. (Cl 181) 
This law is in fact merely a reflection of the universal law 
of progression in time, which all things are obliged to obey. 
In a sense the state of becoming which is the condition of 
existence is a series of breaks in perfect equilibrium: 2 
1 L 1 ordre est ~quilibre et immobilite. L 1 univers soumise au 
temps est en perpetuel devenir. L 1 energie qui le meut est 
1i.naximander, quot. Simplicius, Phys. , 24, 13, in Kirk & 
Raven 1.. pp. 106-7: lE; ~y dt n ytvEat.c; l<Y'tl. 'tO~c; 0001.' Kal 'tt)Y cpSoplxv 
de; "tCXU'ta 1\YE<YSal. KCX'tix-'tb XpEl.7v• d1.dbva1. ylxp a6m d\KTJY Ka\. -r\<Yl.Y 
&AA~Ao1.c; TTJ<; &d1.x\ac; KCX'tix 'tt)Y 'tOV xpbvou -r&E;1.v, KOl.TJ'tl.KW'ttpol.c; o~~ 
Trans • .Simone 11-ieil (IF 117). OWIJ.a<Yl.Y a6'tlx Atywv. 
2
-vJe shall consider Simone \•leil 1 s ideas on time in more 
detail in I, §3. See also II, §1. 
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principe de rupture d'equilibre! (IP 151}.~ This essentially 
Greek nostalgia for a world in which change and consequently 
decay have no part makes Simone Weil suggest that becoming is 
in itself the source of evil. Referring again to Anaximander, 
she notes the relationship he has made between injustice and 
becoming: 1 1 Anaximandre: injustice des choaes. Si les chosea 
n'etaient pas injustes, il y aurait equilibre, c 1 eat-a-dire 
immobilite. Le devenir est le mal' (C3 227}. And yet this 
same movement is both inju~tice and harmony. She associates 
Heraclitus' 'l'harmonie est changement de cote• 2 with the idea 
on the mechanism of the bow put forward by Lao Tzu,3 for whom 
the Tao itself proceeded by cyclic motion: 'Turning back is 
how the way moves•. 4 The laws of phenomenal change are thus 
reversion, return (fu},5 giving that interaction of opposing 
movements probably moat familiar to the West in the concepts 
1
see also I, §2 for Simone Weil's ideas on the origin of 
evil. 
2Frag. 51: 06 ~vv~aa~v ~~ d~a~p6~Evov ~~~~ b~oAoytE~: 
uaAtvTpou~ &p~ovt~ ~Ep Tb~ou xal trans. Simone Weil (SG 152}. 
A~p~~' 
3Tao te ching, trans. D. C. 
184. 
4Ibid., XL, 88. 
Lau (Harmondsworth 1963}, LXXVII, 
5Fung Yu-Lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, trans. R. 
~ughes (London 1947), PP• 98-9. 
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of yin and~ already mentioned. 1 
Because Simone Weil was conscious of the law of cyclic 
progression as applied to all phenomena, it is hardly surprising 
that she should apply the same law to the movement of the 
intellect. It is thus that she accepts the Platonic dialectic 
as a means--perhaps the only means--of thought. Contradiction 
and analogy, which are for her the two essential features of 
Plato's dialectic, are both means of relating phenomena, and 
both 'des moyens de sortir du point de vue' (Cl 76). 2 From 
Alain too she had learnt that any observation must be followed 
by its contrary in order to obtain a balanced view of the whole: 3 
1But Jean Grenier warns against too close a parallel between 
Heraclitus' theory of opposites and the concept of yin and ~· 
The analogy is too general to have any real significance according 
to him. L'Esprit du Tao (Paris 1957), P• 51· 
2The use of contradiction as a kind of mystical moment will 
be discussed in III, §6. 
3cf 0 I J I • • 1 1 • t • t 1 • e.g.. a1 appr1s ••• que oppos1 1on es e 
mouvement mime de la pensee et le seul moyen de donner du corps 
aux idees. Cela est sensible dans ces contraires que Platen 
a dessines comme par jeu, ainsi le chaud et le froid, le lourd 
et le leger, le grand et le petit. A force d'y penser j'ai 
fini par apercevoir que ces contraires etaient inherents l'un 
a l'autre, de fa~on qu'il soit impossible de juger qu'un corps 
est petit si l'on ne juge en mime temps qu'il est grand, ce qui 
n'est que parcourir toute l'etendue d'un genre et faire courir 
1 1 idee. • •• Hegel a trouve de merveilleuses idees, pleines 
de matiere et de consistance, a force de chercher en chac~ne 
son contraire identique a elle.• Alain, Histoire de mes pen-!!!! (~aria 1950), p. 35· For a comment on this particular 
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'Methode d'investigation: des qu'on a pense quelque chose, 
chercher en quel sens le contraire est vrai' (Cl 191). Seen 
from another angle, if both propositions are true, then neither 
is. Truth is to be found rather in relationship: 'la verite 
se produit au contact de deux propositions dont aucune n'est 
vraie; leur rapport est vrai' (C2 398). Eckhart too, whom 
Simone Weil appears to have admired, judging from the relatively 
few but approving references to him in her published work, used 
the same method of intellectual progression: 
Lchez 1u!7 negation et affirmation ferment a elles 
deux la verite. L1 une n'est pas vraie sans l'autre; et 
ne peut se concevoir que par rapport a l'autre. Affir-
mation et negation sont indispensables, n'etant que les 
deux aspects d'une meme verite.l 
Thus contradiction can be a positive value as well as a 
negative conflict. It can also serve the related purpose of 
illustrating the relativity of all human positions, and in 
particular the relativity of the very notions of good and evil. 
Whereas these are generally taken to be absolute opposites, 
theme, and an assessment of Alain's influence on Simone Weil's 
thought in general, see Marie-Magdeleine Davy, Introduction au 
message de Simone Weil (Paris 1954), §2. 
1B. Groethuysen, quot. by Denis de Rougemont, op. cit., 
P• 132. 
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Simone Weil insists that what we know as good is in fact 
another facet of evil: 1 Le bien comme contraire du mal lui 
est equivalent en un sens, comme tous lea contraires 1 (Cl 171). 
And 'ce qui est directement contraire a un mal n'est (peut-etre) 
jamais de l 1 ordre du bien superieur. A peine au-dessus du 
mal, souvent 1 (Cl 199). 
Needless to say, this does not preclude the possibility 
of a 1 bi.an superieur 1 • A consideration of what this was will 
bring us to the question of true dualism. For the relativity 
of what we know as good and evil is a feature of dualistic 
thinking as is the related concept of the distance between these 
two and the true good. This latter is, in a sense, unknowable, 
and the source of sin is the attempt to know it: 
••• chez lea grands gnostiques on aperc~oit 
nettement cette idee que nous ne pouvons connaitre le 
bien, et que meme c 1 est la faute essentielle de vouloir 
le connaitre, au moins d'une certaine fa~on.l 
The emphasis in dualistic thinking is on the absence of the 
good rather than on the presence of evil. As Simone Petrement 
puts it, 1LPour lea gnostique!l la premiere question ne semble 
pas avoir ete: d 1 ou vient le mal? mais: d 1 ou vient le bien? 12 
et 
as 
2 DH, P• 94. 
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And yet this presence of evil is not a problem which can be 
ignored, and in a sense a dualist philosophy is one solution 
of this question. In relation to the concept of deity, the 
problem of evil is in some ways the most fundamental of all, 
and it is perhaps appropriate to quote in full here Epicurus' 
expression of it: 
God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable, 
or He is .. able, and is unwilling; or He is neither 
willing nor able, or He is both willing and able. If 
He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not 
in accordance with the character of God; if He is able 
and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance 
with God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both 
envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if He is both 
willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from 
what source then are evils ? or why does He not remove 
them ?1 
To resolve this problem one can have recourse to only two 
perfectly consistent solutions; ~irstly one can adopt a monist 
view of the universe, asserting the ultimate unity of all 
things with God, and the consequent illusory nature of evil, 
such as is found in the East, in Hinduism, and in the West, in 
2 Spinoza's philosophy. Evil is then only a distortion caused 
by our finite, and false, perspective. Some form of dualism 
1Quot. in J. Hick, Evil and the God of Love {London 1966), 
P• .5, n. 1. 
2Ibid., PP• 23-29. 
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is the other consistent solution, the affirmation of the 
radically different nature of the ultimate good from the 
cre~ted univers~ with a tendency to remove God further and 
further from any part in the creative act. 1 The Judaeo-
-Christian solution to the problem, given in the account of 
creation and original sin in Genesis, while it is of great 
richness in preserving the omnipotence of God, his goodness, 
and the freedom of the creature man, nevertheless results in 
the contradiction expressed by Epicurus. Christian theology 
thus tends to hover between the two extremes--for instance, 
Augustine's concept of evil as essentially privatio boni 
comes very close to monism. 2 Simone Weil's own solution was 
nearer to dualism, although it is important to realise that 
'solution' here is a very relative term, as she never set out 
1The ultimate link between these two concepts regarding 
the relationship of God with his creation will be noted in I, §3. 
2
simone Petrement expresses clearly this mingling of monism 
with dualism when referring to religions positing the trans-
cendence of God. All these are dualist in a sense: 'Elles ne 
le sont pas jusqu'au bout, parce qu'elles enseignent qu'en re-
montant jusqu'a l'origine des choses, on atteindrait enfin 
l'unite: la matiere est creee par l'esprit, le diable lui-meme 
est venu de Dieu. Mais si elles sont monistes en ce qui touche 
l'origine temporelle du monde, elles semblent dualistes en ce 
qui regarde le monde comme il va.• DH, p. 14. 
to •solve• once and for all any problem. Hers was a way, a 
th d th th t d . d t 11 t" 1 me o , ra er an a sys em es1gne o answer a ques 1ons. 
It was a consciousness of the radical difference between two 
d th G d d "t 2 ll h f th or ers, e oo an necess1 y, as we as a searc or e 
path between the two. She frequently quotes Plato on this 
point, insisting that 'on n'a rien compris tant qu'on ne sait 
pas quelle difference il y a, comme dit Platen, entre l'essence 
du necessaire et celle du bien• (IP 155).3 The fundamental 
contradiction of man's existence is in Simone Weil's view based 
on this opposition: 
La contradiction essentielle de la condition humaine, 
c 1est que l 1 homme est soumis a la force et desire la 
justice. Il est soumis a la Necessite et desire le Bien. 
Ce n 1 est pas son corps seul qui est ainsi soumis, mais 
aussi toutes sea pensees. (OL 209) 
The consciousness of this contradiction is of prime 
importance in Simone Weil's thought, and can be said in fact 
1It is interesting to note that Simone Petrement considers 
dualism to be a characterstic of the philosophers of the 'way' 
(Plato, and those who took up the Platonic spirit, Descartes, 
Kant), whereas monism is a feature of the system-builders who 
followed them (Aristotle, Leibniz, Hegel). DH, p. 37· 
2what Simone Weil meant by the term 'necessity• will be 
discussed in I, §3. 
3Republic, I, 493· 
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to constitute her particular form of dualism. 1 It would 
thus seem pertinent to consider in turn both terms of the 
contradiction, beginning in the next chapter with Simone Weil's 
idea of absolute good, and the association which she makes with 
the concept of God. 
• 
1Jacques Dufresne considers that it is her concept of 
the duality of good and necessity which distinguishes her 
from modern dualism with its distinction between mind and 
matter. 'Simone Weil et la tradition dualiste', unpubl. 
diss., Dijon 1965, P• 48. 
I, §2 
THE UNKNOWN GOD 
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It may seem surprising, even wrong-headed, to begin a dis-
cussion of the opposition good-necessity with the transcend-
ent element. A sense of man's lowly condition might seem to 
require him to confine his attentions to what he knows empir-
ically, to the physical world, or at least to start there. 
Traditional 'proofs of God' in the Western world have done 
this in so far as they have called on the idea of God to 
'explain' what is known as existing in the world. Thus 
Aristotle's 'Unmoved Mover.• would be unnecessary were there 
not a realm which could be seen physically to be 'moved'. 
The Christian ontological proof is in the same category in so 
far as it starts from the concept of being and posits a Being 
greater than all other, although the essence of this Being is 
necessary rather than contingent, and in that sense depends 
in no way upon creation. 
But the essence of a dualistic conception of the world 
seems to be that God, or the transcendent element of the dual-
ism, is so completely 'other' that it can in no way be deduced 
from the material world. The two are utterly incommensurate, 
and any link between the two incomprehensible. In addition, 
as we noted earlier, the basic question in dualism seems to be 
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not so much whence comes evil ? but whence comes good r 
Simone Petrement also emphasises the fact that, historically, 
a sense of transcendence has preceded that of the conflict of 
good and evil in the world. 2 It thus seems appropriate to 
start with the transcendent element. 
Turning to Simone Weil's own writings, we find that the 
expression of the concept of God comes fairly late. She 
herself tells how she was brought up by her parents and her 
brother in complete agnosticism (AD 62), and early adopted 
the attitude 'qu'etant en ce monde notre affaire etait d 1adop-
ter la meilleure attitude a l'egard des problemas de ce monde' 
(AD 32). She wa• conscious at this stage of the 'problem of 
God', and conscious too of its insolubility, but already 
attached great importance to its correct solution, or rather 
to the danger of an incorrect solution: 
Des !'adolescence j'ai pense que le problema de 
Dieu est un problema dont les donnees manquent ici-bas 
et que la seule methode certaine pour eviter de le re-
soudre a faux, ce qui me semblait le plus grand mal 
possible, etait de ne pas le poser. (ibid.) 
1DP, P• 310. 
2DH, P• 15. 
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Even in her last years she considered that no conclusion on 
the subject could be reached by the means of intellect alone, 
as when she says in the essay 'Formes de ~'amour implicite de 
Dieu' '11 ne depend pas d'une ame de croire a la realite de 
Dieu si Dieu ne revele pas cette realite' (AD 164). Not only 
should one not believe in God unless his existence has been 
revealed, but to deny him in these circumstances is probably 
nearer the truth: 'Ehtre deux hommes qui n'ont pas l'experience 
de Dieu, celui qui le nie en est peut-etre le plus pres' (C2 
15}. Elsewhere she criticises Christianity for requiring 
belief in God before contact has been established, contrasting 
this unfavourably with Plato's restriction on the use of the 
idea of God (IP 91). 
However, there is evidence that in her early years of 
philosophy teaching she was already using the idea of God as 
a philosophical concept, but it is significant that her observ-
ations frequently reveal the distance and intrinsic 'otherness' 
of God, as in the following comment (taken up later in the 
Cahiers: C2 146): 'La seule empreinte de Dieu sur nous-memes, 
c'est que nous sentons que nous ne sommes pas Dieu•. 1 It is 
1 Anne Reynaud, Lexons de philosophie de Simone Weil (Roanne 
1933-4) (Paris 1959), P• 81. 
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only in her last years, and in particular from 1940 onwards, 
that ske uses the term 'Dieu' with any frequency, and from 
then until her death it recurs constantly, often sot in the 
form of a speculation on God, but as a point of reference for 
other ideas. 
It is not surprising that in spite of her religious ex-
perience which she interpreted in a Christian light, Simone 
Weil's conception of God should retain elements from the 
Greek culture of her intellectual formation, and in partie-
ular from Plato. It is from Plato, for instance, that she 
derives her equation of God with the Good. In her commentary 
on the passage of the Republic where Plato is speaking of the 
Good which illuminates the mind in the spiritual realm, she 
identifies the two (SG 95-6), having commented previously (SG 
93) on Plato's comparison of the Good and the sun, noting that 
1 in many civilisations the sun is an image of God. 
1It is permissible however to doubt this identification 
as an interpretation of what Plato actually meant. Etienne 
Gilson, commenting on a similar passage where the Form of the 
Good is shown as the author of a-ll- .things beautiful and right, 
the source of reason and truth (Republic, 517), admits that 
'assuredly, nothing more closely resembles the definition of 
the Christian God than this definition of the Good'. (God and 
Philosophy (Yale 1941), pp. 25-6). But he goes on to assert 
that since Plato did not actually identify the Idea of the 
Good and God we should not take the liberty of doing so. (See 
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Although this identification is initially made in a 
commentary on Plato, Simone Weil takes it over and uses it 
in other contexts. It is clear that for her 'the Good' was 
one of the few things that could be predicated of God with 
any certainty. The essay on 'Israel et lea Gentile' begins 
with the affirmation: 'La connaissance essentielle concernant 
Dieu est que Dieu est le Bien. Tout le reate est secondaire' 
(PSO 47). Elsewhere she notes that 'l'etre meme de Dieu est 
d'etre bien' (C2 364), and one of her few approving references 
to St. Augustine is made on the same theme, where she quotes 
his assertion 'Dieu est un bien qui n'est autre chose que 
bien' (SG 96) (while claiming Plato as the source of Augustine's 
inspiration in this instance). 
It is significant that the ohly 'proof' of God's existence 
which she accepted (apart from the 'preuve par la beaute du 
also Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford 1951), p. 
43. Ross bases his separation of the Idea of the Good and God 
on the fact that by the time the concept of God occupies a 
central position in Plato's thought (in the Laws), the Ideas 
have receded into the background.) In addition, Gilson con-
tends that such an identification is unjustified because an 
idea cannot be thought of as a person, and hence as a God. 
This charge will be met later in the chapter when the imperson-
al aspect of God is discussed. For the moment let it suffice 
to say that provided one is not looking for an anthropomorphic 
ceonception of God, there is no reason why Simone Weil's view 
of the Good as God should not stand. 
monde' to be discussed in Section III below) concerned the 
1 
concept of God as goodness. This was her version of the 
ontological argument, which she called 'la preuve ontologique 
experimentale' (C3 36) or 'la preuve par la perfection•. 2 
She notes it in the 'Theorie des sacraments' as the only valid 
argument for God's existence: 
Pour tout ce qui concerne le bien absolu et le 
contact avec lui, la preuve par la perfection (parfois 
faussement nomme preuve ontologique) est non seulement 
valable, mais la seule valable. Cela resulte immediate-
ment de la notion meme d& bien. (PSO 136) 
In other words, it is not so much a question of existence 
demanding an ultimate existent, as in the traditional onto-
1It is true that one must be wary when speaking of 'proofs 
of God! in connexion with Simone Weil. Gilbert Kahn is right 
when he warns us: 'Pour Simone Weil la question de 1' exis·tence 
de Dieu ne se pose pas vraiment, en depit de la "preuve onto-
logique experimentale". La ph:i.loaophie religieuae est essen-
tiellement une pneumatologie. Il ne s'agit pas de ce que 
Dieu eat pour nous, mais de ce que nous semmes par rapport a 
lui, ou si l'on veut, de notre aventure dans l'ordre du bien.' 
('A propos de Simone Weil', Empedocle, mars-avril 1950).. A 
discussion of 'proofs of God' is perhaps justified however, 
when it conerns God as the Good, since it is clear that for 
Simone Weil this was a matter of deep intellectual and spirit-
ual conviction. 
2For a discussion. of Simone Weil's use of the ontological 
argument, see Raper, op. cit., pp. 65 ff. 
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logicaL.proof, but of the desire for good in man necessitating 
the absolute Good. 1 Man could have no idea of perfection if 
that perfection did not in fact exist; conversely, his aware-
ness that he himself is imperfect leads logically to the idea 
of the perfection 1rrhich he is not. This idea is already de-~~ 
veloped in the notes for her philosophy classes: 
Nous sentons que nous n'avons pas le droit d'etre 
imparfaits et finis; si c'etait pour nous une maniere 
d'etre legitime et normale, nous ne nous dirions pas 
imparfaitsr nous sentons que cette imperfection nous 
est etrangere.2 
The relationship between absolute good and the idea which 
we have of it is expressed for Simone Weil in the conviction, 
central to her thought, that good alone can produce good. 
She puts it thus: 'Seule la pensee de la perfection produit 
du bien--un bien imparfait. Si on pro~e de l'imparfait, on 
fait le mal' (C9 313) •. Her interpretation of the parable of 
good. 
the good tre·e which produces,.(fruit is an illustration of this 
1It thus differs from the ontological argument in that 
whereas in this latter existence demands an ultimate existent, 
in the 'preuve par la perfection' it is not good in itself 
which demands an ultimate good, but the mere desire for it, 
the eonsciousness of its absence. In this was it can be said 
that Simone Weil's 'proof' does not work from the earthly to 
the spiritual. 
2 Reynaud, op. cit., p. 81. 
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idea, which for Simone Weil is a matter of self-evident truth: 
••• le Christ n'a pas dit qu 1 on reconnait le fruit 
a l'arbre ••• mais qu'on reconnait l'arbre aux fruits • 
• • • l'unique peche sans pardon, le peche contre le 
Saint-Esprit, consiste a dire que du bien, reconnu comme 
tel, precede du mal. On peut blasphemer contre le Fils 
de l'homme; on peut ne pas discerner le bien. Mais 
quand on l'a discerne quelque part, affirmer qu'il pro-
cede du mal est le peche sans remission, car le bien ne 
produit que le bien et le mal ne produit que le mal. 
(PSO 53) 
The rhetoric of this passage may seem overdone, but she clearly 
meant it quite literally; the ultimate blasphemy was that 
which made evil the source of good. Hence her condemnation 
of Augustine who held that pagan ~ood works' were in fact evil, 
because they originated in paganism, i.e. evil (PSO 52). 
From the immense importance which Simone Weil attaches to 
the idea of God being essentially the Good, it may be inferred 
that in her mind the Good was superior to all other attributes. 
This is in fact the case. To take one expression of this, in 
the essay referred to above on 'Israel et lea Gentile' she com-
ments on Moses' knowledge of God as Being, and asserts: 
Mais Platon ••• a ete instruit bien_plus avant 
que Mqis~, car il savait que l'Etre n'est pas encore 
ce qu'il y a de plus haut; le Bien est au-dessus de 
l'Etre et Dieu est Bien avant meme d'etre ce qui est. 
(PSO 49) 
To fol~ow Plato's cave-image, the Good illuminates the objects 
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of intelligence just as the sun illuminates the objects of this 
1 
world. Following this train of thought, Simone Weil asserts 
quite logically that it is in a sense unimportant whether this 
absolute Good exists or not. All that is required of man is 
that he should turn from the false good of this earth, and 
direct his attention towards the true Good. 
Mais, me dira-t-on, ce bien existe-t-il? Qu'im-
porte? les choses d'ici-bas existent, mais elles ne sont 
pas le bien. Que le bien~iste ou non il n'est pas 
d 1autre bien que le bien. (CS 284) 
This idea was also developed by Simone Weil into a kind 
of wager, similar in form to Pascal's, but vastly superior in 
content to his. In Simone Weil's version there is nothing to 
be gained·from a wager on God's existence except the knowledge 
that one has lived in the truth. Extinction of life after 
death is of no account beside this over-riding concern. It 
is a question for her of subordinating all things to the obed-
ience of God, with the thought that 
Si Dieu est reel, on gagne ainsi tout--quand meme 
l'instant de la mort apporterait le neant; si ce mot ne 
correspond a rien qu'a des illusions, on n'a rien perdu, 
car alors il n'y a absolument aucun bien, et par suite 
rien a perdre; on a meme gagne d'atre dans la verite, 
car on a laisse des biens illusoires, qui existent, mais 
1Republic, VII, 516. 
qui ne sont pas des biens, pour une chose qui (dans cette 
supposition), n 1 existe pas, mais qui, si elle existait, 
serait encore l'unique bien •••• (CS 109) 
In another writer this kind of speculation might be regarded 
as no more than a verbal exercise; it offends our sense of 
reality after all to be told that what is of the highest value 
may not even exist. But it is clear that for Simone Weil the 
matter was not mere verbiage, and such a speculation is com-
pletely consistent with the development of her thought else-
where. To make it clear that this is no idle jest she con-
tinues: 
Quand Dieu serait une illusion du point de vue de 
l 1 existence, Il est l'unique realite du point de vue du 
bien. Cela, j'en ai la certitude, car c'est une defi-
nition. 'Dieu est le bien' est aussi certain que 'je 
suis 1 • (ibid.) 
If the Good takes precedence in Simone Weil's thought 
over the idea of Being, it does no less over the idea of 
Unity. Not that she denied the unit~ of God: s~e recognised 
that this concept was the contribution of Judaism to the idea 
of the divinity, and accepted it genuinely at its true value 
(C2 184). She also attributes to Plato the idea that God is 
the supreme One (IP 130) although this idea, even if it *s 
present in embryo in Plato, is never ~eally developed until 
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Plotinus and the Neo-platonists. 1 But the concept of Bod 
as One is always subordinated to that of God as the Good. 
God's unity depends by definition on his goodness: •c•est 
seulement parce que le Bien est unique qu'il faut reconnaitre 
un seul Dieu' (PSO 48). 
This great emphasis put by Simmne Weil on the concept 
of the essential goodness of God is an indication of another, 
allied feature of her religious thought, that is, her appre-
hension of God as impersonal. 2 The concept of an impersonal 
deity can lead in two opposing and yet complementary directions: 
either God becomes so transcendent, so utterly remote from the 
world and human experience that he no longer has any part to 
play in man's consciousness--some of the African sky gods 
belong in this category, being at best objects of formal belief 
but not recipients of worship,3 as does to a certain extent 
Aristotle's Unmoved Move·r; this latter is still conceived as 
1J. M. Rist accepts the identification of the Form of the 
One with the Form of the Good. Eros and Psyche (Toronto 1964), 
P• 21. 
2Dufresne has also noted this link (op. cit., P• 95). · 
3cf. G. Parrinder, West African Religion (London 1949), 
PP. 30-32. 
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a person, but only in a philosophical sense,,and could never 
become the centre of religious devotion. Or the idea of an 
impersonal deity can lead to the concept of an immanent Uni-
versal Principle, suffusing all things and source of all life, 
as for instance in Upanishadic tradition. Simone Weil was 
conscious of both these directions, conscious that God was 
at one and the same time beyond the boundaries of the universe 
and at its very centre (AD 117), but the emphasis was invar-
iably placed by her on the transcendence of God. Certainly 
there· is no place in her thought for any pantheistic doctrine 
of immanence. 
This tendency towards impersonality provides one of the 
features in Simone Weil's work least likely to meet with sym-
pathy from a reader accustomed to the Judaeo-Christian emphasis 
on the 'personality' of God. It is not that she completely 
neglects the personal aspect--she seldom mentions the impers-
anality of God withaut at least implying personality at the 
same time--but she was acutely conscious of the dangers of 
1 
attributing personality in the human sense to God. It was 
1simone Weil's criticism of the immediacy of Yahweh in 
the Judaic tradition will be dealt with in II, §4. See also 
Raper, op. cit., §3. 
~-
equally dangerous in her eyes however to think of God in terms 
of the impersonality of an inanimate object, simply because 
human definitions can never encompass ·the divine (C2 174). 
But of the two Simone Weil seems more aware of the dangers 
inherent in the attribution of personality to God, unless it 
is accompanied by the concept of impersonality: 
Dieu n'est pas une personne a la maniere dent un 
homme croit l'etre. C'est la sans doute le sens de 
cette parole profonde des Hindous, qu'il faut concevoir 
Dieu a la fois comme personnel et comme impersonnel. 
(IP 13?-8)1 
In her emphasis on the impersonal aspect of God, Simone 
Weil was undoubtedly more in sympathy with Indian and Chinese 
thought than with Christianity, although as Otto points out, 
all gods transcend from time to time tha~ bounds of mere per-
sonal representation, and reveal their ancient character as 
numina (even Yahweh was frequently referred to as the plural 
'Elohim', expressing·'the divi~e'). 2 The impersonal aepect 
1cf. Otto, mp. cit., p. 204: 'In India brahm~n is the. 
everlasting Lord and God, the personal Brahm~; while br~hman 
is the divine Absolute, the supra-personal Br,hma, an 'It' 
rather than a 'He'. And the two are bound together in indis-
soluble unity as the two essential poles of the eternal unity 
of the Numen.' 
2Ibid., p. 20. Examples are too numerous to cite, but 
see R. Young, Anal tical Concordance to the Hol Bible (?th e~n, 
London c. 1926 , s.v. God, gods, objects of worship, elohim. 
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is however more pronouneed in certain Eastern religions. M. 
Hiriyanna criticises Western scholars for classing as a defect 
the 'im~erfect anthropomorphism ' of Vedic religion (for exam-
ple, Agni and Parjanya retain their character as 'fire' and 
'cloud'), as though anthropomorphism were the ultimate goal 
in man's evolving consciousness of the deity. 1 
Impersonality is a feature of the Gnostic concept of 
deity too. The Naassenes' idea of God as the Most High, 
the impersonal, limitless spirit, also named the Good, has 
2 
several affinities with Simone Weil's concept. Like Simone 
Weil, most Gnostic thinkers were overwhelmingly conscious of 
1
outlines of Indian Philosophy (London 1964), p. 32. 
This criticism would also app~y to Gilson, who, as we have 
already seen, considers that Plato's Idea of the Good could 
not possibly represent his concept of God, since an idea is 
less than a person, 'much less a person than a thing' (~ 
cit., P• ·26). When asserti~g that in Plato's mind the gods 
are inferior to the Ideas, he does not seem to ~nsider the 
possibility that ·'the gods', that is, mortals as~hey can and 
should ~e, occupied a relatively lowly position in his scheme, 
whereas the Idea of the Good represents the equivalent of what 
the Christian tradition knows as 'God'. 
2
on the Naassenes, see L. G. Rylands, The Beginnings of 
Gnostic Christianity (London 1940), p. 124. He notes that 
the Greek word used by the Naassenes is ~b &ya96v, neuter, 
and could not therefore be ascribed to a person, and links 
this with Platonic doctrine. 
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the distance and remoteness of God, and obsessed by the idea 
that to bring him into too familiar contact with humanity 
might detract ~rom his purity and essential otherness. While 
their concern for the transcendence of God was condemned as 
heretical by the Church, it cannot be said that their God lost 
significance by being removed beyond man's comprehension, since 
few philosophies are more essentially religious than theirs. 
The impersonal aspect of the deity is of course not completely 
foreign to Christianity; the third Person of the Trinity is 
in a sense God conceived impersonally. Simone Weil herself 
points to St. John of the Cross, and other 'saints d'une tr~s 
~ 
haute spiritualite 0 • • ~u!7 ont saisi simultanement et avec 
une force egale l 1aspect personnel et l'aspect impersonnel de 
Dieu' (LR 36). But, she adds, since in the West God is 
generally thought of in his personal aspect, those who think 
of him as impersonal believe themselves to be atheists (LR 37). 1 
Simone Petrement makes the same point, noting the contrast 
between East and West: 
1 The French language has an undoubted advantage over Eng-
lish here, in that the pronoun 'il' can be used to cover both 
the personal and impersonal aspects. English seems obliged 
to use 'he' for God, although 'it' is perhaps acceptable for 
concepts such as 'the deity'. 
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Peut-on croire au divin sans croire en Dieu? Non 
sana doute, mais il n·•.est pas necesaaire que ce aoit a 
un Dieu unique et personnel. 11 est permis de se de-
mander si le Dieu personnel des Occidentaux n'est pas 
.quelque peu 4nthropomorphique, et si le Dieu impersonnel 
ou supra-personnel des Orientaux n'est pas plus proche 
du sentiment religieux primordial (qui est aussi le sen-
timent r.eligieux le plus necessaire), le sentiment du 
divin.l 
The expression of transcendence in Simone Weil's thought 
goes further however than the conception of the impersonal 
aspect of God. God is not only impersonal, he is essentially 
'not-person', to be expressed only in negative terms. The 
reference made earlier in this chapter to man's knowledge of 
God (p.31) is an instance of this; all that we can know of 
God is essentially negative: 'Nous ne pouvons savoir qu'une 
chose de Dieu: qu'il est ce que Qous ne sommes pas' (C2 146). 
Simone Petrement states a similar case when defining the 
'knowledge' of God expressed by the Gnostics: 
••• bien que le salut, pour les gnoatiquea, ae 
trouve dana la connaiasance, la connaiaaance.,:dont il 
s'agi.t .. n.'est pas tant celle du divin que· celle de 
l'etrangete du divin • • 2 
· This negative expression of God can be found at the heart 
1 DH, P• 342. 
2 . 
Ibid., p. 15· 
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of the Christian tradition, in St. Thomas Aquinas, who held 
that 'we do not know what ~od is, but only what He is not, 
and the relation of all things to Him•. 1 The anonymous 
author of The Mirror of Simple Souls affirms the essential 
unknowable quaiity of God in the following words: 'There is 
none other God but He that none may know, which may not be 
known'. 2 Simone Weil speaks of a 'foi negative' in which 
it is necessary to believe that 'rien de ce que nous pouvons 
saisir n'est Dieu' (C2 122). She insists that nothing real 
corresponds to one's idea of God when his name is pronounced 
(Cl 200), and in a commentary on a passage of Aeschylus' 
Agamemnon, 
Zeus, qui qu'il puisse etre, si sous ce nom il lui 
plait d'3tre invoque, 
Sous ce nom je l'appelle,3 
notes the significance of this God, who, although invoked by 
1 . . 
Contra Gentiles, I, 12, xxx. Quot. E. 0. James, !a! 
Concept of Deity (London 1950), p. 84. 
2Quot. Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (London 12th edn, 
revised 1930), P• 337. 
3v. 160. Trans. Simone Weil (SG 43): 
ZE(x;, lfo'1:1.c; 1fOT 1 l:t7nv, £l Tf>d 1 cxU~, cpllov KEKlf'IJJtV\t?, 
1:ouTb v1.v upoaEvvt~. 
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the name of Zeus, 'n'a pas de nom' (SG 45). 1 This has a 
parallel in Taoism, where of the Tao it is said: 
I know not its name 2 So I style it 'the way'. 
Simone Weil does not mention this passage specifically, but 
elsewhere identifies the Taoist 'way' with the impersonal 
aspect of God (e.g. LR 28). 
She goes further 8owever than the simple negative ex-
pression of God. \~e have already seen (p. 36 ) that God as 
the Good precedes in Simone Weil's scheme God as Existent, 
and it is clear that for her it is not sufficient that God 
should be unnamable and unattainable; in a certain sense 
we must be prepared to say that he does not exist at all. 
This in fact follows on quite logically from the idea that 
the very concept of God is completely unattainable by Man, 
since if God is unknowable it is reasonable to express his 
existence negatively. Such a procedure also serves the pur-
pose for Simone Weil of purifying God of all our man-made 
1The idea of an unknown God who remains the same by what-
ever name he is invoked is conveyed also in the following pass-
age: 'What is but one, wise people call by different names--
as Agni, Yama and Matarisvan•. Rig-Veda, I, 164, 46. Quot. 
Hiriyanna, op. cit., P• 39. 
2. . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . -· -·-
Tao-te-ching, -~~_, ___ _!_?_. 
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concepts, of affirming the absolute othe-rness of God. In 
its form as 'l'atheisme purificateur' (e.g. Cl 199), it is 
a 
precisely this,/purging of the mind's preconceived notions 
of God. It is a· technique to be used in prayer, so that the 
soul is not hampered by any earthly concpts: 'Un mode de puri-
fication: prier Dieu, non seulement en secret par rapport 
aux hommes, ma~s en pensant que Dieu n'existe pas' (Cl 213). 
In a sense however this is a different concept from that of 
the possible non-existence of the absolute Good, in so far as 
'l'atheisme purif.icateur' is a method of preserving the trans-
cendence of God (implying his existence), while doubt as to 
the existence of transcendent Good indicates merely that if 
good exists, then it must be transcendent. There are affin-
ities between the two, but not identity. 
Once again, Simone Weil's speculations here seem to bring 
her closer to certain ·toriental ways of thinking than to ortho-
dox Christianity. In ••••••.._ asserting the reality of what 
may perhaps not even exist Simone Weil echoes for example the 
1 
use of 'Nothing' to designate the Tao. 
1Tao-te-ching, XL, 89. 
D. c. Lau contrasts 
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this sort of thinking with Western attitudes: 
In the Western tradition, up to the beginning of 
the present century at least, it has generally be·en 
assumed that only what exists can be real, so much so 
that when, at one time, universals were denied existence, 
an ad hoc subsistence had to be invented to give them 
reality. With the Taoist, however, whatever has exist-
ence cannot be real, for whatever exists also suffers 
from the limitations of the specific. Hence it is 
thought far less misleading to say of the Tao that it is 
like nothing, though·~ strictly speaking, the Tao can be 
no more like Nothing than it is like something:T 
It seems that a sort of negativity leading to what can 
only be termed atheism is indispensable to a comprehension of 
deity within the termsc-of man's finite existence. Simone 
Petrement points to this as a feature of dualistic thought 
in particular, and indicates the relaionship between this kind 
of atheism and mysticism: 
Dieu est con~u comme l'unite totale, comme la source 
et le principe de tout. N'est-ce pas pour cette raison 
que certains dualistes sont athees? Quant aux autres, 
qui .. ne .le .sont pas, quel .eat leur Dieu ? Un Dieu separe, 
un Dieu absent, un Dieu faible; n'est-ce pas, en un sens, 
une negation de Dieu? Le dualisme serait-il done neces-
sairement une sorte d 1 atheisme ? Il est cependant certain 
qu'il y a des rapports avec le mysticisme, ou du moins 
avec un sentiment religieux profond.2 
1Introduction to the Tao-te-ching, pp. 21-2. 
2im, PP• 90-91. 
49 
One might expect that in Simone Weil's view God should 
take on a more positive aspect in the act of creation. In 
fact, however, creation for her is yet another example of the 
distance of God and of his inaccessibility. She retains God 
as the creator of the universe, unlike certain theories of 
creation which, wishing to preserve the transcendence of God, 
have assigned the act of creation to a lesser deity. She 
realises the contradiction however in making God the originator 
of the universe: 'Dieu est l'auteur de tout; Dieu n'est l'au-
teur que du bien; on ne peut se tirer de la' (C2 101). Thus 
far she follows the Judaeo-Christian tradition (it should be 
noted however that as far as she was concerned this was Plato's 
theory too, since she assumes that Plato's creator-demiurge is 
an aspect of God). 1 Unlike the Yahwistic and Priestly accounts 
of Genesis, though, she does not appear to have accepted the 
idea of a creatio-n ex nihilo. She speaks of creation being 
1 Cf. DP, P• 48: 'On peut ••• se demander si le Demiurge 
est le.Dieu supreme, pour Platon, ou un dieu inferieur; s'il 
n'est pas tout au moins inferieur au monde intelligible et a 
l'idee du Bien. C'est ainsi que Numenius d'Apamee, par exem-
ple, interpreta le platonisme; mais il est impossible de sa-
voir si c'est avec raison, car le fait que le Demiurge a les 
yeux fixes sur le modele eternel ne prouve pas que, par nature, 
il soit inferieur a ce modele; il a pu descendre pour creer 
le monde.' 
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'la matiere mise en ordre par Dieu' (IP 129), of the creator 
as 'Dieu qui limite', of God 'Liu!7 se soumet ala necessite' 
(PSO 35) and of the 'Verbe ordonnateur' (C2 347). The manner 
in which creation is accomplished is however utterly different 
from the Genesis ve~sion, where creation is a positive &ct of 
1 God and the resulting created order good. 
account, 
In Siioone Weil's 
ce n'est pas seulement la Passion, c 1 est la Creation 
elle-meme qui est renoncement et sacrifice de la part de 
Dieu. La Passion n'en est que l'achevement. Deja 
comme createur Dieu se vide de sa divinite. Il prend 
la forme d'un esclave. Il se soumet a la necessite. 
Il s'abaisse. (PSO 35) 
Not only does God in creating the world have to take 
account of necessity, as in the Timaeus, but God through 
creation has become less than God. She emphasises thia 
further in a passage from the essay 'Formes de l'amour impli-
cite de Dieu': 
1
simone Weil nevertheless does not reject the Genesis 
account, meeely treating it as one among many, all containing 
an element of truth: 'L'histoire de la creation et du peche 
originel dans la Genese est vraie. Mais d'autres histoires 
de creation et de peche originel dans d'autres traditions sont 
vraies aussi et enferment aussi des verites incom~arablement 
precieuses' (LR 68). 
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La creation est de la part de Dieu un acte non pas 
d 1 expansion de soi, mais de retrait, de renoncement. 
Dieu et toutes lea creatures, cela est moins que Dieu 
seul. (AD 106) 
This is readily understood if God is considered as a complete 
self-contemplating entity, who renounces his completeness in 
order that something else might exist, namely creation. God 
has limited himself by creating something outside himself. 
He had no need of creation, or desire for it, since desire 
implies an object desired, which is impossible if God is 
everything. But ig another sense God is only diminished by 
creation if one thinks of him as Being. If God is thought 
of as Good, then creation will be the product of pure, grat-
uitous love (cf. PSO 123l. 
Simone Weil probably derives from Plato the idea of 
creation involving diminution and consequently suffering, 
since she interprets thus the passage from the Timaeus con-
earning the world-soul cut in pieces. 1 But there seems to 
have been an ancient tradition concerning the suffering at 
the 1 bir~h 1 of the world, 2 and Simone Weil was certainly 
lT. J.maeus, 36. See SG 135· 
2" For example in the Bab~lonian tradition the universe is 
created from the body of Tiamat the Great Mother, slain by her 
familiar with its Manichean version, as she mentions 
une ~dmirable image ~u'on trouve chez lea Mani-
cheens, Ld'apres laquell!/ l'esprit est dechire, mis en 
morceaux, disperse a travers l'espace, a travers la 
matiere etendue. Il est crucifie sur l'etendue •••• 
(SS 139) 
Likewise James records the Indian tradition that Prajapati, 
the personification of the creative principle, suffered primal 
sacrifice at the hands of the gods, as a result of which the 
phenomenal. universe came into being as so many parts of his 
1 body. 
In the light of this idea of creation involving God's 
sacrifice and withdrawal, it is not difficult to appreciate 
the s~gnificance of a claim such as 'Dieu n'est pas tout-
-puissant, puisqu'il est createur' (CS 67). We are reminded 
of Alain's definition of true religion which must contain the 
idea of 'un dieu absolument faible et absolument proscrit•. 2 
sons the gods, le&by Marduk. See H. Frankfort and others, 
Before Philosophy (Harmondsworth 1949), P• 19. Gnostic 
thought too conceives creation as formed from 'fragments' of 
God. See M. Bourgeois, 'La Jpiritualite du travail selon 
Simone Weil', unpubl. thesis (Paris 1961), p. 33· 
1
op. cit., P• 53· 
2Entretiens au bord de lamer (Paris 1949), P• 220. 
53 
From anobher point of view however, 'Il est tout-puissant en 
ce sens que son abdication est volontaire' (CS 67). And 
again, 'le vrai Dieu est le Dieu con~u comme tout-puissant, 
mais comme ne commandant pas partout ou il1 en a le pouvoir' 
{AD 105). But since S~mone Weil elsewhere insists that 'les 
limites du vouloir et du pouvoir sont les memes en Dieu. Il 
ne veut que ce qu'Il peut, et s.~Il ne peut pas davantage, c'est 
qu'Il ne veut pas pouvoir davantage' (CS 72), 2 the idea of 
God's potential 'toute-puissance' seems to be only an illus-
tration of the withdrawal of God, an expression of the limit~ 
ations of language {it is impossible to conceive of withdrawal 
without the complementary notion of abdicated power, with-
drawal ~something). 
It might be supposed that, given the idea of the renunc-
iation and suffering involved in creation, God was under some 
1 In MS: Il. We are grateful to M. R. Gaillardot for per-
mission to compar.e the published texts of Attente de Dieu and 
Intuitions Pre-chretiennes with copies corrected by him from 
Simone Wail's manuscripts. The manuscript version will be 
indicated as above throughout the present study where there is 
any discrepancy. 
2
see Le .. Livre des deux principes, IV, in R. Nelli, Lea 
Ecritures cathares (Paris 1959), p. 148: 'Si Dieu ne veut pas 
tous les maux, s'il ne veut ni mentir ni se detruire lui-meme, 
sans nul doute, il ne le peut pas. Car ce que Dieu dans son 
unite ne veut pas, il ne le peut pas; et ce quJil ne peut pas, 
il ne veut pas.• 
sort of constraint in the act of creating. Simone Weil is 
very positive, however, as to the reasons for creation: 
'Dieu a cree par amour, pour l'amour. Dieu n'a pas cree 
autre chose que l'amour meme et les moyens de l'amour' (AD 
8?). She is obviously stating a personal conviction when 
she says of the Timaeus: 
L1 idee essentielle du Timee c'est que le fond, la 
l¥bstance de cet univers ou nous vivons, est amour. Il 
iJgree par amour et sa beaute est le reflet et le signe 
irrefutable de cet amour divin, co~e la beaute d'une 
statue parfaite, d'un chant parfait est le reflet de 
l'amour surnaturel qui emplit l'ame d'un artiste vrai-
ment inspire.l (IP 3?) 
She returns frequently to the analogy between divine and 
artistic creation, interpreting thus Plato's theory of the 
creation of the universe (Timaeus 2?-28; see SG 130). The 
Model represents transcendent inspiration, the equivalent on 
a higher level of the inspiration necess~y to the production 
of a work of art. This seems at first sight to be a more 
positive attitude to the act of creation than we have seen 
previously, but such an idea proves illusory. Artistic ere-
ation for Simone Weil is an act not of personal expansion, but 
1The theme of beauty and its relation to Simone Weil's 
concept of God will ·be discussed in III, §1. 
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er 
of renunciation: 'Dans l'art et la science de 1 ordre, la 
creation est renoncement a soi' (CS 38). 
The same result is obtained if we examine the idea of 
the 'verbe ordonnateur', which represents 'le Bien ••• sous 
l'aspect de la creation' (C2 347). Tr~ to her conception of 
the Good and transcendent, Simone Weil elsewhere designates 
the 'Verbe' as 'le silence de Dieu' (C2 193). So it is not 
surprising to find that in Simone·,,. Weil's view, although God 
created through love, and God is, above all, good, the result-
ing creation should contain an essential element of imperfect-
ion. It is important to note that matter,: as what is utterly 
apart from God, is for Simone Weil not essentially evil: it is 
simply neutral. She associates it with the 'receptacle' of 
the Timaeus, essentially pure (IP 104). Indeed, 'la Creation 
comme totalite est sans souillure' (CS 164). This idea of 
the purity of creation thus dissociates her from certain Gnostic 
ideas of the evil inherent in matter. 1 But evil is neverthe-
less in her mind associated with the creative act, though not 
in creation itself; it is rather the distance between God and 
1According to Nelli, the Manicheans considered matter to 
be essentially evil, while the Cathars thought of it as simply 
neutral. Op. cit., PP• 16-17. 
56 
his creatures (C2 303). 1 This is the impersonal aspect of 
evil; the personal aspect, that is, the possibility of sin, 
is implied by the existence of the creatures: 
Le seul fait qu'il existe des etres autres que 
Dieu implique la possibilite du peche, Ce n'est pas 
a la liberte que cette possibilite est attachee (car 
elle n'existe pas pour Dieu), mais a l'existence. 
L'existence separee • • •• Dieu en creant a cree la 
possibilite du peche. cc2 ?8) 
It is an inevitable result of the gulf separating God and 
man: 'Le mal, troisieme dimension du divinl Solitude de 
l'homme. Distance de Dieu. Transcendance' (C2 184). Thus 
the existence of a world apart from God is the source of sin. 
Although Simone Weil elsewhere accepts the Genesis account of 
creation (see p.50, n.l), she seems to have reservations on 
the idea of a temporal succession of creation and fall, main-
taining that there is rather a causal relation between them; 
Toutes les difficultes (insurmontables) &oncernant l'his-
toire du peche originel viennent de ce .qu'on se represente 
1
simone Weil seems at times to presuppose an emanation 
theory akin to that of Plotinus, in which creatures have less 
part in God the further away they are from him. See e.g. the 
following p~ssage: 'Dieu a cree toute une gamme d'etres, une 
echelle infiniment ~ariee. Et la limite inferieure de cette 
echelle dans la categorie des creatures faites de penseer c'est 
la plus miserable qui soit capable de l'aimer' (C2 290). 
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cette histoire comme se deroulan~ans le temps. Alors 
qu'elle exprime des rapports de d·ausalite, ou plutot ce 
qui dans le surnaturel repond analogiquement aux rapports 
de causalite. (C2 258) 
Creation and the fall are thus simultaneous, merely two 
different awpects of God's abdication of power (CS 91). 
Such a concept of creation might seem to make God res-
ponsible for evil: if God's withdrawal necessarily causes the 
possibility of sin, the question arises why he thought it good 
to create at all. Simone Weil draws the logical conclusion, 
and ascribes to God the 'sin' of creation: 'Le grand crime de 
Dieu envers nous, c'est de nous avoir crees; c'est que nous 
existions' (CS 225). Yet elsewhere she insists on the abso-
lute innocence of God. Man was created by God, with a pro-
pensity for sin; and yet God is innocent of this sin (C2 258). 
This seems, logically enough, to be the reason behind her 
affirmation of the absolute transcendence of God. Since God 
and evil are utterly incommensurable, no contact between them 
is possible: 
Le mal et l'innocence de Dieu. Il faut placer 
Dieu a une distance infinie pour le concevoir innocent 
du mal; reciproquement, le mal indique qu'il faut 
placer Dieu a une distance infinie. (C2 173) 
In the same way.- the impersonality o~ God is an indication 
of his innocence, just as his personality is an affirmation 
of his responsibilty for good: 'Dieu doit etre impersonnel 
pour etre innocent du mal, personnel pour etre responsable 
du bien' (CS 59). We are thus left with a contradiction: 
God's transcendence is a sign of his innocence with respect 
to evil, but it is this very same transcendence, the distance 
between God and his creation, which is the source of evil. 
It is characteristic of Simone Weil that she should hold the 
contradiction, not attempting to resolve it by, for example, 
removing from God the creativ~ct, as in an absolutely dual-
istic scheme of thi~gs, or by compromising her essential stand-
point, the transcendemce of the Good. 
* 
'Le Dieu cache, inconnu, invisible, innomme, nouveau, 
etranger, d'un autre pays, l'Autre, le Different.• 1 Mani's 
concept of God, in its emphasis on God's ultimate transcendence 
and unknowableness, is perhaps not so far removed from Simone 
Weil's. God is certainly 'Notre Pere', but he is 'lCelu!72 
qui est dans les cieux' (AD 166). As far as Simone Weil is 
1A. von Harnack, Marcion, das Evangelium vom Fremden Gott 
(Leipzig 1921), I, 89-90. Trans. and quot. Simone Petrement, 
DP, P• 164. 
2}1IS.: 'celui' included. 
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concerned, the ultimate expression of the distance between 
God and creation1.is that Christ himself was met only by silence 
when he cried out to the Father: 'Dieu a laisse Dieu crier vera 
lui et n'a pas repondu' (C3 322). 1 In a sense God's silence 
does not matter; our existence can make no difference to God: 
'Une fois qu'on a reconnu Dieu comme le bien supreme et reel, 
eternellement satisfait par soi-meme, c'est assez' (CS 85). 
Simone Weil had learned from Plato that 'God does not deal 
directly with man' (Symposium 203), but iu her emphasis on 
the transcendence of God, she is in line with an important 
current of modern theological thought beginning with Kierke-
gaard, and developing with the work of Barth and Brunner in 
this century. For them, God is essentially unknowable, and 
the only contact which can be made is through revelation. 
He is inaccessible to man through the intellect, and his exis-
tenoe cannot be intellectually proven. Intangible though 
this deity may seem to be, to the point of having no 'existence' 
in any sense we can comprehend, it was a matter of profound 
conviction to Simone Weil that our kn~wledge of the deity must 
1
cf. Nerval's treatment of this theme in 'Le Christ 
Oliviers' and Vigny's in 'LeMont des Oli~iers'. (For a 






start from the point of his unknowableness, of his absolute 
'otherness'. The kind of 'atheism' which resulted from this 
was an affirmation of the supremacy of goodness over being, 
and the negative approach to God an avowal of the essentially 
finite nature of creation. This 'atheism' can be summed up 
in Simone Petrement's words: 
En effet ce Dieu separe, inconnu, detache de tout, 
parait etre sans puissance et presque inexistant; c'est 
le 'Dieu qui n'est pas' de Basilide. Mais en un autre 
sens, le dualisme est peut-etre le seul theisme, car le 
'Dieu qui n'est pas' est peut-etre le seul Dieu. 1 · 
In the next·chapter the opposite pole of the dualism will 
be considered, the nature of creation and of that necessity to 
which God subjected himself in the creative act. This will 
lead to a discussion of Simone Weil's concept of the nature of 
man, and of the ·dualism inherent in that nature • 
• 
1DH, P• 120, n.l. · 
I, §3 
THE REALM OF NECESSITY 
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It is proposed to examine in this chapter the concept of 
necessity in its purely neutral aspect only; its relation-
ship with what Simone Weil calls 1la beaute du monde' will 
be discussed at length in a later chapter (III, §1). It is 
necessary here to consider first of all Simone Weil 1 s termi-
nology. As Raper has pointed out, 'necessite• is generally 
used by Simone Weil to indicate the sum of conditions to which 
man, as an earthly creature, is subject, that which in 'Greek' 
terminology would be referred to as 1 nature•. 1 Simone Weil 
herself uses the word 'nature' surprisingly seldom. But 
whereas 'nature' tends to mean the whole condition of man, 
Simone Weil seems to consider that a certain part of man is 
not subject to necessity. What that part is we shall attempt 
to illustrate in the next chapter, concerning the nature of 
man. 
As we saw in the last chapter, necessity is that to which 
God submitted himself by the act of creation. It is therefore 
·utterly other than God. But it would be a mistake to think 
of it as matter; it is rather the network of relationships 
1Raper, op. cit., P• 59. 
which constitute order within matter: 
La necessite qui constitue le mecanisme de la 
matiere n'est pas autre chose qu'un tissu de rapports; 
et la realite du monde exterieur n'est pas constituee 
par autre chose que par la necessite • • • (SG 167-8) 
Simone Weil insists on this association of necessity and 
reality, returning to the point several times in the Cahiers. 
(Reality here is opposed to what is imaginary.) Necessity 
is a 'criterium du reel' (C2 332), and phenomena may be judged 
by it in order to establish their authenticity: 
Tout ce qui est reel est soumis a la necessite. C'est 
la necessite du mecanisme spirituel qui permet de recon-
naitre les cas de saintete authentiques des imaginaires. 
(C2 201-2) 
She realises the difficulties in this association, how-
ever, since, as we saw in the previous chapter, reality is 
the definition of the Good, and the Good is completely other 
than necessity: 'Identite du reel et du bien. Necessite 
cooone criterium du reel. Distance entre le necessaire et J.e 
bien. Debrouiller cela' (C2 337). In a sense the paradox 
is legitimate, since it brings us up against the basic contra-
diction of our existence, that of the gulf between the Good to 
which man aspires, and the necessity to which he is subject. 
Contradiction too is a mark of reality: 
Les contradictions auxquelles l'esprit se heurte, 




La contradiction est l'epreuve de 
(C2 287) 
Just as necessity is the criterion of the real, it is 
only through necessity that the reality of the world can be 
known. Matter cannot be known as such (E 222); since 
matter, like everything else on earth, is finite and relative, 
it is only through the relationships established between 
various phenomena that we can know anything. By asserting 
that we know the way in which things behave in relationship 
one to another, rather than things themselves, Simone Weil is 
of course in line with modern physics. As we saw earlier, 
'pour penser la necessite d'une maniere pure, il faut la 
detacher de la matiere qui la supporte et la concevoir comme 
un tissu de conditions nouees lea unes aux autres' (IP 146). 
Thus 'la necessite seule est un objet de connaissance. Rien 
d'autre n'est saisissable par la pensee. • • • La necessite 
est ce avec quoi la pensee a contact' (CS 94). And since 
necessity is a network of relationships, there must be some-
thing to establish those relationships, namely, the human mind. 
Necessity may thus from one point of view be termed 'pensee en 
acte' (IP 154). 
The idea of the relativity of all things made apparent in 
necessity impresses upon us clearly that they are finite and 
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limited. I"ian' s desires are unlimited, but as he learns how 
little they correspond to reality, he will learn to see 
necessity governing everything, will learn how all things are 
dependent on one another and lack finality. The only danger 
is that since this is a hard fact to face, we may be tempted 
to cover over the truth 'qu'il n'y a pas de bien ici-bas, que 
tout ce qui apparait ici-bas comme bien est fini, limite, 
s'epuise, et une fois epuise laisse apparaitre a nu la neces-
site' (AD 163) •1 
Limit is for Simone Weil a reality of the physical world 
closely associated with that of necessity or relationship. In 
the following passage she illustrates this association, com-
paring man's experience of limitation with God's freedom from 
it: 
La limite est la loi du monde manifeste. Dieu seul 
(ou quelque nom qu'on veuille employer) est sans limites. 
(Sous un autre aspect, la relation est la loi du monde 
manifeste, Dieu seul est sans relation.) (SS 275) 
M.-J. Rustan.has studied in some detail the idea of limit in 
! ~ .,, ·. 
Simone Weil's work, comparing it to that of Camus, and illus-
trating how Camus' was essentially a moral concept, an affir-
1The refusal to face this fact leads to 'idolltrie' in 
Simone Weil's terminology, and this concept will be dealt with 
in Section II of the"present study. 
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mation of man's moral responsibility not to transgress certain 
limits in his dealings with his neighbour, whereas for Simone 
Weil the limits were part of the fabric of the physical world. 1 
In this Simone Weil affirms the Greek source to this part of 
her thinking. She seems to have been greatly impressed by 
the concept of nemesis, the idea that retribution is automatic 
once certain bounds are overstepped. She describes it as a 
'chitiment d 1 une rigueur g~om~trique, qui punit automatique-
ment l'abus de la force' (SG 22), and claims that this idea of 
limit, of measure, is one which suffused all Greek thinking 
and which subsequent ages have rejected, to their cost. She 
associates the concept of limit with that of alternation which 
was noted earlier (I, §1): 
Partout ou il y a limite, il y a compensation des 
actions par lea reactions. 
• • • 
Lea limites impliquent des ph~nomenes de compensation. 
(Cl 123) 
In its~lf this is a primitive notion, and one may feel 
some surprise at Simone Weil's associating herself with the 
idea of retribution, with all its overtones of elementary 
11.-J. Rustan, 'La Notion de limite chez Simone Weil et 
chez Camus', Terre humaine,.III (1953), 32-43. 
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justice and summary vengeance. It is important to realise 
however that Simone Weil is speaking here of the laws of the 
physical world, which for her are totally amoral. The appli-
cation of these laws to the moral world of human relationships 
will be considered in the next chapter. Fo~he present we may 
note that these laws of retribution do bring a sort of rudi-
mentary justice into dealings between men. Natural justice 
is no more than the observance of limits: 'Pour 1 1 homme en 
tant qu'etre nature!, le maintien entre des limites est la 
justice• (IP 150). This natural justice can occur only when 
there is 'necessite egale de part et d 1 autre 1 (IP 137), when 
neither party is subject to the other as a result of inferior 
force. There is thus recognition by each other that the other 
party exists as a being in its own right, and an agreement can 
be reached. On this point, Simone Weil frequently quotes a 
passage from Thucydides, which she considers illustrates per-
fectly the way in which relationships between men are governed 
by necessity: 
L'esprit humain etant fait comme il est, ce qui est 
juste n 1 est examine que a:' il y a necessi te egale de part 
et d'autre; au contraire, s'il y a un fort et un faible, 
le possible est accompli par le premier et accepte par 
le second.l (IP 136) 
* 
1The Peloponnesian "l@r, V, lxxxix: ~nt.a'DXJJtYOuc; ngbc; d-db~ ~Tl. dtxata JJtV ~v ~ &v9ponElw A6~ &nb ~~ ran~ &vayxn~ 
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The relationship between force and necessity implied here 
is used extensively elsewhere by Simone \oleil, and should now 
be considered. In a sense, force too is a network of relation-
ships, a mechanism which, in spite of the illusion to the con-
trary, is not in reality wielded by any man (C3 132). ~d 
yet it is not simply a series of relationships seized by the 
mind in thought, since it has a reality outside the mind 
(C3 147). This idea is expressed in a passage in which 
Simone Weil equates matter and blind force, and contrasts 
these with necessity: 
La matiere, la force aveugle ne sont pas l'objet 
de la science. La pensee ne peut lea atteindre; elles 
fuient devant elle. La pensee du savant n'atteint 
·jamais que les relations qui saisissent matiere et force 
dans un reseau invisible, impalpable et inalterable 
d'ordre et d 1 harmonie. (E 222) 
The distinction here is clear; force is material ('Toutes les 
forces sont materielles; 1 1 expression de force spirituelle 
est essentiellement contradictoire' LQL 13Q7),1 whereas 
KplVETal., dwa't'lx dk ot trp6UXOVTE<; 'll"pfxcraOUCYl. Kat. ot &cJSEVEi'<; 
~uy.xwpoVal. v. 
1
cf. Alain: 'La puissance est un attribut de 
l'esprit tout-puissant n'est plus du tout esprit'. 
Pouvoirs', Les Idees et les ages, §6, Lea Passions 





necessity is only truly conceived 'au moment ou les relations 
apparaissent comme parfaitement immaterielles' (E }65). 
Simone Weil seems here to be going beyond the basic Greek 
meaning of&~Kn as 'force, constraint, necessity•, 1 and 
approaching the Stoic concept of necessity as the order of 
the world, the logos or divine reason at work in the universe, 
of which more will be said in a later chapter (III, §1). 
Force as a property of matter is the starting-point of a 
number of images in which Simone Weil relates the physical to 
which 
the spiritual, among/the best-known is perhaps gravity. 
Gravity is the 'force par excellence' (Cl 115), the pheno-
menon against which all other forces can be discerned and 
calc~lated (C2 69). (Clearly she is here thinking in terms 
of Newtonian physical theory.) She enlarges on this in 
another passage: 
Il n'y a ici-bas, dans l'univers sensible, que deux 
forces; la pesanteur d 1 une part, et d 1autre part toutes 
les energies qui nous permettent de contrebalancer la 
pesanteur, et qui toutes (est-ce bien toutes, absolument?) 
precedent du soleil, c'est-a-dire de la meme source que 
la lumiere. (C} 187) 
Simone Weil's subsequent analogy between light and grace, and 
1Liddell & Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. &v&yKn 
gravity and the •natural' condition of man, is well known. 
For the present it is only the second part of the analogy 
which will concern us. 
Simone Weil seems to have the same consciousness of 
man's natural tendency as J. P. Richter, when he says 1 l 1 allure 
morale de l'homme ressemble a son allure physique, laquelle 
n 1 est qu'une chute continue•. 1 Simone Weil's definition of 
the law which equates force, the strength to accomplish a 
particular action, with 'low' motives, is a significant example 
of this kind of moral 'pesanteur• (PG 3). Similarly when 
criticising the Hebrews• concept of God as being •natural' and 
'carnal' she says 'leur Dieu etait lourd' (C2 27). The moral 
and spiritual significance which she gives to the concept thus 
differentiates her from Bachelard, whose treatment of 'la pesan-
teur• is essentially a psychological interpretation of a poetic 
. 2 1mage. 
But the 1 fall 1 is not necessarily a downward movement; 
rather is it man's natural inclination to obey physical laws, 
1La Vie de Fixlein, quot. G. Bachelard, La Terre et lea 
reveries de la volonte (Paris 1948), P• 341. 
2 Bachelard, op. cit., pp. 341-402. 
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the central one of which is gravity. An example of 'pesanteur' 
in the psychological field, though not in the physical, is 
thus demonstrated in the image comparing the natural tendency 
in man to expand wherever he is able to, with the expansion 
of a gas: 
Comme du gaz, l'ime tend a occuper la totalite de 
l'espace qui lui est accorde. Un gaz qui se retracterait 
et laisserait du vide; ce serait contraire a la loi 
d'entropie. (C2 88) 
This is immediately linked with the passage from the Pelopon--
nesian \"var quoted above (p. 67): 'Thucydide "chacun exerce 
tout le pouvoir dont il dispose". Chacun s'etend autant qu'il 
peut' (ibid.). 
The tendency to expand which is a law of man's existence 
in the realm of necessity leads on naturally to the idea of 
space, the 'necessite supreme' (CS 16). Space and time occupy 
an important part in Simone Weil's conception of necessity, 
both of them being concerned with man's obligation to travel 
a certain distance either spatially or temporally before his 
desire is achieved. Thus the very nature of suffering is 
defined by a relationship between past and future: 'La souf-
france n'est rien hors du rapport entre le passe et l'avenir' 
(C2 24). Similarly, 'le temps est la croix. La douleur 
physique est la contrainte du temps sensible a l'ime' (C2 354). 
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Recipropcally desire can be defined as the will to alter the 
rhythm of passing time: 'Desir: toujours arr&ter ou hater le 
cours du temps' (Cl 66). There is thus a continual conflict 
between what man desires and the dictates of necessity, conflict 
which results in suffering. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, suffering is in 
Simone Weil's view intimately linked with the act of creation. 
We have already noted her impressions on the Manichean image 
of the spirit crucified on ~pace (p. 52), and on Plato's account 
of the creation which involves the cutting in two of the world-
-soul. In the second book of the Cah_iers Simone \·leil elaborates 
this last point, defining the suffering of the world-soul: 
'L'ame du monde souffre, quoique parfaitement heureuse. Le 
temps et l'espace sont sa souffrance' (C2 359). Time for· the 
world-soul is the cross, symbolised by its cruciform disposition 
at the creation of the world: 'L'ame du monde crucifie entre 
lea etoiles fixes et le soleil. Crucifiee sur la croix du 
temps. La creation est deja une passion' (C2 359). That 
man's suffering too is directly related to his existence in 
time is indicated by the following note: 'Porter sa croix. 
Porter le temps' (ibid.). 
It is not altogether clear whether for Simone Weil creation 
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existed within space and time, as in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, or whether space and time were merely aspects of 
creatio~, and came into being at the same time as the creation 
of the world. She uses Plato's image of time being created 
as a moving likeness of eternity (Timaeus, 37) in an interpre-
tation of her own: 'Faire du temps une image mobile de 
l'eternite, car il ne l'est pas naturellement' (Cl ~7). It 
seems however from the above analysis of the relationship 
between creation and suffering that time is one of the ele-
ments of necessity met by the divine creator in the act of 
t . 1 crea ~on. The world-soul is crucified in space and time, 
implying that these are pre-existent elements of a b8sically 
hostile 'natural cause'. Space and time thus become the 
essential basis of division between God and his creation, and 
consequently between God and his incarnate Son: 
Le Fils separe du Pere par la totalite du temps et 
de l'espace, du fait qu'il a ete fait creature; ce 
temps qui est la substance de ma vie--et de meme pour 
chacun--ce temps qui est si lourd dans la souffrance, 
est un segment de cette ligne tendue par la Creation, 
!'Incarnation et la Passion entre le Pere et le Fils. 
(CS 27) 
... 
1This is akin to the concept of time iri the Indian Sankhya 
system, where time and space are aspects of prakriti, this 
In accordance with our conclusions on Simone Weil's 
concept of the nature of God· reached in §2, we have found 
little evidence of the presence of God in the created order 
in our discussion of her ideas on necessity. Since this has 
been established by inference rather than through demonstra-
tion we shall consider now her ideas on Providence, since 
these indicate in a very positive way the effects on creation 
of an absent Creator. 
Simone Weil was a bitter critic of what she called the 
Roman concept of Providence, which she describes as 'une inter-
vention personnelle de Dieu dans l'univers pour ajuster certains 
moyens en vue de fins particulieres' (E 236). 1 (The pages in 
which she elaborates her criticism of this notion provide evi-
dence incidentally of Simone Weil's sense of irony, which has 
often remained unnoticed by critics.) In both public and 
private life, according to her, the idea that God intervenes 
personally in order to alter the necessary sequence of events 
latter having many points of resemblance with Greek necessity. 
See Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 270. 
1
we shail be dealing in detail with this criticism, inclu-
ding Simone Weil's views on Roman civilisation, in Section II. 
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is absurd and blasphemous. It is a desire to see the infinite 
in what is finite and limited, to reduce God to a finite good 
(E 238). She accepts the pre-quantum notion of causality as 
a vast network of relationships perceived only supe·rficially 
We single out one of these relationships 
as particularly striking, but it is only one of an infinite 
number: 
Les desseins particuliers qu'on attribue a Dieu 
sont des decoupages pratiques par nous dans la complexite 
plus qu'infinie des connexions de causalite. No~s les 
pratiquons en joignant a travers la duree certains evene-
ments A certains de leurs effets choisis parmi des 
milliers d'autres. (E 239) 
The true relationship between God and his creation is however 
to be found in the identity between the will of God and the 
existence of the universe; as she says, 1il y a identite 
entre: Dieu veut cela, et: cela est• (C2 248). In this 
way, it is possible to read the will of God in every event 
without exception: 
Tous les evenements qui composent l'univers dans 
la totalite du cours des temps, chacun de ces evenements, 
chaque assemblage possible de plusieurs evenements ou 
davantage, entre deux assemblages d 1 evenements ou davan-
tage, entre un evenement et un assemblage d'evenements--
tout eela, au mime degre, a ete permis par le vouloir de 
Dieu. Tout cela, ce sont les intentions particulieres 
de Dieu. (E 240) 
She puts the same case, simply and forcefully, a little further 
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on: 'La Providence divine n'est pas un trouble, une anomalie 
dans l'ordre du monde. C'est l'ordre du monde lui-meme' (E 
241). 
This serves to emphasise one of the most important 
attributes of God, according to Simone Weil: his impartiality. 
She frequently quotes the Gospel passage on the Father who 
sends rain on the just and the unjust (Matt. v. 45, e.g. C2 
122, EL 43), taking this as an essential precept for man. 
God refuses to take aides, to interfere with the workings of 
destiny (C2 122), which is another way of saying that he has 
willed the blind mechanism of necessity to rule over creation 
(PSO 93, C2 394).1 Thus there is nothing in the universe but 
God and that which obeys God (AD 91), and it is nonsense to 
speak of God altering the mechanism of causality. 2 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is not difficult 
to see why Simone Weil refused to perceive behind the actions of, 
1
simone Petrement notes Plato's assimilation of necessity 
into ~v~, 'chance', which is in this context not a lack of 
causation but blind and mechanical causality. DP, pp. 40-41. 
2Alain comments similarly on the idea of a God who does not 
intervene in human affairs, making the traditional rationalist 
point of the moral superiority of a man who acta rightly without 
the fear of divine sanctions. 'Un saint eat l'homme qui ae·; 
passe de Dieu': Propos sur la religion (Paris 1938), P• 255· 
for example, Joan of Arc, the inspiration of God. Using 
Sanskrit terminology, she says that it was prakriti which 
caused Joan of Arc to act as she did, not itman (Cl 90). 
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In the Sankhya system, prakriti is the first cause of every-
thing physical in the universe, both matter and force, and 
accounts for everything except spirit, which is uncaused.1 
As Sri Aurobindo points out, the conscious will and intell-
igence are also part of prakriti, since they are subject to 
the mechanical energy of nature. 2 Although Simone Weil 
admits the entry of grace into men's actions, she does not 
appear to have done so in the case of Joan of Arc, because 
of the impossibilty of making God a partisan in war (Cl 90). 
Another passage emphasises the same idea, that the use 
of force belongs to the realm of prakriti. Commenting on 
the acceptability of suicide only when constraint is present, 
she adds: 'De meme pour l'usage de la force. C'est contrainte, 
non grace, prakriti, non itman' (Cl 93). Prakriti seems thus 
in Simone Weil's mind to be identified with necessity, as the 
1Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 270. 
2
sri Aurobindo, Essays on the Gita (New York 1950), P• 66. 
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source of all human action. 1 She suggests in a commentary 
on the Bhagavad Gita that 'Prakrit avec ses guoas fait tout 
--meme le bien--meme le mal--le mal et le bien, tout' (Cl 154). 
By 'le mal et le bien' she presumably means what are usually 
taken to be such, as her general view is that it is not given 
to man to do good. In other words, necessity is responsible 
£or the network of re~ationships governing human action. 2 It 
is a mistake to account for success or failure in battle by the 
intervention of divine Providence. 
This view of Providence, where no event is of more signi-
ficance than any other, seems to have little in c6mmon with 
the traditional Christian interpretation of the concept. On 
the contrary, it is akin to Stoic ideas, in which the presence 
of the logos can be discerned in the world simply through the 
existence of things as they are. There are perhaps too traces 
of Spinoza in this scheme of things, where God and the world 
are so intimately connected as to produce an identity between 
the two. This is an apt illustration of the ultimate link 
1 For the association of prakriti and necessity the present 
writer is indebted to a verbal suggestion of David Raper's. 
2Hiriyanna however implies that in the Gita obedience to 
the dictates of prakriti is not automatic, but is the response 
of the lower, sensuous self. Op. cit., P• 128. 
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between an extreme transeendent view of the deity, in which 
God does not interfere with the processes of nature and can 
therefore be said to will whatever is, and an extreme monism 
which identifies God and nature. Simone Weil holds ultimately 
to the former concept, and it is interesting to compare her 
account of Providence with that of a writer already mentioned, 
Rudolf Otto, who emphasises the transcendent element in the 
concept of deity. Otto insists on the futility of the 
'rational' approach to the miraculous, of the desire to see 
the hand of God in nature, altering for his own ends the 
causality of the created order, and claims that at a certain 
point there must be an irrational 'leap' of faith. 1 Although 
Simone Weil would view with suspicion any over-emphasis of the 
irrational, their similar attitudes to the question of divine 
intervention betray the consciousness of a deity who is not to 
be deduced by any rational process of observation. The logical 
conclusion to Simone Weil's view of Providence seems to be 
similar to the naturalist doctrine of the Svetasvatara Upanishad, 
according to which the world is not lawless, but is not governed 
from the exterior. Nature reveals no divine power behind it, 
1
otto, op. cit., P• 3· 
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nor any transcendent being controlling it. 1 This would be 
a fairly accurate assessment of Simone Weilts position as 
regards natural man: the difference lies in that the super-
natural is admitted by Simone Weil and plays a part which 
radically alters man's conception of necessity. This, how-
ever, will be entered into more fully in Section III. 
The aspects of creation which have been considered so 
far in this chapter, force, necessity and Providence, are 
illustrated admirably in Simone Weil's reading of Homer's 
Iliad. Apart from scattered and fairly numerous references 
to the poem in the notebooks, there is a long essay entitled 
'L'Iliade ou le poeme de la force• 2 in which she presents the 
·poem as the artistic expression of man's subjection to necessity, 
and of a correct reaction to this subjection. In a later 
general note on the Greeks, she traces the inspiration of the 
Iliad to the guilt felt by the Greeks at the destruction of 
Troy (SG 77). Far from glorying in this destruction as a 
1Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 103. 
2Published under the pseudonym Emile Novia, Cahiers du 
~~ dec. 1940-janv. 1941. 
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victory for Greece, they saw it as their 'peche originel' 
(AD 188) whose shadow lies over the whole poem. 'Toute 
l'Iliade est sous l'ombre du plus grand malheur qui soit parmi 
lea hommes, la destruction d'une cite' (SG 37). As a result 
of this the Greeks seemed to acquire a spiritual insight which 
enabled them to contemplate man's suffering without attempting 
to disguise it. Thus 
Il n'y a pas de tableau de la misere humaine plus 
pur, plus amer et plus poignant que l'Iliade. La con-
templation de la misere humaine dans sa verite implique 
une spiritualite tres haute. (SG 78) 
It is clear that for Simone Weil the picture given by 
Homer is indeed 'amer' and 'poignant•. The real hero of the 
Iliad she considers to be force, 'la force qui est maniee par 
lea hommes, la force qui soumet lea hommes, la force devant 
quoi la chair des hommes se retracte' (SG 11). Force she 
defines as 'ce qui fait de quiconque lui est soumis une chose' 
Sometimes it is_a question of a man being trans-
formed into an inanimate object through death; sometimes force 
is subtler in its effects, sometimes it is 'l'autre force, 
celle qui ne tue pas; c'est-a-dire celle qui ne tue pas encore. 
Elle va tuer surement, ou elle va tuer peut-etre, ou bien elle 
est seulement suspendue sur l'etre qu'a tout instant elle peut 
tuer; de toutes fa<tons, elle change l'homme en pie·rre' (SG 
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12-13). This is the force which holds one man in complete 
subjection to another, which causes the behaviour of the one 
who wields the force to be modified by the other only as it 
would be on meeting an inanimate object (SG 15). This sub-
jection is a form of slavery, where the slave ceases to have 
any being except in relation to his master. Since he exists 
only at his master's pleasure he can be said not to exist at 
all as a person. There is identity between throwing a stone 
to repel a dog and telling a slave to get rid of the a~imal 
(AD 104). 
One of the most important aspects of force as illustrated 
in the Iliad is the way in which even those who think they 
possess it are in fact subject to it. For no one possesses 
force. The man who wields it cannot imagine that this situ-
ation will not continue, but in his very blindness he is sub-
ject to force. Sooner or later he will become the victim, 
reduced to lifeless matter. The greatness of the Iliad in 
Simone Weil's view is to have brought out this elementary fact: 
Lea hommes ne sont pas divises, dans l'Iliade, en 
vaincus, en esclaves, en suppliants d'un cote, et en 
vainqueurs, en chefs, de l'autre; il ne s'y trouve pas 
un seul ho~e qui ne soit a quelque moment contraint de 
plier sous la force. (SG 19) 
But the very simplicity of this f~ct means that men have 
difficulty in perceiving and understanding it: 
Le fort n'est jamais absolument fort, ni le faible 
absolument faible, mais l'un et l'autre l'ignorent. 
(SG 21) 
The law of 'pesanteur' applies here as elsewhere, according 
to which every man exercises all the power he has, or thinks 
he has. It is not in man's nature to reflect that an abuse 
of force will automatically cause his own downfall. Simone 
Weil gives examples from the Iliad of this unconsciousness: 
Quand on peut d'un mot faire taire, trembler, obeir 
un vieillard, reflechit-on que les maledictions d'un 
pretre ont de !'importance aux yeux des devins? S'ab-
stient-on d 1 enlever la femme aimee d'Achille, quand on 
sait qu'elle et lui ne pourront qu'obeir? Achille, 
qu~d il jouit de voir fuir les miserables Grecs, peut-il 
penser que cette fuite, qui durera et finira selon sa 
volonte, va faire perdre la vie a son ami eta lui-meme? 
(SG 22) 
This lack of perspective is translated too in the complete 
subjection of the warriors to the war in hand. The war has 
become an end in itself, has grown in men's minds in proportion 
to the horror of it, so that they might not think that all is 
in vain. Great sacrifice demands a great cause. But because 
the warriors do not understand why they are thus sacrificing 
themselves, they attribute the continuance of the war to the 
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mysterious influence of the gods (OL 94-5). On the subject 
of the gods in the Iliad, Simone Weil has her own personal 
interpretation. With the notable exception of Zeus, she does 
not take them too seriously: 
Les dieux grecs • • • etaient melanges de bien et 
de mal; ~u plutot, dans l'Iliade, ils sont tous demo-
niaques, sauf Zeus. Mais aussi, les Grecs ne prenaient 
pas leurs dieux au serieux. Dans l'Iliade, ils four-
nissent les intermedes comiques, comme les clowns dans 
Shakespeare. (PSO 56)1 
This opinion seems to be echoed by Bowra, although he makes no 
exception of Zeus: 
••• this complete anthropomorphic system.has of 
course no relation to real religion or to morality. These 
1
compare this instinctive understanding of Homer's system 
with Alain's appeal for man's self-determination in the following 
passage: 'Les dieux d'Homere me gatent l'Iliade. Car ces hommes 
naifs et si bien dessines seraie·nt entierement beaux a voir, 
s'ils n'etaient conduits par les die.ux invisibles. - Leurs · 
passions memes sont reglees au conseil des dieux; leurs actions 
sont perpetu~llement deviees. • • • Deux idees dominent ces 
hommes et ce poeme. Une destinee invincible, qui conduit aussi 
lea dieux et qui regle aussi lea courages; et, avec cela, une 
·intervention continuelle des dieux, qui contrarient et retardant 
le destin, sans pourtant arreter l'evenement principal, qui 
vient comme un nuage orageux. Aussi est deja dessinee cette 
theologie accablante pour l'esprit, d 1apres laquelle l'homme 
s'agite et Dieu ie mene.' Propos sur la religion, p. 20. 
1 gods are a delightful, gay invention of poets. 
Zeus is different however for Simone Weil, and represents 
God, as opposed to 'the gods': 'Dans l'Iliade, Zeus est Dieu 
et lea autres dieux sont des demons' {C3 66). But.where other 
critics have seen in Zeus a capricious and irresponsible deity 
--for example in his defence of Achilles--she sees a manifest-
ation of the 'absent God', who is unable--because unwilling--
to alter the mechanism of necessity. She considers this to 
be the only teaching on the nature of the deity presented by 
Homer: 
Le seul enseignement direct sur la divinite contenu 
dans l'Iliade est le tableau de Zeus prenant sa balance 
en or pour y peser les destinees des Grecs et des Troyens, 
et oblige de laisser la victoire aux Grecs quoique son 
amour aille aux Troyens a cause de leur piete. 
(PSO 56) 
A man's good deeds thus in no way influence Zeus' attitude, 
since he himself is bound by his golden scales, which Simone 
Weil interprets as necessity (C3 66). Necessity governs all 
created things, and God cannot intervene through his Providence 
1c. M. Bowra, Tradition and Design in the 'Iliad' (Oxford 
1930), p. 222, quot. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Los 
Angeles 1951), p. 2. 
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to alter the chain of cause and effect which binds creation. 
As in the case of Joan of Arc, one cannot make God a partisan 
in war. Ares, the god of war, imposes a kind of elementary 
justice which is itself a reflection of necessity: 'Ares est 
equitable, et tue ceux qui tuent' (SG 21). This blind 
necessity, or destiny, is thus the rule, and the only rule, 
of war. Man has learnt nothing so long as he has not realised 
fully the void that separates God and necessity, that the hand 
of God is not to be seen distorting the pattern of the created 
order. The answer to the question 'why all this suffering?' 
is that there is no answer. Simone Weil was struck by the 
way in which T. E. LawrenceP9Bed the question, and gives the 
reply from her interpretation of the Iliad: 
Ils demandaient pourquo! • • ·~ Nous nous 
demandions taus, attendant Lla mor!f en tremblant, a 
qui cela servait, qui cela honorait, de nous faire 
souffrir de la sorte; quel etait le sens evident et 
secret de tout cela • • •• On se torturait le cerveau 
• • •• 
LReponse (Iliade): pourquoi pas :fJ (Cl 26) 
If all men are thus subject to mechanical necessity, and 
suffering is an integral part of human existence, a right 
attitude to this situation will produce a broad compassion 
for apparent victims and victors alike. Simone Weil evidently 
found this in Homer, who saw Greek and Trojan su~ject to the 
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same· forces: 
L'extraordinaire equite qu1 1nspire l'Iliade a 
peut-etre des exemples inconnus de nous, mais n'a pas 
eu d'imitateurs. C'est a peine si on sent que le 
poete est Grec et non Troyen. (SG 38) 
This compassion for manKind in general is extended by Simone 
Weil to include those whom one normally designates as criminal, 
since in one sense at least crime is simply obedience to the 
dictates of necessity. She reiterates Christ's plea for the 
forgiveness of his persecutors, since they are unaware of 
their crime: 'Les crimes humains qui sont la cause de la plu-
part des malheurs font partie de la necessite aveugle, car lea 
criminals ne savent pas ce qu'ils font' (PSO 94). Criminals 
are thus obedient to necessity in exactly the same way as inert 
matter is (IP 162). Simone Weil compares what we call crimi-
nals to 'des tuiles detachees d'un toit par le vent et tombant 
au hasard' (AD 91) and adds that 'leur seule faute est le choix 
initial qui a fait d'eux ces tuiles' (ibid.). 1 If human failure 
is viewed in these terms as a manifestation of 'la misere hu-
maine', then it is impossible to despise anyone for his crime. 
1 By 'choix initial' Simone Weil may be referring to Plato's 
theory of the drawing of lots by souls before their incarnation. 
See Republic, XX, 617-20. 
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(C2 19). Bernard Halda is certainly right in assessing 
Simone Weil's attitude towards humanity thus: 1Elle voit beau-
coup plus de victimes que de coupables•. 1 
A right attitude to necessity inevitably produces a sense 
of compassion towards one's fellow-beings. In the next chap-
ter an attempt will be made to analyse Simone Weil's concept 
of man, the extent to which he can rise above necessity, and 
his divided nature which results from this • 
• 





If man is subject to necessity in Simone Weil's scheme of 
things, he has nevertheless a consciousness of God, albeit 
a stranger God, which indicates that his subjection is not 
complete, that there is a part of him capable in some way of 
apprehending the true Good which is not of this world. It 
is to this duality within man that our attention must now be 
turned. 
Evelyn Underhill has noted the language of exile which 
comes naturally to the soul which apprehends God in the terms 
of transcendent reality. 1 If God is not to be found in any 
way on earth, and the soul knows God to be its true home, 
then its earthly residence will be experienced in terms of 
loss and of exile. The ~trangers and pilgrims' of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews (XI. 13) who sought a better, heavenly country, 
are only one example of a recurrent phenomenon. Even Camus' 
'homme absurde' retains a nostalgia for what is not subject to 
the passing of time, although he prefers to reject it for the 
2 here and now. Simone Weil seems to have derived inspiration 
1
op. cit., p. 98. 
21 L 1 Homme absurde', Le Mythe de Sisyphe in Essais (Bibl. 
de la Pleiade 1965), p. 149. 
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for her consciousness of man's exile from the Greeks, about 
whom she says: 'Ce qu'ils ont eu intensement, c'est le senti-
ment de l'exil, le sentiment que l'ame est exilee dans le 
monde' (SS 241). 
Simone Weil seems to relate this sense of exile to the 
idea of original sin, as expressed in her commentary on Plato's 
myth of the divided man. She refers to Aristophanes' speech 
in the SlmEosium, where the original man is said to have been 
cut in two by Zeus as a result of his wrong-doing. 1 In her 
commentary on the passage, she relates this division to the 
basic tragedy of human existence: 
Notre vocation est l'unite. Notre malheur est 
d'etre en etat de dualite, malheur da a une souillure 
originelle d 1 orgueil et d'injustice. La division des 
sexes n'est quA·une image sensible de cet etat de dualite 
qui est notre tare essentielle, et l'union charnelle est 
une apparence trompeuse de remede. Cette dualite qui 
est notre malheur, c'est la coupure par laquelle celui 
1
symEosium, 191. It is interesting that Simone Weil 
makes no comment on the rather doubtful motives for Zeus' act. 
Mortals are not destroyed altogether in spite of their wicked-
ness, because the gods would be 'thus depriving themselves for 
ever of the honours and sacrifice due from humanity'. The 
plan for the division of man is agreed on because, as Zeus says, 
'in this way they will be weaker, and at the same t~me more 
profitable to us by being more numerous'. Even allowing for 
the fact that the speech is attributed to Aristophanes, the 
underlying morality is far inferior to that of the Genesis 
account of the fall and punishment of man. 
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qui aime est autre que ce qui est aime, celui qui connait 
est autre que ce qui est connu, la matiere de l'action 
autre que celui qui agit, c'est la separation du sujet et 
de l'objet. (IP 45-46) 
Man is thus isolated from the other half which would complete 
him, isolated from the object of his desire, isolated as 
thinking subject from the object of his thought. This is 
another facet of the contradiction which has already been noted, 
between the good that man desires and the necessity to which he 
must submit. Simone Weil shares with Plato the idea that man 
is not what he ought to be, that the soul is somehow uncomfort-
able in its mortal dress. 1 Pascal had a similar sense of the 
'disproportion de l'homme•, 2 and of the contradictions which 
form his existence: 
Nous souhaitons la verite,·et ne trouvons en nous 
qu'incertitude. Nous cherchons le bonheur, et ne trouvons 
que misere et mort. Nous sommes incapables de ne pas 
souhaiter la verite et le bonheur, et sommes incapables 
ni de certitude ni de bonheur.3 
This expression of contradiction in man is akin to Baude-
laire's experience of duality which he describes as the existence 
1 Phaedo, 79, 84. 
2Pensees, ed. Lafuma, 3e.edn (Paris 1960), No. 390. 
3Ibid., No. 125. 
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within man of 'deux postulations simultanees, l 1une vers Dieu, 
l l'autre vers Satan', although for Baudelaire it is rather a 
sense of being pulled in opposing directions. \-li thin the 
Christian tradition it is St. Paul who gives earliest express-
ion to the contradiction, with his despairing cry of 'the good 
that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I 
d I 2 0 • 
In a sense it is possible to deduce this duality within 
man from the fundamental opposition between a transcendent 
deity and finite man subject to necessity. Evelyn Underhill 
holds that the consciousness of the opposition between Absolute 
and Contingent, Being and Becoming etc. involves the existence 
of the natural self and the transcendent self within man. 3 
Simone Petrement goes further, and claims that the one dualism 
is inevitably deduced from the other, and precedes the other 
in historical development. A dualism of principles, 'a 1 1 in-
terieur du monde', is merely an extension of a more fundamental 
1
•Mon cceur mis a nu', XIX, Journaux intimes, in Oeuvres 
(Bibl. de la Pleiade 1954), p. 1211. 
2 Romans, VII. 19. 
3op. cit., p. ix. 
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dualism, that of transcendence. 1 Thus we arrive at the idea 
of a horizontalism dualism2 (illustrated in such concepts as 
the conflict between body and soul, spirit and matter etc.) 
which can b~ deduced from, and is complementary to, a vertical 
dualism of an absolute, transcendent deity and the created 
order. The relationship between the two is readily demon-
strated by the observation that one term of the horizontal 
dualism (for example, soul) is always akin to the transcendental 
element of the vertical dualism. It would seem appropriate 
therefore to examine the horizontal dualism inherent in Simone 
Weil's conception of the human being. 
Simone Weil drew the inspiration for much of this dualism 
from the Platonic tradition, but since this tradition has come 
through strongly into Christianity, many of her assertions have 
a familiar Christian ring. The division between body and 
spirit appears very early in Christian teaching with St. Paul's 
emphasis on those righteous men 'who walk not after the flesh, 
but after the Spirit' (Romans, VIII. 1). There are many 
1DH, PP• 15 & 105-6. 
2The term 'horizontal' should be taken to mean here 
'existing within human experience', since in a sense even this 
dualism is vertical, having a spiritual element which can be 
represented as 'superimposed' on the material element. 
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examples of this division in Paul's letters1 and in the Gospel 
of John, 2 both writers who have been considered to have dualist 
if not directly Gnostic tencencies. The t~adition continued 
in developed form with the growth of monasticism, emphasising 
the life of the spirit at the expense of the carnal life. 
Simone Weil uses this dualistic tradition often implicitly, 
and the opposition ame-corps. appears repeatedly. The word ame 
in her terminology appears to mean both the intellectual and 
spiritual life, as is evidenced for example by the following 
passage from the 'Theorie des sacrements', in which she is 
writing of the identity between the sacramental host and God: 
La seconde condition est que la croyance en une 
certaine identite entre le morceau de pain et Dieu ait 
penetre l'etre tout entier au point d'impregner non pas 
l'intelligence, qui ne peut avoir la aucune part, mais 
tout le reate de l'ame, l'imagination, la sensibilite, 
presque la chair elle-meme. (PSO 1~9; italics added) 
This soul is frequently considered by Simone Weil under the 
aspect of the privation which it suffers in one way ·Or another 
through incarnation. (This could be seen as a parallel to God's 
experience of privation at the creation of the world.) Thus 
1 E.g. Romans VII. 25; VIII. 5-8; Galatians v. 16-25. 
2 E.g. III. 6. 
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she speaks of 'la privation de chaleur physique ou de nourri-
ture materielle soufferte par l'ame celeste attachee a un 
corps martel ••• • (C2 338). The soul is made subject to 
necessity, and suffering is caused by the fact that nec-essity 
is not its natural element; the soul ought to be free from 
physical constraint, and is in fact in bondage. Simone \tleil 
quotes the Orphic mDJ,la ~J.la, 'the body is a tomb' , as an ex-
pression of this 'death' of the soul (C2 184). She uses this 
idea again coupled with the idea of prison in another note, in 
which she affirms: 'Le corps est une prison' (C2 189). But 
instead of the traditional Christian interpretation of the 
'things of the flesh' seducing man away from God, she offers 
an original explanation of the power of this 'prison': 'La 
chair n'est pas ce qui nous eloigne de Dieu, elle est le voile 
que nous mettons devant nous pour faire ecran entre Dieu et 
nous' (C3 317). This appears to be simi~ar to Pascal's con-
cept of 'divertissement', though for him man seeks entertain-
ment in order to forget the reality of his condition. 
Simone \tleil seems to have been attracted by Plato 1 s 
theories of the origin of the sou1. 1 Since on this matter 
1 See Phaedrus, ?45-8. 
97 
she is usually commenting either directly or indirectly on 
Plato, there arises the question as to how far these ideas 
were merely a commentary, merely intellectual speculation, 
and how far they were her own. While there is clearly no 
question for her of the literal truth concerning the Platonic 
myths (any more than there was for Plato for that matter), it 
is difficult to believe that s·he attached no importance to 
them, given her conviction of the tremendous spiritual signi-
ficance of Plato's writings. Thus 'lflhen she wri tea 
Ainsi tout etre humain, sans aucune exception, y 
compris le plus degrade des esclaves, a une ame qui vient 
du monde si.tue au-dessus des cieux, c • est-a-dire de Dieu, 
et qui est appelee a y retourner 
(SG 116) 
we are aware that she believes what she says to be the mythical 
representation of a spiritual truth. This impression is 
heightened by the fact that she draws from it a general observ-
ation on the nature of man, and one which has direct relevance 
to the actual world: '11 n'y a entre lea etres humains que des 
differences de degre qui sont accidentelles et variables. Par 
essence ils sont identiques et par suite egaux' (ibid.). In 
the same way Simone Weil uses Plato's theory of reminiscence., 
in which the soul on learning something in its earthly life is 
in reality only remembering truths from its past, incorporeal 
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a 
. t 1 ex~s ence. In a commentary on ia.iul passage from Aeschylus' 
2 Agamemnon, she associates the I memo ire douloureuse I \·lith 
Plato's theory of reminiscence, and with :Jt. John of the 
Cross' 'dark night of the soul' (SG 45). The link which she 
sees appears to be that of the pain and discomfort endured by 
the soul at this moment, when links with earthly reality have 
been disturbed if not finally broken, and the confused image 
of something beyond this reality has been glimpsed by the soul, 
but not yet attained. 
Although this division between soul and body occurs fre-
quently in Simone ~eil 1 s writings, the associated distinction 
between different parts of t~e soul is used at least as often. 
This twofold division is probably inspired by Plato, for whom 
man \·las compounded of an immortal soul associated \rli th a mortal 
body, to which the lesser deities added the mortal parts of the 
soul. 3 So in Simone Weil we have different ways of dividing 
the soul, usually correspondine to one or other of the Platonic 
myths. dhe speaks for example of 'la partie naturelle et ••• 
1 . 
Phaedrus, 249. The whole Socratic method of education 





la partie surnaturelle de l'ame' (IP 155) and of 'la partie 
spirituelle de l'ame' which must use the prison of the body 
'pour enfermer, emmurer la partie charnelle' (CS 189). This 
clearly derives from Plato's division already mentioned of 
the whole man into immortal soul, mortal soul, and body, as 
does the note 'L'ame doit avoir ete divisee en deux avant 
qu'une partie puisse utiliser le corps contre l'autre' (ibid.), 
which seems to be a combination of that myth with the myth of 
the primal division of man already referred to. Sometimes 
she speaks of one part of the soul only, but in such terms as 
imply a complementary part, as where she mentions 'la partie 
humaine de l'ame ~ui esi7 soumise ala necessite' (C2 192); 
'la partie inferieure de l'ame' (C3 112), 'la partie divine de 
l'ime (C3 316) and 1 la partie mediocre de l'ame' (PSO 140). 
In this last case she refers to the opposite half as 'la part:. 
de la verit.e dans l'ame', and suggests that the division takes 
place (in the particular case she is discussing) when the soul 
comes into contact with a true sacrament. 'La partie mediocre' 
then tries to escape, becuase it cannot bear contact with 
absolute purity, while the superior part desires this contact. 
Another use of this division of the soul is in her inter-
pretation of the Upanishadic image of the two birds, one of 
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which eats the fruit while the other watches. 1 It is not 
absolutely clear as to whether Simone Weil regards the two 
birds as two different souls, or as the two parts of the soul, 
but the principal idea for our purpose is clear enough, that 
of the 'partie eternelle de l'ame' in its abstinence 'digesting' 
and thus destroying the 'partie martelle de l'Ame': 
Ici-bas, regarder et manger sont deux. Il faut 
choisir l'un ou l'autre. On appelle 1 1un et l'autre 
aimer. Seuls ont quelque espoir de salut ceux a qui 
il arrive quelquefois de rester quelque temps a regard·er 
au lieu de manger. 
'L'un mange les fruits, l'autre les regarde.• 
La partie eternelle de l'Ame se nourrit de faim. Quand 
on ne mange pas, l'organisme digere sa propre chair et 
la transforme en energie. L'ime aussi. L'ame qui ne 
mange pas se digere elle-meme. La partie eternelle 
digere la partie martelle de l'ime et la transforme. 
(CS 252) 2 
This 'partie eternelle de l'ame' is presumably what Simone 
Weil refers to occasionally~s 'la partie increee de l'ime' 
(CS 49, 85) • For this definition loiJ:oeller accuses her of 
1
chandogya Upanishad, VIII, 1. 
2
cf. the interpretation of this passage given by Aurobindo: 
'One of the birds is the eternally silent, unbound Self or 
Purusha by whom all this is extended and he regards the cosmos 
he has extended, but is aloof from it; the other is the Purusha 
involved in Prakriti' (op. cit., p. 71). We shall return to 
this passage in the next chapter. 
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Gnostic tendencies, 1 but there is surely no need to turn to 
heretj_cal doatrines within the Christian tradition for a 
possible source. In the second of these two references, it 
is clear that she has adopted the idea from Eckhart, and puts 
it forward merely as a suggestion that one part of the soul is 
uncreated. But Plato too in the creation-myth of the Timaeus 
indic.tes the same thing, 2 and it would seem reasonable that 
Simone Weil should adopt this myth, as she did others, for 
what spiritual value it had. In the first passage referred 
to, she is using the idea of the uncreated part of the soul 
to form the essential link between man subject to necessity 
and God: 
La creation est abandon. En creant ce qui est 
autre que lui, Dieu l'a necessairement abandonne. Il 
ne conserve sous sa garde que ce qui dans la Creation 
est Lui--la partie increee de toute creature. (CS 49) 
This implies that Simone Weil made a definite distinction. 
between a part of man which simply obeys the laws of necessity, 
and a part which in some way remains outside necessity. She 
states this clearly in the preceding note, which indicates the 
~oeller, Litterature du XXe siecle ••• , p. 243. 
2T. ~maeus, 41. See p. 98. 
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direct relationship between 1 la partie incre~e• and 'la partie 
eternelle et surnaturelle'. 
Dieu abandonne notre etre tout entier, chair, sang, 
sensibilite, intelligence, amour, ala necessite impitoyable 
de la matiere et a la cruaute du demon, sauf la partie 
eternelle et surnaturelle de l'ame. (CS 49) 
That this part of the soul plays no part in the conscious life 
of man is implied in a passage from the essay 'L'Amour de Dieu 
et le malheur•: 
Porter la croix, c'es~ ~orter la connaissance qu'on 
est entierement soumis a Ll!f necessite aveugle, dans 
toutes les parties de l'etre, sauf un point si secret de 
l'ame que la conscience ne 1 1atteint pas. (PSO 110) 
This can perhaps be related to Simone We"fl' s view of what is 
sacred in a human being. In her eyes, it is not his person or 
his personality, but something essentially impersonal: his 
desire for good, in spite of all the evidence that good is not 
to be found in the world (EL 13). There is here the same 
division between necessity and the Good as is implied in the 
previous passage, and the same association of these with parts 
of the human soul. This desire for good is the part of the 
soul which struggles to return to the Good which it glimpsed 
in its pre-incarnate state, if one follows Plato's Phaedrus 
myth. 1 
1 Phaedrus, 248. Trans. and commented on, SG 114-6. 
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From the same myth Simone Weil also uses the image of 
the division of the celestial soul into two horses and a 
1 
coachman. As in her interpretation of the Upanishadic image 
of the two birds, where the 'partie eternelle de l'ame' by 
abstinence gradually destroys the 'partie mortelle de l'ame' , 2 
so here the 'mauvais cheval' has to be trained and brought 
under control.3 The 'mauvais cheval' for Simone Weil repre-
sents the physical and appetitive part of the soul, which must 
not be allowed to disturb the perfect equilibrium of the soul's 
4 
approach to the Good. 
Another use of the idea of the divisions of the soul 
should be mentioned here, and that is the interp~etation of 
Plato's Republic as a myth of the soul. As for Alain, so for 
Simone Weil the different citizens simply represented different 
parts of the soul, the philosophers representing 'la partie 
Trans. and commented on, SG 122-4. 
2 See above, p. 100. 
3see I, §5 for a further consideration of this 'training'. 
4It is significant, however, that Simone Weil assigns a 
positive role to the 'mauvais cheval', that of causing the 
soul's approach to the Good through beauty. This will be 
discussed in III, §1. 
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surnaturelle de l'lme' (SG 105). Thus the whole Republic 
would seem to be an extension·of the discussion of the various 
component parts of man contained in Book IV. Simone \1/eil 
backs up this assertion with Plato's own words from the end 
of the work (IX, 592): 'C'est dans le ciel peut-etre qu'il 
y a un modele de cette cite pour quiconque veut le voir, et, 
le voyant, fonder la cite de son propre moi' (SG 105) • 
• 
The idea that the soul is divided, that only a part of 
it has any relationship with the truth, while the rest is 
subject to the b~ind forces of necessity, implies that much 
of man's life is spent in darkness. The workings of neces-
sity, completely amoral and divorced from the Good which is 
man's true home, form the conditions under which he must live, 
and do not permit the hand of God to be seen directly at work 
in the universe. Thus the feeling man has of being a stran-
ger in the world is reflected in a certain unreality concern-
ing the things of this world. As we have seen, such is the 
interpretation given by Simone Weil to Plato's myth of the 
cave. For her this myth represents the ultimate description 
of man's condition; asshe says, 'on. ne peut pas pousser plus 
loin le tableau de la misere humaine' (SG 100). In contrast 
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to those who criticise Plato's excessive faith in man's 
intellect, Simone Weil deduces from this myth that we do 
not in our natural state know anything at all: 
Nous naissons et vivons dans le mensonge. Il 
ne nous est donne que des mensonges. M&me nous-m&mes; 
nous crayons nous voir nous-memes, et nous ne voyons 
que l'ombre de nous-memes. Connais-toi toi-meme: 
precepte impraticable dans la caverne. (SG 101) 
Furthermore, the man still in chains who has never left the 
cave is not even capable of the 'sentiment de l'exil' already 
referred to (p. 90) which is a necessary condition of his 
spiritual pilgrimage: 
Nous naissons et vivons dans l'inconscience. 
Nous ne connaissons pas notre misere. Nous ne savona 
pas que nous sommes chaties, que nous sommes dans le 
mensonge, que nous .sommes passifs, ni, bien entendu, 
que nous sommes inconscients. (ibid.) 
Simone Weil's interpretation of this part of Plato's 
myth is illustrative of one of the moat fundamental features 
of her social and political thought. If we can never be 
certain that we are 'in the truth', if we do not even know 
that we do not know, then the idea of creating a utopia on 
earth is not merely foolish, it is positively dangerous, 
since although occasionally and by chance our ideas may 
correspond to the truth, most of the time our desires and 
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actions will simply conform to the working of necessity. 1 
In the 'monde des melanges' good and evil produce one another 
incessantly, and a vision of a future paradise on earth not 
only is no guarantee of a viable society in the present, but 
2 is likely to prove deceptive even as a long-term goal. 
'L'ho~ne a pour condition naturelle les tenebres 1 (EH 84), 
and he must beware of acting as if he were in broad daylight. 
Thus in spite of her active career fighting for the 
riBhts of the French worker, indicating a positive reaction 
in the face of social injustice, Simone Weil's concept of 
what political action could achieve was essentially self-
limited and to a certain degree pessimistic. Her admira-
tion for Machiavelli, which seems to have been considerable, 
was based on this pessimism, since she saw in him the continu-
ation of Plato's theories on the essential evil of society.3 
~Iarx too considered that man is not always conscious of 
the misery of his condition, but deduced from this that it is 
the task of the social reformer to awaken his fellow-men. 
2For a comparable rejection of millenarian ideals see 
Camus, 'L'Homme revolte', Essais (Bibl. de la Pleiade 1965), 
PP• 413-705. 
3Plato's theories, in particular his image of society ·as 
the Great Beast, will be discussed fully in Section II. 
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She thus expresses Machiavelli's ideas on the reform of society 
in essentially negative terms: 'La reforme ou la transform-
ation de la societe ne peut pas avoir d'autre objet raisonnable 
que de la rendre la mains mauvaise possible' (SG 90). 
Such a programme for social action seems to follow logic-
ally from the affirmation of the gulf between what is good 
and what is possible. Since necessity is the raw material 
of society, sociology must be the scientific examination of 
necessity. Simone Petrement expresses the same concept, 
related to Gnostic thought: 
LEe dualisme gnostiqu!7 aboutit a la distinction 
lucide de deux ordres; celui du bien et celui de la 
necessite; a wne politique ou le bien ne serait pas 
confondu avec la force, mais ou il serait tenu compte 
et de la force et du bien; a une science de la neces-
site, a une morale de la fidelite.l 
There is no apocalyptic vision, no desire for the rule of 
justice on earth, simply an interpretation of society as a 
'mal irreductible qu'on peut seulement tenter de limiter' 
(SG 91). In order to perform this task, a real analysis of 
society is necessary, and the mechanism of social relation-
ships determined (Cl 207, 215, 236). It was the great merit 
1DP, 298 P• • 
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of Machiavelli, in Simone Weil's view, to have begun this 
analysis. 
This concept, while limited in its aim and scope, is 
nevertheless more positive than P~scal's reaction to the same 
problem. He too saw clearly that no paradise on earth was 
possible, but concluded from this that the wisest thing was 
to desire no change in the social order, that laws should be 
obeyed not because they were just in absolute terms, but 
because disobedience causes anarchy. His famous phrase 
'la justice est ce qui est etabli 11 is a terse illustr~ion 
of this. 
This deliberate limitation of ambition in the social 
field has its counterpart in Simone 1;/eil's thought in inter-
national politics. She saw clearly that conflicts between 
nations are frequently based on meaningless notions, on the 
1Pensees, no. 198. Montaigne provides a source for 
Pascal's view in the following passage: 'Nos meurs sont 
extremement corrompues, et panchant d'une merveilleuse incli-
nation vera l'empirement; de nos loix et usances, il y en a 
plusieurs barbares et monstrueuses; Toutesfois, pour la 
difficulte de nous mettre en meilleur estat et le danger de 
ce crollement, si je pouvoy planter une cheville a nostre 
roue et l'arrester en ce point, je le ferois de bon coeur•. 
Essais, II, xvii, 441. 
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conception in absolute terms of what only has meaning in the 
relative political sphere. On the power of abstract words 
she writes the following: 
• • • notre univers politique est exclusivement 
peuple de mythes et de monstres; nous n'y connaissons 
que des entites, que des absolus. Tous lea mots du 
vocabulaire politique et social pourraient servir 
d 1 exemple. Nation, securite, capitalisme; communisme, 
fascisme, ordre, autorite, propriete, democratie, on 
pourrait lea prendre tous lea una apres lea autres. 
(EH 259) 
It was for these reasons that in the years leading up 
to the Second World War she adopted a pacifist attitude, and 
frequented pacifist circles. An article in L'Effort speaks 
of a none-too-successful pacifist demonstration at St.-Etienne 
1 in which she took part; in another journal there appears a 
declaration signed by Simone Weil among others approving 
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, and urging the French to 
act likewise. 2 In an article which appeared in Syndicats 
she elaborates the workers' point of view in a manner which 
seems eminently rational and yet perhaps ultimately short-
1
•ou etaient-ils tous ces pacifistes?• 28 oct. 1933· 
2
•Pour une negociation immediate', Feuilles libres de 
la quinza~ (Lyon), no. 54, 25 mars 193~ 
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sighted. She does not seem at this point to have grasped 
the truth about the German regime--she was not alone in this--
and considers the whole matter to be a question of national 
pride and prestige, and consequently unreal. She speaks of 
the great personal humiliations which the workers had suffered 
in the years before the reforms in factory conditions of 1936, 
and of the way in which they had kept quiet in spite of it all: 
On n'a pas verse le sang de ceux par qui on avait 
subi parfois des humiliations qui atteignaient chacun 
au fond de l'!me, qui brisaient presque physiquement. 
En revanche on accepterait de mourir a cause d'une soi-
-disant humiliation nationale qui ne touche aucun de 
nous en particulier.l 
The only honour to be defended, she concludes, is that of the 
oppressed, wherever they ~re to be found, and this must be 
done through social struggle rather than by armed conflict. 
In a later article in the same paper, she develops this 
theme, pointing out that in the case of war in Europe, all 
the advantages recently gained by the workers would immedi-
2 
ately be lost. The emancipation of the workers is incom-
1
•Prestige national et honneur ouvrier', Syndicate, 
no. 26, 8 avr. 1937. 
2 
'Lea. dangers de guerre et les conquetes ouvrieres', 
Syndicats, no. 28, 22 avr. 1937. 
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patible with the sort of reinforced state power necessary to 
the waging of a war: 
En ce sens, si l'on admet, avec Marx et Lenine, 
que la revolution, de nos jours, consiste avant tout 
a briser immediatement et definitivement l'appareil 
d'Etat, laguerre, meme faite par des revolutionnaires 
pour defendre la revolution qu'ils ont faite, constitue 
un facteur contre-revolutionnaire. (EH 241) 
It is important to note howwer that during this period 
when she held pacifist ideas, she had enlisted as a volunteer 
in the Spanish civil war, joining Durruti's anarcho-syndicalist 
column. It is not completely clear whether or not she had 
any intention of actually fighting; Gabriel Marcel declares 
that she never took up arms, 1 and Halda suggests that although 
she was armed she had no intention of ever resorting to force. 2 
A fellow-volunteer, Louis Mercier, indicates that this was 
not so, that she had come to Spain determined to do whatever 
was required of her, and certainly it is unlikely that she 
would have gone as far as asking for a gun, as Cabaud relates, 
unless she had intended to use it.3 She was determined at 
1
•simone Weil', The Month, July 1949, PP• 9-18. 
2 Halda, op.cit., pp. 27-8. 
3 1 Con~tribution a la connaissance de Simone Weil', Le 
v 
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any rate to play an active part in the war, as she notes in 
her letter to Bernanos: 
En juillet 1936, j'etais a Paris. J~ n'aime pas 
la guerre; mais ce qui m'a toujours fait le plus horreur 
dans la guerre, c'est la situation de ceux qui se trouvent 
a l'arriere. Quand j'ai compris que, m~lgre mea efforts, 
je ne pouvais m'empecher de participer moralement a cette 
guerre, c'est-a-dire de souhaiter tous lea jours, toutes 
les heures, la victoire des una, la defaite des autres, 
je me suis dit que Paris etait pour moi l'arriere, et j'ai 
pris le train pour Barcelone dans !'intention de m'engager. 
(EH 221) 
It was clearly this need to 'participer moralement' which 
finally caused her to leave her pacifist position with regard 
to Hitler's Germany. It is obvious that she regretted her 
previous attitude and found it subsequently short-sighted, as 
is illustrated in her attempt to explain though not excuse it: 
Mon erreur criminelle d'avant 1939 sur les milieux 
pacifistes et leur action venait de l'incapacite causee 
depuis tant d'annees par l'ecrasement de la douleur 
physique. Etant hers d'etat de suivre leur action de 
pres, de les frequenter, de causer avec eux, je n'ai pas 
disce~ne leur inclination a la trahison. (CS 317) 
She puts her failure down to 'le peche de paresse, la tentation 
d'inertie' (ibid.) which made her involuntarily want a peaceful 
Dauphine libere, 16 nov. 1949, and Jacques Cabaud, Simone Weil: 
A Fellowship in Love (London 1964), p. 138. Cabaud supports 
this account by indicating a post-card sent by Simone Weil to 
her friend Claudius Vidal. 
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solution to the crisis, without actually examining her own 
motives in strict objectivity. This attitude seems to bear 
little relation to the reasoned pacifism of the articles des-
cribed earlier, but the divergence can perhaps be explained in 
her own terms, in that she simply accepted pacifist arguments 
at the time because her state of fatigue did not allow her to 
go into the matter more deeply. vfuatever the explanation, and 
although she was still attracted by the idea of non-resistance, 
she became convinced of the necessity for non-resistance to be 
effective, and frequently quotes the example of Gandhi on the 
subject. The effect against the hostile power must be as 
great when one uses non-violence as when one actively resists, 
and for this great spiritual power is needed. Non-violence 
is thus a goal, rather than an immediate way of action (Cl 153). 
In this matter of the acceptance of the need to fight, 
Simone Weil clearly drew considerable inspiration from the 
Bhagavad Gita, which she read for the first time in the spring 
of 1940 (AD 39). In her interpretation, Arjuna's fault in 
refusing to fight at the beginning of the poem lies in his 
desire to find good incarnate in action (C2 268), his very 
human desire to feel he is fighting for a just cause. His 
enlightenment comes through the progressive revelation by 
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Krishna that in the realm of necessity there are no absolute 
rights and wrongs; to some extent one must accept being a 
channel1for the workings of necessity. The aim is thus 
'laisser agir en soi la necessite' (C2 180), 'accepter d'etre 
soumis ala necessite et de n'agir qu'en la maniant' (Cl 66). 
This kind of obedience is in essence passive, an 'activite 
passive' (AD 149), a resolution to restrain oneself to immed-
iate acts which cannot be avoided, rather than attempting to 
see any long-term 'good' in a particular course of action. 




L'accomplissement pur et simple des actes prescrits, 
p~us ni moine, c'est-a-dire l'obeissance, est a l'ame 
que l'immobilite est au corps. C'est la le sens de 
Gita. (CS 306) 
The individual self is no account in this kind of obedience, 
and to Western minds, accustomed to the expansion of the self, 
this concept may seem strange. It is akin however to the 
obedience exacted in the monastic life within the Christian 
Church, except that in monasticism obedience is directed, in 
an immediate sense at least, towards one's superiors, whereas 
for Simone Weil it was a question of inner compulsion, a con-
formity t~he will of God as she understood it. 1 This kind 
1More (art. cit., PP• 43-57) has criticsed this reliance 
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of compulsion she defined as 'action non-agissante' (Cl 153), 
described thus: 'Faire seulement ce qu 1 on ne peut pas ne pas 
faire' (ibid.). Thus Arjuna is led to fight, not thro.ugh any 
positive desire for victory, but because he realises that in 
the realm of necessity it is the basic minimum: 
Il voudrait· ne pas combattre et se perd dans son 
emotion de pitie. Mais s'il se demande clairement: 
•est-ce que je peux ne pas combattre?' il ne peut pas, 
a ce moment, dans cette situation; repondre oui. 
(ibid.) 
The concept of •action non-agissante' is noted, naturally 
enough, in Simone Weil's discussion of the philosophy of the 
Tao. The doctrine which pro~es that the wise man should 
1n'agir que sans effort• 1 is the most developed form of this 
kind of negativity in action, and Simone Weil seems to have 
been particularly struck by this aspect of Taoist philosophy, 
contrasting for instance the Tao '~u!l agit sans effort• with 
the Newtonian vision of a universe ruled by forces (C2 110). 
Likewise the following comment: 'Reculer devant l'objet qu'on 
on an 'impulsion interieure' as a sign of pride, and a lack of 
doubt of her own capacities. It seems strange however to 
equate this complete withdrawal of the individual will with 
what is normally understood by pride. 
1Tao te ching, XXIII, trans. Grenier, op. cit., P• 123. 
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poursuit. Seul ce qui est indirect est efficace. On ne 
fait rien si l'on n'a d'abord recule' (PG 136) has echoes of 
Lao Tzu's 'turning back is how the way moves' (XL). She 
also makes a comparison between Christ's affirmation 1 Je suis 
la Voie' and the 'action non-agissante' of the Tao which in 
her eyes is an equivalent form (C2 221). There is indeed the 
same notion in. both of a non-active vehicle which allows itself 
to be usemby the active principle, although Christ's definition 
of himself as the Way involves the idea of a person which is 
lacking in the Chinese (see III, §4). 
An extension of this concept of 'action non-agissante' is 
linked with Bamone Weil's well-known idea of •attention•. It 
is not our concern to make an exhaustive study of this funda-
mental concept, but simply to indicate its association with 
11 • I 1 e non-agl.r • The basis of the idea is in any case familiar; 
it is an availability to truth, a desire for it, as opposed to 
the more 'positiye' notion of searching. It is opposed to the 
activity of the individual will, to all muscular effort, as 
Simone Weil demonstrates in the essay 'Reflexions sur le bon 
1This concept has been studied by D. w. 
'Attentive Fruition. Simone Weil's vocation 
"Ils porteront des fruits dans l'attente."' 





usage des etudes scolaires •• •' (AD 71-80). Instead of 
the muscular contractions which pass for intellectual effort 
(AD 75), Simone Weil sees a completely different form of 
activity which she defines thus: 
L 1attention consiste a suspendre sa pensee, a la 
laisser disponible, vide et penetrable a l 1 objet •••• 
La pensee doit etre vide, en attente, ne rien chercher, 
mais etre prate a receyoir dans sa verite nue l'objet 
qui va y penetrer. (AD 77) 
The mind has thus only to be a receptacle for the truth 
which passes through it. But although this is an essentially 
negative activity, it is far from being useless; it is in 
~act the only effective method. Simone. Weil relates a series 
of techniques from Taoist philosophy, by which the hunter is 
taught never to miss his prey, however small, provided a certain 
degree of attention is achieved. 1 Thus •une certaine qualite 
d'attention est liee auxmouvements efficaces, sans effort ni 
1The text, taken from the Lieh Tzu, was found among Simone 
Weil 1 s papers and included in the Cahiers: 'Technique de l'at-
tention. Pour abattre lea cigales en plein vol, il suffit de 
ne voir dans 1 1 univers entier que la cigale visee; on ne peut 
la manquer. Pour devenir archer, rester deux ana couche sous 
un metier a tisser et ne pas cligner lea yeux quand passe la 
navette. ~re grimper trois ana un pou le long d 1 un fil de 
soie, face a la lumiere. Quand il paraitra plus grand qu'une 
roue, qu'une montagne, quand il cachera le soleil, quand on 
verra son cceur, on peut tirer: on le touchera en plein cceur • 
(C2 45-6). 
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desir' (C2 45). The idea that the action should be 'sans 
desir' seems to be contradicted in another note: 'L'attention 
est liee au desir. Non pas a la volonte, mais au desir' 
(PG 136). But by 'sans desir' she seems to~mean •Ldesi£7 
non attache a un objet•, as is evidenced by another note on 
the same page. It is akin to St. John of the Cross' 1adver-
1 tencia amorosa', a loving disposition towards God, unattached 
to any earthly object or any specific benefit. This.non-act-
ivity can thus produce practical results in the spiritual 
sphere, although these are not specifically aimed at: 
L'attention tournee avec amour vera Dieu (ou, a un 
degre moindre, vers toute chose authentiquement belle) 
rend certaines choses impossibles. Telle est l'action 
non-agissante de la priere dans l'ame. (PG 137) 
But this open disposition of the soul is by no means 
natural. The soul, as a part of nature, abhors a vacuum, 
and is by no means willing to abandon the pursuit of specific 
objects. As Simone Weil notes in the following passage: 
'Mauvaise maniere de chercher. Attention attachee a un prob-
leme. Encore un phenomena d'horreur du vide. On ne veut pas 
avoir perdu son effort' (PG 135). It is however, as we have 
1 St. John of the Cross, quot. Halda, op. cit., p. 113. 
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seen, a fundamental feature of Simone Weil's dualism that the 
soul's desire cannot be satisfied with earthly things: the 
void between desire and its object, between the necessary and 
the Good, must be preserved if the integrity of earthly and 
spiritual realms is to be maintained. In the last chapter 
of this section it is proposed to examine the idea of 'le 
vide' in Simone Weil's terminology, as a necessary preliminary 





The concept of the void, as used by Simone Weil, is the psycho-
logical reflection of the metaphysical dualism which has been 
the subject of this section so far. It is the maintenance 
intact of the gulf which separates the Good from the necessary, 
a conscious acceptance of the fact·that nothing on earth can 
satisfy the desire for good. Even this desire for good is a 
'vouloir a vide', since the Good cannot be represented in any 
way to man's intelligence: 
En tout vouloir, quel qu'il soit, p~r-dela l'objet 
particulier, vouloir a vide, vouloir le vide. Car 
c'est un vide pour nous que ce bien que nous ne pouvons 
ni nous representer ni definir. (C3 120) 
In extreme situations ho~er it is impossible for man to 
produce this non-directed desire; in extreme pain, for example, 
the only good conceivable by the soul is the alleviation of 
that pain. At that moment 
l'univers tout entier est occupe a pousser le cri 
de l'ame: 'J'ai faiml' 'J'ai mal!' 'Il faut que cela 
cease!' Il n'y a plus d'autre bien au monde que la 
satisfaction immediate du besoin. (CS 193) 
It is then that the 'partie eternelle de 1 1 £me' must reply, 
as Talleyrand did to the beggar who said to him 'Il faut que 
je vive', 'Je n'en vois pas la necessite' (ibid.). It is, 
in other words, the total and unconditional rejection of the 
satisfaction of that need, the consent to the permanent 
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absense of good, and acknowledgement that the Good is not to 
be found on earth. Simone Weil returns frequently to Christ's 
despairing appeal on the Cross: 'My God, why hast thou for-
saken me?' (Matt. XXVII. 46). This 'why?', Simone Weil says, 
does not express the search for a cause, but for an aim (IP 
168). To what end all this suffering? The answer is that 
there is no answer, since 'tout cet univers est vide de finali-
te' (ibid.). The soul has simply to learn this through repe-
tition of the question, until 
il lui arrive un jour d'entendre, 1 non pas une 
reponse a la question qu'elle erie, car il n'y en a pas, 
mais le silence meme comme quelque chose d'infiniment 
plus plein de signification qu'aucune reponse, comme 
la parole meme de Dieu. (ibid.) 
If the desire is 'a vide', it must be expected that the 
reply be equally intangible. 
Simone Weil has been criticised by Catholic writers for 
what they take to be her despairing solution to the problem 
of human suffering, and her reduction of the role of God as 
Father caring for his children. Certainly her complete 
rejection of consolation in any form demands a lucidity and 
~S: no comma. 
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a courage which could not be expected of everybody. But 
since consolation is a false representation of man's actual 
condition, suffering must not be comprehensible: 'Expliquer 
la ~ouffrance, c'est la consoler; il ne faut done pas qu 1 elle 
soit expliquee 1 (C2 135). 
This silence encountered by the desiring soul is fre-
quently expressed in terms of mechanics. It is in fact for 
Simone '1/eil a mechanistic notion, obeying the same laws as 
the physical \'lorld, and akin to her theory of 1 pesanteur 1 • 
The suffering experienced by the soul when faced with the 
void is simply the tension caused by the lack of correspondence 
between desire and fulfilment. 1 Simone t.rleil defines it thus: 
1Berlioz uses similar mechanical imagery when analysing 
the feeling of 'isolement' and 'absence' which precedes the 
experience of 'spleen'. He describes the experiment in 
which, by the creation of a vacuum, water, in the presence of 
sulphuric acid, is made to boil and evaporate, leaving behind 
a block of ice through the water's loss of heat, and compares 
it to his own experience: 'Le vide se fait autour de ma 
poitrine palpitante, et il semble alors que mon coeur, sous · 
!'aspiration d'une force irresistible, s 1 evapore et tend i 
se dissoudre par expansion. Puis, la peau de tout mon corps 
devient douloureuse et bralante; je rougis de la tete aux 
pieds. Je suis tente de crier, d 1 appeler i mon aide mes 
amis, les indifferents memes, pour me consoler, pour me garder, 
me defendre, m'e•pecher d 1 etre detruit, pour retenir rna vie 
qui s 1 en va aux quatre points cardinaux. 
Cet etat n'est pas le spleen, mais il l 1 amene plus tard: 
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'Vide, guand rien d 1 exterieur ne correspond a une tension 
interieure' (C2 9--Simone Weil's italics). In a sense the 
experience of the void breaks the laws of nature, since in 
nature this vacuum is not tolerated. Thus '.rhucydides 1 defi-
nition of psychological law, already quoted, whereby man 
always exercises all the power he has, becomes the b~sis for 
a new experience: 'Ne pas exercer tout le pouvoir dent on 
dispose, c'est supporter le vide' (C2 34). •s•arr3ter, se 
retenir, c'est creer du vide en soi' (C2 28). This is obvi-
ously a painful process, since, as in the physical world, 
exterior forces are ready to rush in and fill the vacuum: 
'En se vidant, on s'expose a toute la pression de l'univers 
environnant' (C2 135). Immediately the soul feels these 
pressures, it is seized by the feeling of impossibility, the 
purely physical reaction that such a state of affairs cannot 
be. Thus in the experience of extreme suffering, the soul 
rebels against the non-accomplishment of its desire, namely 
the alleviation of that suffering: 111Souffrir ainsi, c'est 
c'est l'ebullition, !'evaporation du coeur, des sens, du 
cerveau, du fluide nerveux. Le spleen, c'est la congelation 
de tout cela, c'est le bloc de glace.• Memoires (Paris 1969), 
I, xl. 
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impossible. 11 Ce sentiment d'impossibilite, c'est le senti-
ment du vide' (C2 18). 
This experience of the void which is felt to be impossible 
is in every sense of the word an unnatural experience. It 
is not natural to face silence when we would have an answer, 
to accept that desire is not met by a compensatory fulfilment. 
In an age when the suppression of a desire is considered a 
crime against human nature, it is not surprising that Simone 
Weil's ideas on the subject should be considered as strange 
and 'unnatural'. li'or her the whole concept of natural ful-
filment and the infinite expansion o~he individual is con-
tained in 'l'horrible phrase de Blilke: 11 Il vaut mieux etouffer 
un enfant dans son berceau que de conserver en soi un desir 
non satisfait" 1 (EL 16). This over-riding need to find com-
pensation for every desire is thus for her not the liberating 
of the individual which Blake and the apostles of 'self-
-expression' thought it to be, but a retaining of man within 
the limits of those natural laws which find their ultimate 
expression for Simone :r/eil in the law of gravity. Man's 
natural tendency is towards a psychological balance which 
consists in the alternate spending and receiving of energy, 
and conforms thus to the laws of necessity governing all 
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natural phenomena (see I, §3). Thus when a man is wronged, 
his natural reaction is to repay in kind the one who has 
wronged him. The idea of forgiveness is unnatural, and in 
a sense impossible, as Simone Weil notes in the following 
passage: 
Pardonner. (Valery) On ne peut pas. Quand 
quelqu'un nous a fait du mal, il se cree en nous des 
reactions. Oubli volontaire. Le desir de la ven-
geance est un desir d'equilibre. Accepter le desequi-
libre. (Cl 213) 
In another passage, she compares the desire for vengeance 
to the desire for satisfaction experienced by a miser: 1Si on 
me fait du mal, j'attends quelque chose de celui qui m'a fait 
du mal, comme 1 1 avare at ~end quelque cho,se de son tresor. 
("Satisfaction".)' (C2 62). The same mechanism operates 
when I am the one who inflicts the wrong: 
En revanche, faire du mal a autrui, c 1 est en rece-
r -·:. voir quelque chose; quoi? Qu 1 est-ce qu'on a gagne 
(et qu'il faudra repayer) quand on a f~it du mal? On 
s'est accru--On s 1 est etendu--On a comble le vide en 
sci, en en creant chez autrui. (ibid.) 
In this way sin against one's fellows is simply a waste of 
energy, energy which should have been directed elsewhere, 
since the quantity possessed by any individual is limited. 
Thus to the question 'en quel sens le peche nous rend-il debi-
teurs'l (Texte du Pater)' she replies: 1 Nous avons laisse 
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de l'energie se perdre (se degrader). Nous sommes des in-
tendants infideles. Il faut refaire le vide en nous' (C2 55). 
An equivalent form to 'remettez-nous nos dettes' is then 
'rendez-nous l'energie gaspillee' (C2 62). 
Man's desire for psychological compensation is illustrated 
again for Simone Weil in her interpretation of Arjuna's spiri-
tual discipline in the Bhagavad Gita. nere, however, her 
reading is fairly orthodox: Arjuna must learn to act without 
any thought of reward, that is, without receiving the fruits 
of that action, without compensation for the energy spent. 
'Agir pour l'acte, non pour son fruit' (Cl 142) is the ideal. 
It is not a question of renunciation of the act itself--hence 
possibly the relative accessibility of the poem to the Western 
mind--but renunciation of its normal compensations. Refusing 
to act does not in any case produce the desired effect: 1Re-
noncer a l'action ne produit pas un vide. Renoncer, non a 
l'action, mais a son fruit; la, il y a vide' (Cl 227). This 
is the necessary result of refusing to look for good in the 
action itself, since a sense of purpose, of accomplishing what 
is good and right, is a necessary stimulant to action and com-
pensation for energy expended. It is thus an affirmation 
of the fundamental distinction between the necessary and the 
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good. 
It is perhaps interesting to mention here another disci-
pline which for Simone Weil was illustrative of the same point. 
This was the Zea Buddhist technique of the ko-an, in which the 
student is made to exhaust the possibilities of the discursive 
intellect through the contemplation of an insoluble problem. 
Simone Weil calls primitive Zen 'une recherche a vide si in-
tense qu'elle se substitue a tous les attachements' (C2 382). 
It is a 'recherche a vide' in the sense that the result of Zen 
is not its aim. As Alan Watts has put it, 
whereas it might be supposed that the practice of 
Zen is a means to the end of atlakening, this is not so. 
For the practice of Zen is not the true practice so long 
as it has an end in view, and when it has no end in view, 
it is awakening--the aimless, self-sufficient life of the 
~ternal now•. To practise with an end in view is to 
have one eye on the practice and the other on the end, 
which is lack of concentration, lack of sincerity.l 
Simone Weil follows traditional comparisons in associating 
the discipline imposed by the search for the answer to the ko-
-an to the process of illumination practised by ~vestern mystics. 
The search brings about a 'nuit obscure' which is followed by 
Way of Zen (Harmondsworth 1957), P• 174. 
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illumination (C2 383), the search itself being a painful disci-
pline during which 1 • • • nous orientons notre attention vera 
le negatif et le vide' (C3 202). The process is made more 
painful by the fact that the soul is already detached from 
earthly things, but has not yet entered into contact with the 
good that it desires (C2 113). 
The acceptance of the void involves a kind of death, 
or at le§st the possibility of death. This idea universally 
found among mystical writers is given a new interpretation by 
Simone \r/eil, since maint·aining the void means rejecting any 
false (and therefore comforting) notion which might come to 
fill it. vii th remarkable lucidity, she expresses it thus: 
I Etre res·olu a mourir I accepter le vide I meme chose; cela 
seul permet que, dans certaines situations, le mensonge ne soit 
pas une necessite vitale' (Cl 224). 1 A development of this 
idea is seen in the following passage, where the entertaining 
of false notions is shown to be a technique for filling the 
vacuum, and thus preventing God from entering the soul: 
La mort meme, subie pour une cause mauvaise, n'est 
pas vraiment la mort pour la.· partie charnelle de l'ame. 
Ce qui est mort pour la partie charnelle de l'ame, c'est 
1This note is in capitals in the text. 
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de voir Dieu face a face. 
C1 est pourquoi nous fuyons le vide interieur, parce 
que Dieu pourrait s'y glisser. (C3 316) 
The distinction made here between physical and spiritual 
death is an important one, since it implies that the two are 
not synonymous, and that physical death is possible without 
the death of the 'partie charnelle de l'ame' (and the con-
verse, that spiritual death does not necessarily imply death 
of the body) o This idea is related to an importantmncept in 
Simone vleil' s thought, that of 'de creation 1 , which should now 
be considered. The term, although not current in the French 
language, is not a true neologism, as it was first used by 
Peguy (in a diametrically opposed sense, it is true)o 1 f\'Iiklos 
Veto, who has made a lengthy study ·of its use by Simone Weil, 
2 defines it as 'the process of man's return to God', and points 
out that while the term is negative in appearancela it is ulti-
mately creative, since it involves the suppression of that dis-
1
•Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie car-
tesienne•, Oeuvres en prose 1909-14 (Bibl. de la Pleiade 1957), 
ppo 1385, 1405 etc. Noted in Veto, op.cit., p. 26o There 
appears to be some discrepancy over pagination: we have only 
been able to find reference to 1 decreation 1 on pp. 1329, 1330, 
1350 of this edition. 
2v t- ·t 26 e o, _o.p_. __ c_~ __ ., p. o 
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tance between God and man caused by creation. It is the 
negative aspect which will concern~ here, however, the 
disappearance of the autonomous creature who says 'I' and who 
(because this 'I' sets him up in opposition to God's will) 
cannot fully love God (C2 289). This appears to be a des-
tructive concept, but Simone Weil sees it as a mere r~flection 
of reality. The creature, by decre~ting himself, is simply 
acknowledging his lack of true being, and by consenting to 
the death of his ego, is indicating his desire that he might 
have life 'more abundantly': 'Dieu m'a creee comme du non-
-etre qui a l'air d'exister, afin qu'en renon~ant par amour 
a cette existence apparente, la plenitude de l'etre m'anean-
tisse' (CS 42). 1 Being and existence are thus at opposite 
poles, when •existence' is taken in the sense of the autonomous 
existence of the creature. 
Such an idea follows naturally from Simone Weil's concept 
of creation, where God and his creatures together are less. 
than God alone. Decreation becomes an answer to creation, 
a redressing of the balance upset at the creation of the uni-
1 Cf. Eckhart: 'The word Sum can be spoken by no creature 
but by God only: for it becomes-the creature to testify of 
itself Non Sum.• Quot. Underhill, op. cit., P• 5· 
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verse, as Simone Weil indicates in the following note: 
De-creation en tant qu'achevement transcendant de la 
creation; aneantissement en Dieu qui donne a la creature 
aneantie la plenitude de 1'3tre,. dont elle est privee 
tant qu'elle existe. (C3 91) 
There is at least a suggestion here of Anaximander's cosmic 
lnE~pov (the indefinite), of which the existing creatures are 
detached fragments, and to which they return at the end of 
their cycle. The deliberate ambiguity of death-in-life, 
being-and-existence, can be compared too to Heraclitus' 'im-
mortal·mortals, mortal immortals, living their death and dying 
their life 1 , 1 on which Robin comments: 'L'individualite de la 
vie est une mort, et l'immortalite consiste a se replacer, des 
cette vie si on le peut, dans le courant universe1•. 2 Deere-
ation is thus the making whole again of a divided universe, 
through the abandonment of individuality. 
As was noted above however this 'death' of individuality 
does not necessarily imply physical death. It is important 
to emphasise this point, as many critics have taken this aspef:t 
1Fr • 62 : As6vcxTO~ 9Vl')Tb~, 9Vl')Tol u9fxVCXTO~, QDVTEC: TbV lKEt. V\OV 
9fxVUTOV, TbV dk lKEt.VWV pt.ov TE9V~TEC:• 
See Kirk & Rqven, p. 210. 
2L. Robin, La Pensee grecque (Paris 1948), P• 93· 
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of Simone Weil's thought to be excessively self-destructive, 
whereas in fact self-destruction is non-productive in the pro-
cess of decreation. She describes suicide as an 'ersatz de 
de<:.'creation • (C2 187), clear·ly because suicide is in a sense 
'-' 
the most final assertion of the individual's desire to con-
trol his destiny. The will to self-destruction is illusory, 
since the more I wish to destroy myself, the more th~t self' 
claims attention and assumes importance. It is a question 
of consent, rather than of will: 'La creature ne s 1 est pas 
creee, et il ne lui est pas donne de se detruire. Elle peut 
seulement consentir a la destruction d'elle-meme qu'opere 
Dieu' (C2 396). In the same way one man cannot assist in 
the decreation of another. If he has the power to destroy 
the individuality of another man, and wields it, he is making 
that man's own decreation impossible, since decreation must 
be consented to, must be an act of love (AD 136; cf. C2 242, 
296). 
The question of Simone \··ieil • s own death raises itself 
naturally here, and one may well argue that in her•. case deere-
ation did in fact involve physical death. C.J. !:inyder sees 
a close relationship between the two, linking them by the con-
cept of imbalance referred to on the death certificate:1 
The concept of decreation • • • is b8sed precisely 
on failure to redress the balance of the mind. That 
Simone \>ieil should have preferred to end her life as she 
did, rather than reason herself into a more normal atti-
tude to it reflects in p~actical terms the theory behind 
her written work. 
Her death was thus the supreme example of refusal of the laws 
of gravity, and acceptance of the void. It coulci also be 
argued however that death was due to being deprived of the 
means of decreation, that decreation involved a positive share 
in the sufferings of her countrymen which Simone Weil felt was 
denied her. Death could thus be seen as an alternative to 
decreation. The suffering which in fact she experienced.was 
in her eyes useless, since she felt cut off from the affliction 
of France. 2 
11 The deceased did kill and slay herself by refusing to 
eat whilst the balance of her mind was disturbed.' Quot • 
. Cabaud, Simone Weil, p. 348. See C. J. Snyder,'Simone Weil: 
A Study of her Thought, \~th special reference to the concept 
of decreation', unpubl. thesis, University of Wales 1969, 
P• 197 • 
2This interpretation is borne out by the fact that Simone 
Weil refused while in hospital to eat more than her fellow-
countrymen in occupied France. This practical gesture of 
solidarity would have theoretical backing if seen as an attempt 
to retain cont~ct with the sphere in which she felt her own 
decreation should lie. Sir Richard Rees has suggested several 
possible additional motives in Simone Weil: A Sketch for a 
Portrait (Oxford 1966), pp. 67-9, 84. 
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Whether decreation involved physical death or not, it is 
clear that by definition it implies a high degree of ~uffering 
for 'la partie charnelle de l'ame•. What is experienced by 
the soul only has reality in so far as it is experienced 
physically in the body, and psychologi&ally in the desiring, 
'carnal' part of the soul. On this physica~ level, the void 
can be experienced only as privation: 
Soif, faim, chastete--privationscharnelles de toutes 
sortes--dans la recherche de Dieu. Formes sensibles du 
vide. Le corps n'a pas d'autre maniere d'accepter le 
vide. (Cl 214) 
In this, she is only following the tradition of asceticism 
common to the religioas life of both East and West. St. John 
of the Cross speaks of the discipline the soul must undergo 
before being unified with God, and describes how 
. Lthe soui7 must completely and voluntarily void itself 
of all that can enter into it, whether from above or from 
below. • •• For who shall prevent God from doing that 
which he will in· the soul that is resigned, annihilated 
and detached ?1 
It is not merely desire for earthly things, but desire itself 
1The Ascent of Mount Carmel, II, §4: 'Lel alm~ ha de 
vaciarse de todo lo. que puede caer en ella perfectamente y 
voluntariamente, ahora sea de arriba, ahora de abajo ••• ; 
porque a Dies ·tquien le quitar~ que el no haga lo que quisiere 
en el alma resignada, aniquilada y desnuda?' 
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which must be eradicated. Simone Weil seems to go no further 
than St. John of the Cross when he speaks of the soul that is 
'annihilated', and yet her asceticism has often been met with 
criticism and incomprehension. 1 As we hope to show in the 
final section of this study, she always considered the disci-
pline which she imposed upon herself to be a means to an end, 
and not an end in itself: 'Le parfait imitateur de Dieu d'abord 
se desincarne, puis s'incarne' (SG 106). The mortification 
of the natural part of the soul was for her simply an acknow-
ledgement of the void which exists between the two orders, 
the natural and the supernatural, an acceptance of the fact 
that our desires cannot be satisfied by earthly objects. She 
illustrates this again by reference to Plato's cave-image, 
which she ~nterprets thus: 
L'irrealite des choses que Platon peint si fortement 
dans la metaphore de la caverne n'a pas rapport aux 
choses comme telles; lea choses comme telles ont la 
plenitude de la realite puisqu'elles existent. Il 
s'agit des choses comme objet2 d'amour. (IP ?4) 
1 . 
See Moeller, Litterature du XXe siecle ••• , p. 244. 
He speaks of 'l'espece de-joie que Simone Weil eprouve dans 
••• l'aneantissement recherche pour lui-meme', and ascribes 
it to 'de la sexualite refoulee'. But see below, p. -~B· 
2MS: objets. 
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In other words, it is a question of denying absolute allegiance 
to earthly things in favour of the true Good which is not of 
this world, and is unknowable. If Simone Weil expresses her-
self as a Platonist rather than as an orthodox Christian, her 
intellectual background is largely responsible. 
She is as aware as anyone of the dangers of asceticism 
as a sort of spiritual gymnastics, which is of course one of 
the reasons why she puts so little emphasis on the development 
of the will and of muscular effort in spiritual progress. 
Her definition of true KKK as opposed to false asceticism 
keeps ap~t the realm of the Good and that of the necessary, 
while giving a just estimate of man's condition: 
Il y a des efforts qui ont l'effet contraire du but 
recherche (exemple: devotes aigries, faux ascetisme, 
certains devouements, etc.). D'autres sont toujours 
utiles, meme s'ils n'aboutissent pas. 
Comment distinguer? 
Peut-etre: les uns sont accompagnes de la negation 
(mensongere) de la misere interieure. Les autres de 
l'attention continuellement concentree sur la distance 
entre ce qu'on est et ce qu 1 on aime. (PG 136) 
She is aware too as all the great mystics have been, that 
the foundation of mystical energy. is the same as that of sexual 
energy, but sees 
une difference essentielle entre le mystique qui 
tourne violemment vera Dieu la faculte d'amour et de· 
desir dont l'energie sexuelle constitue le fondement 
physiologique, et la fausse imitation de mystique, qui, 
laissant a cette faculte son orientation naturelle, et 
lui donnant un objet imaginaire, imprime a cet objet, 
comme etiquette, le nom de Dieu. (C3 92 ) 
In the mystical life, where the soul is so disaiplined as to 
make union with God its primary concern, no energy is wasted 
on earthly objects: 1 'Tout attachement a un objet est emission 
d'energie • Le detachement, c'est l'emission de la 
totalite de l'energie vers Dieu' (C3 92). Thus chastity is 
the acknowledgement that one's love should be directed outside 
the created world, towards God. IDhis leads Simone Weil to 
speculate on the spiritual significance of courtly love in 
twelfth-century France; she considers that its roots go back 
to the practice of homosexuality in Greece, although the role 
of the woman was obviously different, due to the comparative 
ease of relationship between the sexes in ancient Greece. 
She affirms: 'Ce qu'ils honoraient ainsi, ce n'etait pas 
autre chose que l'amour impossible' (EH 79-80). Denis de 
Rougemont takes this basic concept of 'amour impossible', 
which he considers to be Cathar, and applies it to the Roman 
de Tristan; Tristan's 'original sin' is to have given way to 
physical passion, and the whole poem is the account of the 
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redeeming of the two lovers by a long penitence. 1 He refers, 
1op. cit., p. 112. It is not impossible that some of 
the common ground illustrated here between Denis de Rougemont 
and Simone Weil was the result of discussion of that subject 
when both were members of the group which formed around the 
Nouveaux cahiers in 1936. Since de Rougemontis study first 
appeared in 1939, and he recalls in his 'Avertissement' (dated 
1938) that he had planned the work out in detail two years 
previously, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he had 
discussed it with members of the group. In this case, Simone 
Weil's interest in the Cathars may well date from this time. 
De Rougemont himself in a private letter to the present writer 
admits the possibility of such an influence, thougk cannot 
affirm it with any certainty: 
'Je n'ai pas ete sans me demander moi-meme quel role mon 
livre avait bien pu jouer dans !'evolution de Simone Weil vers 
le catharisme, telle que je l'ai decouverte apres la guerre en 
lisant ses lettres et les essais parus dans les Cahiers du Sud. 
Honnetement, je ne sais rien de certain. 
J'ai rencontre Simone Weil a maintes reprises dans le 
cercle des "Nouveaux Cahiers", je l'ai souvent entendue lors 
des debats organises par .-la revue - de 1936 ou 7 a 1939 -, mais 
il.me semble que nos relations se sont bornees a celles d'un 
redacteur en chef et d'une collaboratrice (elle nous avait 
donne plusieurs longs articles). Je la revois tres bien, dans 
cette salle, au premier etage d'un cafe pres de la Place St 
Sulpice, ou avaient lieu nos debats: presque affalee sur la 
table devant elle, la tete entre lea avants bras ~~ a cause 
de ses perpetuels maux de tete. Mais je n'ai pas souvenir 
d'avoir discute avec elle d'autres sujets que politiques. 
L'Amour et l'Occident n'a jamais fait .l'objet de debats aux 
"Nouveaux Cahiers", mais bien sur les animateurs de la revue 
l'avaient lu - et plusieurs m'en ont ecrit - lors de sa paru-
tion en janvier 1939· J'imagine que je l'avais envoye a 
Simone Weil aussi. Et en tout cas, elle a dii lire quelques 
uns Li~7 des nombreux articles que le livre a suscites en l939 
et 1940. • • • 
C'est chez Gustave Thibon que Simone Weil s'est refugiee 
dans le Midi en 1940. Or Thibon ecrivait alor.s un texte ex-
tremement elogieux sur mon livre • • •• Il est done a peu pres 
certain que Thibon et Simone Weil ont parle de mes theses a ce 
moment-la.' Letter dated Geneve, le 14 avril 1970. 
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as does Simone Weil, to various Hindu chastity-techniques, in 
which the object was the retaining within the body of sexual 
t f d th . t . "t 1 1 energy, rans orme us 1n o sp1r1 ua energy. Simone Weil 
speaks of an 'image hindoue ••• du nerf nouveau que produit 
la chastete veritable, le detachement, qui fait monter l'energie 
sexuelle jusqu'au sommet de la tete' (C3 92-3). She also 
mentions the ancient belief, repeated by Aristotle, that in a 
child the sperm, symbol of spi_ritual energy, circulates in the 
body, so that he is 'disponible; il est oriente, et il n•est 
pas oriente vers quelque chose. Oriente a vide' (C3 89). 
The aim of the adult was thus to detach himself so that the 
sperm once more circulated. 
Simone Weil thus belongs on this point to a well-defined 
mystical tradition which has flourished both within and without 
Christianity, and she certainly would never claim any original-
ity in her use of sexual imagery and language. To those who 
accuse her and other mystics of 'refoulement• because of this 
imagery, she replies: 
Repracher a des mystiques d'aimer Dieu avec la faculte 
d'amour sexuel, c'est comme si on reprochait a un peintre 
1
op. cit., PP· 98-99· 
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de faire des tableaux avec des couleurs qui sont com-
posees de substances materi~~les. Nous n'avons pas 
autre chose avec quoi aimer. On pourrait d 1ailleurs 
aussi bien faire le meme reproche a un homme qui aime 
une femme. (C3 91) 
Denis de Rougemont sees the idea that mysticism is simply a 
sexual deviation as the fundamental error of materialism, 
poi~ting out that firstly, the language of passion found in 
the mystics is not primarily-the language of physical love 
'mais il est au contraire la rh~torique d'une ascese etroite-
ment liee a l'heresie meridionale du douzieme siecle'; 
secondly, among the great mystics, the language of passion is 
used with such free.dom, 1 que 1 1 on ne voi t plus ce que pourrai t 
signifier, dans leurs cas, le soupgon habituel de 11 ref'oule-
ment11'. 1 
The direction of sexual energy towards God is thus the 
means by which the mystical consciousness attempts to approach 
the only object worthy of its love. But since for Simone 
Weil God is essentially unkno~able, it is a question of 
'aimer a vide' (C3 121). In so far as our love requires a 
tangible object, we may love the persons and things surrounding 
us, but only 'en tant qu'indignes d'amour' (ibid.). The void 
1 Op. cit., P• 136. 
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must be maintained within, even where the world claims our 
attachment. 
This maintenance of the void is supremely difficult, 
and yet it is essential in order to conceive of the idea o£ 
intermediaries, objects which do not hinder the ascent of 
desire towards the Good, but which act as a channel for it 
(C2 35). The tendency of desire is, however, to omit these 
intermediaries, and to aim for the absolute, forgetting that. 
the absolute has no place on earth. The result of this 
tendency will be the subject of our next section, where some 






ASPECTS OF IDOLATRY 
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Having attempted in the previous section to give some idea 
of the nature and extent of Simone Weil's dualism, we shall 
try in this section to illustrate her ideas on what could be 
called illegitimate mediation, the false resolution of con-
tradiction. It is our contention that the false harmony 
thus created is the equivalent of Simone Weil's definition of 
idolatry. The originality of this definition seems to lie 
in the fact that Simone Weil took what is essentially a rel-
igious notion (and one characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition) a~d extended it to cover practically every aspect 
of human society, secular as well as sacred. Conversely it 
can be said that it was not so much a matter of extending 
this religious notion to secular society, but of Simone Weil's 
essentially religious vision of society. The emancipation 
of the concept of idolat.ry from its narrow theological inter-
pretation thus follows automatically. 
As a result of this, whereas in section I we were dealing 
mostly with religious philosophy, this section will range over 
several aspects of Simone Wail's criti~ue of society. For 
example, in the chapter dealing with Simone Weil's relation-
ship with Catholicism, we will be discussing the Church as a 
social institution rather than as the elaborator and conserver 
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of Christian doctrine. Phus, although the subjects of the 
various chapters ranga from imperial Rome to Karl Marx, and 
from Judaism to Hitler, we shall not attempt to give a full 
account of each of these phenomena, but shall be guided by 
our theme, to which, in the interests of coherence, the over-
all picture will be subordinated. We shall therefore be 
following Simone Weil's bias rather than attempting to set 
the record straight on behalf of t-hose who have objected to 
her handling of, for example, Judaism or the Catholic Church, 
but every effort has been made to indicate opposing arguments 
within the restrictions of the theme of idolatry. We are 
conscious that this method leads inevitably to a certain im-
balance, but have tried to redress this to some extent in 
section III, where for instance the positive role of Catholic-
ism, as Simone Weil saw it, is discussed • 
• 
The notion of idolatry is one which has evolved consider-
ably over the centuries, and the modern Christian interpret-
ation is a kind of synthesis of ideas which have their origins 
in early Jewish tradition. We are assured, for instance, 
that 'dans 1 1 Ecriture, Et~Aov, idolum, simulacrum traduisent 
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trente noms hebreux differents•. 1 Classical definitions, 
such as that given by St. Thomas, 'to give divine honour to 
whom that honour is not due•, 2 or Origen's distinction bet-
ween Et~ (a true representation of something which exists) 
and Etd~Aov (a false representation of something which does 
not exist)3 beg the question as far as a definition is co.n-
cerned, as they still leave open the more relevant question 
of how one is to judge of the truth or existence of the God 
concerned. Simone Weil would certainly have concurred in 
them as definitions,.since her concept of God implied of nee-
essity both truth and, to a more limited extent, existence, 
but this .does not mean she accepted the trad~~al Judaeo-
Christian notion. As we shall see in the chapter on Judaism 
(II, §4), monotheism was no protection against idolatry; in 
fact, it seems almost irrelevant: 'Connaitre la divinite 
seulement comma puissance et non comme bien, c'est l'idolatrie, 
et peu importe alors qu'on ait un Dieu ou plusieurs' (PSO 48). 
In any case, she believes that true monotheism, that is, the 
1A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, Dictionnaire de theologie catho-
~~?~~· VII (Paris 1922), s.v. Idolatrie, idole. 
2 Sum~ theol., IIa, IIae, q. xciv, a. 1. '· •• ad super-
stitionem pertinet exhibere cultum divinum cui non debetur', 
quot. Vacant & Mangenot, loc. c~t. 
3vacant & Mangenot, loc. cit. 
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belief in a S~preme Being, has always been widespread: 1 Ce 
que nous nommons idolatrie est dans une large mesure une fie-
tion du fanatisme juif. Tous les peuples de tous les temps 
ont toujours ete monotheistes• (LR 13). 
This would explain her unconcern when confronted with 
polytheism in its various manifestations. Homer's represent-
ation of the Olympic pantheon in the Iliad she takes as a 
comic interlude (PSO 56). Plato's knowledge of the Good as 
One was to her of far more significance. In the same way, 
various references to fetishism (E 220) and idolatry in the 
sense of image-worship (PSO 72) compare these favourably 
with what are in her view far more serious manifestations of 
idolatry. In so far as her opinion on the essential mono-
thesim of all peoples is simply an affirmation of belief in 
a single Supreme Being, Simone Weil is in agreement with most 
modern anthropological studies1 (although there are always 
exceptions to this general rule: Buddhism, for example, is 
not founded on a belief in God as such). 2 But this is not 
1 See J. Danielou, 'Hellenisme, Judaisme, Christianisme•, 
Reponses aux questions de Simone Weil (Paris 1964), P• 22. 
2
see C. Humphreys, Buddhism (Harmondsworth 1951), P• 79· 
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necessarily monotheism as in the Judaic tradition; belief 
in a Supreme Being does not automatically imply worship of 
this Being. Parrinder illustrates this ambiguity in his 
study of West African religion to which we have already ref-
erred (I, §2), indicating that the concept of the High God 
in these tribes is very different from our modern European 
one; whole areas of human life are completely untouched by 
this supreme being, and he often lacks any moral force, moral 
sanctions being imposed by lesser deities. As he says, 
while to us belief in God is the 'highest' article 
of religion, and practised as such, it is not in the 
forefront of practised West African religion. What-
ever lip-service may be paid to the creator, in practice, 
worship and morals, he may not even be first among equals. 1 
But this remoteness of the West African High God would be 
unlikely to trouble Simone. Weil in her views on monotheism, 
given her own concept of God's essential otherness (see I, §2). 
The same applies to her reading of Plato's deity, which we have 
already discussed (ibid.). 
But although this might seem to indicate that Simone 
Weil's attitude towards idolatry tended towards the excessively 
1 OJ?• cit.,· PP• 31-2. 
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tolerant, the contrary i~ true. One thing was perfectly 
plain to her: man had a need of envisaging beyond himself 
an absolute good, and thus had a choice only between worship 
of the true God and idolatry. There could be no half measures: 
Nul etre humain n'echappe a la necessite de concevoir 
hors de soi un bien vers lequel se tourne la pensee dans 
un mouvement de desir, de supplication et d'espoir. Par 
consequent, il y a le choix seulement entre l'adoration 
du vrai Dieu et l'idolatrie. (CS 276) 
It is not even necessary to identify this good with God, but 
only to avoid g~ving the name of God to anything else: for 
this reason it is better to deny the existence of God than 
to worship a false one: 
Il ne depend pas d4une Arne de croire a la realite 
de Dieu si Dieu ne revele pas cette realite. Ou elle 
met le nom de Dieu comme etiquette sur autre-chose, et 
c'est l'idolatrie;l ou la croyance a Dieu reate abstraite 
et verbale. (AD 164) 
Simone Weil seems to have realised the impossibility of absol-
ute agnosticism, however, as is indicated in the passage from 
La Connaissance surnaturelle quoted above. She even concedes, 
with a compassionate insight, the necessity of idols to man's 
existence in the world (CS 112), but adds 'il faut les idoles 
1Ms: de l'idolatrie. 
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lea mains mauvaises possible' (CS 113). Idols in the form 
of concrete images are in fact a guarantee against more serious, 
because more convincing idols, since 'on ne peut pas se mettre 
devant un marceau de bois sculpte et lui dire: "Tu as fait le 
ciel et la terre"' (CS 171). 
Another, and more startling,'use' of images is indicated 
in a passage from La Connaissance surnaturelle, where Simone 
Weil is speaking of the necessity to strip the soul of all 
that is 'au-dessus de la vie vegetative' (CS 260) in order to 
leave this 'partie vegetative' directly exposed to the light 
of grace. This union of 'la matiere inerte', type of perfect 
obedience with 'l'esprit divin', is an image of perfection, 
and in the same way the union of a divine spirit with an in-
animate object in an image or idol reflects this perfection. 
But altho~h these examples provide interesting vindic-
ation of the use of tangible objects in worship, Simo~e Weil 
never stresses this type of idolatry, and as we have said 
before 1 in l!l·er own terminology, idolatry means something very 
much broader and more difficult to grasp. In general philo-
sophical terms, she defines i4ols thus: 'des biens relatifs 
penses comme biens hors de toute relation' (Cl 226) or alter-
natively, they are earthly objects considered to embody absolute 
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good (E 137). 1 In other words, referring back to the notions 
of opposites and of the transcendence of the Good which we 
discussed earlier (I, §§1, 2), idolatry is the illusion that 
the good which is the opposite of evil is the absolute Good, 
the denial of transcendence. Looked at in another way, it 
is the denial of limits (I, §3), the claim that the infinite 
can exist on earth. The limit, seen as 'quelque chose qui 
est toujours depasse, mais impose une oscillation compensatrice' 
{C2 32) is the point to which everything alw~ys returns, and 
which prevents the pendulum from continuing indefinitely in 
one direction. It is akin to the definition of the Tao as 
given by Granat: 
Le Tao est un Total constitue par deux aspects qui 
sont, eux aussi, totaux, car ils se substituent entiere-
ment l'un a l'autre. Le Tao n'est point leur somme, 
mais le regulateur (je ne dis pas: la loi) de leur al-
ternance.2 
1In the essay 'Reflexions sur lea causes de la liberte et 
de 1 1 opprssion', Simone Weil defines the 'folie fondamentale qui 
rend compte de tout ce qu'il y a d 1 insense et de sanglant tout 
au long de l'histoire' as the 'renversement du rapport entre le 
moyen et la fin' (OL 95). Although at this stage she does not 
call it 1 idolatrie', this concept is clearly very close to her 
later elaboration of idolatry. Alain indeed makes the connexion 
explicit: '· •• l'idolltrie donsiste proprement a adorer le 
moyen et l'outil' (Propos sur la religion, Paris 1938, P• 15). 
2La Pensee chinoise (Paris 1934), P• 325. 
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It is also obviously connected with the law of Anaximander 
already quoted (I, §1), concerning the tendency of things to 
compensate each other for their injustice, according to the 
regulative factor in the universe. 
To understand the implications of Simone Weil's defin-
ition, however, it will be necessary to loo~nto its practical 
applications. One of its most fundamental manifestations is 
that exhibited by the role of force .a in the world. The 
essence of force, as we have seen (I, §3), is that it recog-
nises no limits to its empire; its effect is to reduce the 
person subjected to it to a mere thing, and to blind the one 
wielding it to the fact that he is not omnipotent, that he 
too is subject to force. The essay on Homer's Iliad (SG 11-42) 
provides, as has been shown, Simone Weil's most poignant ex-
pression of the concept of force. It illustrates too that 
most extreme example of the use of force, slavery. Through 
its denial of limits, it is a false refolution of opposites, 
the opposites in this case being the rival claims to existence 
of two separate human beings. The opposites are also relative 
good and evil, the standards by which morality is assessed; a 
master with absolute power over his slave does not question the 
morality of his conduct towards him: 
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A qui peut tout, tout est permis. Qui sert un 
Tout-Puissant peut tout en lui. La force delivre du 
couple de contraires bien-mal. Elle delivre qui l'ex-
erce, et meme aussi qui la subit. On ne fait pas tort 
a un esclave. Un ma!tre a toute licence. (C3 140) 
The opposites are resolved here through simple extermination 
of one of them. This conclusion is more pessimistic and at 
the same time more realistic than Camus' analysis of the 
master-slave relationship in L'Homme revolte.1 For Camus 
there comes a point at which the slave says no, a point beyond 
which submission cannot be tolerated: Simone Weil, with her 
factory experience which she likened to the state of slavery 
(AD 36), knew that in the situation where revolt is possible, 
complete servitude has not yet been reached. Slavery, a form 
of 'le malheur', deprives a human being of the consciousness 
of his personality, makes an inanimat~ object of him, no longer 
able or even willing to better his condition in any way (AD 86). 
Is there an illogicality here ? If a man can spend a 
li,etime in the state of slavery, so far deprived o~ his human-
ity that he is incapable of desiring a better life, then how 
does the notion of limits operate ? There seems to be no 
1in Essais (Bibl. de la Pleiade, Paris 1965), p. 423· 
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chance of the slave redressing the balance in this life, and 
Simone Weil does not seem to have believed in, or wanted to 
believe in, a compensatory after-life. The answer seems to 
be that the master who believes he has absolute power over 
his slave is simply living in an illusion; even if he retains 
this power throughout his life, or the life of the slave, he 
is none the less subjected to the force of necessity and 
ultimate death. His power is in reality limited by his own 
limits as a finite human being. Idolatry is after all a 
belief in what is false, a belief in the absolute nature of 
the phenomena of this world, and Simone Weil's discussion of 
it is centred on the contradiction between apparent limitless-
ness and real restrlction. 
The denial of limits in the individual, leading to the 
illusory expansion of the ego to fill all available. space is 
mirrored in the tendency of the collectivity to expand indef-
initely. Worship of the collectivity seems to have formed 
for Simone Weil a much more real form of idolatry than worship 
of the individual. If the 'je' was dangerous, the 'nous' was 
infinitely more so, because of the power it exercised over the 
individual. The 'je' was the product of the flesh, the 'nous' 
was the product of the devil (AD 22-}; cf. p. 174below). It 
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is thus that Simone Weil discerned in the theories of Marx 
a more potent version of the illusion concerning power which 
she read in the master-slave relationship. Marx, according 
to Simone Weil, believed that the opp~ressed proletariat would 
..., 
through revolutio~ seize the power at present in the hands of 
their capitalist masters. But this in practice was mere day-
..... 
-dreaming: 'Couple de contraires domination-oppression. Re ve 
..... 
impossible de mettre la domination aux mains des opprimes' (C3 
285). And why impossible? Simone Weil elaborates :1 
La force, en changeant de mains, demeure toujours 
une relation de plus fort a plus faible, une relation 
de domination. Elle peut changer de mains indefiniment 
sans que jamais un terme de la relation soit elimine. 
Au moment d'une transformation politique, ceux qui s'ap-
pretent a prendre le pouvoir ~sedent deja une force, 
c'est-a-dire une domination s~r de plus faibles. S'ils 
n'en possedent aucune, le pouvoir ne tombera pas entre 
leurs mains, a moins qu'il• ne puisse .. intervenir un 
facteur efficace autre que la force; ce que Marx n'ad-
mettait pas. (OL 208) 
It is a question again of the false harmony of opposites: 
Les anarchistes sinceres, entrevoyant a travers un 
brouillard le principe de l'union des contraires, ont cru 
qu'en donnant la domination aux opprimes ont. detruit le 
mal. (C3 284) 
The mere reversal of historical roles cannot however destroy 
1This passage and Simone Weil's criticism of Marxism are 
commented on in Dufresne, op. cit., PP• 152-5. 
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evil because it denies the transcendent element: 
La mauvaise union des contraires, mauvaise parce 
que mensongere, est celle qui se fait sur le plan ou 
sent lea contraires. L'union authentique est sur le 
plan au-dessus. (C3 284) 
In this particular case 1 ce qui est au-dessus de la domination 
est le point d 1 unite, c•est-a-dire la limitation de la puis-
sance 1 (C3 285). 
Marx evidently felt the need for the transcendent element, 
and by denying its existence while making use of it, albeit 
illegizimately, he involved himsel~n a fundamental contra-
diction: 
Le materialisme revolutionnaire de Marx consiste 
en somme a poser, d'une part que la force seule regle 
exclusivement lea rapports sociaux, d 1 autre part qu•un 
jour les faibles, tout en demeurant les faibles, seraient 
quand meme les plus forts. 11 croyait au miracle sans 
croire au surnaturel. D1un po~nt de vue purement ratio-
naliste , si:'.l' en croi t au miracle, il vau t mieux croire 
aussi a Dieu. (OL 208) 
Marxist transformation of Hegel's original idea of the pro-
gress of Spirit through·_; the world into an ambiguous mater-
ialism above which Spirit still hovers is criticised in like 
terms by Raymond Aron: 
Ceux que n•eclaire pas la grace ont toujours eu 
peine a admettre la compatibilite entre le caractere 
intelligible de la totalite historique et le materialisme. 
On comprenait la coincidence finale de l 1 ideal et du 
reel, aussi longtemps que l 1 histoire elle-meme passait 
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pour le Progres de l'Esprit. Le materialisme meta-
physique, aussi bien que le materialisme historique, 
rend etrange, sinon: contradictoire, cette combinaison 
de necessite et de progres. Pourquoi cette ascension 
dans un monde livre aux forces naturelles? Pourquoi 
l'histoire dont la structure est commandee par lea 
rapports de production, devrait-elle aboutir a une 
societe sans classes? Pourquoi la matiere et l'econo-
mie nous apportent-elles la certitude que l'ut~pie 
s' accomplira ?1 
For Marx of course the reply was obvious: the historic 
mission of the proletariat was to bring about salvation through 
suffering. This was automatic and an article of faith; the 
laws of the dialectic could not be questioned. In addition, 
the 'negation of the negation', the self-abolition of the pro-
letariat which suffered as a negation of its own true self, 
would necessarily produce something positive; but whereas 
Simone Weil, with Aron, could accept the idea of the tendency 
·of Spirit to self-improvement and eventual perfection, there 
was nothing to suggest that matter contained within itself a 
similar tendency: 
Marx a pretendu "remettre sur sea pieds" la dia-
lectique hegelienne qu'il accusait d'etre "sens dessus dessous"; 
1L 1 0pium des intellectuels (Paris 1968), p. 157· Aron 
has clearly adapted for the title of this work Simone Weirs 
definition of Marxism as 'un opium du peuple', since the pass-
age where she refers to it thus, and Marx's original categor-
isation of religion as 'l'opium du peuple', are used as epi-
graphs to it. 
il a substitue la matiere a !'esprit comme moteur de 
l 1histoire; mais par un paradoxe extraordinaire, il a 
con~u l'histoire, a partir de cette rectification, comme 
s'il attribuait a la matiere ce qui est !'essence meme 
de !'esprit, une aspiration au mieux. (OL 65) 
Other writers have of course pointed out this contra-
diction. R. c. Tucker for instance has indicated the mean-
inglessness on purely rational grounds of expecting good to 
come out of evil: 
Capital becomes, therefore, the agency of capital's 
own destruction, and Hegel's notion of moral evil as the 
prime beneficent force on history lives on in Marxist 
thought. He sees in the dehumanization process itself 
the means of man's ultimate hUmanization. He entrusts 
to the force of greed that he recognises as absolutely 
evil the decisive responsibility for ensuring the triumph 
at the end of that which is constructive and good. 
As we have already seen, this for Simone Weil is a false 
resolution of opposites, false because made on the same plane 
as the opposites themselves. Harmony is sought in the chang-
ing, the transient: 
Il me semble qu 1il y a peu d'idees plus completement 
fausses. Chercher l'harm~nie dans le devenir, dans ce 
qui est le contraire de l'eternel. Mauvaise union des 
contraires. (C3 306) 
But although the philosophers of the nineteenth century exploited 
1Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge 1961), P• 223. 
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this notion, they by no means created it; in Simone Weil's 
eyes such an illusion goes back to the origins of Christianity 
and the idea of 'la pedagogie divine' (C3 305) with its corres-
ponding notion of spiritual progress. It is the Christian 
'notion d'histoire comme continuite dirigee' (C3 306) to which 
she objects, and which inspired Marx and Hegel. She puts it 
graphically thus: 'La grande erreur des marxistes et de tout 
de XIXe siecle a ete de croire qu'en marchant tout droit devant 
soi, on monte dans les airs' (C3 55). 
This protest against the whole nineteenth century concept 
of history is a very significant one, and needs to be set out 
in some detail, as it relates to a number of concepts funda-
mental to Simone Weil's thinking. As a criticism of the a1 
idea of God controlling history, it finds expressioqin her 
anti-Jewish sentiments (See II, §4}. God does not intervene 
in human events and change the laws governing the relationships 
between parti~les of matter according to a preordained, divine 
plan. This of course is only ano~er expression of her con-
viction of the remoteness of God, his essential tran~ndence 
(See I, §2). It is also a protest against the idea that what 
passes for right in this world of the relative bears any real 
·relationship to ·the Good. Popper makes the same protest: 
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The theor-y that God reveals Hi•self and His judge• 
~nt in history is indistinguishable from the theory 
that worldly sucqess is the ultimate judge and justif-
ieation of ou~ actions; it comes to the same thing as 
the•dootrine that history will judge, that is to say, 
that future might is right.l 
Histqry is written by the conquerors for both Simone We~l 
and Popper, and can na.$r be more ~ban the rec~rd of earthly 
c~nflict. In t~~ respect, it,is as idolatrous to.suppose 
that God reveals himeelfiiD histo~y as tq reject the idea of 
God and substitute a t.eleological philosophy ot secular his-
tory. Hegel's theory that God becomes God through self-act-
ualisation in history lays the foundation stone for the hist-
oricism of Merleau-Ponty--and incidentally of all existential 
thinking--when he says: 
Une philosophie de 1 1histoire suppos~ que l'histoire 
humaine n'est pas ~ne simple aomme de faits juxtaposes--
decisions et aveutures individuelles, idees, interets, 
inetitutioas--ma~s qu'elle eat, dans l'instant et dans 
la succession. une totalit6 en mo•vement vera un etat 
pr~vile1ie qui donne le sens de·l 1ensemble.2 
Hegel ie also partially responsible for the moral relativ-
ism of our time, for the idea that any event~or custom must be 
~. R. Popper, The Open $ooiety $Dd its Enemies, II: Th~ 
Bi&h Ti4e.of Prophecy (4th edn, London 1962), p~ 271. 
2M. Merleau-Ponty, Humani~e et terreur: Essai sur le 
probl&.e communiste (Paris 1947), pp. 165-6, quot. Aron, ~ 
oit., P• 2M. 
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judged in the light of the society of the time, and that no 
moral absolutes are possible. Simone Weil, with her per-
ception of the moral and spiritual value of certain ancient 
civilisations--the humanity of the Greeks, the mysticism of 
certain Chinese and Hindu texts (see PSO 58-9)--realised that 
the source of these different manifestations was the same in 
every case and that the moment in history at which they app-
eared was irrelevant: 
Autant lea fluctiuationa de la morale selon lea 
temps et lea pays sont evidentes, autant aussi il est 
evident que la morale qui precede directement de la 
mystique est une, identique, inalterable. • •• Cette 
morale est inalterable parce qu'elle est un reflet du 
bien absolu qui est situe hors de ce monde. (OL 211) 
~he was thus no easy prey either to moral relativism or 
to the idea of humanity's natural tendency to self-improvement. 
She would have appreciated Benda's comment on •tout un groupe 
de critiques litterairea, lesquela, devant un ouvrage et de 
leur propre aveu, cherchent bien moine s'il est beau que s'il 
e~t expressif des 11volontes··actuelles 11 , de "1' ame contempor-
aine 111 • 1 He quotes with obvious distaste the remark made 
by Barres: 
1J. Benda, La Trahison des clercs (Paris 1927), P• 124. 
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Voila que les professeurs en sont encore • • • a 
discuter sur la justice, la verite, quand tout homme qui 
se respecte sait qu'il faut s'en tenir a examiner si tel 
rapport est juste entre deux hommes determines, a une 
epoque determinee, dans des conditions specifiees.l 
Simone Weil's protest against the worship of history is 
manifested in yet another way: her concept of time. In 
contrast to those philosophies which find comfort in the idea 
of a final purpose, and which are prepared to accept W. ...... 
personal destruction so long as the individual spirit lives 
on in some greater collectivity, or to those who look to per-
sonal immortality in one form or another, Simone Weil is acute-
ly conscious of the limitations of human existence, and the 
impotence of man faced with the future. The idea that the 
future in some way belongs already to the present is a sin: 
'Le cri de l'orgueil c'est "l'avenir est a moi", sous quelque 
forme que ce soit. L1 humilite est la connaissance de la 
verite contraire• (CS 47). In fact, 'tous les peches sont 
des essais pour fuir le temps' (ibid.). God cannot in any 
way reveal himself in past history ~r in future progress, 
which is why a mediator is necessary: 'Un mediateur est neces-
1Ibid., p. 118, n. 1. 
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saire parce qu'il n'y a aucun rapport possible entre Dieu et 
le temps' (C2 162). Time is experienced as somet~ing essent-
ially painful; the desire for immortality is strong in man, 
and renunciation is immensely difficult. Renunciation is, 
precisely, submission to time, the acceptance of mortality 
(C2 122). The pain thus experienced is a purification: 
Accepter le temps, descendre dans le temps. 
de. plus douloureux pour la pensee? Il le faut. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Quoi 
Fais entrer le temps dans mon ame comme une croix, comme 
des clous. 
La mort des Stres chers est une purification, si on ne 
croit pas a leur immortalite. (C2 201) 
While transience and the tragedy of death can be a sign of 
submission to time, however, so can apparent endlessness. 
The disgust and exhaustion experienced in long physical toil 
can convey the burden of time just as effectively (C2 246). 
Both are means for overcoming time and entering into eternity: 
Duree. Quand la douleur et l'epuisement arrivent 
au point de faire naitre dans 1 1 ame le sentiment de la 
perpetuite, en contemplant cette perpetuite avec accep-
tation et amour, on est arrache jusqu'a l'eternite. 
Croix. (C2 217) 
The cross of Christ, symbol of suffering and of the meet-
ing-point of eternity with time, is usually seen b~ Simone 
Weil as a perpetual cosmic event rather than as a single occur-
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renee in history (see III, §7). Christ is 'l'etre dechire 
le long du temps' (C2 162), an archetypal figure whose sacri-
fice is continuous and eternal, an example of. Eliade's 'eternal 
1 
retour'. The attraction of this static concept for Simone 
Weil is obvious, the eternity of being contrasting with the 
frailty and mortality of becoming. That Eliade attaches the 
myth of 'l'eternel retour' to the Greeks, who thus sought to 
'satisfaire leur soif metaphysique de l"'ontittue" et du statique• 2 
only renders it more plausible since Simone Weil had learned 
early from Plato the value of absolute being as opposed to the 
world of change. This concept is essentially different from 
the Jewish idea of time taken over by Christianity, where the 
historical process is seen as all-important, and revelatory 
of the divine will (see I, §4). But for Simone Weil history 
could never reveal the purposes of God except in so far as 
the interplay of the forces governing the world were a sign 
of God's absence and therefore of his goodness (see I, §2). 
The idea of God's revelation in history was as foreign to 
her as Marx's march of history towards Communism and his mission 
~. Eliade, Le Mythe de l'eternel retour (Paris 1949). 
2Ibid., P• 133· 
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of the proletariat in the creation of a just society • 
• 
We must now turn back to Marx, and to what Simone Weil 
considered to be another, and perhaps the most important, 
aspect of his idolatry. He was not only a worshi~~f histo~y, 
convinced taat antagonisms could be resolved in the future: 
his idol was primarily society, the future society: 
Marx etait un idolatre. Son idolatrie avait pour 
objet la societe future; mais, comme tout idolatre a 
besoin d'un objet present, il la reportait sur la frac-
tion de la societe qu'il croyait sur le point d'operer 
la transl~rmation attendue, c'est-a-dire le proletariat. 
(OL 210) 
But in order to ensure that the prophecy was fulfilled, Marx 
was obliged to conceive of the actions of the proletariat not 
in relation to any absolute good, but in relation to the final 
end which for Marx had taken its place. The era of justice 
and righteousness which was the goal of society was also to 
ba its judge. In the light of this, anything which could 
bring about the promised end was right: 
Il regardait comme juste et bon, non pas ce qui 
apparait tel a un des esprits fausses par le mensonge 
social, mais exclusivement ce qui pouvait hater !'appari-
tion d'une societe sans mensonge; en revanche, dans ce 
domaine, tout ce qui est efficace, sans aucune exception, 
est parfaitement juste et bon, non pas en soi, mais rela-
tivement au but final. (OL 252) 
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This is the 'morale de groupe' which forbids the exercise of 
judgement upon itself, which, because it is literally 'beyond 
good and evir, is by definition right. Simone Weil defines 
it as the phenomenon of 'mise a part', by which shg means 
that the normal associations and relationships made between 
things are lacking in this instance. It is particularly 
common in anything concerning the collectivity: 
Notamment toutes lea fois qu'intervient le social, 
lea sentiments collectifs, guerra, haines nationales, 
de classes, patriotisme d'un parti, d'une Eglise etc. 
Tout ce qui est couvert du prestige de la chose sociale 
est mis dans un autre lieu que le reate et soustrait a 
certains rapports. (C2 311) 
Simone Weil recognised this as a psychological phenomenon 
common to all peoples at all times, but nevertheless links it 
with Marx's worship of society, of which this is an instance. 
She does not seem, however, to make much of a more conspicuous 
example, that is, Hegel. Her references to Hegel are limited 
to a few in connexion with Marx (e.g. C3 306, OL 47 & 65), and 
the approving observation of his idea of 'le corps rendu comme 
filiuide par !'habitude' (OL 121) applied to the submission of 
the body to the machine whic;it serves. But of his theories 
of the State and of his identification of the interests of the 
collectivity with right, there seems to be no mention. Hegel's 
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definition of the State as 'the self-certain absolute mind 
which acknowledges no abstract rules of good and bad, shame-
ful and mean, craft and deception• 1 is surely a supreme example 
of the tendency to 'mettre a part', to put things beyond the 
opposites of good and evil. 2 The declaration that 'the State 
is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. . . • We must there-
fore worship the State as the manifestation of the Divine on 
earth •• • •3 and that 'the State is the march of God through 
4 the world' surely means nothing if it is not an exhortation 
to social idolatry. It leads straight on to the idolatry 
1Hegel, System der Sittlichkeit, trans. Sterrett, § 258, 
quot. E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State (Yale 1946), p. 264. 
2Her comments on that other exponent of the principle 
'beyond good and evil', Nietzsche, are limited to a letter to 
Andre Weil, in which she admits that the philosopher inspires 
in her 'une Eepulsion invincible et presque physique•. This 
seems to be based on his 'orgueil sans mesure' and on his in-
comprehension of the Greeks, particularly their concept of pro-
portion and sense of the tragic in man's life. On Dionysos 
too, 'il s'est completement trompe • • •• La demesure, l'i-
vresse~ cosmique, et Wagner n'ont rien a voir la-dedans' (SS 
231-2, and variants pp. 240-1 & 247-8). 
3Hegel,'Theories of the State' (from Hegel, Selections 
ed. J. Loewenberg, 1929), quot. Popper, op. cit., p. }1. 
4Ibid •• 
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present in the concept of the modern totalitarian State, where 
the religious character of the State removes it not only from 
all criticism, but from all possibility of being wrong. As 
Aron, writing this time about the Communist party, puts it: 
L'histoire du parti est l'histoire sacree, qui abou-
tira a la redemption de l'hUmanite. Comment le parti 
pourrait-il participer des faiblesses inherentes aux 
muvres profanes? Tout homme, meme bolchevik, peut se 
certaine/ tremper. Le parti, d'une/fa~on, ne peut ni ne doit se 
trompel' puisqu'il dit et accomplit la verite de l'His-
toire. 
The notion that the party by definition can do no wrong 
must inevitably be attributed in essence to Hegel. And this 
is surely one of the most revealing manifestations of what we 
have termed idolatry. For to Simone Weil idolatry was always 
of a social nature, was alw~ys concerned in one way or another 
with the pressures of society upon the individuals which com-
pose it: 'L'objet du veritable crime d'idolatrie est toujours 
quelque chose d'analogue a l'Etat' (E 103). Simone Weil's 
definition of idolatry here has much in common with George 
Orwell's definition of nationalism: 
1Aron, op. cit., P• 160. Sartre makes use of the idea 
that the party is an end in itself, rather than merely a means 
to power, in the conflict established between Hugo and Hoeder.er 
in Lea Mains sales. See e.g. 5e tableau, sc. 3· 
17L 
By 'nationalism' ••• I mean the habit of iden-
tifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, 
placing it beyon4 good and evil and recognising no other 
duty than that of advancing its interests.! 
Before him, Benda had strongly criticised the prevalence of 
the same phenomenon: 
L'Etat, la Patrie, la Classe sont aujourd'hui fran-
chement Dieu; on peut meme dire que pour beaucoup (et 
plusieurs s'en font gloire) ils sont seuls Dieu. L'hu-
manite,par sa pratique actuelle des passions politiques, 
exprime qu'elle devient plus realiste, plus exclusiveme~t 
realiste et plus religieusement qu'elle n'a jamais ete. 
But long before ei~her of them, Plato had depicted what 
Simone Weil considered to be the archetype of the object of 
social idolatry: the Great Beast of the Republic (VI, 493). 
Plato's image of the collective as an animal whom its masters 
(i.e. the leaders) attempt to pacify by studying its moods 
and habits is expanded by Simone Weil into a symbol of uni-
versa! import; it is perhaps legitimate to ask whether she 
does not, in fact, make too much of it by inter~ting the 
animal as society in general. It is surely valid to see in 
Plato's image merely his aversion for the form of democracy 
1 
'Notes on Nationalism', Collected Essays, Journalism 
And Letters, III,(London 1968), P• 362. 
2 Op. cit., P• 52. 
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which was being practised in Athens at the time, and which 
was responsible for Socrates' death. Themimal is then 
merely the masses, the unruly mob with its collective instincts 
and fic·kle sympathies. The whole art of government is to 
study the .._ psychology of the mob in order to be able to 
keep it under the control of the leaders. 1 
Be that as it may, Simone Weil clearly attaches great im-
portance to this image, and refers to it constantly throughout 
her writings. In the commentary on this section of the Rep-
ublic, she notes two main points (SG 91): firstly that the 
opinions of the 'gros animal' are not necessarily contrary to 
truth. B t th t • 11 I • • I 2 u ey are essen ~a y op~n~ons , that is, 
1This interpretation tallies with Demosthenes' use of 
the same image, though this is not necessarily significant. 
Addressing the people of Athens, he analyses their troubles 
and says of their leaders: 'They have mewed you up in the city 
and entice with these baits, that thez m~y keep you tame and 
subservient to the whip.' ot d'~v a6TQ ~v wbAe~ Ka9ate~v~E~ 
U~U~ ~n&youa~v ~nl ~aU~ Kal ~~9aOebo~ XE~po~SE~~ aU~o~~ no~ou~E~. 
(3rd Olynthiac, 31) 
Shakespeare uses the same image in Corialanus, .._ 4. 1. 
2
simone Weil's concept of 'opinion' is an interpretation 
of Plato's epistemology. See Republic, VI, 509-11 and VII, 
514-8. It is presumably influenced by that of Alain, who 
warns against .'la puissance des illusions, surtout collectives' 
(Propos sur la religion, p. 71) •. 
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judgements which have been formed as a result of social pres-
sures, and thus, while theJ may sometimes concur with the 
truth, they are quite unrelated to it. Simone Weil gives 
the following example: 'Si on a envie de voler et quton se 
retienne, il y a une grosse difference entre se retenir par 
obeissance au gros animal ou par obeissance aDieu' (SG 91). 
The second point concerns the difficulty of distinguish-
ing the motive for an action, of knowing wk*•• whether it is 
inspired by God or the 'gros animal', since we are so utterly 
XkK under the influence of the latter. 'En fait tout ce qui 
contribue a notre education consiste exclusivement en choses 
qui a une epogie ou a une autre ont ete approuvees par le 
gros animal' (SG 91; Simone Weil'~talics). She gives as 
an example 
L'histoire; les hommes dont le nom est parvenu 
jusqu'a nous ont ete rendus celebres par le gros animal. 
Ceux qu~il ne rend pas celebres restent inconnus et.de 
leurs contemporains et de la posterite, (ibid.) 
an illustration of the worship of history discussed earlier 
1 in this chapter. 
1
rt is interesting to compare this with Popper's passion-
ate denunciation of what is normally taught as history, and 
which, in his view, is 'nothing but the history of international 
crime and mass murder', leaving aside 'the life of the forgotten, 
of the unknown individual man; his sorrows and joys, his suff-
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Given this insistence on the social nature of idolatry, 
it is interesting to note that Simone Weil's references to the 
Devil are almost invariably linked with social temptations. 
She frequently cites the temptation of Christ by the Devil, 
where the kingdoms of the world are offered to him, as the 
supreme temptation (SG 90, IP 76, PSO 55, etc.; Matt. iv. 8-
10) and in the commentary on the passage of the Republic dis-
cussed above as in an essay on Marxism (OL 236) this episode 
is associated with the 'gDos animal'. Power is the gift of 
the Devil (CS 282) because it creates the illusion of omni-
potence, the illusion that limits do not obtain, and so the 
Devil is, in another sense, infinity (C3 287). 1 His power 
is such that the social temptation is much more difficult to 
ering and death ••• all the history which exists, our history 
of the Great and the Powerful, is at best a shallow comedy; it 
is the opera buffa played by the powers behind reality •••• 
It is what one of our worst instincts, the idolatrous worship 
of power, of •success, has led us to believe to be real' (~ 
cit., PP• 270, 272). This comparison is the more fascinating 
in the light of Popper's attack on Plato as the father of mod-
ern totalitarianism, in the fist volum of this work. In spite 
of this, it is clear that he and Simone Weil had much in common. 
1This is an interpretation of Simone Weil' s note 'si l·.·.est 
Dieu, o( est le diable' (C3 287), coupled with the idea that 
'on echappe ala limite en montant a l'unite ou en descendant 
dans l'illimite' (C3 140). 
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overcome than the temptations of the flesh. It is in this 
sense that Simone Weil interprets Plato and St. Paul: 
Platon 
sociale est 
chir que la 
O!iest aussi 
n 1 y a pas a 
• • •• 
sentait surtout tres vivement que la matiere 
un obstacle infiniment plus difficile a fran-
chair proprement dite entre l'ame et le bien. 
la pensee chretienne. Saint Paul dit qu'il 
lutter contre la chair, mais co~tre le diable 
(OL 236) 1 
It is the devil who e~loits the collective instinct: 
La chair pousse a dire !2i et le diable pousse a 
dire ~; ou bien a dire, comme les dictateurs, i! 
avec une signification collective. Et, conformement 
a sa mission propre, le diable fabrique une fausse imi-
tation du divin, de 1 1 ersatz de divin. (AD 22-3) 
This false divinity in which the devil clo.thes the collectivity 
gives the illusion that society is somehow transcendent to the 
individual, that it is an absolute on earth: 
Il n'y a sur terre qu 1une seule chose qu 1il est en 
fa~t possible de prendre pour fin, parce que cela a une 
espece de ·transcendence a l'egard d~a personne humaine, 
c'est le collectif. (C3 205) 
Characteristically, she finds reality in an inversion of this: 
'Chacun est dans la societe l'infiniment petit qui represente 
l'ordre transcendant au social eat infiniment plus grand' (C3 
84). Once again true strength, strength which is not of this 
" 
1Presumably a reference to Ephesians vi. 11-12. 
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world, is to be found in the apparently weak and insignificant. 
It will make no conquest on earth, but it is the only path to 
a knowledge of the Good. 
• 
Given Simone Weil's views on social idolatry, and the 
power of collective values over the individual, it is not 
surprising that she should take exc~ption to Durkheim and his 
sociological school. There are only a few references to 
Durkheim in Simone Weil's writings, but they have rather more 
significance than this would suggest, both to a study of Si-
mone Weil and the general intellectual atmosphere of the time. 
's 
Firstly she considers th~t Durkheim/theories do in fact 
contain an element of truth, in that they expose the difficulty 
of distinguishing between true religion and.:.idolatry: 
Si stupide que soit la theorie de Durkheim con-
fondant le religieux avec le social, elle enferme pour-
tant une verite; a savoir que le sentiment social res-
semble a s'y meprendre au sentiment religieux. Il y 
ressemble comme un diamant faux a un diamant vrai, de 
maniere a faire meprendre effectivement ceux qui ne 
possedent pas le discernement surnaturel. (AD 15)1 
1It is important to note that in this passage Simone Weil 
is not objecting to the use of religious terminology in the 
evaluation of society; in her equation of society with the 
Devil, and in her use of the idea of mediation through society 
(III, §5), she does the same thing. 'Le religieux' in this 
passage must be taken to mean God, the transcendent good which 
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The feeling that the individual is only a part of a greater 
whole, and yet is unable to encompass with his intelligence 
the society to which he belongs creates an illusion of simi-
larity between the social and the supernatural; Simone Weil 
is thus ready to excuse Durkheim his error, at least to a 
certain extent (Cl 207). 
But his theory of the God whom men worship being an ex-
tension of the primitive tribe's projection of itself is in 
many ways based on the flimsiest of evidence. Why &hould 
we accept, for instance, his assertion that society is the 
highest reality in the intellectual and mora~rder that we 
can know by observation?1 Is it really correct to say that 
the division of time into units--days, months, years etc.--
2 is a social phenomenon? Surely the social phenomena involved, 
and the celebrating of festivals and such like, are simply man's 
is utterly other than society. Nor is any harmony possible 
between God and the Devil, since they are not on the same plane 
(the opposites are resolved 'en montant a 1 1unite (God) ou en 
descendant dans l'illimite (the Devil)' (C3 140)). 
1Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse (2e edn revue 
Paris 1925), P• 23. 
2Ibid., P• 15. 
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adaptation to what he finds around him? The phases of the 
moon and the succession of the seasons can hardly be attrib-
uted to man as a social being. 
In addition, in discussing the influence of society 
upon its members, he seems to make no distinction between 
the sort of momentary mass hysteria which can lead a group 
of people to do something which they would not normally do, 1 
and the traditions and culture oi a society which exercise 
a constant influence upon all who form part of it. 2 This is 
the very distinction which Simone Weil makes between the evil 
influence of society, that which leads to idolatry, and that 
which in a society leads to the concept of 'enraciaement' 
(see III, §5). Imogen Seger, in a review of Durkheim's 
position, says that if he had known of the concept of 'cul-
ture'as later developed by American anthropologists, he would 
have used it in many instances where he used the wprd 'societe', 
and thus have saved himself many misunderstandings.3 
1op. cit., PP• 300.1. 
2Ibid., PP• 303-4. 
He seems 
3nurkh~im and his Critics on the Sociology of Religion 
(Columbia Univ., 1957), p. 34. 
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only too ready, nevertheless, to equate the collective element 
in crowd phenomena and that in the 'collective unconsciousness', 
to borrow Jung's term. Simone Weil 1 s idea of the apparent 
weakness and real strength of the individual in the face of 
0 s~iety is taken up by Essertier in a comparison between 'l'lme 
de la foule' and 'la conscience collective': 
L'ame de la foule, si on l'etudie sans parti-pris, 
revele precisement des caracteres opposes a ceux qu'on 
attribue a la conscience collective: il ~ a moine dans 
le tout que dans les parties et il n'y a pas autre chose. 
Par rapport aux individus qui la compose, une foule est 
toujours une diminution, une soustraction; elle repre-
sente une complexite psychologique moindre et meme mini-
ma; son originalite n'est qu'apparente ou 1 tout au plus, 
superficielle.l 
But to the individual this is by no means obvious, and 
for Simone Weil it is only too easy for the individual to 
feel that the apparently transcendent reality forming the soc-
ial element is in fact transcendent. 'Le sentiment social 
de Durkheim, s'il n'est pas le sentiment religieux, en est 
bien reellement un ersatz' {C2 130). False transcendence, 
embodied in the collective, is thus identified with the Devil; 
as indicated in a cryptic note: 'Le Diable est le collectif. 
1Paychologie et sociolo~ie, essa~ de bibliographie cri~ 
tigue (Paris 1927), pp. 17-1 • Quot. Seger, op. cit., p. 23. 
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(C'est la divinite de Durkheim)' (CS 272). Aron has the 
sa~e difficulty in beleving in the truly transcendent nature 
of Durkheim's divinity. As he says, 
Il me parait proprement inconcevable de definir 
l'essence de la religion par l'adoration que l'individu 
voue au groupe car, au moins a mea yeux, l'adoration de 
1 1 ordre social est precisement de l'impiete. Poser 
que les sentiments religieux ont pour objet la societe 
transfiguree, ce n'est pas sauver, c'est degrader l'ex-
perience humaine dont la sociologie veut rendre compte.l 
The idea of social idolatry at which we thus arrive is 
something akin to Popper's definition of totalitarianism as 
'the closed society'--society contemplating its navel. rfuile 
it would be rash to assert that Durkheim's theories had any 
influence on the modern development of the totalitarian State, 
it is perhaps justifiable to call him a product of his age. 
Imogen Seger comments on the putting into practice of some of 
his theories, and the transformation they underwent in the 
process: 
Durkheim's thesis that a religion to fulfil all 
its essential functions, does not need other gods than 
society, is being tried out experimentally on a gr~nd 
scale in our time. Not, however, in the scientific 
manner Durkheim envisaged. The new authorities which 
replace the old transcendent authority are by no means 
1Les Etapes de la p~nsee sociologique (Paris 1967), P• 361. 
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the •real society' which encompasses'ideal society' and 
which Durkheim wanted to find and to define by scientific 
investigation. They are on the contrary a mythically 
clouded biological concept, 'people' or 'race' 1 or the 
eschatological image of the perfect classless society to 
be achieved via the Communist state. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Durkheim did not contribute to the apotheosis of 
the socialist society which began in Russia some five 
years after the publication of £es Formes elementaires, 
but the two events are related products of a leading 
trend of the age.l 
A survey of the development of totalitarianism as Simone 
Weil saw it, and a study of the theoretical notion of social 
idolatry put into practice will therefore be both pertinent 
and illuminating. 
• 
1op. cit., PP• 53-4 & 72. 
II, §2 
i'OTALI TARIANISl-1 I : 
ROME & 'LE ROI SOLEIL' 
The totalitarian State as \·te kno\"1 it in the tl'rentieth century 
is generally considered to ba a modern phenomenon, differing 
from previous autocratic regimes in several important respects. 
This is not to say that it does not have roots in the past; 
\"tri ters differ considerably in thei:b search for the origins of 
totalitarianism, but most are prepared to make comparisons 
with either ancient autocracies or more modern theories of the 
State. It is ironic indeed, when we think of Simone \oleil' s 
great love for Plato, that he should have been considered by 
Popper to have outlined the first totalitarian State in his 
Republic; 1 ironic again that Rousseau, \'lhom Simone \rleil 
thought to be one of the greatest exponents of the principle 
of individual liberty, should be held responsible for the 
ideas·: that hardened into totalitarianism over a century later. 
We shall be considering Simone \oleil' s interpre-tation of Rous-
seau in the next chapter; but for the moment perhaps it would 
be as well to attempt some sort of definition of totalitarianism, 
so as to have a focal point from which to examine Simone \•leil' s 
1K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London 
1952). Simone \rleil \tould of course have scorned such an inter-
pretation since, following Alain, she did not consider the 
Republic to be a political treatise but a dialogue on the comp-
osition and development of the human soul (see SG 105). 
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developme~t of the concept. 
A useful etarting-point oan be found in the definition 
given by i'r:l.eclrioh and Brzez:I.Qkl, who· prea4tlit a c:lear idea 
. . 
of what they mean ~y t~ term in statins six features common 
to all totalit~ian States~ 
·The •arndroae•, or pattern of inte~relate4 traits, 
~t th~ totalitar1aD ~1~tato~ehip .consists of, an 1deologJ 1 
a sin;1e p~ty typiQallf led by one maa, a ter~orist 
police, .a communication• monopolJi a weapons monopoly, 
and a centrally directed ecoao~. 
They go on to say, however, that these alWQ1S form an organie 
system where totalitarianism is concerned, and warn ef taking 
one individual trait, applying it to a "s7ttem or regime, and 
concluding it is totalitarian. Since it is a tact that no 
anc1eat autocracy ever contained all these features--for exam-
ple, the Roman· emperors had no need ot a party or an ideology 
to support them2--they conclude that totalitarianism is a 
modern phenomenon • 
. Sbone Weil has, :Laevi t•bl.J, a less acade~ic approach, 
1ear1 J. Friedrich & Zbip.iew K. Brzezinski • Totalitarian 
D1ctatorsh1f and. Autpcracy (~b~ldge,_ MaQa. 1956), P• 9· 
a· fhis olaim.rather leaves aside tbe whole question of the 
relationship betweea religion and the State in Rome. 
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and her analysis is on several points at variance with this 
definition. For her the concept is closely linked with that 
of the 'gros animal', the Great Beast representing the sum of 
collective values and the annihilation of the individual, and 
as such is capable of appearing at all times and in any age. 
Its principal concern is existence, and since the existence of 
anything else is intolerable, existence means unlimited expan-
sion: 
Le gros animal a pour fin l'existence. 'Je suis 
celui qui suis 1 • Il le dit aussi. Il lui suffit 
d 1 exister, mais il".ne peut ni concevoir ni admettre 
qu'autre chose existe. Il est toujours totalitaire. 
(C3 312) 
Totalitarianism means total surrender or death. Hannah Arendt 
considers imperialism to be an e:<:ample of this kind of unlim-
•t d . 1 ~ e expans~on. Expansion is a built-in law of capitalism, 
and when this reached national boundaries it was inevitable 
that the businessman should-turn politician and direct his 
gaze outwards towards territories giving scope for further 
. 2 
expans~on. Totalitarianism is essentially dynamic, con-




cerned l'rith self-preservation at the expense of all opposition. 
But while it is constantly outward-looking in its desire 
to exterminate opposition, the totalitarian State is also 
essentially narcissistic; for Simone Weil it l·ras merely an 
extreme form of social idolatry. T~e State becomes an abso-
lute, absorbing all spiritual values at the same time as it 
saps the vital energy of the individuals subjected to it. 
The first manifestation in history of the spirit of social 
idolatry was to be found in the Hebrew people; we have dealt 
with this in a separate chapter (II, §4). Then came the 
Romans, particularly the Romans at the founding of the Empire; 
it is these whom we must now consider, bearing in mind Fried-
rich and Brzezinski's definition of totalitarianism, and the 
fact that they do not consider the Romans to l~ve formed a 
totalitarian State. Later we shall turn to what S1mone Weil 
held to be other manifestations of the totalitarian spirit: 
the development of the modern State under Richelieu and Louis 
XIV, the imperial designs of Napoleon and later imperialism, 
and finally modern totalitarianism in the guise of Fascism and 
Communism, which Simone vleil had observed at first hand • 
... 
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Simone Weil's di~taste for ancient Rome and all it repre-
sented, and her a~most complete rejection of the fruits of 
Roman civilisation, are well known. The whole idea of a 
Roman 'civilisation' appears to her as a giant hoax. Rome 
has succeeded in convincing the \vestern world of its enormous 
debt to her simply by exterminating all cultural activity 
flourishing before her arrival. The Romans' physical and 
spiritual rootlessness has resulted in the uprooting of the 
Mediterranean world: 
Les Remains etaient une poignee de fugutifs qui se 
sent agglomeres artificiellement en une cite; et ils 
ont prive les populations mediterraneennes de leur vie 
propre, de leur patrie, de leur tradition, de leur passe, 
a un tel degre que la poster~te les a pris, sur leur 
propre parole, pour les fondateurs de la civilisation 
sur ces territoires. (E 48) 
It is significant that 'deracinement' is, in Simone lr/eil' s 
analysis, the greatest ill of modern Europe, significant too 
the scorn which she pours on the Romans' 'deracinement'. It 
is of course not the fact of their being 'deracines' which 
ex:cites her anger, but their audacity in claiming to impose a 
civilisation on conquered peoples. There is no civilisation 
where there is rootlessness. She implies as much in the 
following comme_nt on the Romans' lack of spirituality: 'Peut-
etre un seul peuple antique absolument sans mystique: Rome. 
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Par quel mystere? Cite artificielle faite de fugitifs 
( C2 240-1). In her assignment of a spiritual vocation to 
each people of antiquity, the Romans are excluded (SG 77). 
Genuine spirituality was unknown in Rome, at least before the 
influence of Christianity laid a thin veneer of civilisation 
over its barbarity: 'Lea Remains fure"bt. completement sourds et 
aveugles a tout ce qui est spirituel, jusqu'au jour ou ils 
furent plus ou.:moins humanises par le bapteme chretien' (AD 
Else\'lhere hm'lever she denies the very possibility of 
Rome's baptism: 'Entre l'esprit de Rome et celui du Christ il 
n'y a jamais eu fusion' (E 125). 
These are hard words indeed, and paradoxical when we con-
sider the importance of the Rowan tradition in the development 
of Christianity. Some points are easier to understand than 
others, however. lf.lhen Simone \"leil accuses the Romans of fre-
quent cruelty and treachery in their methods of conquest, we 
know what she is talking about, since the histoi.ical records 
1 
are there. The account of the siege of Numantia, for example, 
1Dufresne emphasises the historical acceptability of the 
material she used: 'Ses propos lea plus severes sur les Remains 
s'appuient sur des textes dont l'authenticite est certaine et 
sur des faits historiques qui semblent incontestables.~ ~ 
cit., p. 213. 
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gives ample proof of cold-blooded resistance to any humanitar-
a. ian considerations, any disp~ of courage or loyalty by the 
Numantines and their allies, and the most blatant treachery 
and lack of honour. A complete account of the siege can be 
found in Appian, 1 and Simone Weil uses his record for her own 
comments in her article on the origins of Hitlerism (EH 32-3). 
What appalled her particularly about the cruelty of the Romans 
was that it was a matter of calculated policy, adopted because 
it brought results: 
Nul n'a jamais egale les Remains dans l'habile usage 
de la cruaute. Quand la cruaute est l'effet d'un caprice, 
d'une sensibilite malade, d'une colere, d'une haine, elle 
a souvent des consequences fatales a qui y cede; la 
cruaute froide, calculee et qui constitue une methode, 
la cruaute qu'aucune instabilite d'humeur, aucune conside-
ration de prudence, de respect ou de pitie ne peut temperer, 
a laquelle on ne peut esperer echapper ni par le courage, 
la dignite et l'energie, ni par la soumission, les suppli-
cations et les larmes, une telle cruaute est un instrument 
incomparable de domination. (EH 28) 
Thus it was that the Numantines' repeated offers for battle 
were met by a continuatiory6f the siege; the capitulation of 
"' the Carthaginians met not by clemency but by the destl,(ction of 
their city. 
1n· t . VI § l.S orl.a romana, , xv. 
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It is sometimes argued that, when once the initial con-
quest had been made, the Romans exerted no direct pressure on 
the newly conquered peoples to 1 Romanise•. 1 This may be true 
is a sense, but it is certain that moral blackmail was imposed 
by the system of re\'lards by titles and honours for increased 
iderlity with Roman ideals. In the sa~e way, French colonial 
policy was not to punish directly the colonised peoples for 
not accepting a French way of life, but to make the rewards to 
the successful 'evolue' so great that no man of ambition would 
be able to withstand them. A similar system has existed in 
Russia in the post-Stalin era with regard to the Christian 
Church: profession of Christianity is punished only indirectly, 
by making membership of the party and consequent social advance-
ment incompatible with it. 
Even worse tha~ the actual cruelty, every atrocity perpe-
trated by the Romans was accompanied by protestations of clem-
ency: 'Ils ne commet taien t jamais de c-ruau tes, ils n 1 ac cordaien t 
jamais de faveur, sans vanter dans les deux cas leur generosite 
1 See e.g. Camille Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule 1 (Paris 
1929), VI, 53: 'LRom~ a propose en example ses institutions 
et ses mceurs, elle ne les a pas imposees.' 
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et leur clemence' (E 123) thus making the recipient indebted 
to them for brutality as for concessions. Simone Weil admits 
that Athens too dealt harshly at times with her subject peoples. 
At least this was never thought of as something to be proud of, 
but merely the necessary course of politics: 
Sans doute Athenes eut des velleites d'imperialisme 
qui firent d'ailleurs sa perte; et il s'en faut de beau-
coup que la perfidie et la cruaute ait ete absente de sa 
politique. l·1ais personne • • • ne regardait de telles 
pratiques comme etant, du point de vue de la morale, 
louables ou indifferentes •••• (EH 52) 
But what of Roman influence on the cities and peoples 
once they were conquered ? Here we are on much less firm 
ground, because to a certain extent we are inside the Roman 
tradition a11d have little evidence of 'IThat went before in 
order to assess the degree of civilisation destroyed or brought 
by Rome. And all evidence, as Simone Weil says, is essentially 
presented from the Roman point of view: 'Sur les Remains, on 
ne ~ossede absolument rien d'autre que les ecrits des Remains 
eux-memes et de leurs esclaves grecs' (E 192). Why should we 
bother to question their testimony? There is no incentive to 
do so, she adds, since 'ce ne sont pas les Carthaginois qui 
disposent des pri~ de l'Academie ni des chaires en Sorbonne' 
(ibid.). An exaggeration perhaps, particularly as she com-
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pletely ignores Josephus' account of the Romans, but she makes 
her point. It is a pity however that she does not seem to 
have known of some of the questionings of the value of Roman 
civilisation which were going on at the time. She often 
gives the impression that she is fighting a lone battle against 
prejudice, and needing to use exaggeration and over-emphasis 
to make her point. Victor Chapot, for example, is far from 
unaware of the drawbacks of the Roman influence. In comment-
ing on the effects of Roman occupation on Gaulj he says it pro-
duced 
a society that was merely polished and refined, very 
much preoccupied with its own comfort but very little 
influenced by any lofty ideal. Its religion was sceptic-
ism allied to ritualistic formulae and conventional 
practices. Its sentiments were not, as a rule, wicked 
or hateful, but rather mean and co~nonplace.l 
His analysis of the price paid for the comforts of civilj.sation 
by the subject peoples would surel;y: have been \t.relcomed by Simone 
Weil: 
\rlherever this culture struck root it v.ras dearly paid 
for. By imposing her own ideas and usages, and the style 
of decoration in which her own life was lived, Rome finally 
destroyed the people's souls and nipped in the bud original 
1The Roman World, tran$. E. A. Parker (London 1928), p. 322. 
193 
civilisations which would have developed. The world 
never needed a uniform mould, a cosmopolitan human type, 
produced at the cost of intelligence, which could only 
yield commonplace results--as is proved conclusively by 
the exa@ple of Rome.l 
Simone Weil did hm·1ever know of the criticism of JulliaU,, who, 
\iri ting at the same time, is sceptical as to the p·ermanent 
2 
value of the Roman occupation in the civilisation of Europe. 
While it is difficult to establish what might have developed 
in the territories occupied by Rome, other regions which never 
formed part of the Empire have not exactly remained in utter 
darkness: 
Les beautes de l'Iliade et les le~ons de Socrate, 
le droit ecrit, la vie municipale, le travail industr±~l, 
la morale chretienne sont arrives a la moitie de l'Europe 
sans qu'elle ait ete annexee par Cesar ou par Charlemagne, 
et je ne m'aper~ois pas qu'elle ait denature les le~ons 
du Hidi en ne les recevant pas de maitres armes.3 
Simone Weil clearly appreciated such criticism. Her ob-
jections to the idea that Gaul was a cultural desert before the 
arrival of the Romans are set out in L'Enracinement (189-90); 
in default of much concrete evidence of pre-Roman Gallic civil-
1 Chapot, op. cit., p. 424. 
2
simone "lt/eil mentions Jullian in E 191. 
3Jullian, on. cit., p. 522. 
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isation she calls the Druids to \•Iitness the level of culture 
of the times. Since \·le kn01r1 through Julius Caesar's account 
that the studies of the Druids lasted twenty years, she con-
eludes that there must have been a wealth of material in the 
form of religious and metaphysical poems for them to study 
during so long a period. 1 The Druids are often mentioned by 
Simone i·'ieil as an example of the Romans 1 lack of toleration; 
they were necessarily eliminated as a spiritual danger to the 
central authority: 
Les Remains ne pouvaient rien tolerer qui fut riche 
en contenu spirituel. L'amour de Dieu est un feu dan-
1J.J. Tierney is more sceptical concerning the 'studies' 
of the Druids, although he is of course speaking of a rather 
earlier time: ·~·ie kno\'r that the Celts at this period, say 
80 BC, were still practising divination by human sacrifice, 
and preserving the skulls of slain enemies by nailing them 
as trophies to the porches of their houses. Is it possible 
that they were at the same time living on the rarefied levels 
of Greek philosophy? • • • The alleged studies of the Druids 
are simply a programme of Stoic philosophy including some of 
their specific doctrines such as that of the periodic destruct-
ion of the universe by fire or water •••• • ~The Celtic 
:ii:thnography of Posidonius' (Proceedings of the Hoyal Irish 
Academy 1960), p. 223, quot. Anne Ross, Pagan Celtic Britain 
(London & New York 1967), p. 56. · Simone ~·leil of course 
considered the material of their studies to be native products 
of literature and .philosophy. 
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gereux dont le contact pouvait etre funeste a leur mise-
rable divin.isation de l'esclavage. Aussi ont-ils impi-
toyablement detruit la vie spirituelle sous toUes ses 
formes. • •• Ils ont extermine tous les Druides de 
Gaule, anean·ti les cul tes egyptians • • •• (E 232-3) 
It is important to note holftever that although Simone vieil 
supposes the spiritual contribution of the Druids to Celtic 
life to have been considerable, she is not categorical on this 
point, and is very little tainted by the romantic elaborations 
of the Druids' role still prevalent at the time. She conceded 
that human sacrifice may well have been practised among the 
Druids, but compares ritual or punitive sacrifice ,_.!i th the 
Roman practice of gladiator fighting for the amuse::nent of the 
rabble (E 190). tihe recognises too the political nature of 
the extermination of tile Druids: they were wiped ott, she says, 
'pour crime de patriotisme' (ibid.). It is clear from Roman 
commentators and modern scholarship that the Druids \-"lere in 
fact a polit~cal power, the centre of Celtic resistance to 
the Romans, and as such a menace to the Roman Imperial po\'ler. 1 
1
see e.g. Anne Ross, op. cit., pp. 52 ff. Also Jullian, 
op. cit., p. 4: '• •. aucune des mesures prises contre ces 
prgtres ne menac,rai101t leurs dieux et leurs dogmes. Il s'agis-
sait pour l'Etat de mettre fin a une societe religieuse qui 
avait fait corps avec la patrie et la liberte gauloises •••• 
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Thus Roman religious 'tolerance' was essentially political in 
nature, since it allo\<Ied to exist only those institutions vthich 
were innocuous to the central authority: 'On a dit que Lles 
Romain~ etaient tolerants. Ils toleraient en effet toutes 
les pratiques religieuses vides de contenu spirituel' (E 232). 
For example, 'les Remains pouvaient facilement tolerer le culte 
de Nithra, orientalisme truque pour snobs et femmes oisives' 
(ibid.). This is perhaps a harsh if amusing judgement on a 
cult vrhich after all challenged Christianity for a short period 
of time, but it is perfectly true to say that it \·ras compatible 
with imperial \'lOr ship. 
The fact was of course, and .. .amone '.ieil su\·t this very vrell, 
th~t \·rith the increasing centralisation of the i1oman Entpire, 
and the intensification of the State cult, all forms of religion 
became l!>ubordinate to the worship of the Emperor. There is 
a curious ambiguity in the Roman imperial \'iorsllip. On the one 
hand it l..ras purely political, a \'lay of cementing .loyalty to a 
central authority, and appealing to an authority higher than 
hu~an to render it valid. On the other hand the Roman ~mpire, 
as Simone Weil points out, appropriated all religious and spirit-
ual values to itself i11 the figure of the Emperor. The mere 
practice of deification is by no means confined to the Romans, 
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and the idea certainly did not originate in Rome, although 
1 Frazer attempted to prove that it was native to Italy. 
Bailey considers it to be simply a degradation in the concept 
of anthropomorphism, and a political rather than a religious 
measure: 
The picture it gave was not of a figure of supreme 
moral or spiritual worth, but that of a wielder of 
supreme power in the2State: it was a political not a personal apotheosis. 
The fact that Simone Weil did not object particularly 
to the deification of the Egyptian rulers, for example, in-
dicates that it was not the actual idea of deification which 
she could not accept, but rather the totalitarian concepts 
which in Rome went with it. The Roman Empire waa totalit-
arian because it demanded·a complete allegiance and a sacri-
fice of spiritual freedom which a temporal authority has no 
right to demand (Cf also AD 5Q). In its total demands, as 
1The Golden Bough (abaridged edn, London 1949), Chap. 13. 
w. Warde Fowler claims that the only obvious trace of divine 
kingship is to be found in the taboos of the Flamen Dialis. 
See Roman Ideas of Deity in the last century before the Chris-
tian e~a (London 1914), p. 96. 
2c. Bailey, Phases~.in the Religion of Ancient Rome (Lon-
don 1932), P• 141. 
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we shall see later, Simone Weil likens it to Nazism: 'L'Em-
pire remain etait un regime totalitaire et grossierement 
materialiste, fonde sur !'adoration exclusive de l'Etat, 
comme le nazisme' (LR 84). It was not simply an adoration 
of God through the medium of the State, but rather a question 
of setting the S~ate up as God and trying thereby to abolish 
all true spirituality: 'Rome a voulu supprimer toute pense-e 
de Dieu et ne permettre aux hommes d'adorer que la puissance 
de l'Etat' (CS 171). This was social idolatry, the reduction 
of God to a social unit: 
L'Empire remain etait ••• idolitre. L'idole 
etait l'Etat. On adorait l'empereur. Toutes lea 
formes de vie religieuse devant etre subordonnees a 
celles-la, aucune d 1 elles ne pouvait s'elever au-dessus 
de l'idolatrie. (AD 184) 
These sentiments are echoed by Bailey: 
The crystallisation of the worship of Rome and her 
destiny in the persons of the Imperial household was 
almost an abandonment of true religion, not so much 
because the individual emperors were unworthy of respect 
and veneration • • • but because in so narrow and offic-
ial a conception all wider and more spiritual thoughts 
of religion as a right relation to unseen powers were 
inevitably lost.l 
Rome, for Simone Weil, was Plato's Great Beast: 'Rome, 
l Op. cit., P• 142. 
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c'est le gros animal materialiste, n'adorant que soi' (C3 
106). It is inevitable that she should also identify it, 
in Kabbalistic tradition, with the Beast of the Apocalypse, 
although she sometimes identifies it rather with the woman 
sitting on the Beast. Thus in one passage she says, when 
speaking of the relationship between the ChriStian Church and 
the Roman Empire: 'La Bete de l'Apocalypse est presque sure-
ment l'Empire' (LR 84), whereas in a later text she affirms: 
Bieh,que Rome ne soit pas, comme on le dit parfois, 
representeepar la Bete, il ne semble pas douteux que 
c 1 est e.lle qui est representee par la femme pleine des 
noms du blaspheme, ivre du sang des saints, mere des 
fornications et abominations de la terre, assise sur 
sept collines. (SG 170) 
Simone Weil is undoubtedly referring here to the Beast of 
Revelations 17. 3-18, and it would seem from the mention of 
the seven mountains upon which the woman is sitting (v. 9) 
and the 'great city' (v. 18) that she is right in this latter 
interpretation.1 
1J. Hastings makes the following observations on both the 
Apocalyptic Beasts and the woman sitting om the seven hills. 
Commenting on Rev. 13 and 19. 11-21 he says: 'The two beasts 
are not identical with the Roman Empire and Emperor worship, 
but are the representatives of these in the spirit-world; they 
are not an abstract symbol of Rome but a concrete (personal) 
embodiment of Rome. They are demonic beings, pictures of the 
evil spirit-power. • •• But though distinct from Rome the 
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This Great Beast, 'n'adorant que soi', is a symbol of 
idolatry, and thus a refusal of mediation. The collective 
always takes over where individual and authentic spirituality 
is suppressed, since the desire for worship can never finally 
be erased from man's consciousness. But instead of the re-
lationship of the individual with his God, we have the circular 
relationship between a collectivity and itself. As Simone 
Weil says, 'un Romain pensait toujoura "noua'" (02 243). To 
those who say that all peoples of the ancient world recognised 
only collective values, she replies: 1 'En realite, cette erreur 
beasts are not apart from it. We mistake the Jewish idea of 
the angelic counterpart if we give it independent significance. 
The beast's power is Rome's power, and Rome's fall is the fall 
of the beast. Yet the two are not one, and it is possible 
that the writer used the figure of Ch. 17 to express his belief 
that Rome was to fall at the hand of its own evil genius, 'by 
the fruits of its own sin. It was the woman sitting on the 
beast, against whom the beast itself would at last turn in 
hatred.' (A Dictionary of the Bible (Edinburgh 1902), IV, s.v. 
Revelation, Book of, V: Teachings of the Book: (3) The Fall of 
Satan.) 
1
simone Weil is not of course the only one to have con-
sidered the adoption of collective values the cause of degrad-
ation to the Romans. Jullian (op. cit., p. 546) expresses the 
same sentiments when speaking of the effect of Romanisation on 
Gaul: 1Reunissez les hommes en une foule, faites-lea sentir, 
penser,·parler ensemble, dans un grand spectacle, ou dana une 
reunion publique; il est bien rare que de ces impressions ou 
de ces efforts collectifs il sorte une idee originale, un sen-
t1ment superieur. La mise en commun des facultes humaines 
aboutit trop aouvent ace qu'ellea soient abaissees.• 
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n'a ete commise que par lea Romains, qui etaient athees, et 
par lea Hebreux; et par ceux-ci, seulement jusqu'a l'exil a 
Babylone' (E 169). 
Worship of the collectivity engendered a certain servility 
in relationship between men, or between the worshipper and the 
Emperor, which Simone Weil was not slow to point out. Obvious-
ly if the object of cult is at the head of a political system, 
and that system is the source of well-being or otherwise to 
the citizens encompassed by it, a certain obsequiousness be-
comes a natural and necessary part of life. Here it is per-
haps relevant to compare the mindless obedience to t.he ruler 
which all totalitarian States produce. The ruler does not 
need to be consistent in his demands; indeed, it is better 
if he is not, so as to keep his subjects in a constant state 
of turmoil and suspense. 1 
Simone Weil expressed this relationship as that of a slave 
to his master: even on a social level the Romans had no con-
ception of the 'vertu religieuse d'obeissance' (E 231), and 
the Emperor possessed his subjects in the same way as a master 
did his slaves. Since Roman society was based on slavery, a 
1
camus' Caligula illustrates this admirably. 
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slave-master would find it quite natural to be, in his turn, 
enslaved by the Emperor (E 232-3). Slavery had touched and 
degraded all sectors of public and private life, a fact which 
Simone Weil stresses: 
Chez Lles Romain!7 l'esclavage avait penetre et 
degrade toutes lea relations humaines. Ila ont avili 
lea plus belles chases. Ils ont deshonore lea suppliants 
en lea foryant a mentir. Ils ont deshonore la gnatitude, 
en la regardant comme un esclavage attenue; da¥s leur 
conception, en recevant un bienfait, on alienl1 en echange 
une partie de sa liberte. Si le bienfait etait important, 
lea m~urs courantes contraignaient a dire au bienfaiteur 
qu'on etait son esclave. Ils on~ deahonore l'amour; 
etre amoureux, pour eux, c'etait ou bien acquerir la per-
sonne aimee comme propriete, ou bien, si on n~e pouvait 
pas, se soumettre aervilement a elle pour en obtenir des 
plaiairs charnels, dut-on accepter le partage avec dix 
autres. Ils ont deshonore la patrie en concevant le 
patriotisme comme la volonte de reduire en esclavage tous 
lea hommes qui ne aont pas des compatriotea. Mais il 
serait plus court d'enumerer ce qu'ils n'ont pas deshonore. 
On ne trouverait probablement rien. (E 230) 
Perhaps the most poignant comment that can be made on Simone 
Weil's feelings on Roman slavery is her confession to Joe 
Bousquet, that after her year's factory experience, 'je me 
suis toujours sentie une esclave, au sens que ce mot av~it 
chez lea Remains' (PSO 81). 
If all social relationships were tainted with slavery, 
was anything good at all to be found in Roman history? Very 
little, in Simone Weil's opinion. She gives as the sole 
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'example de bien parfaitement pur' the account of the slave-
-owner, whose slaves, during the proscriptions under the Tri-
umvirate, tried to shield him from arrest and were tortured 
as a result. The master, seeing his slaves being tortured 
from his hiding-place, came out and gave himself up in order 
to save them, and was immediately killed (E 196). In addition 
to this anenymous slave-owner, she would except Marcus Aurelius 
and the rule of the Antonines from her general condemnation, 
but these exceptions would not go much further. Roman Stoic-
ism she found a grotesque parody of its Greek counterpart. 
It was no more than a flexing of the muscles of the will, a 
sort of endurance test: 'L'esprit de competition sportive per-
met de tout endurer sans aucune vertu veritable. Le stoicisme 
romain avait degenerl.. en cet esprit' (CS 179). 1 
Simone Weil does not say much on the early phases of 
Rome's history, and the form which its religion took before 
the imperial cult wa• established. Since she never undertook 
to give a systematic history of Rome, she cannot be expected 
to do so, but her approach to the Romans is fairly typical of 
her approach to all phenomena. She homes on a particular 
1 See further III, §1 below. 
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feature in delight or disgust, analyses it deeply, but makes 
no attempt to put it in historical perspective or to make any 
allowances for time, place or personality. Yet had she 
delved more deeply into the early history of Rome, it is 
unlikely that she would have found much to impress her. The 
primitive animism which constituted Rome's religion in the 
pre-Imperial age was laudable in so far as it gave prominence 
to the vitures of obedience, hierarchy and family life, but 
was in the end dull, and lacking in spiritual elevation. 
From earliest times Roman religion was plagued by an excessive 
attention to ceremony and ritual, and possessed neither the 
plastic grace of the Greek pantheon, since anthropomorphism 
was a later import into Italy, nor the Greek capacity for 
metaphysical speculation which existed side by side with their 
polytheism. And after all, this is not the period for which 
Rome became famous. Rightly or wrongly she must stand on 
the evidence of her Empire, since this was the age of her 
glory. Simone Weil could reconcile neither the motives 
behind this empire-building, nor the means by which it was 
pursued, nor the results which it obtained, with a desire for 
truth and a concern for spiritual values. Given what she 
demanded of a civilisation, it was inevitable that she should 
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reject Rome and all it stood for as an example of the degrad-
ation caused by social idolatry • 
• 
The Roman Empire, and the fruits of it which we have 
examined above, laid the foundations, in Simone Weil's view, 
of the modern totalitarian State. The spirit of Rome, passing 
through the Catholic Church, next appeared in France under 
Louis XIV and Richelieu. 'Le Roi Soleil 1 in his admiration 
for the reign of Augustus followed closely the Roman model, 
and any lack of success was due to incompetence rather than 
to lack of ruthlessness. Simone Weil associates him with 
Napoleon in the following passage: 
Napol~on et Louis XIV ont visiblement ~t~ ~~s~d~ 
par le souvenir d'Auguste, et tous les proc~d~s de Rome 
ont paru,=:bons a imi ter. Si leurs efforts n I ont pas et~ 
couronn~s par un succes durable, un certain d~faut d'ha-
bilet~ en est cause, mais non pas certes un exces de 
scrupule. 
As in the Roman Imperial State, we have an absolute 
ruler responsible to no one and a subject people dependent 
for their existence on his every whim and fancy. The formula 
'L'Etat, c 1 est moi', even if apocryphal, expresses perfectly 
the fusion of State and ruler, expressed by Louis himself thus: 
'Quand on a l'Etat en vue, on trav~ille pour soi. Le bien de 
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l'un fait la gloire de l'autre•. 1 This complete identific-
ation of ruler and State, while implying a considerable sense 
of duty in the King, meant that any disagreement with the 
King was tantamount to treason, and criticism of person or 
policy out of the question. 2 Unquestioning obedience was 
exacted from his subjects, an obedience which Simone Weil 
characterises as 'une soumission qui ne merite pas le beau 
nem d 1 obeissance' (EH 82), just as the Romans had developed 
a sense of servility rather than of obedience. One has only 
to read any account of life at the court of Louis XIV to know 
that this is true.3 The adulation and complete submission 
of almost every member of the court to the King during a 
period of no less than fifty-five years appears absurd and 
distasteful to the modern:r.•·mind--although the twentieth century 
is not above fixing its adoration on the strangest objects at 
times. An instance of the abasement of spirit brought about 
1Memoires quot. s. Skalweit, 'Political Thought' in~ 
New Cambridge Modern Historf, V, The Ascendancy of France 
1648-88, ed. F. L. Carsten Cambridge 1961), P• 98. 
2 See F. L. Carsten, 'Introduction: The Age of Louis XIV,. 
in ibid., PP• 9-10. 
3see e.g. J. Lough, 'France under Louis XIV' in ibid., p. 
240. 
207 
in all whom this regal pantomime touched is provided by a 
comment of Mademoiselle, the King's niece: 'Il est comme 
Dieu, il faut at·tendre sa volonte et tout esperer de sa jus-
tice et de sa bonte, sans impatience, meme, afin d'avoir plus 
d • • t I 1 e mer1 e • 
As with the deification of the Roman emperors, however, 
it is not the resulting adoration which Simone Weil attacks, 
but rather the fact that the object of this adoration should 
be identified with the State, the confusion of absolutes with 
a tempora·l, collective power. She makes a comparison between 
the Spanish concept of monarchy, and the French: 
La soumission totale a un roi n'a pas abaisse les 
Espagnols au XVIe siecle et ~u debut du XVIIe comme elle 
a abaisse les Franqais sous Louis XIV, parce_que ce qu'ils 
adoraient, c'etait leur propre serment et la vertu de 
loyaute; ils pouvaient (conformement a !'etiquette) 
baiser les pieds du roi ou de n'importe quel superieur 
sans rien perdre de leur fierte. Au lieu que sous la 
personne de Louis XIV c'est le pouvoir d'Etat qu'on 
adorait; il en resulte un abaissement effrayant. 
(EH 110) 
Here she differs from critics such as Boulanger who considers 
that the rule of Louis XIV resembles the Spanish monarchy or 
oriental despotism, precisely because of its authoritarian 
1Quot. J. Boulanger, Le Grand Siecle (Paris ~948), p. 211. 
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nature. Boulenger holds that the resulting evil of this 
kind of rule was the complete divorce of the monarchy from 
the people by implying that the stuff of monarchy was of a 
1 totally different nature from that of ordinary people. 
Simone Wei·l pays scant attention to the native ability 
which, combined with a special congunction of circumstances, 
allowed the man to impose himself on his subjects as divinity 
itself, thus breaking with the past history of the French 
monarchy. His personal grace and attraction must have been 
considerable. Even Saint-Simon acknowledged his supremacy 
in the art of kingship, of embodying regality, although his 
views were more usually coloured by Louis's suppression of 
the power of the nobility. But then Simone Weil was never 
impressed by talent alone, and she could never have accorded 
genius to a man whose personal glory, however much identified 
with that of France, was of such importance to himself. 
She recognises however that many developments had to 
take place before the modern totalitarian State could be 
2 formed; under Louis XIV it was but in embryo. Although 
1
op. cit., p. 186. 
2Although she attributes to Louis XIV's reign the name of 
totalitarian in e.g. EH 14. 
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the power of the State, centralised as never before, increased 
enormously during his reign, it never reached the high degree 
of development necessary for totalitarianism (EH 304). The 
unpredictability necessary to such a regime in its dealings 
with its own people as well as abroad, was also lacking. 
Since the leaders in a totalitarian State are, in their own 
eyes, merely executing the laws of history, and these are to 
be 'interpreted', there are no reliable criteria by which 
human beings can order their lives with a view to remaining 
'within the law•. Since the law is fluid and constantly 
B.hanging, arbitrariness is an essential part of totalitarian 
rule, and terror ensues, from which no!~an is safe. 1 Simone 
Weil recognises that this unpredictability was not cultivated 
as a means of government at least with regard to foreign coun-
tries, potential allies and enemies, under Louis XIV (EH 38). 
It is true however that the technique was there in embryo, 
particularly as regards the King's immediate entourage. The 
devotion of the Court "to their monarch was built on the assum-
ption that the King's will was absolute and not to be questioned, 
and did not necessarily obey the laws governing the behaviouF 
1 Arendt, op. cit., pp. 464 ff. 
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of ordinary people. Nevertheless the King's will and not 
any supposed laws of history was the relevant factor. 
Certain other features of totalitarianism Simone Weil 
considers however to have been present under Louis XIV! ~in 
spite of the ~ack of modern techniques, propaganda played an 
important part in the building up of the royal image: 1 'Lise-
lotte, la seconde Madame, n'ecrivait-elle pas qu'on ne pouvait 
publier aucun livre sans y inserer les louanges du roi?' (EH 
15). (This in i ta·elf can hardly have had any considerable 
effect on the general public, most of whom could neither read 
nor write. In fact, the impact of Louis XIV 1 s reign on the 
peasantry seems to have been felt mainly through taxation and 
other measures necessary tqpromote the interests of the Court. 
The King's personal influence was felt less than any previous 
monarch's, particularly after the removal of the Court to 
Versailles.) 
The other feature of Louis XIV's rule which Simone Weil 
considered totalitarian was his foreign policy, which she com-
pared to Hitler's (EH 15). In her.. eyes it was built on an 
1Propaganda with regard to foreign seems to have been 
neglected by Louis XIV, unlike Richelieu, who used it extens-
i.vely. See G. Zeller, 'French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 
in their European setting', New Cambridie Mod.~' V, 208. 
211 
insatiable pride, a great capacity to humiliate, and a com-
plete disregard for conventional notions of honour governing 
international relations. She cites as examples the taking 
of Strasburg in contempt of a previous treaty, the devastation 
of the Palatinate, and the unprovoked attack on Holland which 
almost destroyed a flourishing civilisation (EH 15). It is 
certain that in his foreign policy Louis XIV's main concern 
was for the glory of France and consequently for his own glory, 
and that this came before any consideration for the people of 
France or for the quality of the civilisation he was attacking. 1 
The lack of honour governing the King's foreign policy is 
underlined by c. G. Picavet, in his consideration of the prin-
ciples which directed it. He writes, 'reconnaissons ••• 
qu'il avait manifeste de bonne heure de grandee dispositions 
pour l'art de tourner le~ traites•. 2 The King was surrounded 
by historiographers and jurists who spent their time mani-
pulating their monarch's designs so as to make them appear 
legitimate. As Louis himself stated, 'il n'est point de 
1
see Zeller, art. cit., p. 207. 
2La Diplomatie fran~aise au temps de Louis XIV (Paris 
1930), p •. l?O. 
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clause si nette qui ne souffre quelque interpretation•. 1 
In agreement with most modern critics, however, Simone 
Weil considered the State as it developed under Louis XIV to 
have been the creation of Richelieu (EH 14).2 She discuases 
the minister's power over the King in a letter to a friend 
(EH 113-6) in which she attributes it, as least in part, to 
a judicious playing on the idea of the King's assassination. 
Once his position was assured, Richelieu used all his consid-
erable powers and energies to build up his concept of the 
State as object of devotion and of supreme importance, beyond 
even that of the King.3 
Sauf erreur, la notion d'Etat comme objet de fide-
lite eat apparue, pour la premiere foie en France et en 
Europe, avec Richelieu. Avant lui on pouvait parler, 
sur un ton d'attachement religieux, du bien publi~, du 
~emoires, quot. Picavet, op. cit., p. 169. Zeller 
(art. cit., P• 208) holds however that Louis 'made ceaseless 
efforts to keep his engagements, though with debatable suc-
cess•. 
2 See e.g. J. B. Wolf, 'The Emergence of the Great Powers 
1685-1715', The Rise of Modern Europe, ed. W. L. Langer (New 
York 1951), P• 98. 
3The development of a loyalty to the State suppaasing 
that accorded to the monarch himself is noted with reference 
to the Colberts in Wolf, op. cit., p. 98. 
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pays, du roi, du seigneur. Lui, le premier, adopta le 
principe que quiconque exerce une fonction publique doit 
sa fidelite toute entiere, dans l'exercice de cette fonc-
tion, non pas au public, non pas au roi, mais a l'Etat 
et a rien d'autre. (E 102) 
Richelieu had the clarity of mind to realise that 'le salut 
des ames s'opere dans l'autre monde, au lieu que le aalut de 
l'Etat ne s'opere que dans celui-ci' (E 103). Instead of 
drawing what Simone Weil considers to be the Christian cone-
lusion, and realising that to the State, being limited, only 
a limited loyalty was due, Richelieu came to the opposite 
conclusion, making the St~te into an absolute, demanding abso-
lute allegiance (ibid.). This led him, in Simone Weil'a eyes, 
to the crime of idolatry: 
Ce cardinal, en posant comme un absolu une chose 
dont toute la realite reside ici-bas, commettait le 
crime d'idolatrie. • •• L1 objet du veritable crime 
d'idolatrie eat toujours quelque chose d'analogue a 
l'Etat. (ibid.) 
The Devil's temptation of temporal power, refused by 
Christ, was accepted by Richelieu. The State is not a nat-
ural object of adoration; but as we saw earlier (p.l85) the 
Great Beast is total in its demands, and since by the law of 
expansion which it obeys it eventually destroys all else, it 
takes bo itself the human need of an object of worship: 
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L 1Etat est une chose froide, qui ne peut pas etre 
a1mee; mais il tue et abolit tout ce qui pourrait l'etre; 
ainsi on est force de l'aimer, parce qu'il n'y a que lui. 
(E 102) 
In terms of the historical reality of France, this is demonstra-
bly true. Richelieu began the work of centralisation, killing 
in France 'tout ce qui n'etait pas Paris' (EH 82), which has 
continued up to the present day. That the centralised power 
was in the hands of the King meant only that the King had taken 
over the function of the State, and the initiative for this 
measure, in spite of the great glamour of Louis XIV's reign, 
came from Richelieu rather than from the King. As Boulanger 
writes, 
apres Richelieu, le pouvoir ae trouva mieux con-
centre que jamaia il ne l'avait ete entre les mains du 
Roi; et par les intendants, agents soumis du gouverne-
ment,~l'administration centrale s'ingera partout. La 
monarchie dite absolue, telle qu'elle fonctionna en 
France au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles, date bien moins de 
Louis XIV que de Ric~elieu.l 
As the absolute power of the King and the centralia-
ation af his kingdom were first conceived under Richelieu, 
so did the new servility of the King's subjects first see the 
1 Op. cit., P• 112. 
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light under Louis XIV's minister. The base flattery to which 
an author had to have recourse in order to be accepted horri-
fied Simone Weil. She gives as an example Corneillds dedi-
cation to Richelieu of his tragedy Horace, written 'en termes 
dont la bassesse est un pendant a l'orgueil presque delirant 
qui inspire la tragedie' (El25). She gives however no credit 
to Corneille for his realisation that such a dedication was 
merely an irksome convention of the times. As he says, 
'Notre siecle a invente une espece de prologue ••• qui ne 
touche point au sujet et n 1est qu 1 une louange adroite du 
.. • I 1 pr1nce • She points instead to Theophila de Viau, who suff-
ered, she implies, while Corneille prospered, because of the 
former's refusal to abase himself by flattery (E 104). While 
it is certain that Theophila was persecuted as much for his 
Protestant background and alleged free-thinking as for any-
thing else, it remains probably true to say that his spirit 
was more independent of the times than was that of Corneille; 
certainly he was not an admirer of Ancient Rome in the way 
Corneille was. For Corneille, imbued with the spirit of Rome, 
1Quot. M. Pellisson, Lea Comedies-Ballets de Moliere 
(Paris 1914), p. 4. 
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a sovreign's subjects belonged to him in the way that a master 
possessed his slaves; his actions could in no way be modified 
by his subjects' wishes, and their treatment depended entirely 
on his beneficence. This is exemplified in the line from 
Cinna, where Maxime is speaking to Auguste: 
Rome est a vous, Seigneur, l'empire est votre bien. 
(II. i) 
Because of the servility which this attitude implied, 
Simone Weil considered Corneille, in~accordance with the gen-
eral atmosphere of his time, to have reduced the concept of 
patriotism to one of idolatry. This debased idea of patrio-
tism, inherited from the Romans, has persisted to the present 
day, which explains why the notion of patriotism is taught 
through the medium of such authors as Corneille (E 125). 
It is the idolatry by a people of itself, and has nothing to 
do with the 'compassion pour la patrie' (E 147) which Simone 
Weil held to be true patriotism: 'Jeanne d •ilrc disait qu' elle 
avait pi tie du royaume de F'rance' (ibid.). Such a concept 
has nothing to do with pride of achievement or glorious ex-
ploits.1 A characteristic rejection of superficial success 
lwe shall examine more fully Simone Weil's concept of 
true patriotism in a later chapter (III, §5). 
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and the values of a merit-conscious (and by her definition, 
idolatrous) world can be seen in the following lines where 
she describes the object of true patriotism as 
une chose a aimer non pour sa gloire, son prestige, 
son eclat, ses conquetes, son expansion future, mais 
en elle-meme, dans sa nudite et sa realite, comme une 
mere dont le fils est entre premier a Polytechnique 
aime en lui autre chose. (EL 54) 
We are a long way here from the aims and achievements of 
'le grand siecle', where the individual was sacrificed to 
the collectivity, and the collectivity deified as an absolute 
end in itself. The achievements of this pursuit of absolut-
ism and the glories of the age are perhaps simply too obvious 
to be acceptable to Simane Weil, for whom all conventional 
success was a lie. Her opinions are of course vindicated on 
consideration of the miser~ of the majority of Louis XIV's 
subjects, and the fact that at the end of his reign his pro-
jects devoted purely to prestige had ruined the country. 
Boulanger's assessment of the achievements of Richelieu pro-
vides a fair comment on the sacrifice made by the ]'rench 
people on the altars of glory: 
Il n'a pas cherche ••• a rendre la justice plus 
juste.ou les agents de finances moims voleurs, bref a 
ameliorer la condition sociale des habitants du royaume; 
il s'est seulement propose de rendre les fonctionnairea 
plus soumis et les institutiomplus souples, de remplir 
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de plus d 1 argent les coffres du gouvernement, et en 
somme de faire de la France un meilleur instrument de 
force et de puissance exterieures entre les mains du 
monarque. • •• Ce qui p~raissait a un Richelieu le 
but meme de la politique, c'etait la gloire de la col-
lectivite, de la France,. autrement dit: la gloire du 
Roi.l 
* 
1Boulenger, 9P• cit., P• 11,. Henri Hauser, in La Pen-
see et l'act~on economigues du cardinal de Richelieu (Paris 
1944), gives a picture ·of Richelieu which interprets his am-
bitions and talents in a very different light. He implies 
that, although for economic reasons Richelieu wanted peace 
above all, and a policy directed towards the sea with all its 
opportunities for trade, he was obliged to turn towards the 
interior of France and to sustain a perpetual series of wars 
in continental Europe. Richelieu was thus able to achieve 
very little of what he had set out to do. (p. 19') 
II,.§ 3 
TO~ALITARIANISM II: 
ROUSSEAU TO BITLER 
As we noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, the 
theories of Rousseau have been considered by some critics 
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to be at the origins of the modern totalitarian State. In 
the light of Simone Weil's admiration for Rousseau, we should 
therefore at least state these criticisms, and attempt to 
assess the validity of her own interpretation of the writer. 
There is a certain difficulty of lack of direct reference: 
although Simone Weil was obviously very attracted by Rous-
seau's philosophy, there is only one passage in her published 
works in which she expounds her ideas in anything like a full 
form (in the essay entitled 'Note sur la suppression generale 
des partis politiques', EL 126 ff). Elsewhere references 
are merely fragmentary. 
She begins by stating that 'quel~ues chapitres mis a 
part, peu de livres sont beaux, forts, lucides et clairs 
comme Le Contrat Social' (EL 127-8). But since she adds: 
'On dit que peu de livres ont eu autant d'influence. Mais 
en fait tout s'est pass·e et se passe encore comme s'il n'avait 
jamais ete lu' (EL 128), we can assume that the treatise is at 
least susceptible to different interpretations, if not to down-
right misunderstandinss. 
The essay begins with a statement of the two 'evidences' 
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which form the starting-point to Rousseau's thought: 
L'une, que la raison discerne et choisit la justice 
et l'utilite innocente, et que tout crime a pour mobile 
la passion. L'autre, que la raison est identique chez 
tous lea hommes, au lieu que lea passions, le plus sou-
vent, different. (EL 128) 
From this Simone Weil concludes that if a group of individuals 
reflects, each one separately, on a given problem, the points 
on which they agree will be in conformity with reason, while 
their di~agreements will arise from their passions. The 
general will of a people--as opposed to a majority will, which 
is only the sum of individual passions--will thus in the major-
ity of cases be just and reasonable through the neutralisation 
of the interest of the individual as such. She notes that 
this is not necessarily so, and that the will of a group, if 
it is unjust, is no better in Rousseau's eyes than the unjust 
will of an individual. But the idea that individuals con-
verge reason~bly and diverge passionately implies this con-
elusion. 
There are a number of obvious objections which can be 
made to this argument. Firstly, the Cartesian divorce of 
reason from passion is by no means an observable fact of human 
nature. Allmen are motivated by a mixture of the two so in-
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tricate that it is in practice impossible to identify any-
thing as 'reason' or 'passion'. Secondly, were one able 
to identify 'reason' as a motive of human behaviour, there 
is no guarantee that this would in fact bring them together. 
What unites men more than anything else is self-interest; 
they herd together because they have something to defend, 
because there is safety and power in numbers. The man who 
wants justice at the expense of self-interest is not only 
rare but invariably a voice crying in the wilderness. The 
fact that men come together to defend what is theirs can 
hardly be put forward as a proof of man's rationality, since 
many animals have devised a better group-security system than 
ours. Simone ~eil, with her acute suspicion of the collect-
ivity, sees the danger inherent in seeking justice in the 
group, when she warns against 'la passion collective': 
Il est tout a fait evident que le raisonnement de 
Rousseau tombe d~s qu'il y a passion collective. Rous-
seau le savait bien. La passion collective est une 
impulsion de crime et de mensonge infiniment plus puis-
sante qu'aucune passion individuelle. Lea impulsions 
mauvaises, en ce cas, loin de se neutraliser, se portent 
mutuellement a la millieme puissance. La pression est 
presque irresistible, sinon pour lea saints authentiques. 
(EL 129) 
She admits, moreover, that since the absence of collect-
ive passion is a condition for democracy, democracy has never 
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been known in France (EL 131). She then goes on to analyse 
ways in which collective passion could be eradicated from pub-
lie life, and--since such is the subject of the essay under 
consideration--concludes that the suppression of political 
parties is of the first importance, since 
il est impossible d'examiner les problemas effroyab-
lement complexes de la vie publique en etant attentif a 
la fois d'une part a discerner la verite, la justice, le 
bien public, d'autre part a conserver l'attitude qui con-
vient a un membPe de tel groupement. (EL 139)1 
This is a characteristic attitude, and we recognise here 
the authentic tone of her continuous warning against the evil 
influence of the collective. Is there then a conflict between 
this position and the one noted at the beginning of the essay, 
where individuals converge in truth an diverge in opinion? 
Not necessarily, since in the former attitude a distinction is 
1It is interesting to note that one of the articles of 
faith of twentieth-century Fascists is also the abolition of 
parties, though for a totally different reason. Whereas 
Simone Weil considers that they engender collective passion 
and blind devotion, the Fascists wished to abolish the split-
ting up of different groups within the State. See Sir Oswald 
Mosley's proposals for the British Fascists in F. L. Carsten, 
The Rise of Fascism (London 1967), and Mussolini's articles 
(actually written by Giovanni Gentile) on Fascism in the 
Enciclopedia Italiana (1932), quot. H. s. Cariel ed., Sources 
in Tweatieth Century Political Thought (London 1964). 
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drawn between the individual thinking independently and the 
same individual subjecting his reasoning to the party-line, 
whereas in the latter the individual reaches his conclusion 
independently and then shares what he has found with other 
like-minded individuals. 
It is difficult to see, however, how collective passion 
in social organisation can be avoided. For not only political 
parties but any group of individuals who come together for a 
purpose and with clearly defined views in common is potentially 
totalitarian. And if one supposes a priori that the general 
will embodies truth and justice, anyone who deviates from the 
general will is a traitor and an enemy to the public good. 
Even Rousseau admitted th~t the general will did not mean the 
will of all. As Talmon remarks, the general will is no more 
1 than an expression of man's higher, better self; therefore 
even if he is constrained to obey the general will he cannot 
complain of coercion since he is merely obeying, albeit un-
knowingly, his own true self. In Rousseau's own words: 
Afain done que le pacte social ne soit pas un vain 
formulaire, il renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui 
1 J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (Lon-
don 1955), PP• 40ff. 
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seul peut donner de la force aux autres, que quiconque 
refusera d'obeir a la volonte generale y sera contraint 
par tout le corps: ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon 
qu'on le forcera d'etre libre.l 
Liberty here means civil liberty as opposed to the natural 
2 liberty of the state of anarchy. The over-zealous desire 
of the eighteenth-century thinkers that all men should be 
happy and free is in itself an invitation to totalitarianism: 
.The very idea of a self-contained system from which 
all evil and unhappiness have been exorcised is total-
itarian. The assumption that such a scheme of things 
is feasible and indeed inevitable is an invitation to a 
regime to proclaim that it embodies tnis perfection, to 
exact from its citizens recognition and submission and 
to brand opposition as vice or perversion.3 
Simone Weil recognised the difficulties of putting into 
operation such a system as Rousseau's, as we have seen. In 
her view, France had only seen one brief moment of democracy 
as Rousseau conceived of it, namely in the early days of the 
Revolution, when the leaders could truly be said to embody the 
1 Rousseau, Le Contrat social, I, 470. 
2Ib~d., I, 500 ff. 
3Talmon, ~p. cit., p. 35· Camus voices similar doubts 
as to the message of the Contrat social: 'Le Con•trat social 
s'acheve ••• dans la aescription d'une religion civile et 
fait de Rousseau un precurseur des societas contemporaines, 
qui excluent non seulement l'opposition, mais encore la neut-
ralite'. (L'Homme revolte in Essais, Bibl. de la Pleiade, 
1965, P• 525.) 
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will of the people (EL 130-1). But although she recognised 
the difficulties, she does not seem to have been aware of the 
perversions such a philosophy might undergo. It is not nee-
essary to state that Rousseau never intended violence to become 
the method of imposing the general will; but it is difficult 
to see how the ambiguities and sheer impracticalities inherent 
in his ideas could have resulted in leas than misunderstandings. 
Simone Weil's apparent explanation, that collective passion de-
grades even the finest theories, is at least as accurate and 
pertinent as any other. 
• 
We now turn to another manifestation of totalitarianism, 
that which is found in imperialism. The heyday of imperial-
ist expansion is now over, in the Western world at any rate, 
but its results are still very much with us, and the new nations 
which have sprung into life in Africa and Asia as a result of 
having European nationalism thrust upon them--their very bound-
aries bear witness to this--may well be the foundation of the 
next turbulent cycle in world history. Simone Weil, in an 
article w-ritten in 19371 fo:retold with a strangt accuracy and on 
1
•Le Sang coule en Tunisie', EH 336-8. 
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a note of triumph the effects of a world war on the colonised 
peoples: 
Quand je songe a une guerre eventuelle, 11 se mele, 
je l'avoue, a l'effroie et a l'horreur que me cause une 
pareille perspective, une pensee quelque peu reconfortante. 
C'est qu'une guerre europeenne pourrait servir de signal• 
a la grande revanche des peuples coloniaux pour punir notre 
insouciance, notre indifference et notre cruaute. 
(EH 338)1 
Imperialism is, on the face of it, an excellent example 
of the expansionist impulses of the Great Beast. The insight 
of Cecil Rhodes, who was struck with horror at the thought that 
there were geographical limitations to his otherwise boundless 
aspirations, illustrates this only too well. We have already 
noted Hannah Arendt's equation of imperialism with capitalist 
expansionist policies: 
Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capital-
ist production came up against national limitations to its 
economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics 
out of economic necessity; for if it did not want to give 
up the capitalist system whose inherent law is con~tant 
economic growth, it had to impose this law upon its home 
governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate 
political goal of foreign policy.2 · 
1
cf. Lewis Nkosi, 'Black Power or Souls of Black Writer~' 
in South African Writing Today (Harmondsworth 1967), p. 196. 
2 Op. cit., P• 216. See above, p. 185. 
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But there is another side to the coin, a facet of imper-
ialism other than mere economic gain, however important. 
True, the capitalist system helped to justify expansion and 
exploitation, since the profit-motive was thus considered 
respectable and indeed necessary in dealings with foreign 
countries, particularly with those who had the misfortune to 
possess a culture other than the recognised European model, 
and who were thus 'barbarians'. But, particularly in the 
case of France, prestige played a very important part in the 
history of colonial development. Growth was all-import~nt, 
and even if this was not financially profitable it was an 
irrefutable good. As Simone Weil puts it: 'Le passe n'est 
que l'histoire de la croissance de la France, et il est admis 
que cette croissance est toujours un bien a tous egards' (E 
121). We have already seen (II, §2) how large a part con-
siderations of prestige played in the policies of Richelieu 
and Louis XIV. Henri Brunschwig, in his work on French im-
perialism, quotes an illuminating extract of a letter written 
by Richelieu to the Frenfh ambassador in London on the subject 
of Guiana: 
Vous sentez parfaitement qu'il serait impossible de 
ceder aux demandes du Portugal, moine a cause de l'inter3t 
reel qu'il y a pour nous a conserver un territoire qui 
ne peut offrir d'avantages veritables que dans un avenir 
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eloigne, que parce que la dignite du roi et de l'Etat 
serait blesse par une concession qui ne serait justifiee 
par aucun droit quelconque de la part du Portugal. 
Cette consideration est de la plus grande force, car, 
dans notre situation actuelle, tout acte de condescendance 
serait pris pour de la faiblesse.l 
The role of the colonies here was obviously not so much to 
bring in revenue as to augment the glory of France abread 
and to act as calculable assets in the great competition for 
world supremacy which France was engaged in with the other 
colonial powers. 
Simone Weil comments on the way in which certain of these 
territories had been acquired in much the same werms as she 
uses when condemning the Roman or Hitlerian use of treachery 
and bad faith in their foreign relations. The essays on 
Morocco, one entitled 1 Le Maroc, ou de la prescription en 
matiere de vol' (EH 331-35), and the other •un peu d 1_histoire 
2 a propos du Maroc' are cases in point. In them she states 
the facmof Morocco's seizure by France and, with heavy sar-
casm, denounces the breaking of treaties (in this case the 
Act of Algeciras) and the selling of the Egyptian people which 
1M thea et realites de l 1 im erialisme colonial fran ais 
1871-191 Paris 19 0 , P• 13. 
2
syndicats, no. 17, 4 fev. 1937, P• 3· See Appendix A .• 
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was necessary to its acquisition, and points out that the 
provocation to Germany of this act was not a negligible factor 
in the outbreak of the First World viar. 
Treachery and the breaking of promises were also current 
in France's later dealings with her colonies. In aDother 
article for Syndicate she compares the plight of the Roman 
slaves who revolted rather than continue to (ight their mast-
ers' battles for no improvement in their condition with that 
of the colonial peoples who provided cannon-fodder for the 
First World vlar: 
L'etat s'est conduit de la meme man1ere envers les 
peuples coloniaux. En 1914, il s'agissait de les jeter 
dans la fournaise, d'en faire de la chair a canon; on 
leur a promis alors de belles reformes pour apres la 
victoire. La guerre finie, on n'a rien change au re-
gime colonial. Preuve que d'opprime a oppresseur il ie 
faut jamais changer des realites contre des promesses. 
Elsewhere she discusses the welfare of the peoples sub-
jected to colonial rule. She comments bitterly in her essay 
'Le Sang coule en Tunisie' on the double-standard applied by 
normally well-meaning people to nations removed from their 
understanding by geographical distance and narrow sympathies, 
1
•La greve des plebeiens ~omains', Syndicats, no. 23, 18 
mars 1937, P• 4. 
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giving the familiar arguments: 
••• Ces gens-la--jaunes, naira, ~bicots'--sont 
habitues a souffrir. • •• Depuis le temps qu'ils 
crevent de faim et qu'ils sont soumis a un arbitraire 
total, va ne leur fait plus rien. • •• Au fond, ils 
ont un caractere plus servile. Ils sont· faits pour la 
servitude. Sans quai ils resisteraient. (EH 336) 
Distance is a very important factor; the further away an 
injustice is, the less it touches the everyday routine, and 
consequently the less unjust it seems. ThUs political 
leaders are able to ignore even the worst oppression when it 
is not taking place on their soil. The international work-
era' movement is a mockery when the majority of the workers 
have no idea of the conditions under which the proletariat 
in less favoured parts of the world has to work: 
Quand lea metallos de Billancourt sont en difficulte, 
Leon Blum revoit une delegation; il se derange pour aller 
a !'Exposition parler aux gars du batiaent; quand ~1 lui 
semble que lea fonctionnaires grognent, il leur adresse 
un beau discours par radio tout expres pour eux. Mais 
lea millions de prolet~ires des colonies, nous tous, nous 
lea avons oublies. (ibid.) 
Even supposing the working conditions of the colonised 
proletariat were as good as those of their fellow Europeans, 
however, even supposing ill-treatment were negligible, colon-
ialism would still be morally wrong. Not only is it wrong 
absolutely in itself, but it is especially wrong for France: 
done? 
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Toute autre nation avait a la rigueur le droit de 
se tailler un Empire, mais non pas la France. • •• 
Quand on assume, comme .. a fait la France en 1789, la 
fonction de penser pour l'univers, de definir pour lui 
la justice, on ne devient pas proprietaire de chair 
humaine. (E l46)1 
But given that France now has her Empire, what is to be 
Simone Weil dismisses the possibility of educating 
the public of the colonial power to the sufferings endured by 
her subjects, and l~kewise the notion of a successful uprising, 
given the difficulties of reconstructing a society afterwards. 
It is to her credit that even in 1938 she was maintaining 
that the best way of freeing the colonised peoples was by pro-
gressive emancipation, by making them partners and collabor-
ators in their own interest--and that of the colonising power--
instead of preserving the master-slave relationship which had 
existed up until the~ (EH 353, 5). It is interesting that 
she regards with suspicion the idea of simply granting citi-
zenship to the colonised population, which would create an 
aura of 'equality' while completing the process of destruction 
1
nurkheim made a similar point concerning the Dreyfus aff-
air when he wrote that since all nations had learned the rights 
of the individual from France, the violation of these rights by 
France was moral suicide. Essays on Saiology and Philosophy 
ed. Kurt H. Wolff (Cleveland 1960), P• 36. 
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wrought on their native culture and institutions: 
Je ne pense pas, comme beaucoup des hommes de bonne 
volonte qui s'interessaient aux populations colonisees, 
que l'ideal fut pour elle de devenir des provinces fran-
~aises peuplees de Fran~ais moyens. La consideration 
de·s droits des individus, si importante qu'elle soit, 
ne me parait pas plus importante que la conservation de 
tresors collectifs constitues par les traditions, les 
moeurs et l'esprit des populations soumises a la conquete 
coloniale. • •• Meme au temps ou les Fran~ais etaient 
des citoyens, avoir un empire f~it de 110 millions de 
citoyens fran~ais au lieu de 40 millions de citoyens et 
70 millions de sujets, ne m~aurait pas paru une solution 
souhaitable.l 
The era of domination is over. France must put an end 
to the expansion which should never have taken place, come 
back within her frontiers, forget the impulse to glamour and 
glory which had been a part of her thinking for so long. But 
it is characteristic that Simone Weil does not waste time on 
the evils that have been. Instead she turns compassionately 
to the victims and begins to work out a scheme for them W) 
which they may preserve what is left of their past and throw 
). 1Lettre (inedite)· a Dermenghem. See Appendix B. 
With reference to the French North-~frican colonies, we should 
mention the articles which Camus wrote for Alger republicain 
under the heading 'Misere de la Kabylie', which were published 
in 1939. In them he describes vividly the sufferings of the 
Kabyles, with the object of removing some of the ignorance 
concerning the colonies then prevailing in France. (Essaais, 
Bibl. de la Pleiade, 1965, PP• 905-938.) 
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down new roots for the future • 
• 
Simone Weil was as uncompromising in her rejection of 
the fully-fledged totalitarian State of our own day as she 
was in all previous manifestations of totalitarianism. 
She knew at first hand and watched with consternation the 
development of Nazi Germany, visited Italy in 1937 and 1938, 
and had followed closely the development of communism both 
in France and elsewhere. It seems even that she had been 
suspected of Nazi sympathies during the few mon•ths she 
spent in the United States, a suspicion which she repudiates 
with scorn in a letter to Jean Wahl: 
Ce qui a pu donner lieu a ces bruits, c'est que 
je n'aime pas beaucoup entendre des gens parfaitement 
confortables ici traiter de laches et de tra!tres 
ceux qui en France se debrouillent comme ils peuvent 
dans une situation terrible.! 
One can readily imagine her defending collaborators from 
attack by people who could afford to be objective several 
thousand miles away from the conflict. 
Like many people in the years leading up to the Second 
1Deucalion, no. 4, oct. 1952. See Appendix C. 
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World War, Simone Weil considered Fascism and Communism to 
be basically alike, whatever their superficial differences; 
together with complete disorder, they are 'les expressions a 
peine distinctes, equivalentes, d'un mal unique' (E 157). 
In her essay 'Ne recommen~ons pas la guerre de Troie' (EH 
256-72) she analyses the main structure of both systems and 
pronounces them almost identical: 
De part et d 1 autre, c'est la mime mainmise de l'Etat 
sur pr8tue toutes lea formes de vie individuelle et soci-
ale; ~ mime militarisation forcenee; la meme unanimite 
artificielle, obtenue par la contrainte, au profit d'un 
parti unique qui se confond avec l'Etat et se definit 
par cette confusion; la meme regime de servage impose 
par l'Etat aux masses laborieuses a la place du salariat 
classique. (EH 261) 
Friedrich and Brzezinski state that this view prevails today 
in the United States and in Western Europe. 1 They do not, 
however, adopt this idea, mainly bedause the avowed aims of 
the Fascist and Communist State are different. Communism 
aims at a world revolution of the proletariat, while Fascism 
dreams of world dominance by a particular people or nation. 2 
1op. cit., P• 7• 
2It is true to say that originally their theories of the 
State were quite different, as Lenin for example foretold and 
expected the gradual 'withering away' of the State. 
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While it is true to say that the aim of early Communism was 
certainly world revolution, it is clear that the expansionist 
ideas of the U.s.s.R. were at least postponed as early as 
the 14th Party Conference in April 1925, with Stalin's policy 
1 of 'socialism in one country'. In fact, Fascism was much 
more inclined to unlimited expansion in the 'thirties than 
was Communism. But in the omnipotence and omnipresence of 
the State, Simone Weil was right in making the comparison 
between the two. They were both instances for her of social 
idolatry, simply contemporary forms of the Great Beast, con-
tinuing the spirit of colonialism: 
Si le sens de l'organisation, du travail efficace 
et de l'Etat, possede a un degre superieur, implique un 
droit surnaturel a coloniser autrui--et a-t-on jamais 
justifie autrement la· colonisation~-une grande partie 
du territoire europeen peut etre regarde comme surnatu-
rellement destine a une colonisation allemande. 
(EH 304) 
1
see R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theorf and Practice of Comm-
unism (London 1950), P• 195· Camus 'L 1Homme revolte', 
Essais, Bibl. de la Pleiade, p. 591) claims that Fascism 
never.really aspired to world domination. 'Tout au plus, 
Hitler, etonne par ses propres victoires, a ete detourne des 
origines provinciales de son mouvement vers le reve imprecis 
d'un Empire des Allemands qui n'avait rien a voir avec la 
Cite universelle, Le communisme rusee, au contraire, par 
ses origines memes, pretend ouvertement a l'Empire mondial.' 
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F. L. Carsten claims that there exists a vast-difference 
between the old colonial expansion and the desire for world 
conquest of the Fascist States, in that the leaders of the 
latter often acted against the interests of their countries 
in the .;pursuit of their aims, and were willing to sacrifice 
the welfare of conquered nations on the altar of their am-
bitions. 1 But we have seen (II, §2) that colonialism, par-
ticularly in the case of France, often ran counter to the in-
terests of the colonising nation. Richelieu's dream of 
dominance for the prestige it brought to France as the world's 
civilising agent, for example, is surely not unlike Hitler's 
conviction of the innate superiority of the German people, 
although it substitutes a national ~or a racial element. 
As we saw in the case of colonialism, the general ten-
dency of the totalitarian State ... is to expand. Simone Weil 
gives a penetrating analysis of the law of expansion which 
~fle,d.,ns su:r·les 
all power obeys in her remarkable essay xcauses de la liberte 
1The Rise 9f Fascism (London 1967), P• 236. Friedrich 
and Brzezinski (op. cit., p. 63) argue that 'while the older 
imperialism was an outgrowth of the industrial economy, the 
will to conquer the world which animates the totalitarian 
systems is intimately linked with their ideological preoccup-
ations'. 
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et de !'oppression' (OL 57-162). Every regime takes advant-
age of what she calls 'hasards providentiels' which enable it 
to gain strength for a new period of expansion, which will 
afford another 'hasard providential' to allow new growth once 
more, and so on: 
Ainsi la guerre permettait aux Romains de ravir des 
esclaves, c'est-a-dire des travailleurs dans la force de 
l'age dont d'autres avaient eu a nourrir l'enfance; le 
profit tire du tr~vail des esclaves permettait de ran-
forcer l'armee, et l'armee plus forte entreprenait des 
guerres plus vastes qui lui v~laient un butin d 1 esclaves 
nouveau et plus considerable. (OL lOl) 
(One might argua that the slaves gained through conquest need 
not necessarily be used to reinforce the army; their labours 
might have been used exclusively in the embellishment of the 
State in one way or another. But of course the harassment 
of the enemy on the frontiers which had caused the State to 
go to war in the first place provided an ever-present incent-
ive to battle on subsequent occasions. In any case Simone 
Wail's argument rests on the peculiar logic of a social org-
anism which causes it to grow rather than to dissipate its 
forces elsewhere.) 
In this urge to constant expansion can be found, accord-
ing to Simone Weil, the fundamental contradiction inherent in 
any oppressive regime. For power, being subject to the same 
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laws as everything else on this earth, is necessarily a 
limited phenomenon. All is well until it comes up against 
its own natural limits, for then, having unlimited desires, 
it seeks to go beyond that which it can effectively control, 
dissipates.its energies, and dies: 
Telle est la contradict2on interne que tout regime 
oppressif porte en lui comme un germe de mort; elle 
est constituee par l'opposition entre le caractere 
necessairement limite des bases materielles du pouvoir 
et le caractere necessairement illimite de la course 
au pouvoir en tant que rapport entre les hommes. 
(OL 103) 
The instrument of expansion thus becomes the instrument of 
downfall. Nemesis automatically renders justice to anyone 
overstepping his natural limits (OL 104). Looked at from 
another point of view, the whole totalitarian concept of 
expansion is thus unreal, false: 
Toute realite implique par elle-meme une limite. 
Ce qui n'existe pas du tout n'est jamais limitable. 
C'est pour cela qu'il y a affinite, alliance entre le 
totalitarisme et le mensonge. (EL 134) 
This non-acceptance of limits brings about the regime's 
downfall in another way. Because in the modern totalitarian 
State all laws are subject to the laws of movement (see above, 
p. 209), its judgements seem arbitrary, and there is no way 
for the citizen to be sure of staying on the 'right' side of 
240 
the regime. Thus the turnover in party-members and sympathi-
sera is great, since no one can know from one day to the next 
whether he is still in favour. This process is referred to 
by Simone Weil in her article 'Reflexions en vue d 1 un bilan 1 
(EH 306), where she gives it as one of the fundamental weak-
nesses of the totalitarian regime. 
Another weakness perhaps more destructive in the long 
run is the state of inertia to which such a regime reduces 
its citizens (EH 307 ff.). Because men are manipulated as 
matter rather than as human beings, they begin to lose their 
human initiative and production suffers. For a totalit~Pian 
regime to succeed, the state of mass enthusiasm in which it 
was born must be preserved throughout its existence. This 
is contrary to human nature: 
Le veritable ecueil du regime ne reside pas dans le 
besoin spirituel qu'eprouvent lea hommes a penser d 1 une 
maniere independante, mais dans leur impuissance physique 
et nerveuse a se maintenir dans un etat durable d 1 enthou-
siasme, sinon pendant quelques annees de jeunesse. 
(EH 308) 
Hence probably the apocalyptic nature of the totalitarian 
regime. The people exist in the future, on the promises of 
their leader, accepting present hardship for glories to come. 
The apocalyptic vision is very often necessary to take people's 
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minds off the lack of the ordinary rewards of remunerative 
work and the stimulus of competition. 
The oppression which results from the exercise of 
totalitarian ideas is. obvious and observable. Simone Weil 
is probably right in ascribing it uniquely to an advanced 
state of civilisation. As she says, society's oppression 
of the individual grows in proportion as the burden of nature 
1 
upon man decreases: 
On dirait que, si la collectivite humaine s'est 
dans une large mesure affranchie du poids dont les for-
ces demesurees de la nature accablent la faible humanite, 
elle a en rev~nche pris en quelque sorte la succession 
de la nature au point d'ecraser l'individu d'une maniere 
analogue. (OL 107) 
It is simply a question of exchanging one state of slavery 
for another. That man, having rid himself of the burden 
of subservience to nature, should have himself created a new 
instrument of oppression is a dismal fact of human nature: 
L'histoire humaine n'est que l'histoire de l'asser-
1This is a Marxist idea. Cf.: 'At the same pace that 
mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other 
men or to his own infamy.' 'Speech on the Anniversary of the 
People's Paper, 1856', Selected Works of Marx and Engels (Mos-
cow 1962), I, 35~· 
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vissement qui fait des hommes, aussi bien oppresseurs 
qu'opprimes, le simple jouet des instruments de domi-
nation qu'ils ont f~briques eux-memes. (OL 95) 
The chief ill of human society is not that each man pur-
sues his own selfish interest, but that each one sacrifices 
himself and his neighbours to what are in fact only the means 
to living. Power becomes deified, and society, which should 
be a mediating force for mankind, becomes an end in itself 
(ibid.). This is clearly illustrated in the ideas of Alfredo· 
Rocco, theorist of Italian Fascism and ~ussolini's Minister 
of Justice. He defines Fascism as the absolute antithesis 
of older liberal doctrines, in which the State existed for 
the benefit of the individual. For Rocco, the State must 
have pDbrity over each individual member. Society has 
'historical and immanent ends of preservation, expansion, 
improvement, quite distinct from those of the individuals 
which at a given moment compose it; so distinct in fact that 
th b • • t• I 1 ey may even e 1n oppos1 1on • The State is quite separ-
ate from its members, has an autonomous if anonymous life of 
1
•The Political Doctrine of Fascism; Fascism as Action, 
as Feeling, and as Thought', in Kariel, op. cit., P• 101. 
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its own. How well Rocco's definition of society accords with 
Simone Weil's indictment of the Great Beast: 'For Fascism, 
society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life 
consists in using individuals as instruments for its social 
ends.• 1 
Simone Weil asser~s, and with reason, that it is the in-
finite complexity of modern life that has made it thus. The 
form of government known as enlightened despotism, always utop-
ic, would be impossible in our day, because no human being has 
the capacity to be enlightened about all the problems presented 
by contemporary civilisation (OL 157). The impe~sonal State 
takes over, and the region in which the individual can think 
and make decisions for himself becomes more and more reduced 
(cf. OL 144).·· The resulting intellectual void is simply a 
breeding-ground for totalitarianism: 
La ou lea op1n1ons irraisonnees tiennent lieu d'idees, 
la force peut tout. Il est bien injuste de dire par ex-
emple que le fascisme aneantit la pensee libre; en realite 
c'est l'absence de pensee libre qui rend possible dPimposer 
par la force des doctrines officielles entierement depour-
vues de signification. (OL 155) 
1Loc. cit •• 
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The lack of any significant intellectual life was illus-
trated, Simone Weil thought, by the incoherence of, ~or example, 
Nazi propaganda. Such an incoherence could only be a 'reflet 
de l'incoherence essentielle du peuple allemand dans sa situ-
ation presente' (EH 152). In fact, the incoherence of total-
itarianism in general is willed to a large extent, in order 
to keep the people in a constant state of uncertainty. If 
man-made laws are abolished to give place to the higher laws 
of 'history' which is interpreted through the acts of man, 
there is room for any amount of change of position above and 
beyond the terrifying logicality of &uch a law. On the other 
hand, as Rocco was to say, the question of means was always a 
secondary one to Fascism; what mattered was the end in view: 
This indifference to method often exposes Fascism 
to the charge of incoherence on the part of superficial 
observers, who do not see that what counts with us is the 
end and that therefore even when we employ the same means 
we act with a radically different spiritual attitude and 
strive for entirely different results.l 
Simone Weil had, as we mentioned earlier, first-hand 
acquaintance with the development of German Fascism. She 
spent the summer of 1932 in Germany as an observer, and as a 
1 Rocco, op. cit., p. 98. 
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result wrote the series of articles which appeared in L'Ecole 
emancipee from December 1932 to March 1933, as well as several 
others. Apart from the severe criticism of the regime which 
forms the main subject of the studies, she finds much to admire 
in the German youth. Deprived of a future, social dignity 
and usually the chance to earn a living as well, they are full 
of courage and the determination to create a life somehow out 
of the ruins of the old society. They are not even partic-
ularly susceptible to Nazi propaganda, though Simone Weil sees 
a time coming whem, driven to desperation by hunger and en-
forced idleness, they might be tempted by the dynamic character 
of the new doctrine {EH 150-1). 
It was natural, given her views, that she should make 
the comparison between the policies of Nazi Germany and those 
of Imperial Rome. She quotes the opinion of Bernanos, 
'l'hitlerisme, c'est la Rome paienne qui revient' {E 146). 
Had she written at greater length on Fascist Italy she wou~d 
probably have made the same comment, though such a camparison 
was of course the avowed intention of the Italian leaders. 
As it is, her only writings on Italy are the fresh and lively 
letters to Jean Pasternak, where her concern is much more with 
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the grim realities of its political present. She does how-
ever express horror at the stifling atmosphere among certain 
young people absorbed i~ascist propaganda. After a conver-
sation with a friend of Jean Pasternak's, a Fascist supporter, 
she jokingly remarks that he would no doubt condemn her to 
work in a salt mine if he had the chance, hut then goes on 
more seriously in her letter, 
••• si j 1 avais le choix, je choisirais plutot de 
peiner et de crever au fond d'une mine de sel que de 
vivre avec l'horizon etroitement borne et limite de 
cette jeunesse. La mine me semblerait mo!ns etouffante 
que cette atmosphere, cette obsession de la nation, cette 
adoration de la force sous sa forme la plus brutale, a 
savoir, la collectivite (voire le gros animal de Platon, 
Republigue, I, V), cette divinisation deguisee de la 
mort.! 
But no comparison with Ancient Rome appears in these 
letters, even when she was in Rome itself. The comparisons 
made with Hitler's Germany, however, are numerous; the art-
icle 'Reflexions sur lea origines de l'hitlerisme' (EH 11-60) 
conta~as the longest and most detailed comment on the Romans 
in her published works. The foreign policy of both Romans 
1Nuovi Arjomenti, No. 2, 1953, p. 91. These letters have 
never been collected in book form in the original French, but 
they appear in translation in Sir Richard Rees' volume of 
Seventy Letters (London 1965). 
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and Nazis was based on domination, and their methods were 
indiscriminate so long as they worked. We have already 
discussed the Romans' frequent lack of honour in their deal-
ings with foreign lands, and it does not need a very great 
step back in time to recall Hitler's complete disregard for 
the normal code of diplomacy, and his contempt for treaties 
and as.reements which did not suit his purposes. Simone 
Weil refutes Hitler's claim to 'l'eternelle Allemagne' by 
indicating the vast differences between the Germans of the 
time of the Roman Empire--free, hospit.ble, honest--and the 
present-day Germans. It is true she relies heavily on Tac-
itus, who saw in the baraarians a reflection of Rome's past 
dignity contrasted with the vice and indulgence of the period 
when he was writing. It is also true that Simone Weil has a 
tendency to idealise barbarians and peoples untainted by 
Western civilisation in general. But her comparisons of 
the temperament of the Romans, especially of the Republican 
epoch, with that of Hitler's Nazis seems exact: 
La vertu propre de Rome etait la meme qui d'un 
certain point de vue met l'Allemagne du XXe siecle 
au-dessus des autres nations, a savoir l'ordre, la 
methode, la discipline et l'endurance, l'obstination, 
la conscience appo~tees au travail. (EH 40) 
We do not, however, says Simone Weil, recognise these 
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parallels unless they are pointed out to us. We become 
indignant, and rightly so, over cruelty practised in our 
own day, but time has softened the contours of the brutality 
of past ages. Thus 
les deportations massives de paysans dans le Sud-
-Tyrol et l'Europe orientale nous font justement horreur; 
~les ne nous rappellent pas cette premiere eglogue de 
Virgile sur laquelle nous avons reve des l'enfance et 
ceux qui disent: 'Nous, nous quittons la terre de la 
patrie et nos champs bien-aimes • • •• Nous allons 
vera l'Afrique pleine de.:soif' • (EH 46) 
Neither do we always recognise brutality when it forms 
a part of our heritage. Simone Weil, as we have noted earlier, 
gives such figures as Louis XIV and Richelieu a prominent 
position in the development of totalitarianism. Inevitably 
she gives Napoleon the same role. The greatness for which 
he is remembered is of the ;·,sort which surrounds Hitler (it 
must be remembered that Simone Weil was writing at the very 
beginning of the war, before the true monstrosity of Hitler 
was realised): 
On pretend que Napoleon a propage, les arm~s ap, la 
mais, les idees de liberte et d'egalite de la Revolution 
fran~aise; mais ce qu'il a principalement propage, 
c•est-l'idee de l'Etat centralise; 1 1Etat comme source 
unique d'autorite et objet exclusif de ·devouement. 
(EH 13-14) 
But we must not suppose that because Napoleon failed in his 
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'tentative de domination universelle' (EH 297), Hitler will 
necessarily do so to. Napoleon, like Charles-Quint and 
Louis XIV, did not possess the means of oppression, that is, 
the State in a highly developed form. Hitler thus harks 
back to the Romans rather than to any intermediate attempt 
at total domination, and Simone Weil rather implies that the 
present-day Germans have as much chance of succeeding as the 
Romans (EH 304). Considering her views on the latter, one 
can see that for her the Nazis presente.d a real threat, not 
a·imply for the immediate future but for hundreds and perhaps 
thousands of years to come. 
It was naturally the German working class rather than 
any other which aroused Simone Weil's interest and sympathies 
during her. visit. She felt that the whole hope of the inter-
national worker~' movement lay in 'cette classe ouvriere alle-
mande, la plus mure, la plus disciplinee, la plus cultivee du 
monde' (EH 150). The aim of Hitler was obviously the crushing 
of the werkers' resistance, and of the Communist party in par-
ticular. Simone Weil notes, hewever, a curious parallelism 
between the ~vowed intentions on the economic front of the 
two movements Cat least from August of that year to 6 November). 
Both wanted to revolutionise 'le systeme', both looked forward 
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to 'le socialisme'. Although Hitler's movement was against 
the class struggle, it was capable of giving strong support 
to a strike, as in the Berlin transport strike, when the 
occasion demanded it. The immense solidarity of the working 
class was shown in the dominance of proletarian ideas-, even 
in the face of Hitlerian propaganda. Hitlerians and Commun-
, 
ists would argue, but about the relative merits of their pro~ 
grammes on behalf of the working class, and not about the 
national issue, for example (EH 154-6). 
The very weakness of the reformist trade unions in Ger-
many, however, lay in their close affinity to the State int-
erests which were coming more and more to be identified with 
the Hitler movement. Simone Weil indicates why this should 
be so in an analysis of the history of the workers~ movement 
in Germany (EH 158 f~). Since it had always operated legit-
imately and within the area controlled by the State, it was 
in the present crisis tending increasingly to fall back on the 
one element of stability left in the country, namely the State. 
The Communist party, while being numerically strong and with 
a proud history behind it, was practically speaking 'un parti 
de chomeurs' (EH 169). In addition, its relations with the 
other parties, that is the Nazis and the Social-Democrats, its 
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only hope of gaining strength, were calculated to alien*ate 
the most important elements (EH 170). 
In the German question as elsewhere we see Simone Weil's 
intense preoccupation with the welfare of the working class, 
whether of Communist allegiance or not. This must not however 
be taken as approval of the Communist State, as embodied for 
example in the U.S.S.R •• Simone Weil was always very crit-
ical of the defects of Communism as practised in Russia, all 
the more so because she felt in it the betrayal of the workers' 
highest hopes. As we have seen, she equated Communism with 
Nazism in its totalitarian aspects. While working for the 
improvement of the F'rench trade-unionists' situation, she was 
never for one moment blind to the true nature of the bureau-
cracy which ruled the world's first Communist State. In 
Russia as elsewhere, the proletariat was always subordinate 
to this bureaucracy, never independent of it. She asks: 
Est-il possible d'organiser lea ouvriers d'un pays 
quel~onque sans que cette organis~ion secrete pour ainsi 
dire une bureaucratie qui subordonne aussitot !'organi-
sation a un appareil d'etat, soit celui du pays lui-meme, 
soit celui de l'U.R.s.s.? (OL 43) 
Many of the articles which she wrote for the syndicalist 
paper L'Effort show a deep disillusionment with Russia as the 
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leader of the international proletariat. In her report of 
the disarmament conference of 1932, she expresses dismay at 
the retreat of the Soviet Union from international militancy 
on behalf of the working class, and at its complicity with 
1 
capitalist States f.or the maintenance of the status quo. 
Stalin's apparent conciliation of the United States also ex-
cites her indignation: 
Le fait que Staline, sur cette question qui se 
trouve -au centre du conflit entre capital et travail, 
a abandonne le point de vue de Marx et s'est laisse 
seduire par le systeme capitaliste sous la forme la 
plus parfaite, ce fait montre que l'U.R.s.s. est encore 
loin de posseder les bases d'une culture ouvriere.2 
She remarks bitterly that Jews fleeing from Hitle~s Germany 
find refuge in capitalist countries much more readily than in 
Russia, and criticises strongly the Germano-Soviet pact, 3 and 
the Soviet leaders' conciliation of Hitler. She quotes a 
passage from the German Communist paper Welt am Abend, which 
had fallen into the hands of Hitler, which expresses the view 
that there is no fundamental disagreement between the policies 
1
•La Conference du desarmement', L'Effort, No. 295, 20 fevr. 
1932, P• 1. 
2
•u.R.s.s. et Amerique', L'Effort, No. 314, 2 juil. 1932, 
P• 1. 
3'La P~trie internationale des travailleurs', L'Effort, 
No. 389, 22 juil. 1933, P• 4. 
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of the Soviet Union, Fascism and National-Socialism. 1 
This, Simone Weil comments, is only too true; one die-
tatorship much resembles anohber, and once the good of the 
individual is sacrificed to that of the collectivity, or of 
the minority of bureaucrats who operate the system, the opp-
ression is uniform. She quotes Rousseau's criticism of the 
'reason of State', by which each individual is susceptible to 
2 liquidation where necessary, except the masters themselves. 
It is to be noted that here, where she is dealing with spec-
ific instances of oppression, and pleading for a specific 
cause, Simone Weil looks on totalitarianism as a conflict 
between the oppressed masses and the privileged few, taking 
a conventional Marxist line,whereas in her more general writ-
ings on the subject, and in particular in the essay 'Causes 
de la liberte et de l'oppression', her analysis, more pene-
trating, is of universal oppression by a State machine set in 




'Le Probleme de l'U.R.s.s.•, L'Effort, No. 406, 2 dec. 
1933, P• 4. 
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France itself of course is by no means spared in the 
analysis of the ills of the present-day Western world. Simone 
Weil comments on the gloomy atmosphere of the country in a 
letter to Jean Posternak, regretting the hold which the Comm-
unist party has over the workers. 1 To the uncertainty of 
the pre-war period is linked the frustration of the reduction 
of France's world role. This need not reduce the quality 
of its civilisation however: 
Mais le passage d'une de ces situations a l'autre 
est dur pour un peuple encore ivre de Louis XIV et de 
Napoleon, qui --** s'est toujours cru a la fois la 
terreur et l 1 amour de l 1 univers.2 
The whole question of France's pre-war situation, and the 
shattering blow of the Nazi occupation is of course dealt 
with at length in L'Enracinement. Simone Weil feels that 
unless the French can immediately find a source of inspiration 
in~ patriotism based on 'la compassion pour la patrie', and 
not on the worship of the State, their present state of root-
lessness will lead inevitably to Communism or Fascism.(E 157). 
Not that there is a will to either of these alternatives, but 
the very absence of will can create the situation where their 
1Letter to Jean Posternak (Spring 1938), Nuovi Argomenti, 
No. 2, 1953, PP• 101-2. 
2Ibid •• 
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rejection is impossible. 
An unpublished letter to herbrother, written probably in 
1940, is very revealing on the state of France at the time: 
Une ~tmosphere lourde, opaque, etouffante, s'est 
etablie sur le pays, de sorte que les gens ont le cafard 
et sont mecontents de tout, mais d'autre part sont dis-
p~ses a encaiss!r niimporte quoi sans protestation et 
meme sans surpr~se. 
She mentions the opinion of the chief of British censorship, 
that France was a Fascist country by the beginning of the war, 
and comments: 
Il manque certains caracteres specifiques du fascisme 
(pouvoir d'un parti, violences physiques en public); mais 2 l'atmosphere ne differe plus tellement de celle de l'Italie. 
She taen gives as example the taking over of judiciary powers 
by the administration, and the imposing of impossibly severe 
penalties for passing opinions which might be detrimental to 
the country's morale. 
In the context of France's moral and miliary defeat of the 
early war years and her more recent history, it is interesting 
to note in passing the situation of General de Gaulle. Simone 
1
unpublished letter to Andre Weil, seen by courtesy of 
the writer's executors. 
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Weil, with certain reservations, accepted his leadership of 
the Free French in 1940. She discusses the question of the 
legitimacy of his claim in the article 'Legitimite du gouver-
nement provisoire' (EL 58~7,), claiming that in the complete 
abdication of nationhood by the French in 1940, de Gaulle had 
simply taken the nation in charge until it could be restored 
to its rightful owners. The people had let the nation drop 
from their hands; de Gaulle 'l'a ramasse, range, et a fait 
savoir publiquement qu'il s'en constituait le gardien jus-
qu'au jour 0u le proprietaire serait en etat de le reclamer' 
(EL 61). It is not hard to imagine what Simone Weil's 
feelings would have been if, more than a quarter of a century 
later, she could have seen this same man revert to a policy 
of national grandeur and the pursuit of the glory of France 
at the expense of all else, thus entering the French traditiqn 
which Simone Weil saw as beginning with Richelieu and Louis XIV. 1 
• 
1General de Gaulle's heritage and the frequent disparity 
between. theory and practice in French politidal life is noted 
in the Observer leader, 19 May 1968: '· •• France, although 
the home o·f much democratic ideology, has seldom been the home 
of democratic practice: General de Gaulle's regime has a long 
ancestry, including the two Napoleons. Much French ideology 
has had to be written by French emigres living among the more 
deeply freedom-loving and self-disciplined Swiss.' 
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Our review of Simone Weil's ideas on the development of 
totalitarianism has taken in a wide range of political regimes 
and moments in history, and has had to be of necessity some-
what summary in places. But it should have become apparent 
that there is a strong thread of continuity linking these 
various manifestatioQs of totalitarianism. For Simone Weil, 
what mattered was not so much the composition and character 
of a particular regime--it will be obvious after our analysis 
that Friedrich and Brzezinski's definition of the totalitarian 
State does not apply to many of what Simone Weil considers to 
be its manifestations--but rather the spirit that inspires it. 
The worship of the collective, the expansion of the Great Beast, 
can take many forms. All are equally objection1ble, as all 
imply the pursuit of collective grandeur as the ultimate aim 
of society, and the abdication of individual responsibility 
which is the necessary condition of tyranny. 




ISRAEL AND IDOLATRY 
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It may seem at first sight out of place in a discussion of 
idolatry to consider Simone Weil's relationship with Judaism. 
The Jewish religion above all other is generally considered to 
have escaped the practice of idolatry, in its avowed purpose 
at any rate, and to have condemned it in all its manifest-
ations .. 3ut reference to the wider concept of idolatry 
as defined in the first chapter of this section will make clear 
to what sort of idolatry Simone Heil was referring when she 
accused Israel of practising it. This notion of idolatry 
will serve as the focal point of this chapter, but since Simone 
~leil 1 s relationship to Judaism as a whole is an extremely com-
plex issue, it will be necessary first to consider certain 
generalities and other points of importance. 
It is certainly a problem to trace the causes behind her 
deep-seated :1ntipathy towards certain aspects of Judaism, 
particularly tov1ards the revelation of the Old Testament. 
Her own opinions on her 'Jewishness', and the lack of affinity 
which she felt for any part of the Jewish traditioni are set 
out in the f~rthright letter to Carcopino, the Minister of 
Education in 1940, when she \·trote to him asking the reason 
for her not having beea accorded a teaching pest after her 
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sick-lea.ve. 1 She supposes that this mmission is due to her 
being classed as Jewish, and asks the ~inister to enlighten 
her as to the official definition of the t.erm '·Jevi 1 , as she 
is unable to see in her background either religious or ethnic 
anything which might qualify her for sue~ a description. 
She declares the alien nature of Judaism and her affinity with 
the Christian tradition: 
Je n'ai certainement rien herite de la religion 
juive • • •• La traditiow chretienne, fran~aise, 
hellenique est la mienne; la tradition h~braique m'est 
etrangere.2 
Critics such as Jacqueline i·iesnil, however, do not take 
this at its face-value, and suggest t:~at, in a spirit of self-
accusation, she rejects Judaism because she is too much a Jew: 
tlrulante nature juive qui d~ns sa soif d'absolu et 
sa conquete de !'Impossible a garde quelque chose de la 
clameur des prophetes jusque dans 1'6cho de son propre 
cri, il semble bien qu'elle ne renie le judaisme que 
parce qu 1 elle s'y reconnait trop •••• 3 
1~Lettre ~ M. le Ministre de !'Instruction publique' 
(Carcopino), Etudes materialistes (Cannes), nQ XVII (dec. 
1947), PP• 2- • 
2Ibid.. It should be remembered that Christianity in 
Simone ':;eil' s opinion had its roots in Greece rati1er th<ln in 
Israel. 
7. 
J 1 5imone ~eil, l'~uteur de L'Bnracinement, renie le judaisme 
parce qu'elle s'y reconnait trop' I La Terre retrouvee, ler janv. 
1950. 
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But the idea that Simone Weil's criticism of Judaism might be 
related to prophetic chastisement of sin presupposes that she 
was as much a part of the tradition as were the prophets, 
which was clearly not the ease. There seems no reason to 
doubt her sincerity when she affirms that Judaism played no 
part in her upbringing, and that the Greek and Christian 
tradition was paramount. But although this might be expected 
to produce indifference towards Judaism, it hardly explains 
the active hostility towards that tradition·which she in fact 
manifested. It is clear that the roots of this hostility go 
much deeper than any accident of birth. 
Simone Weil seems to have been acutely conscious of the 
gulf separating the Greek and the Jewish wormds, and her 
hostility to the latter was,rif not caused by, at least in-
tensi~ied by her great devotion to the former. She seems to 
have shown little interest in any meeting of the two cultures, 
considering for instance their highly fruitful union in Hellen-
ism from an essentially Greek standpoint and ignoring the 
Jewish contribution. It is perhaps true to say that Judaism 
was fundamentally too unphilosophic to appeal to Simone Weil, 
the Old Testament too much the account of a direct relationship 
between God and his people. Gerald Abrahams implies the con-
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trast with Greek thought when, considering developments in 
Judaism, he writes: 
Their theology was too intimate to be philosophical. 
In the spirit of a Book in which the only proof of the 
Godhead is by revelation they thought of God as near and 
not remote, as humanll thinkable, not as a comprehensive 
predicate of reality. 
But it must be admitted that Simone Weil knew little of 
Rabbinic Judaism, or of any part of the tradition outside the 
account of the Old Testament. Indeed, there is a cert~n 
irony in the fact that her knowledge of Judaism seems to have 
been restricted to that part of it which has come through into 
Christianity, although she repeatedly disclaims this filiation 
in so far as it concerns 'true' Christianity, the Greek com-
ponent. Even when restricting the field to the Old Testament 
she does not seem to have bad a deep knowledge of much of it, 
confining her attention for the most part to the less Hebraic 
elements, the sapiental literature and pre-patriarchal mytho-
logy. This partial character of her knowledge explains the 
loss of objectivity in many of her judgements. It means 
nevertheless that her particular brand of 'anti-semitism' bears 
little or no relation to the type which was raging in Europe 
1The Jewish Mind (London 1961), P• 76. 
at the time of her death. It was based not on race (although 
there is an element of race in her conjectures on the sons of 
Noah and their d'.escendants, in which the Hebrews come out 
badly) 1 but on the Old Testament concept of God's relationship 
with man, and its effect on man's view of his position in the 
universe. The anti-semitic trend in France, at least in its 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century manifestation, based as it 
was on the exploitation of irrational fears as to Jewish power 
and influence, 2 must have seemed abhorrent to her, and she was 
urgent in her condemnation of Nazi Germany, although not, it 
is true, specifically because of the persecution of the Jews. 
The writings of her later years, however, condemning the Old 
Testament concept of divinity, must have been seen in the 
context of the time as anti-Jewish, adding fuel to the fire, 
and must be criticised as lacking in a sense of occasion, to 
say the least.· It is perhaps surprising too that, seeing the 
persecutions which the Jews were undergoing, she did not immed-
iately, even exaggeratedly, avow her Jewishness, finding frater-
1
•Les trois fils de Noe et l'histoire de la civilisation 
mediterraneenne I ' AD 177-189.· 
2
see e.g. Henri Drumont, La France juive (Paris 1886). 
264 
nity in adversity. ~vhile this would not have been a natural 
reaction for everybody, it would have fitted the inner logic 
by which she acted when confronted with oppression. 
Having established the restricted area within which 
Simone Weil's critique operated, an attempt should now be made 
to define the precise nature of her criticism. 1 It can be 
divided into different but interrelated points. Firstly, 
and this is fairly commonplace, there is her revulsion against 
the cruelty frequently portrayed in the Old Testament. 'Jus-
qu'a l'exil, il n'y a pas un seul personnage de race hebraique 
mentionne dans la Bible dent la vie ne soit souillee de chases 
horribles' (PSO 57). 'Dans Moise, les preceptes de charite 
sent rares et noyes parmi quantite de commandements d'une 
cruaute et d'une injustice atroces' (PSO 49). These accus-
ations of barbarity are not of course original to Simone \o/eil, 
but form part of the traditional rationalist critique of the 
Old Testament. Their immediate ancestry can be traced to 
Alain, who also was persuaded that 'la Bible, ce livre cruel, 
2 
n'a pas fini de massacrer', but within the French tradition 
1The fullest account of this criticism is to be found in 
Raper, DR· cit., passim. 
2
•Le Dieu cruel', Saisons de l'esprit, Propos LXXXIV. 
Quot. A. Lunel, 'Simone Weil et Israel', Revue de la pensee 
juive, juillet 1950. 
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they can be discovered much earlier, in Voltaire for example, 
who compared the high moral standards of the deists with the 
barbarities of Old Testament tradition. 1 In Simone Weil's 
case the comparison is made with the piety expressed in the 
Egyptian Book of the Dead, where the soul renders an account 
of the high ethical standards it has observed during life 
(see PSO 47). It will be obvious that these criticisms in-
volve a partial use of material, and an ignoring of the devel-
opment towards a higher concept of morality within the Old 
Testament. 
If this was the extent of Simone Weil's criticism, it 
could be rejected as superficial and unjust, but there is a 
great deal more to it than that. The crux of the matter lies 
in a concept of God rather than in one of morality, although 
the two are ultimately related. It was not so much that the 
early Hebrews were lacking in gentleness that earned her con-
damnation, but that their God claimed direct responsibility 
for the atrocities they committed. The entry into Canaan 
and the massacre of the peoples the Israelites found there 
1L. Poliakov, Histoire de l'antise~itisme, III, De Vol-
taire a Wagner (Paris 1968), P• 104. 
266 
was a direct result of Israelis being chosen by God to occupy 
that land. In Simone Weil's eyes, if the spirit of the true 
God had been in them, they would have preferred to remain en-
slaved in Egypt rather than to commit such atrocities in the 
pursuit of freedom (PSO 54). Her concept of God was rooted 
in the idea of his goodness (see I, §2), and this meant that 
whatever atrocities man might commit, God could have no part 
in them: 
Car la verite essentielle concernant Dieu, c'est 
qu'il est bon. Croire que Dieu peut ordonner aux 
hommes des actes atroces d'injustice et de cruaute, 
c'est la plus grande erreur qu'on puisse commettre a 
son egard. (LR 11) 
In this respect, Simone Weil is not making any assessment of 
relative morality; she admits the horrors performed by other 
peoples, such as, for instance, the destruction of Troy by 
the Greeks. The difference was simply that, whereas for 
example the occupation of Canaan remained for the Jews an 
instance of triumph, although the methods used might later be 
considered regrettable, for the Greeks the destruction of 
Troy was an act of shame, and recognised as such: 
Cette guerre de Troie etait bien l'entreprise de 
destruction de toute une civilisation. L'entreprise 
reussit. Homere appelle toujours Troie 'la sainte 
Ilion'. Cette guerre fut le peche original des Grecs, 
leur remords. (AD 188) 
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The reason why the Jews never displayed the same sense of 
shame over their conquests was because of their basic error on 
the nature of God. Simone Weil claims that whereas for the 
Greeks God was good before all else, for the early Hebrews he 
was essentially powerful; 
d'apres l'Ecriture, les Hebreux avant Moise 
n'ont connu Dieu que comme 'Tout-Puissant'. Autrement 
dit ils ne connaissaient de Dieu que l'attribut de puis-
sance, et non le bien qui est Dieu meme. (PSO 47-48) 
It cannot be denied that the emphasis in the earlier books of 
the Old Testament is on the powerful presence of God as he 
appeared to the Jews. This presence was moral above all; 
God was a constant critic and director of their collective 
life, commanding and punishing when Israel departed from the 
standards he set. As J. Guttmann puts it: 
The distinctiveness of biblical religion is due to 
its ethical conception of the personality of God. The 
God of the prophets is exemplified by his moral will; 
he is demanding ~d commanding, promising and threatening, 
the absolutely free ruler of man and nature.l 
But for Simone Weil this educative role is lost in the concept 
of God as powerful defender of his people, 'le Dieu des armees•. 2 
1Philoso 
from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig 
2Raper suggests that the Hebrew term 'adonai tsebaoth' 
translated as 'Lord of Hosts' or 'l'Eternel des Armees' does 
not necessarily mean this, but could refer simply to the heaven-
ly company of angels. Op. cit., p. 3· 
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This is not a new or original attribution either: the fact 
that it is a well-known Gnostic criticism of 'le Dieu juste' 
provides another line of attack for Moeller when he accuses 
Simone \'leil of Cathar tendencies. 1 But it reappeared also 
in the mouth of certain thinkers of the Enlightenment; Reus-
seau tras unable to accept the 1 Dieu des combats' which he 
2 found in the Old Testament, and this seems as likely a source 
as any for Simone \'leil' s critic ism. Among modern critics, 
H. B. Parkes provides an example of the distaste often felt 
for this period in Jewish history: 
Even by the standards of the second millennium, 
Jehovah ttas a barbaric deity, far less humane than the 
cosmic spirit worshipped by the Pharaoh Ikhnaton or the 
Babylonian Sun-god who had dictated the laws of Hammurabi. 3 
Criticism of Yah\·reh as powerful rather than good is 
associated in Simone Weil's mind with another criticism, that 
of the idea of God intervening in human affairs, which is based 
1Litterature du XXe siecle ••• , p. 238. 
2Poliakov, op. cit., p. 120. 
3Gods and Hen: The Origins of 'lolestern Culture (London 1960), 
p. 94. Stendhal puts tke same criticism into the mouth of 
Julien Sorel, when he refers to 'Lle Diei7-de la Bible, petit 
despote cruel et plein de la soif de se venger ••• •. Le 
Rouge et le noir, §XLIV. 
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on the concept of time and history which we noted in - a 
previous chapter (p.l64). The essential quality of the 
Jewish consciousness concerning time is the importance attached 
to the idea of becoming, of development, of the significance 
of the individual historical moment. The contrast between 
this attitude and the more static Greek concept is made by 
Guttmann: 
in 
It is/the unique historical process and not in the 
unchanging being of nature that the revelation of God's 
will and the satisfaction of all religious aspirations 
are to be found • • •• For biblical religion, the 
\'lorld does not dissolve into empty nothingness; on the 
contrary, the moral activism of the Bible envisages the 
world as the scene of the realisation of a divine order, 
which is an order of moral \V"ill and moral life .1 
God is therefore fulfilling his purposes in the historical 
process, and to this end has chosen Israel to be the instrument 
of his will. The fact of Israel's election was one which 
Simone Weil was unable to accept~ partly because she failed 
to appreciate the historical process involved in it. The Old 
Testament is the record of a people gradually losing its 
national exclusiveness with regard to its deity, gradually 
realising that the God of Israel was also the universal God 
1 Op. cit., p. 12. 
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to whom all people owe allegiance. Although the Old Testa-
ment records many instances of petty nationalism,1 neverthe-
less there is a growing awareness of the nature of election, 
and the responsibility it entails. Abrahams indicates clearly 
the nature of this responsibility within the concept of elec-
tion: 
The Jew, be it understood, makes no claim to the 
status of 'chosen' in any invidious sense. • •• If 
he uses, in his prayers, words like 'exalted', the con-
text is of ethical inspiration. The meaning is that he 
has been 'elected' to be the best behaved among the 
nations, and his language has been made the vehicle of 
great ethical thought.2 
To Simone Weil hov1ever only the political consequences of 
election were apparent; a God who 'chooses' a people cannot 
present at the same time the impartiality which, v.1e have seen, 
was necessary to her concept of the true God. 'l'he idea of 
God's will working itself out in history, of his ability to 
alter the course of nature to fulfil his own ends, was funda-
mentally antipathetic to one who believed, as she did, that God 
in creating the world submitted himself to necessity (see I, §2). 
1see Sir G. Adam Smith & others, The Legacy of Israel 
(Oxford 1927), P• 75· 
2
op. cit., p. 32. 
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For her the love of God is to be seen more clearly in the order 
of the \V"Orld than in the notion of Yahweh who is able to move 
mountains in defence of his people. God does not intervene 
in human af:.:"airs 1 and therefore I la notion meme de peuple elU 
est incompatible avec la connaissance du vrai Dieu' (PSO 51). 
1rhe fact that Yahweh's promises to Israel referred to the 
temporal sphere, being promises regarding the destiny of that 
people, makes her accuse him of being an earthly deity, and 
Moses of being a politician rather than a spiritual leader: 
LMoisyetc:dt avant tout un fondateur d'Etat. Or, 
COMI:'le dit tres bien Richelieu' le salut de 1 I ante s I opere 
dans 1 1 autre monde, mais le salut de l 1 Etat s 1 opere dans 
ce monde-ci. Noise voulait apparai.tre comme l'envoye 
d 1 un Dieu puissant q~i fait des promesses temporelles. 
(PSO 50) 
She supposed that in Egypt Hoses had learned Jmd. lp;;wuad of 
other revelations, but had refused them, 1 parce ~u~ comme 
Maurras, il concevait la religion comme un simple instrument 
de grandeur nationale 1 • 1 ll:ioses 1 mission was certainly that 
of a national leader in so far as he was chosen to lead the 
Israelites out of bondage in Egypt, and to impart to them God's 
promise of better things to come. But Simone \'Jeil ignores 
1 1Lettre a J"ean i;lahl 1 , Deucalion, no. 4 (oct. 1952). See 
Appendix C• 
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the spiritual element in God's commandments to Israel, with 
their far-reaching ethical consequences. For her, the nation-
alistic conception of Israel outweighed all other considerations. 
The idea of God's direct intervention in the affai~s of 
the world, so that his designs could be seen working them-
sleves out in history, has unfortunate consequences which 
Simone Weil was not slow to point out. If God is seen as 
a father-figure rewarding the righteous and punishing the 
wicked, this leads inevitably to a confusion between pros-
perity and virtue: 
Aux yeux des Hebreux (du moins avant l'exil, et 
sauf exceptions) peche et malheur, vertu et prosperite 
sont inseparables, ce qui fait de Iahweh un Pere ter-
restre et non celeste, visible et non cache. (LR 68) 
This can h~~dly be called a false charge, given the prevalence 
in the earlier books of the Old Testament of comments such 
as the following concerning Joseph (Gen. XXXIX .• 2-3): 
And the Lord was with Joseph, and he was a prosperous 
man 
And his 1naster sa\"r that the Lord was with him, and 
that the Lord made all that he did to prosper in his hand. 
Even in the Psalms, where there is frequently a deeply personal 
sense of sin as being wrong in itself, rather than as a prelude 
to punishrnent, the same equation is made; the Psalmist asks 
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God for relief from the affliction into which his wrong-doing 
has led him, and God promises the Psalmist victory over his 
. 1 
enem~es. Although it could be argued that there are many 
instances in which God's forgiveness prevails, and sin does 
not reap its'punishment, this does not really alter the funda-
mental premise that God, being just, has a right to reward and 
punish according to deserts, whether or not he exaereises it. 
The prevalent spirit is that when Israel does right in the sight 
of the Lord, the nation prospers: when it disobeys God's com-
mandments, then misfortune befalls Israel, battles are lost and 
the enemy triumphs. 'l;lhen seen from Israel 1 s point of vie\..r, 
this could be reg~rded as a necessary educational measure to-
wards a recalcitrant nation, but its corollary, that the de-
feated enemy is guilty simply because it is defeated, is quite 
unacceptable to Simone Weil: 
Les Hebreux voyaient dans le malheur le signe du 
peche et par suite un motif legitime,de mepris; ils 
regardaient leurs ennemis vaincus comme etant en horreur 
a Dieu meme et condamnes a expier des crimes, ce qui 
rendait la cruaute permise et nteme indispensable. 
(SG 41) 
1 See e.g. Psalms XXVII, XXXIV, XXXVII, LXXXIII, CXXIX. 
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One of the few exceptions to this spirit is shown in 
the Book of Job, which Simone Weil admired because she felt 
it illustrated "the incomprehensibility of God's purposes for 
man, even supposing he had any. (It may be noted in passing 
that this book was one of the few in the Old Testament which 
found favour with Voltaire, partly because Job was exterior 
to the Hebrew tradition.)1 The same exception of the Book 
of Job is made by Simone Petrement in her criticism of the 
equation sin-affliction: 
Ce qu'il y a de terrible dans l'Ancien Testament, 
c'est la confusion trop frequente de la justice et de 
la puissance, de la vertu et de la reussite, du bien et 
de la destinee. Peu de pitie pour les vaincus, car 
s'ils sent vaincus, c'est que Dieu les a punis. Si 
les Israelites eux-memes sent vaincus, c'est qu'ils ont 
peche. Une seule protestation peut-etre avant l'Evan-
gile: c'est le livre de Job. La seulement un mal-
heureux n'est pas represente comme coupable, et lui-meme 
soutient courageusement, centre l'opinion de ceux qui 
l'entourent, que son malheur n'est pas une punition. 2 
In sharp contrast to this is the Greek concept of a world 
ruled by necessity, where misfortune is either a result of 
the common human condition, or the natural consequence of 
certain actions ('Ares est equitable, et il tue ceux qui 
1Poliakov, op. ci~, p. 105. 
2DP, p. 182. 
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tuent', quot. SG 21). One is thus discouraged from passing 
judgement on one's less fortunate fellows. The w.orld obeys 
mechanical laws which are not broken even by a divine sovereign, 
and if Ne wish to deal justly with man we must follo"ll'r the ex-
ample of the Father who 'maketh his S\Ul to rise on the evil 
and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the un-
just•.1 Simone Weil comments: 
Le reproche le plus amer que fassent les hommes a 
Ll!l necessite, c'est son indifference absolue aux 
valeurs morales. Justes et criminels sont egalement 
frappes d'insolation, noyes dans les inondations. C'est 
precisement cette indifference que le Christ nous invite 
a regarder comme l'expression meme de la perfection de 
notre Pere celeste et a imiter. (IP 150) 
We are reminded of Simone Weil's discussion of the Iliad; and 
of the passage where Zeus takes his golden scales and against 
his o~m personal ·inclination ~ives the victory to the Greeks 
(PSO 56). It is interesting to note that i-Testern Europe is 
today so conditioned to the idea of an omnipotent deity that 
Zeus' inability to influence the battle ~ccording to the divine 
will' seems to be more of a l>Teakness on his part than a virtue. 
11-iatt. V. 45. It is interesting to note that I:·1arcion· uses 
this as the basis of an attack on Judaism, saying that if God 
treats saints and sinners alike, then his justice must be div-
orced from the concept of goodness. See A. Marmorstein, Studies 
i.n Jewish Theoih:ogy, ed. J. Rabbinowitz & M. S. Lew (London 1950). 
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It is sometimes argued that in her criticism of the Old 
Testament, Simone Weil took no account of the dialectic within 
which the tradition developed, of the fact that cruelties and 
chauvinism were balanced by prophetic criticism. The Old 
Testament is a people's record of its own growth, and contains 
both the rebellion from God and the exhortation to return to 
him. In this connexion Raper suggests that Simone Weil simply 
misunderstood the Book of Jonah, for example, seeing in it an 
example of Jewish vindictiveness rather than disapproval of it. 1 
This criticism is justified in part, especially as regards 
Simone Weil's condemnation of cruelties committed by the Hebrews, 
and the unfavourable comparison she makes with other cultures. 
It is clear that she makes no allowances here either for atroc-
ities committed by the other cultures in question, or for the 
gradual process towards a more enlightened way of dealing with 
one's neighbours recorded in the Old Testament. The continual 
dialectic between the often crude reactions of a primitive 
people and the undercurrent of higher spiritual awareness is 
made aptly by Abrahwns: 
The people whose story is reflected in the Bible 
were primitive enough, and later, chauvinistic enough, to 
1 Op. cit., P• 5· 
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express thoughts about God in terms of the lower levels 
of experience; boasting of His powers and His favours, 
and invoking fear in a crude way. But the higher trad-
ition, the tradition of emotional sublimity, was early, 1 
and was never lost; and in the Exile it gained strength. 
But, as we have seen, the object of Simone Weil's casti-
gation was not so much cruelties in themselves, but the idea 
that God could order and approve cruelty, and that he could 
intervene to assist his people at the expense of other nations. 
This is a feature that 111as never questioned by the prophets, 
who invariably condemn Israel's falling away from God, and 
the nation.!,s idolatry and worship of false gods, but operate 
~ri thin the concept of election. A religion which still 
celebrates the Passover as a symbol of delivrance from past 
bondage has obviously a very developed sense of the purpose 
of God in history. 
• 
It is this sense of the presence of God in the temporal 
sphere \vhich forms the basis for the charge of idolatry which 
Simone Weil brought against Israel. This is not to say of 
course that she failed to recognise the essential monotheism 
1 Op. cit., p. 170. 
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of Judaism: l she in fact claims, as did Renan, that the 
religious mission of Israel was to proclaim the unity of 
God (every nation in antiquity having a vocation with regard 
to one aspect of the divinity Lsee SG 717). But she would 
claim at the same time that the unity and utter transcendance 
of God cla~med by Judaism 1rrere in the end too difficult to 
live by without compromise of one sort or another. As Alain 
puts it, 'visant trap haut, il LYsrae17 a vecu trap bas•.2 
There is great purity in the basic concept of Yahloreh: 
Israel is forbidden to attach the name of God to anything on 
earth, for·bidden to make images of the Almighty. Judaism in 
its trascendent element is very conDcious of the utter other-
ness of God, of the vast abyss separating him from man because 
of man's sinful nature, but not of the necessity for any medi-
ating principle to bridge the gap: 
• • • for the restoration of harmony, in Je1r1ish 
teaching, man does not stand in need of a mediator. 
The various mediating terms in use in the Bible such 
as the 'Holy Spirit' and the rabbinic Nemra (vlord) 
denote only aspects or qualities of the Deity, and are 
not to be regarded as beings of any kind, much less as 
~'Histoire du peuple d'Israel', Oeuvres completes, VII 
(Paris 1955), P• 97. 
2
•La Bible', Saisons de l'esprit, Propos LXXXIV. Quat. 
Lunel, art. cit •• 
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personal beings. So are the angels considered mere 
instruments used by God, and not intermediaries to 
bridge some imaginary gulf between God and the world, 
or God and man.I 
The mse of the word 'imaginary' to qualify 'gulf' would seem 
to indicate that to the Jewish way of thinking, even though 
man has aroused God's anger by his wrong-doing, nevertheless 
·his isolation from God is only temporary, and full communion 
can be restored through a return to righteousness. Indeed, 
this isolation is a form of relationship, since it is based 
on God's disapproval, a positive attitude of person to person. 
In this sense it is unreal to the Jewish mind to speak of a 
gulf between God and man because, while he is infinitely more 
than man can comprehend, man was nevertheless made in his 
likeness, and the relationship of God to man is that of a 
father to his son. 
For Simone Weil, as we have seen, the separation of God 
from man was much mor~ radical and much more real. She 
would claim that any relationship between God and man necess-
arily involved a mediator, and that, psychologically speaking, 
this was as true for the Jews as for anyone else. But having 
1I. Epstein, Judaism: A Historical Presentation (Har-
mondsworth 1959), P• 142. 
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rejected the idea of mediation revealed to them by surrounding 
civilisations, Israel tried to use the nation itself as a 't.iay 
to God: 
Il ne peut y avoir de contact de personne a personne 
entre l'homme et Dieu que par la personne du Mediateur. 
Homlui il ne peut y avoir de presence de Dieu que collec-
tive, nationale. Israel a en meme temps, du meme coup, 
choisi le Dieu national et refuse le mediateur. Israel 
a tendu peut-etre de temps a autre au veritable mono-
theisrne? Mais toujours il retombait, il ne pouvait pas 
ne pas retomber, au Dieu de tribu. (C3 255 ) 
The attempt to make the collective unit of the nation 
act as mediator must end in failure, since a true mediator 
partakes of the nature of both extremes, and the~true God can 
have no place in the interests of the collectivity. Simone 
Weil's hatred of the national mission of Israel is a clear 
example of her antipathy towards Plato's 'gros animal', and 
her judgement .on Israel, that it had made a god out of the 
nation itself, blinded her to the very real achievements of 
the Jewish people: 
Israel est une tentative de vie sociale surnaturelle. 
Il a reussi, on peut le supposer, ce qu'il y a de mieux 
dans le genre. Cela suffit. Inutile de recommencer. 
Le resultat montre de quelle revelation divine le gros 
animal est susceptible. La Bible, c'est la revelation 
traduite en sociale. (C3 106) 
The depth of the chasm separating this kind of reasoning from 
orthodox Jewish thought can perhaps best be illustrated by 
giving a passage from the work of Epstein to which reference 
has already been made, in which the fact of Israel having 
received a collective revelation is a mark of its authenticity: 
The scope and substance of Israel's universal 
priestly mission \·las indicated in the inaug-ural revelation 
on Mount Sinai with the giving of the Ten Commandments. 
The psychological experience involved in this Sinaitic 
revelation, like all other disclosures of the Divine, 
cannot be determined, but it is unique in its claim to 
have been shared by a whole nation. This collective 
national experience of Israel served to authenticate for 
the people the revelational claims of1the individual Patriarchs as well as those of Moses. 
One can well imagine Simone rJeil 1 s reaction to such an idea. 
Religion for her could never be a matter bet\"leen God and the 
nation, but between God and the individual. 
Ala revelation~urnaturelle Israel opposa un 
refus, car il ne lui fallait pas un Dieu qui parle a 
l'ame dans le secret, mais un Dieu present ala collec-
tivite nationale et protecteur dans la guerre. Il 
voulait la puissance et la prosperite. (AD 1a3) 
While it \'lould be possible to show that she overstates 
her case, it is nevertheless true to say that in so far as 
God is made to represent the national interest of a people, 
1 Op. cit., P• 20. The idea of the corporate personality 
of Israel was elaborated by writers contemporary to Simone Weil, 
e.g. Johannes Pedersen, in Israel: Its Life and Culture, I & 
II (London 1926-40), p. 476. There is no evidence that Simone 
Weil knew of this theory, however. See Raper, op. cit., P• 
106. 
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he will be in danger of being confused \'lith immediate ends 
and tangible successes. The entry into Canaan of the Israel-
ites may well have been considered as part of.God~s plan for 
humanit~by the Israelites themselves; but one can hardly 
expect the peoples thus exterminated to view it in the same 
way. The event can hardly justify any assumption other than 
that here was an instance of the idea of a universal God 
being used for national purposes. For Simone Weil, the whole 
concept of a national God amounts to idolatry, whether or not 
there is any actual worship of images: 'On ne faisait pas de 
statue a Jehovah; mais Israel est la statue de Jehovah. On 
a fabrique ce peuple, comme une statue de bois, a coups de 
hache 1 ( Cl 167) • 
The worship of images being consistently forbidden in 
Israel, idolatry took on a new and more insidious form, the 
worship of temporal power incarnate in the State. In Simone 
Weil's view, the very notion of a chosen race implied idolatry: 
La veritable idolatrie est la convoitise (Coll. III. 
5), et la nation juive, dans sa soif de bien charnel, en 
etait coupable dans les moments memes ou elle adorait 
so.n Dieu. Les Hebreux ant eu pour idole, non du metal 
ou du bois, mais une race, une nation, chose tout aussi 
terrestre. Leur religion est dans son essence insepa-
rable de cette idolatrie, a cause de la notion de 'peuple 
(LR 15) 
It seemed to Simone ~·Ieil, and this is incomprehensible to the 
orthodox Jewish mind, that this social form of idolatry was 
far worse than the worship of statues attributed to surround-
ing pagan religions, even if these involved human sacrifice: 
I Les sacrifices humains a Baal ? Hais les exterminations de 
peuples entiers sont bien plus affreuses' (C3 245). It is 
clear that she is not here concerned with sheer weight of 
numbers, but with the motives behind the killings. The dis-
tinction she is drawing is that between ritual sacrifice, 
where the victim is generally one of the tribe, and the motive 
is the appeasement or pleasing of a deity, or is part of a 
ritual cleansing, and mass slaughter in the pursuit of terri-
torial advantage, where the victims are outside the community 
and therefore unable to participate in any active sense. The 
distinction is a fine one, and it could be argued that it is 
of no consequence, that each type of slaughter was 'barbaric' 
and to be condemned. 
Simone Weil herself admits elsewhere that the general 
debauchery which was part of many of the pagan rites was to 
be deplored, but claims that abuses were less frequent than 
one no\o~adays imagines: 1 On a raison d 1 alleguer centre certains 
de ces cultes les debauches qui les accompagnaient--mais, je 
crois, beaucoup plus rarement qu'on ne le pense aujourd'hui' 
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(LR 14). She does not attempt to substantiate this claim, 
and gives the 'pagan idolaters' the benefit of the doubt on 
rather slim evidence. To support her claim she would no 
doubt add that since history is written by the victors, it 
is impossible to believe nebrew accounts in this particular 
instance. The corruption and L~piety of the Canaanite cities 
would thus be 'des inventions calomnieuses des H~breux centre 
leurs victimes' (LR 18). It is as well to remember too that 
what may strike us today as obscene and debauched was certain-
ly not considered so in its origins, though the possibility 
of later debasement is always· there. 
Simone \'i"eil also comments on the restrictions imposed. 
on the Israelites in the matter of the worship in high places. 
She sa\'s in these restrictions a refusal of mediation: 'Dans 
Israel, interdiction des sacrifices sur les hauts lieux et 
au pied des arbres. 
leur etait interdit' 
Tout ce q,ui se rapporte a la m~diation 
(C3 244). This is only true in so far 
as she attributed the acceptance of mediation to the Canaanite 
tribes and its refusal to the Jews. The 'high places' were 
in. fact forbidden to Israel quite simply because they \-.sere 
the old worshipping-places of the Canaanites, and if allowed 
to worship there the Israelites cot~ld very soon have abandoned 
the \•rorship of Yahweh--as in fact they did at intervals 
throughout their history. The best element of Judaism wanted 
above all a pure religion, and it is in the light of this de-
sire, with its elevated and sometimes harsh demands, that 
Judaism can best be understood. Their lapses are often only 
the corollary to the moral earnestness of their faith, just 
as their intolerance, as Henan remarked, \1as a direct result 
of their monotheism. 1 Without a constant reminder of their 
monotheistic mission Israel would sooner or later have been 
assi~ilated by the surrounding tribes. Hircea Eliade, while 
not underestimating the importance of the Baal cults during a 
considerable period of time, speaks of the gradual ascendancy 
of Hebrew monotheism over these: 
• • • ·the Semites at one time in their history 
adored the divine couple made up of Ba'al, the god of 
hurricane and fecundity, and Belit, the goddess of 
fertility (particularly the fertility of the earth). 
The Jewish prophets held these cults to be sacrilegious. 
l!,rom their s·tandpoint--from the st~ndpoint, that is, of 
those Semites who had, as a result of the 1-losaic reforms, 
reached a higher, purer and more complete conception of 
the deity--such a criticism was perfectly justified •••• 
The 'divine form' of Yahweh prevailed over the 'divine 
form' of Ba'al; it manifested a more perfect holiness, 
it sanctified life without in any way allowing to run 
wild the elementary forces concentrated in the cult of 
1 op. cit. , p. 87. 
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Ba'al, it revealed a spiritual economy in which man's 
life and destiny gained a totally nel-l value; at the 
same time it made possible a richer religious experience, 
a communion with God at once purer and mere complete.l 
Simone ~eil seems to have felt however that this greater purity 
was only achieved at the expense of increased intolerance, 
and an exclusivist attitude to the deity. 
She also accuses the liebrews of not accepting the medi-
ation of Osiris while they \>Tere in Egypt. The cult of 
Osiris, or of his Greek counterpart Dionysos, \·ras of course 
widespread in the ancient world, but it is not difficult to 
see why the Jews were unable to adopt him in the same way as 
other peoples. .Simone \·Jeil however evolves from this a 
theory according to 1rrhich Israel was considered accursed by 
the ancient world for refusing the revelation of Osiris. 
This would explain, she claims, why Israel is not so much as 
mentioned by Herodotus, although it is inconceivable that he 
knew nothing of that nation: 
Si on admettait qu'Israel eatait regarde par les 
anciens comme un peuple maudit parce qu'ayant refuse la 
notion du Dieu mediateur, souffrant et redempteur reve-
lee a l'Egypte, on comprendrait ce qui autrement est 
1Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed 
(London & New York 1958), pp. 3-4. 
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inexplicable: a savoir qu'IIerodote, si avide de toutes 
les curiosites d'ordre religieux, n'ait jamais parle 
d' Israel. (LR 79) 
She mentions also the passage where Herodotus 'enumere une 
grande quantite de peuples helleniques et asiates, parmi les-
quels un seul avait un "Zeus de armees"' (LR 12). 
The objectivity of this kind of interpretation taken as 
historical criticism is of course reduced by her central pre-
occupation: the conviction that the Yah\..reh of pre-exilic 
Jud.a ism, because of the barbarities he at times commanded, 
was not and could not be the supreme God. The question put 
to the Benedictine Dom Clement in 1942 refgis more like an 
affirmation: 
Est-on anathema qund on pense que la source d'ou 
est issu pour Israel le commandement de detruire lea 
villas, de massacrer les peuples et d'exterminer lea 
prisonniers et lea enfants n'etait pas Dieu; et qu'avoir 
pris Dieu pour l'auteur d'un tel commandement etait une 
erreur incomparablement plus grave que lea formes meme 
lea plus basses de polytheisme et d'idolatrie; et qu'en 
consequence, jusqu'a l'epoque de l'exil, Israel n'a eu 
presque aucune connaissance du vrai Dieu, alors qu'une 
telle connaissance se trouvait parmi l'elite de la plu-
part des autres peuples? (PSO 72) 
But behind the lack of objectivity or of any compromise with 
accepted notions, there is the implacable logic of her con-
viction: God is the Good, and therefore cannot comma11d evil. 
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We have already discussed Simone ~ieil's interpretation 
of the idea of idolatry (II, §1). What we think of as ido-
latry is to a large extent, she tiDught, the product of Jewish 
fanaticism. In the history of missionary activity it is cer-
tainly true that the envoys of a monotheistic religion such 
as Christianity have tended to assume that any images or repre-
aentational figures found among non-Christian peoples are 
objects of worship and gods in their own right. By this 
reckoning, Simone ~·Jeil contends, the early Hebrews would see 
idolatry in Christianity itself, and act accordingly: 
Si les Hebreux de la bonne epoque ressuscitaient, 
et si on leur donnait des armes, ils nous extermineraient 
tous, hommes, femmes et enfants, pour crime d'idolatrie. 
Ils nous reprocheraient d'adorer Baal et Astarte, prenant 
le Christ pour ilaal et la Vierge pour Astarte. (LR 14) 
This latter charge has just sufficient truth in it to make it 
credible. It is perfectly accurate to say that Jewish relig-
ious teaching has never and will never be able to accept the 
deity of Christ: the Jews' O\·tn concept of a Nessiah and his 
mission was vastly different from the historical figure of 
Christ and the Church he founded. As Epstein puts it, 
• • • the Messiah in Jewish teaching is not a super-
natural being, nor a divine being, having a share in the 
forgiveness of sin; much less is he to be confused with 
God. At the highest the Messiah is but a mortal leader 
who will be instrumental in fully rehabilitating Israel 
in its ancient homeland, and through a restored Israel 
289 
bring about the moral and spiritual regeneration of the 
tlhole of humanity, maldng all mankind fit citizens of 
the Kingdom.l 
This obviously has little in common with the cult of a 
dying and resurrected saviour-god which Simone Weil considered 
to be one of the corner-stones of religion. But it must 
nevertheless be admitted that Christianity 0\'lles.more to Judaism 
than Simone \·leil likes to think. James, in the \•rork already 
mentioned, claims that the conception of God in the two relig-
ions is not essentially different. 2 The Christian recognition 
of the Three-in-One does not, he says, conflict with the abso-
lute monotheism of Judaism; the New Testament emphasis on the 
single creator and sustainer of the universe gives ample proof 
of Christianity's essential monotheism. He goes on to write 
of the polytheistic trend which reappeared with the cult of 
the saints, but stresses that care was taken to di.stinguish 
between worship (latria), which may legitimately be addressed 
to God alone, and veneration (dulia), which should be directed 
towards saints and heroes of the faith. He realises however 
1 Op. cit., P• 140. 
2 Op. cit., P• 105J 
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that this is a theological distinction which is in practice 
very difficult to sustain. 1-iohammed indeed drew from a form 
of Christianity prevalent in his time that the Christian Tri-
nity consisted of God, Nary and Jesus, with the archangel 
G b • 1 th H 1 n • "t l -a r~e as e o y ~p~r~ • 
Similarities in their conception of the Godhead, however, 
cannot alter the fact that in Judaism there is no place for 
an incarnate God. And for Simone l:feil incarnation \"las a 
most impor·tant feature of authentic religious experience 
(see e.g. C3 231-2). She naturally enough brings the charge 
of refusing the notion of incarnation against Islam, as well 
as against Judaism. In general terms, Islam does not seem 
to have excited her curiosity; in her extremely wide-ranging 
notes about all kinds of religious phenomena, Islam is scarcely 
mentioned. 2 Allah, for Simone Heil, shares Yah\-1eh' s chuacter-
istic of being a God of war (C3 255); this can readily be ob-
served in the notion of Jihad, or holy war, put forward by 
Mohammed himself, and carried out in practice through the 
1 Koran, Sura 3, quot. James, op. cit., p. 106. 
2But see Appendix B. 
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raids on his neighbours which he undertook while at Medina. 1 
She claims however that 
le Bien-Aime des mystiques du Xe siecle n'est pas 
cet Allah. Il est le Mediateur, le Mithra perse, seul 
dieu adore par les Perses a cote de Zeus, equivalent de 
l'Aphrodite Celeste. (C3 255) 
Presumably she is writing here of the Sufi, although 
these had a long history whose origins can be found in the 
period following Moha1nmed 1 s death, and are by no means con-
fined to the teBnth century. It is certainly true to say 
that the God whom the Sufis \'torshipped l'ias conceived differ-
ently from the Allah of orthodox Islam, although the movement 
never broke awa~ from Islam, and claimed to find its inspir-
ation in the mysticism of the Prophet himself. But, as G. G. 
Scholem has pointed out, the God of mysticism is necessarily 
far removed from the God of institutional religion, even where 
mysticism develops (as it generally does) at the heart of an 
. t"t t" 2 l.ns l. u l.on. It is difficult to state categorically however 
that the God worshipped by the Sufis was in f~ct Mithra and 
1A. C. Bouquet, Comparative Religion (Harmonds\'iorth 1941), 
P• 269. 
2Major Trends in Je\'rish Mysticj.srj (London 1955), PP• 7-8 • 
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not Allah. ~lorship of ruthra is attested a-long \'lay back in 
Persian civilisation. He is depicted for example in the 
Avestan hymns as the god of heavenly light and the guardian 
of oaths, as well as an arch-foe of the powers of evil and 
hence a god of battles. Later, when Mithraism sprang up in 
the West, as a result of the Persian conquests, his function 
as creator of life and mediator between man and the higher 
gods was stressed (Plutarch gives an account of him as inter-
mediary between the good and evil powers1 ). 
But this does not prove that he was an object of veneration 
for the Sufis. t-Ioreover, he was not the 1 seul dieu adore par 
les Perses a cote de Zeus'; Herodotus claims that the Persians 
worshipped, besides Zeus, the sun, moon and earth, fire, water 
and winds. 2 He also states that they learned from the Assyr-
ians and Arabians the cult of Uranian Aphrodite (the equivalent, 
as Simone Weil says, of the Persian Mithra). It is interesting 
to note too that throughout his history, both in Persia and in 
the West, Mithra kept his warrior-nature, as illustrated by the 
ease \-.rith which the cult spread among the Roman legions. 
1Moralia, 369e. 
2The Histories, I, 131. 
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But to return to Allah. In Simone Weil's opinion, 
Allah, like Yahweh, was a cause of totalitarianism. But 
this was never developed to the same degree because the 
Arabs have never formed a state in the same way that the 
Jews have done, or desired to do. Allah was a God of war, 
but not of.an expansionist war; rather a 'guerre de razzia' 
(C3 141). In all fairness it should be pointed out that the 
notion of Jihad has caused at least as much suffering and 
wanton destruction in its time as the expansionist contentions 
of the Jews, which after all \vere confined almost entirely to 
the early part of their history. Islam is never condemned 
by Simone lrleil to anything like the same extent as Judaism, 
and one feels that it remained quite foreign to her. The 
refusal of incarnation, and the resulting problem of the 
relationt;;hip between God and man, \'lere the same for Islam as 
for Judaism. But, instead of the social idolatry of which 
she accused the Jews, the result for the Arabs was 'une reus-
site extraordinaire' (Cl 162). She seems to put this down 
to the outward movement and relative flexibility of Islam, in 
contrast to the rigid nationalism of Judaism. Islam, she 
claims, at least made conversions to the religion of the Pro-
phet, and did not perform wholesale extermination of the peoples 
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it conquered: 
Les musulmans ne sont pas retombes dans 1 1 idolatrie 
a la maniere des Juifs. Ils ont converti, non sans une 
part de violence. Les Hebreux n'ont presque fait qu'ex-
terminer, du moins avant la destruction de Jerusalem. 
(Cl 162) 
It is strange however that she should mention conversion of 
the conquered in the Arabs' favour, after all she says else-
where about missionary activity (see e.g. LR 34). Perhaps 
conversion is merely the lesser of two evils. But she never 
holds the proselytising of the Jev1s during the Hellenistic 
era in their favour. This is another instance of course of 
her concentrating on the earlier and bloodier aspects of 
Judaism to the exclusion of all else. 
She considers, however, that the barbarities of pre-exilic 
Judaism have had a thoroughly-baleful influence on Western 
civi~isation right down to the present day. Like Tindal, the 
English deist, she attributes cruelties committed by the 
Catholic Church to Jewish influence. 1 Totalitarianism has 
passed from Israel to Rome, and from Rome to the Church. 
1Poliakov, op. cit., p. 80. See also Parkes, op. cit., 
p. 94: '· •• because this tribal deity afterwards became iden-
tified with the ruler of the universe, the bloodthirsty actions 
recorded in the Pentateuch have continued to have an evil influ-
ence on Western civilisation down to modern times.' 
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'L'Empire a succede a Israel, l'Eglise succede a lPEmpire' 
( cs 172). The heritage is clear; only the nature of the 
heritage can be disputed. For Simone Weil, the constitution 
of any sort of Establishment against \'lhich there can be no 
redress is the death of true religion. Nationalism in reli-
g~on, whether by a nation using religion as a means to poli-
tical ends, or by a religious institution assuming political 
power over i"l:;s members, is utterly condemned, and the associ-
ation of Church and State can only result in the death of 
spirituality. 
Paradoxically, while Simone Weil blames Israel for much 
of the savagery of the present-day world, she also denies it 
any influence at all: 
Notre civilisation ne doit rien a Israel et fort 
peu de chases au christianisme; elle doit presque tout 
a l'antiquite pre-chretienne (Germains, Druides, Rome, 
Grace, Egeo-Cretois, Pheniciens, Egyptiens, Babyloniens 
... ) . (LR 19) 
Given her usual views on the effect of Israel on Western civi-
lisation, one can only suppose .that by 'notre civilisation' 
she means that pure current of spirituality which she traces 
back to the ancient \torld and \'lhich runs like a golden thread 
through the fabric of history, bypassing all institutions and 
refusing all measure of compromise with 'la Bate'. Otherwise 
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the statement hardly makes sense, since the influence of 
Christianity, and through Christianity of Israel, on Western 
Europe, whether one approves of it or not, is only too appar-
ent. 
Because all Simone Weil's energies are concentrated on 
that period in Jewish history which she abhorred, the pre-
-exilic period, there are many aspects of the Jewish tradition 
which she ignored completely. As we have seen, when she con-
siders other, more enlightened personalities or events in the 
Old Testruaent, such as are found in the Book of Job, she tends 
to ignore the fact that these are equally manifestations of 
the Jewish spirit. 1 She pays very little attention to devel-
opments in Judaism since the time of Christ. One might have 
1
she gives an account of this non-Hebraic tradition in 
the following passage from the letter to Jean \'lahl quoted above, 
111here she says that after the destruction of the Jewish nation 
by Nebuchadnezzar, the Jews received a good deal of foreign 
influence: 'De la viennent, dans l'Ancien Testament, le livre 
de Job (que je crois etre une traduction mutilee et remaniee 
d'un livre sacre concernant un Dieu incarne, souffrant, mis a 
mort et ressuscite), la plupart des Psaumes, le Cantique des 
Cantiques, les livres sapientiaux (qui viennent peut-etre du 
meme courant qui a produit lea ouvrages dits hermetiques; lea 
ecrits attribues a Denys l'Areopagite en viennent peut-etre 
aussi), ce qu'on nomme le "second Isaie", certains des petits 
prophetes, le livre de Daniel et celui de Tobie. Presque tout 
le reate de l'Ancien~Testament est un tissu d'horreurs.' See 
also Appendix C. 
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thought that Philo \vould interest her, because of his attempt 
to fuse Greek and Hebrew thought, but apart from odd quotations 
and references the only passage on Philo of any significance 
is l'rhere she mentions his concept of the mediator, the logos: 
Philon (s'il faut croire ce qu'on en dit ?) con~oit 
le Mediateur entre Dieu et l'ho~ne. Degradation de 
l'harmonie pythagoricienne. La vraie conception est 
qu'il soit tout a fait Dieu et tout a fait homme, et 
aussi ordre du monde ,· lien des deax. (C3 261) 
Philo seems to have believed fervently in the immanence of 
Jewish 
God, at the same time as emphasising in traditional/fashion 
his transcendence. 1 It was sacrilegious to him however to 
think of God being present in the \'IOrld in human form, and 
the Christian notion of incarnation had no meaning for him. 
The logos is sometimes thought of by Philo as almost a second 
God, sometimes as the chief attribute of the deity, but never 
as an equal with the Supreme God. He is a sort of concession 
made to human frailty by the deity: 'The logos is the God of 
us imperfect people, but the true sages worship the One Being•. 2 
1
see e.g. N. Bentwich, Philo-Judaeus of Alexandria (Phila-
delphia 1910), p. 133· 
2Philo Judaeus, ~egam Alle~o~iae, III, 73: 
he says: O~Toc; ylxp nlllDY "t\DV &TEA\iJV cxv Etl'l 9Ebc;, -Nv 
TEAEt\iJV b n~TO~· 
Trans. Bentwich, op. cit., P• 157. 
Of the logos 
dt ao.,.Dv xcxl 
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The logos is thus a stage on the way to God, and not God him-
seil:.f. In the same way, the logos can be the divine influence 
in man, raising him indeed to God, but without becoming incar-
nate. This was the manner in tihich Philo conceived the Messi-
anic hope. But of course for Simone 1·Jeil such a conception 
was lacking in the vital element of incarnation. A mediator 
was not a mediator unless it partook of the nature of both 
extremes. 
The development of angelology in Judaism is a feature 
which might have interested her had she turned her attention 
to it. £ngels were clearly mediators of a sort, conceived 
to bridge the ever-widening gulf between the deity and man. 
Deutsch explains it thus: 
The whole angelology, so strikingly simple before 
the captivity and .so wonderfully complex after it, owes 
its quick development in Babylonian soil to some awe-
stricken desire which grows with growing culture, re-
moving the inconceivable Being further and further from 
human touch or lmowledge .1 
But the 'inconceivable Being' to~as not in fact compromised by 
the concept of intermediary beings. As Guttmann points out, 
the gulf remains in spite of them: 
1 Essay on the Talmud, quot. Bentwich, op. cit., P• 140. 
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Even where it .LPersonalistic monotheisyJ.·pictures 
a kind of celestial world inhabited by angels, neither 
the basic difference between God and his creation, nor 
the uniqueness of God himself is compromised.l 
The fact that this appeared to be unacceptable to Simone Weil, 
in spite of its purity in keeping apart the realms of the Good 
and the necessary, has been pointed out by Leslie Fiedler in 
connexion with the Jewish dogma of the Sephiroth. 2 She necess-
arily rejected the notion because in the end she was only con-
cerned 1r1ith incarnation, whereas the Sephiroth 1rrere looked on 
as intermediaries between the earthly sphere and the heavenly. 
Certainly in the concept of angels the incarnate element is 
lacking. 
It is in some ways strange ho\'rever that Simone ~ieil was 
not more interested in the development of Je\"lish mysticism, 
which has a long and authentic tradition. The ideals of the 
Jewish mystics redressed many of the \·rrongs of which 3imone 
Weil accused early Judaism; it was intensely person~l, as is 
all mysticism, and because, obviously, it i.~Fas unconcerned 1r1i th 
1
op. cit., P• 8. 
21 Simone \'leil, Prophet out of Israel, Saint of the .Absurd' , 
Commentarz (Jan. 1951), pp. 36-46. 
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territorial conquest, it had none of the earlier belligerency. 
J"elrdsh mysticism was a genuine attempt to bridge the gap ere-
ated by the transcendental monotheism of orthodox Judaism; 
the mystic's role is to re-establish contact: 
Mysticism does not deny or overlook the abyss; on 
the contrary, it begins by realizing its existence, but 
from there it proceeds to a quest for the secret that 
\<Till close it in, the hidden path that vtill span it.l 
Once again however the distinction between man and God 
at all times is seldom blurred. In the early stages of Jewish 
mysticism this is particularly true; for the Herkabah mystic~ 
the sense of transcendence is overwhelming: 'The infinite gulf 
between the soul and God the King on His throne is not even 
2 bridged at the climax of mystical ecstacy'. It is signifi-
cant that the Hebrew expression for the unio mystica is 'deve-
kuth', adhesion to God, a union with and conformity to the di-
vine will, rather than an abandonment of self in the divine. 
As we have seen however, Simone \•!eil conceived tile mystic goal 
rather differently, as an annihilation of the individual self 
1 Scholem, op. cit., p. 8. 
2Ibid.!.., P• 55· 
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in the divine (I, §5). According to her, man is incapable of 
loving God except through the presence of divine love within 
him. l'4an' s task is to deny his own individuality in order 
that God may love God through him. 
L'ame n'aime pas comme une creature d'un amour cree. 
Get amour en elle est divin, incree, car c'est l'amour de 
Dieu pour ~ieu qui passe a travers elle. Dieu seul est 
capable d'aimer Dieu. Nous pouvons seulement consentir 
a perdre nos sentiments propres pour laisser passage en 
notre ame a cet amour. C'est cela se nier soi-meme. 
Nous ne semmes crees que pour ce consentement. 
(PSO 102-3) 
This is clearly somewhat removed from the vigorous life-affir-
mation of the best of Jewish thought. One is sorry however 
that she did not pay more attention to the mystic tradition 
of Judaism, in 'l'thich she would probably have found much to 
praise. 
It is a pity too that Simone \:leil never seemed to _appreci-
ate the ethical precepts set out in Talmudic teaching, as many 
of these anticipate her 0\·m declaration of rights and obli-
gations in L'Enracinement. The right to live, to possess 
things by which to live, the prohibition of deception and 
re5ard for truth, regard for the human person, including liber-
ty and human freedom and equality--all these are included ex-
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plicitly or implicitly in Talmudic law. 1 Simone '\IJeil divides 
her list of human needs into two categories, physical and spiri-
tual, but in essence they are similar to those enumerated in 
Talmudic teaching. Physical needs, she says, are easy to 
enumerate, and fairly obvious: 'Ils concernant la protection 
centre la violence, le logement, les vetements, la chaleur, 
l'hygiene, les soins en cas de maladie' (E 12). Among spirit-
ual needs she considers of first importance things such as 
order, liberty, equality, hierarchy or a sense of one's place 
in a given order, respect for the human person, security, 
property both private and collective. From this brief.' com-
parison it is possible to see in Simone Weil and the Talmudic 
teachers a common concern with the practical rights and duties 
of the individual living in society. 
One can only regret·that the richness of this tradition 
remained a closed book ·to Simone \·leil, and that her hatred of 
the earlier part of Jewish history blinded her to its later, 
less barbaric phase. At the sa~me time however, it is import-
ant to appreciate the stand that she took; her criticism of 
1For an exposition of Talmudic teaching, see Epstein, 
op. cit. , Gl5, and Abrahams, op. cit. , §7. 
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pre-exilic Judaisn1, in spite of its occasional excesses and 
errors of fact, must stand as a just condemnation of brutality 
carried out in the name of the Supreme God, and as a warning 
of the dangers inherent in the idea of a God who intervenes 
in the affairs of man. 
* 
II, §5 
THE CHURCH AS SOCIETY 
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Simone Vleil's reactions to the Catholic Church are to some 
degree an extension of her views on Judaism; she accuses 
Catholics of the s~ae worship of the social element, and con-
siders true Christianity to have been betrayed by the incorp-
oration into the Church1 of Jewish elements utterly alien to 
the true spirit of Christianity. There is however an import-
ant difference; 1r1hereas Simone \•leil felt herself, in spite 
of her Jewish blood, a complete stranger to Judaism, in the 
case of Catholicism she felt a strong affinity which led her 
to the threshold of' the Church, although to the end of her 
life she remained there, on the threshold, without reaching 
the point of membership through baptism. 
The main sources of her attitude to Catholicism are to 
b f d . t' 1 tt ~ p . 2 d . f h t" e oun 1n ae e ers to !r. err1n, at1ng rom er 1me 
in Narseille, in the long Lettre a un religieux written to 
the priest Fr. Couturier in America, in one of the letters to 
Maurice Schumann dating from the months in London, and the 
profession of belief contained in the 'Dernier texte•. There 
1For convenience we shall refer throughout to the Homan 
Catholic Church as 'the Church'. 
2 We shall deal here only 
the Church as an institution; 
role of Christ, see III, §7. 
with Simone \·leil 1 s attitude to 
for her interpretation of the 
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are also frequent references in the Cahiers, but since these 
are jottings, experiments in ideas, they can be considered as 
less definitive than the letters, where she was attempting to 
explain her ideas. 
necause of her association towards the end of her 
life with prominent Catholics such as Fr. Perrir1 and Gustave 
Thibon, and because of the obvious trust she put in these 
men, Simone Weil was associated from the time of the public-
ation of La Pesanteur et la grlce with Catholicism. 1 This 
was perhaps unfortunate, since it allowed the ge~al public 
to think that she was very much nearer entry into the Church 
than she actually was, and caused a backlash from Catholics 
anxious to point out that her ideas were not, in fact, in 
tune \'lith Catholic dogma. The position is thus somewhat 
confused, and many Catholics in authority have taken up defens-
ive positions against this figure who seems, superficially at 
1The confusion was increased by her apparently free gift 
of her ideas, in the form of her notebooks, to Gustave Thibon, 
\>Tith the injunction that 1 Si pendant trois ou quatre ans, 
vous n'entendez pas parler de moi, considerez que vous en 
avez la complete propriete' (PG, Introduction, p. viii). 
Elsewhere in this letter she notes: 'Pour qui aime la verite, 
dans l'operation d'ecrire, la main qui tient la plume et le 
corps et l'ame qui y sont attaches, avec toute leur enveloppe 
soci~le, sent choses d'importance infinitesimale' (ibid., pp. 
vii-viii). 
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least, to represent so clearly the modern spirit of anti-
authoritarianism, lest she should appear also to represent 
orthodox Catholicism. 1 
Although the \rlri tings embodying her dialogue v-Ti th the 
Church date from the last two years of her life, the relation-
ship esta~l5hed with Fr. Perrin in June 1941 was by no means 
Simone \veil 1 s first contact \rli th Christianity. Previous 
encounters are outlined in the 'Autoaographie spirituelle' 
2 (AD 31-51); first the experience in the Portuguese fishing 
village, then in 1937 the journey to Assisi. \there, in the 
little chapel of Santa Maria degli Angeli, ·~uelque chose de 
plus fort que moi m' a obligee, pour la pren1H~re fois de ma 
vie, l me mettre l genoux' (AD 37). Later, the monastery 
1see e.g. J.-M. Perrin, J. Danielou, etc., Reponses aux 
questions de Simone Weil (Paris 1964); C. Moeller, 'Simone 
Weil et l'incroyance des croyants', Litterature du XXe siecle 
et christianisme (Paris 1954), pp. 220 ff.; M. !"lore, 'La 
Pensee religieuse de Simone Weil', Dieu vivant, No.4 (1950), 
35-68. 
2
rt is important to note that here she is speaking of 
'trois contacts avec le catholicisme qui ont vraiment compte' 
(AD 36). Other contacts, such as her attendance at mass in 
Bourges cathedral and her friendship with a fellow-student 
\'Iho was about to enter a convent, have been noted by J. Cabaud, 
L'Experience vecue de Simone Weil (Paris 1957). This fact 
is rem~ked upon by J.-h. Perrin, Reponses aux questions ••• , 
P• 13, n. L 
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of Solesmes was the occasion of the two •rencontres avec le 
Christ' which will be considered in III, §7. In addition 
to these personal encounters, she tells Perrin that:~her 
familiarity with the basic message of Christianity gives 
her the impression of having been born inside it (AD 35). 
She tells him frankly that he did not in fact introduce her 
to Christianity: 
Vous ne m'avez pas apporte !'inspiration chretienne 
ni le Christ; car quand je vous ai rencontre cela 
n'etait plus a faire, c'etait fait, sans l'entremise 
d'aucun etre humain. (AD 32) 
She indicates the same early acceptance of the Christian 
tradition in an unpublished letter to Emmanuel :t-"iounier 
written probably between 1936 and 1938, in which she says: 
Pour moi, personnellement, je ne suis pas catholique; 
mais je considere l'idee chretienne, qui a ses racines 
dans la pensee grecque qui a nourri au cours des siecles 
toute notre civilisation europeenne, cornme quelque chose 
a quoi on ne peut pas renoncer sans s'avilir. 
These encounters however were with the spirit of Christ-
iani ty as Simone Heil sa\-1 it , and not with the Church as an 
institution. Her close relationship with the latter can be 
said to have begun in 1941 in Marseilles, which indicates 
that it waa: concentrated in a short period at the end of her 
life, of which more than half was spent in Protestant countries, 
the United States and England. It is thus somewhat precarious 
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to speculate on what her attitude would have become had she 
survived the years of the war and returned to France. No 
final conclusion is possible on the question of whether her 
attitude 1r1ould have hardened towards the Church, or \'lhether 
some of har difficulties would have been resolved by later 
developments within Catholicism its~lf. 
What can be said however is that she took the question 
of her possible baptism extremely s:eriously. This is reflect-
ed of course in her contact with Perrin, in the long letters 
she wrote to him and the visits she paid him for the purpose 
to 
of discussing her position, in the letterAFr. Couturier, 
which is not, as is sometimes supposed, a series of accus-
ations levelled at the Church, but propositions on which she 
had been meditating, but neither affirmed nor denied, and as 
to the orthodoxy of which she wanted a categorical answer. 1 
Until such time as her objections to the Church had been met, 
she \'las prepared to remain 'au seuil de 1 1 Eglise , sans bouger, 
1 
'Les op~n~ons qui suivent ont pour moi des degres divers 
de probabilite ou de certitude mais toutes sent accompagnees 
dans mon esprit d'un point d'interrogation. Je ne les expri-
merai a l'indicatif qu'a cause de la pauvrete du langage; 
j'aurais besoin que la conjugaison contienne un mode supple-
mentaire. Dans le domaine des chases saintes, je n'affirme 
rien categoriquement' (LR 10). 
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immobile' (AD 45). She was aware of the distress that this 
caused her Catholic friends, but, as she wrote to Thibon 
about li'r. Perrin, ' j e ne peux pas en trer dans 1 'Eglise pour 
ne pas lui faire de la peine•. 1 Her conviction that this 
was the place God wanted"-.her to occupy was very stable, secure 
as she was in the belief that if one desired the truth suff-
iciently one ,..,ould not go unrewarded (AD 3L~). Because of 
this, she says, 'je suis loin d 1 6prouver aucun tourment' (AD 
45). 
But it must be admitted that she found barriers of in-
comprehension between her and the Church, even among those 
members of it to whom she Nas nearest, barriers \"lhich for 
example the Lettre a un religieux and the 'Questionnaire' 
were designed to remove. She confesses to failing to under-
stand Fr. Perrin at times; it is fairly clear that they vrere 
not ah1ays on the same wavelength: 'Je ne comprends jamais 
2 
exactement de quoi il parle'. It is clear that she was 
\"lorried by divergences among opinions given her by different 
1J.-M. Ferrin & G. Thibon, Simone Weil telle gue nous 
l'avons connue (Paris 1952), P• 55· 
2 Letter to Thibon, ibid •• 
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priests on matters of faith; this, she held, made for an 
incoherence which was at odds with the apparent rigidity of 
the Catholic system (LR 47-8). In particular, she held that 
the belief that salvation \"las possible outside the visible 
Church was illogical, 'car tout l'edifice est construit auteur 
de 1 1 affirmation contraire 1 (LR L~B). 
She was concerned too about the apparent contradiction 
between an infallible Church and its evolution in history 
(Ll~ 46); that is, she 1r1as conscious of the element of chance 
invomved in the gradual building up of dogma, much of which 
seems to have only a very tenuous conne.xion with Biblical 
teaching. These contradictions necessitated a complete re-
thinking of the Church's position, in her opinion. Her 
efforts t~ clarify certain aspects of the Church's teaching 
did not ahrays meet \'lith success: she never received an 
answer to the letter written to Fr. Couturier, although this 
perhaps due to the difficulties of communication in a 1r1orld 
1 
at war rather than to any desire to remain silent on his part. 
'
1
some sort of a reply seems indicated by a remark in Fr. 
Perrin's preface to the Reponses aux questions ••• , p. 11, where 
he speaks of Fr. Couturier 'qui avait obtenu, avant de communi-
quer le texte paru sous le titre de Lettre a un religieux que 
cet ecrit ne serait pas publier sans sa reponse'. But no 
reply is indicated in the official Gallima~d publication of 
the text. 
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The answer which she eventually received in the form of the 
Reponses aux guestions de Simone \'/eil, even if it had not 
had to be posthumous, would scarcely have satisfied her, 
since the writers, having praised her personal qualities 
and admitted her~iritual insight, invariably have recourse 
to judgements of 'right' and 'wrong' rather than the 'orthodox' 
and 'unorthodox' which she sought • 
• 
\"That then \tlere her objections to the Church? As we 
have seen, she sets themout at great length. But if we 
analyse the Lettre a un religieux and the letters to Perrin, 
we find the same themes treated in every case; the conviction 
that God \vants her to remain outside the Church, her love for 
all that is not contained in the Church which prevents her 
asking for baptism, criticism of the exclusiveness of the 
Church. Her love for manifestations of the religious spirit 
outside the visible Church and her attempt to encompass these 
within Christianity have led to the charge of syncretism on 
the part of some of her critics, and \-Jill be dealt with more 
fully in other chapters (e.g. III, §3). It is important to 
remember however that in the ideas she was evolving on matters 
of comparative religion, Simone Weil was working against time 
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in conditions which would have reduced most people to silence, 
and that she never came to any final conclusion on the question. 
The very fact that she 1r1as able to ask the questions she 
did in the Lettre l un religieux indicates that ohe saw a 
possibility of reaonciling her ideas on other religions with 
the Church. It is possible that had she received a favour-
able reply from Fr. Couturier she would have felt herself one 
step nearer baptism. But here she apparently failed to see 
the great gulf \·lhich in fact separated her from the Church, 
and to realise that although she might eventually feel herself 
reconciled ~rli th Catholicism, the Church could not possibly 
admit as a member someone who left her mind open even to the 
possibility of revelation outside Christianity \'lhich \'Tas of 
egual value to it. The position here is unambiguous·; while 
the Church has come--increasingly in recent years--to realise 
the value of other religions and the genuine spirituality 
which can be ~enerated by them, neverktheless the true reve-
lation can be through Christ alone, and the Church as guardian 
of this revelation is alone charged with the mission of bring-
ing men to the truth. 'Aucune mission ne se realise pleinement 
hors de l'Eglise•, 1 was Perrin's answer to Simene Weil's hesi-
1Perrin & Thibon, P• 80. 
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tations concerning her baptism, a remark similar to that made 
by Henri de Lubac \vhen he wrote that something is lacking in 
all religion that is not a following of Christ; outside 
Christianity nothing attains its end. 1 'rhe message was 
essentially reiterated by Pope Paul VI when, speaking of the 
adherents of other monotheistic religions and of the great 
Afro-Asian religions, he said: 
Obviously we cannot share in these various forms 
of religion nor .. can we remain indifferent to the fact 
that each of them, in its own way, should regard itself 
as being the equal of any other and should authorize its 
followers not to seek to discover whether God has revealed 
the perfect and definitive form, free from all error, in 
\'lhich he wishes to be known, loved and served. Indeed, 
honesty compels us to declare openly our conviction that 
there is but one true religion, the religion of Christian-
ity. It is our hope that all who2seek God,and adore him may come to acknowledge its truth. 
1
catholicism, trans. L. c. Sheppard (London 1950), p. 111. 
Karl Adam affirms a similar superiority in Catholicism when he 
\-Trites: 'Catholicism is the positive religion par excellence, 
essentially affirmation without subtraction, and in the full 
sense essentially thesis. All non-Catholic creeds are essent-
ially anti-thesis, conflict, contradiction and negation. And 
since negation is of its ver~ nature sterile, therefore they 
cannot be creative, productive and original, or at least not 
in the measure in ioihich Catholicism has displayed these qual-
ities throughout the centuries.' The Spirit of Catholicism 
(London 1929), p. 12. 
2Encyclical on the Church, 6 Aug. 1964. Quot. in B. 
Leeming, S. J., The Vatican Council and Christian Unity (London 
1966), p. 288. Against this should be set however the very 
positive approach to other religions of a Catholic such as 
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Thus the Church claims an absolute superiority, though 
not an absolute monopoly, in access to God's truth. Because 
this truth is uncontaminated by historical accident, historical 
'mistakes' such as the Inquisition, made by the Church, although 
regrettable, are of no consequence in the end, since they are 
a sign of the evil inherent in history and not in the Church 
itself. Thus Perrin claims: 
Il est a remarquer que les prejuges que nous de-
plorons, dans le moyen-age, par exemple, ne sont pas 
imputables a l'Eglise ni au message chretien, ntais au 
contraire que ce sont les defauts du moyen-age qui1 ont fait peser leur imperfection sur tel ou tel saint. 
Adam too argues that mediaeval persecutions did not spring 
from the nature of the Church, since there v,rere non-Catholic 
2 persecutions too, but from the mediaeval concept of the State. 
But Simone \tleil "'JOuld doubtless reply to this that allegiance 
to the Beast will always result in persecution, and that it is 
Louis Hassignon, whose work regarding Islam is based not on 
any missionary zeal but on a genuine love for this religion, 
and a respect born not of an idle intellectual curiosity but 
of a recognition of its uniqueness. See e.g. the essays of 
Parole donnee (Paris 1962). Simone l.::eil seems to have been 




1 Commentary to Attente de Dieu (lst edn, Faris 1950), p. 
The numbering of the pages of this edn is different from 
of subsequent edns. 
2 Op. cit., p. 205. 
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the duty of the Church to preserve dogma and the sacraments, 
and not to associate itself with the secular State. The 
Cathar Church, for instance, persecuted nobody. For Simone 
\·leil the tree is known by its fruit: good produces only good, 
and evil can produce only evil, so that evil in the Church 
could only proceed from a fundamentally evil inspiration. 
There must have been a divergence at some point from the true 
teaching of Christ: 'L'Eglise a port~ trop de fruits mauvais 
pour qu'il n'y ait pas eu une erreur au diuart' (LR 32). 
It should be noted that Simone Weil's difficulty in acc-
epting the historical aspect of the Church does not spring 
from an incapacity to separate the visible Chur.ch and the 
message of Christianity contained therein. She herself makes 
the distinction \-ihen speakine; of those aspects of the Church 
which she loves--the sacraments, the Incarnation, and so on 
(see 'Dernier texte', FSO 149), and the social aspect which 
prevents her from seeking baptism. She makes the same dis·-
tinction between the vessel and its contents in other spheres; 
in spealdng of the sacraments, for example, she repeats Cath-
olic dogma in affirming that the perfection of the J!:ucharist 
does not depend on the quality of the elements of bread and 
wine, nor on the moral rectitude of the priest administering 
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them (AD 142). Again, the truth \'Thich she believed herself 
to be carrying vo~as in no sense a value-judgement on herself; 
she only hoped that that truth would not die in the womb as 
a result of her own inadequacy (AD 68). One can only assume 
that the reason tlhy she accepted the imperfection of the 
vehicle in the one case and not in the other 1r1as because of 
the Church's claim to be a vehicle superior to all others, 
while in the case of the sacraments or of a human being, it 
was only one vehicle among many. 
* 
Returning to the question of the Church in history, it 
would be as well to survey the development of the Church as an 
institution, in order to understand the tendencies to which 
Simone Weil objected. Firstly there is the question of the 
links between the Church and the Roman Empire. It may be 
that Simone \'Ieil over-emphasised the influence of Rome on the 
developing Church, ignoring the conflict between the two, but 
Perrin's rather naive statement that the Church 'ne doit aux 
Cesars que la potence oi:t fut crucifie Pierre et le glaive qui 
decapita Pau1• 1 is hardly borne out by the facts of history. 
1 Commentary to AD, p. 109. 
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The fact that it was Rome that became the capital of the 
v/estern Church \"/aS perhaps a historical accident, in the 
sense that it could well have been Constantinople, but it 
remains true nevertheless that the recognition of Christianity 
and the subsequent association of the Church with the State 
ensured that much that was purely Roman passed into the Church. 
Constantine \'tas a Roman Emperor, none the less Roman for being 
Christian, and the place occupied by Christianity under Con-
st~ntine was very much the same as the situation of the old 
Roman religion in the pre-Christian State. In taking a firm 
stand on the question of religious practice, and in associating 
religj.on 'l'ri th the State in the person of the i~mperor, Constant-
ine was only continuing the Roman tradition. 11. L. Green-
slade puts it thus: 
Roman religion had been very much an affair of the 
State. ~rhe cults 'I'Tere maintained a·t public expense in 
order to secure the favour of God for the s·tate, and the 
Emperor was pontifex maximus. • •• The real paradox, 
the real revelution, \'tould have come to pass if the Emp-
eror had renounced ultimate control over the Church or 
any part of the life of his subjects. 1 
It is of course slightly ambiguous to speak of Constantine 
1
church and State from Constantine to Theodosius (London 
1954), p. 12. 
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as a Christian Emperor; scholars are still undecided as to 
the depth of his religious conviction. He \•ras primarily a 
statesman, as is shown by the way in which he sided with the 
stronger party and sought peace before doctrine in for example 
his dealings with the Donatist and Arian heresies. 1 His own 
profession of faith, recorded--approvingly--by Eusebius, makes 
it clear that he regarded Christianity as a success-philosophy 
in the same \va~. that previous Emperors had placated the State 
gods in order to obtain peace and prosperity: 
• it appears that those \·lho faithfully discharge 
God's holy laws and shrink from the transgression of His 
commandments are rewarded vlith abundant blessings and 
endued \-rith well-grounded hope as \·/ell as ample power 
for the accomplishment of their undertakings. On the 
other hand, those who have cherished impiety have exper-
ienced consequences in keeping with their evil choice. 2 
One can understand why Simone 11eil considered Constantine's 
recognition of Christianity as one of the tv10 1 catastrophes 
de l'histoire du christianisme' (SG 170). She saw only too 
that the State must be concerned for the physical \'tell-being 
of its subjects, and that to link this with religious practice 
1 See J. Zeiller, L'Empire remain et l'Eglise, Histoire du 
Mende (Paris 1928), V, 69 ff. 
2 Quat. C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture 
(New York 1957), p. 184. 
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would inevitably lead to Constantine's attitude. 
Catholicism was not however finally established as the 
State religion until the edict of the Emperors Gratian, Val-
entinian II and Theodosius I in 380. This document is im-
portant for the definitive statement of faith which it made 
after a century of controversy on the nature of the Trinity, 
and for the intolerant \vording in 1r1hich it was couched. The 
Emperors define the elements of the Christian faith as they 
would have them, and then continue: 
We order those who follow this doctrine to receive 
the title of Catholic Christians, but others we judge 
to be mad and raving and ltlorthy of incurring the disgrace 
of heretical teaching.l 
Not that Simone vleil ,,;as much more enthusiastic about the 
Church in the Roman Empire before its official recognition by 
the State. One might have thought that while Christianity 
was visibly weak and persecuted, her natural instinct to side 
with the oppressed would have prevailed. But she was suspic-
ious of the joy of the martyrs as they \vent to their death; in 
her view this sprang from an illusory feeling of strength and 
1Quot. S. z. Ehler & J. B. Horrall, Church and State 
through the centuries (London 1954), p. 7· Cf. the equation 
of unorthodoxy and lunacy in present-day Russia. 
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from the conviction that their sufferings would be rewarded 
in a material sense. She compares the difficulty of faith-
fulness to the despised and rejected Christ at the time of 
the crucifixion with the comparative ease of faithfulness to 
the risen and triumphant Christ, surrounded by a Church of 
follo\'lers: 
Il etait difficile d'etre fidele au Christ. 
C'etait une fidelite a vide. Bien plus facile d'etre 
fidele jusqu'a la mort a Napoleon. Bien plus facile 
pour les martyrs, plus tard, d'etre fideles; car il y 
avait deja l'Eglise, une force, avec des promesses tem-
porelles. On meurt pour ce qui est fort, non pour ce 
qui est faible; ou du mo~ns pour ce qui, etant momentane-
ment faible, garde une aureole de force. (C2 ll) 
On the other hand her interpretation of Rome as the Beast of 
the Apocalypse (see II, §2) is the interpretation of the per-
secuted early Christians, when the conflict between the new 
religion and the pagan State was at its height. 
The link bet\veen Rome and the Christian Church \'las ob-
viously accepted by St. Augustine. The De civitate Dei is 
built on the assumption that the heavenly city is a spiritual-
ised version of the earthly one, and those vittues which had 
impelled the Romans in pursuit of earthly glory could be em-
ployed for the gaining of the heavenly city. 'rhe Roman Em-
pire l'Tas an example to Christians: 
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Wherefore there were two reasons \·shy the Roman Empire 
was expanded and won glory from men; first, that due re-
ward might be given to its citizens who were of the char-
acter which I have described; secondly, that the citizens 
of the eternal city during their sojourn here might study 
with sober diligence the examples set before them in Roman 
history, and might perceive how much affection theJ owe 
to their heavenly country in order to win eternal life if 
the earthly city has inspired such affection in its own 
citizens that they may win glory among Iilen.l 
Simone Weil is perhaps not altogether unjustified in her judge-
ment of Augustine; having commented on the transfer of the 
religious inspiration of the Eebre\·Ts to the Romans she continues: 
1 La Cite de Dieu marque un nouveau transfert. L 1 Empire a sue-
cede a Israel, l'Eglise succede a l 1 Empire 1 (CS 172). Her 
main cri ticisr.a of Augustine ho\"/ever \"las that, like Thomas 
Aquinas, he considered the pagans to have gone wrong not in 
their actions but in their worship of false gods. This, for 
Simone vleil, was the 1 blaspheme centre l 1 Esprit {.qu{/ consiste 
a affirmer que le mal peut produire du bien pur, ou que du bien 
2 pur peut produire du mal' (C2 31C). His attitude thus reflected 
1
•Proinde non solum ut talis merces talibus hominibus red-
deretur Romanum imperium ad humanam gloraim dilataum est; verum 
etiam ut cives aeternae illius civitatis 1 quamdiu hie perigrin-
antur diligenter et sobrie illa intueantur exer.apla et videant 
quanta dilectio debeatur supernae patriae propter vitam aeternam, 
si tantum a suis civibus terrena dilecta est propter hominum 
gloriam.• De civitate Dei, V, §16. Quat. R. H. Barrmo1, In-
troduction to St. Augustine 1 The City of God 1 (London 1950), pp. 
52-3. 
BarrO\v (op. cit., 
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the same sort of social idolatry with relation to the Church 
as the Hebrews' idolatry of Israel (CS 64). 
To be fair to Jmgustine, he expressly states his belief 
that men living before Christ and foreign to the tradition of 
Israel have lived according to God and therefore belong to 
the spiritual Jerusale~. 1 Job is one example (this surely 
'l'rould have pleased Simone Heil). Horeover, he holds that 
this could only be granted to men \'rho had received from God 
a revelation of the one Mediator of God and man, Jesus Christ, 
surely an example for Simone Weil of the working of the Spirit 
outside the visible boundaries of Christianity. 
Simone ~·Teil 1 s dislike and suspicion of early Christianity's 
acceptance by Rome and the resulting influence of the one on 
p. 161) vindicates Augustine as follows: 'It is easf to miss 
what St. Augustine means by this constant assertion (that the 
life of the nations \'1/'as vitiated because they \'1/'orshipped false 
gods) and to assume that in his zeal for the god of Christianity 
he is simply affirming the jealousy of a jealous God. When he 
says that pagan thought and ambitions and the institutions 
which were their outeome went wrong because the pagans worship-
ped false gods, he means that they analysed their experience 
incorrectly; because their analysis 11-1as. incorrect, they failed 
to see what were the absolute presuppositions upon which their 
sciences rested.' 
1
ne civitate Dei, XVIII, §4i. 
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the other was, it is clear, only a manifestation of her re-
pugnance at the idea of the Church itself becoming a State, 
\'Thether this were absorbed into the secular State, a tradition 
which \'Tas continued in the Eastern Empire in the form of 
Caesaro-papalism, or formed a rival of like nature to it. 
She ignores any possible benefit which the situation might 
produce, such as the tempering of the secular po\·Ter by the 
1 
sacred, and vice versa. As far as she was concerned, the 
more powerful the Church became temporally, the more difficult 
it was to follow Christ. 
As the Roman Empire disintegrated, and the Dark Ages 
closed in upon Europe, the temporal pO\'Ier of the Church grew 
rapidly, ho\'lever. H. J.lrlarrou shows ho\•r, with the decay of the 
Imperial institutj.ons, the Church gradually acquired administ-
rative power by rising to fill a gap every time one occurred, 
so that by the thirteenth century a great deal of temporal 
p01.1er had been amassed and the Church was a force to be reck-
oned with in Europe. 2 On the other hand it can be argued 
1
see Greenslade, op. cit., p. 34. 
2J. Danielou & H. Narrou, The Christian Centuries, I: The 
First Six Hundred Years, tr. v. Cronin (London 1964), p. 44o:-
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that this povter was necessary to the very survival of the 
Church in conflict with the nascent nationalisms of the med-
. 1 . d 1 ~aeva per~o • For example, it is possible to predict that 
the history of Europe would have taken a very different course 
if the Emperor Frederick II's designs on Rome and the recon-
stitution of the Roman Empire had been realised. ~vhat it is 
unfortunately impossible to specify however is the precise 
nature of this difference, or the way in which Christianity 
would. have dev.eloped if deprived of its Roman heart. Perhaps 
the focus of Christianity would have swung to the East, leaving 
only pockets of the Church in the West to develop divergently. 
v/ould Siraone \'leil have been satisfied 1rli th the disapr;earance 
1The case is made out for the temporal rule of the med-
iaeval Popes by Dam Cuthbert Butler, The Vatican Council 1869-70 
(London 1930), p. ll~. He 1r1rites of the immense po1r1er of the 
secular Emperors of the Fra!'lconian and 3uabian Houses, and con-
cludes: 'In the contest for the independence cf the Church 
against such rulers the modern Pope, interested only in the 
welfare of religion, wielding only spiritual authority, could 
not have counted, would have had no power for good, in those 
times of brute force and turbulence. Only that union of 
spiritual and temporal force that seems so strant?;e to us, 
could have withstood the evils and achieved the great 1r10rk for 
Western Christendom, which the mediaeval Papacy would seem to 
have been providentially raised up to achieve in the transition-
al period while the •reutonic principalities v1ere being 1r1elde(i 
into the nations of Europe.' 
. 
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of the Church as an institution? It seems unlikely, since 
though she attacked the social aspect of the Church she real-
ised that as a body it had an important function to fulfil, 
which we shall discuss later in this chapter. 
~hat she did criticize bitterly however was the rise in 
the mediaeval Church of a totalitarian concept of its role, 
and this is the centre too of her criticism of the Church as 
an institution. She saw a totalitarian stranglehold on the 
u 
intellect in ;;>t. Thomas' definition of faith as q-bmission to 
the Church;.~. 1rihich for he:c \•las pure idolatry: 
L'adhesion inconditionnee et globale a tout ce que 
1 1 ~glise enseir;ne, a enseigne et enseignera, que Saint 
Thomas nomme la foi, n'est pas la foi, mais de l'ido-
latrie sociale. (CS 82) 
The mediaeval Church in her opinion set itself up as a 'Dieu 
terrestre' which 'I'Ias in all respects the equivalent of the 
national God of Judaism, or Hitler's incarnation of the Ger-
man 'soul' in \\Iotan ( C3 136). This worship of the social 
element \>las even more daneerous in the case of the Church than 
in that of a secular society, because it was 'une sociiti a 
pretention divine', containing an 'ersatz du bien' (C2 239). 
This claim to divine inspiration was capable of more harm than 
t~e actual evil which marred it. 
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It is not possible to deny the attempt at temporal domi-
nation by tile Church in the high hi delle i...ges. ·.~hether this 
is justified by the Church's desire for survival or not, it 
is clear that the Church thought fit to use the weapons of 
politics for political ends. It is also true that this devel-
op1nent of the ascendancy of the spiritual po\•ler over the temp-
oral can be traced back to Augustine's claim of submission of 
the earthly city to the heavenly, whatever his intentions were. 
The null Unam Sanctam issued by l:'ope Roniface VII in 1302 is 
one of the clearest expositions of the logic of the position. 1 
He argues the superiority of the spiritual power, and the right 
of the secular power to \"lield the 'material' sl·JOrd only under 
the supervision of the priest--although most of his arguments 
are a priori, and he depends in several instances on 'it is 
necessary that' as an argument--ending on a note tliat has a 
doctrinal as well as a political implication: 'Consequently 
we declare, state, define and pronounce that it is altogether 
necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject 
to the Roman Pontiff'. 
i!:xactly the same line is taken by Pope Innocent IV in his 
1.., t 
"'lUO • Ehler & Morrall, op. cit., p. 89. 
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encyclical Eger cui levia, except that this Pope is more 
open in tracing his lineage back to the Roman Emperors. 
According to him it was not even necessary for the ~ope to 
receive temporal authority from Constantine's fusing of Church 
and State, since he had it potentially and by the nature of 
things. 1 It is this use of the spiritual for temporal ends, 
and the assumption that all men are in reality under the Church's 
jurisdiction that caused Simone ~·,·eil' s denunciation of the 
mediaeval Church as a 1 £!;ros animal tol;alituire' (C3 312), the 
Great Beast \·lho, as v-re saw in the preceding chapters, is un-
satisfied while anything remains outside his s'1ay. 
Ln the question of the Crusades there is of course the 
sar.1e difficulty of a fusion and confusion between temporal 
and spiritual ends. 3ince the Church was a political power, 
it must use political and military force to repel what v1as 
after all a military attack. The immediate incentive of the 
First Crusade was ti~e request by the 3yzantine :i::mperor AJ:exis 
Conmenus for military assistance to keep out the invading 
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1 Turks. An attack on the Eastern frontier of Christendom 
was an attack on the Church itself, and the Church had to 
2 
respond. The Albigensian crusade, the one which scandal-
ised .Simone ~ieil perhaps the most deeply (see ·III, ~5) , began 
as the purely religious issue of fighting heresy within the 
Church, but passed through all shades of political involvement 
right up to the purely political aims of the adventurer Simon 
de Hontfort. 
It is interesting; to compare the attitude of SL.1one Wail 
and ,-. _,_•r. Perrin tovw.rds the Crusades and other episodes of 
the mediaeval Church's history. Perrin, as vie saw, holds 
that the deeds committed earlier by the Church and now re~ret-
ted cast no shadow on the Church itself nor on the message of 
Christianity, since they \vere simply the ir.1perfection of the 
1
see M. 1.'1. Bald\vin, The Hediaeval Church (New York 1953), 
pp. 100 ff. 
2
see P. Alphand,ry & A. Dupront, La Chr,tient' et l'id'e 
de croisade (?aris 1954). 'l'he \'rriters describe the emotional 
background to the Crusades, beginning ,.lith the pilgrimages to 
the Holy Land vrhich becarae ever more popular during the Hiddle 
Ages, and the idea, after tile fall of Jerusalem to the Nuslims 
in 1009, that the privilege of pilgrimage 111ight have to be 
;fought for. 
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age reflected through otherwise holy l men. Simone 1.-Ieil on 
the other hand tells Perrin: 
Des saints ant approuve les Croisades, l'lnquisi-
tion. Je ne peux pas ne pas penser qu'ils ant eu tort. 
Je ne peux pas r6cuser la lumi~re de la conscience. Hi 
je pense que sur un point je vois plus clair qu'eux, je 
dais admettre que sur ce point ils ant ete aveugles par 
quelque chose de tres puissant. Ce quelque chose, c'est 
l'Eglise en taut que chose sociale. (~D 22 ) 
Contact with the message of Christ is thus inevitably lost, 
in her opinion, the more temporally poNerful one becomes. 
".:·!ith e;reat candour she d.irects the same criticism at Perrin 
himself; she reproaches him for defining SOiiletlling as 'faux' 
when he meant 'non orthodoxe', sees in this slip a lack of 
objectivity and intellectual integrity, and t~erefore an 
imperfection, and puts this imperfection do1rrn to 'l'attache-
ment a l I Eglise comrJe a une pa.trie terrestre I (AD 64). 
It should be noted that Simone Weil's objection to the 
more barbarous aspects of the mediaeval Church's policy is 
not simply their physical crudity. In o~r supposedly more 
delicate age the Church is at one with enlightened opinion 
n 
in conder¢ing the use of physical force in persuading either 
l Commentary on AD, p. 58. 
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pagans or heretics to conform. Cardinal Bea admits the 
errors of coercion in the history of the Church: 
Une ••• ab~rration d'un amour mal entendu de la 
verit~ se trouve dans les douloureuses guerres de reli-
gion, quand au nom de la verite on a tente d'imposer 
avec la force certaines convictions aux autres hommes, 
reniant un fait non moins fondam.ental de l'a.mour de la 
verite, a savoir la liberte defl 1 homme.l 
In oti1er vTords coercion as a means of impartinr; the tru·~h is 
condemned. But for Simone '~<"Jeil the idea of persuasion it-
self is \'iron,;. She was convinced that u change of religion 
was a very dangerous .L' • 1..11J.ng' and that missionary \•iork v1as a 
waste of time even where it was not directly evil: 
Fersonnellement, jamais je ne donnerais fiit-ce 
vingt sous a. une oeuvre de missionnaires. J e crois que 
pour un homme le ch~ement de religion est chose aussi 
:lanGereuse que pour"t;:n ecrivain le chan[:;ement de langue. 
(LR 34) 
:rler interpretation of Nhat mission \·lork should be abnut was 
quite different from the usual: 
Quand le Christ a dit: 'Enseigne7.. toutes les nations 
et portez-leur la nouvelle', il ordonnait de porter une 
nouvelle, non une theologie. • •• ?rooablement il vou-
lait que chaque apotre ajoutat ••• la bonne nouvelle 
de la vie et de la mort du Christ a la religion du pays 
ou il se trouverait. (LR 31) 
1La Liberte des consciences, in ¥erri~ etc., R~ponses 
aux questions ••• , ·P• 180. 
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Spreading the good ne\'iS should thus not involve peoples 
in having to renounce the faith and traditions which were a 
part of themselves; such an attitude could only end in 
'deracinement' (LR 32-3). De Lubac likewise criticises the 
attitude that conversion of 'the nations' involves a destruct-
ion of the manifestations of religion already present. It 
is a mistake, he holds, to abolish a pagan religion, even if 
it contains error, and to 'start afresh' with Christianity. 1 
It is thus easy to understand how ~imone teil, having 
so broad an interpretat:.on of the Christian community, ~;hould 
have such a horror of anathema and excommunieation; spirit-
ual persecution is in !1er eyes \•iorse than ph~1sical, and the 
sue;gestion that a soul is dam..11ed because it finds itself--
even wilfully--outside Catholic orthodoxy is very repugmant 
to her. 2 It is unfortunate that her criticism of the Church's 
use of the anathema should have been answered only by. Perrin's 
contention: 'f-our reprocher a l 1:C:glise ses 11anathemes 11 , il 
faut oublier quelles lo.rmes ils lui arrachcnt, car, comme 
1 op cit., p. 144. 
2The attitude of the Church on this point has of course 
undergone considerable modification. Bee the end of this 
chapter, pp. 343-4. 
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1'.-lpotre, nc•est en pleurant qu 1 elle parle 11 • 1 As an attitude 
however this comes dangerously near to the claim of the media-
eval Church that heretics \·;ere condemned to the stake for the 
good of their souls. 
And yet, once again, it is easy to see how, givea the 
temporal rule of the Church, persecution coald arise and the 
Inquisition come into being. I~ society is Christendom, 
and members of' that society are at the same time·members of 
the Church, there being no distinction betv1een the t\-10 comr:1-
unities, then heresy is anti-social and must be punished as 
such. .~s Balliwin puts it: 
In the religio-political society of those days heresy 
was tantamount to treason, an~ its persistence endangered 
the immortal souls of the faithful. • • • ·~:hat is perhaps 
most difficult for the modern mind to grasp is the media-
eval view that, to those who had been duly baptised into 
the Church, religi~us belief was not a matter of free 
individual choice. · 
• 
The resulting abdication of intellectuetl freedom \·ras an 
impossible and undesirable position for ~imone ~·,eil. .i.s 
far as she was concerned, there was no such thin!) as collective 
1~ t D 110. vomtne11 'a.I"Y 011 A , p. 
2~o.P~·~C~i~t~., P• 62. 
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thought (this attitude is brought out clearly in the essay · 
~Note sur la suppression generale des partis politiques', (EL 
126-148). Faithfulness at the same time to the truth and to 
a social group, whether it be political or religious, was im-
possible: 
Il est impossible d'examiner les problemes effroyable-
ment complexes de la vie publique en etant attentif a la 
fois, d'une part l discerner la verite, la justice, le 
bien public, d'autre part a conserver l'attitude qui con-
vient a un membre de tel g'r.aU.pement. La faculte humaine 
d'attention n'est pas capable simultanement des deux sou-
cis. (~L 139) 
It is not that membership of a group is necessarily repugnant 
to ~irnone ~eil; on the contrary, she admits envy for those 
who have found a terrestrial home, but knm·;s t.h!;.l.t for her it 
is forbidden: 
Il existe un milieu catholique pr~t i accueillir 
chaleureusement quiconque y entre. Or je ne veux pas 
~tre adoptee dans un milieu, habiter dans un milieu o~ 
on dit 'nous' et ~tre partie de ce 'nous', me trouver 
chez moi dans un milieu humain quel qu'il soit. En di-
sant que je ne veux pas je m'exprime mal, car je le vou-
drais bien; tout cela est d6licieux. Xais je sens que 
cela ne m'est pas permis. (AD 23) 
It is not permitted because it \"lOUld involve an abandoning 
of 11er intellectual vocation, which is to \"litness to the truth 
wherever it may be found. It is a travesty of tru~. faith to 
put oneself in the hands of the Church and submit to the 
335 
Church's authority in deciding what was truth and what was 
not: 
Un converti qui entre dans l'Eglise ••• a aper~u 
dans le dogme du vrai et du bien. l1ais en franchissant 
le seuil il professe du meme coup n'etre pas frappe par 
les anathema sit, c'est-a-dire accepter en bloc tous les 
articles dits 'de foi stricte'. Ces articles, il ne 
les a pac etuclies. Heme avec un haut degre d' intelli-
gence et de culture, une vie enti~re ne suffirait pas l 
cette etude, vu qu'elle implique celle des circonstances 
de chaque condamnation. Comment adherer a des affirma-
tions qu' on ne connait pas ? Il suffi t de se soumettre 
inconditionnellement l l'autorite d'o~ elles emanent. 
(EL 141-2) 
In this \·tay, even·, though there may be great joy in be-
longing to the Church as a social unit, the idea is finally 
repugnant to Simone itJeil. In addition she felt the time 
perhaps not appropriate for adhesion to the Church claiming 
to be a mystical body, since so many other collectivities 
111ere claiming to be mystical bodies too, generating in their 
members the same collective enthusiasm (AD 48-9): 
L'image du corps mystique du Christ est tr~s se-
duisante. ~~is je regarde l'importance qu'on accorde 
aujourd'hui a cette imae;e comme un des signes les plus 
graves de notre decheance. Car notre vraie dignite 
n'est pas d'etre parties d'un corps, fut-il mystique, 
fut-il celui du Christ. Elle consiste en ceci, que 
dans l'etat de perfection, qui est la vocation de chacun 
de nous, nous ne vivons pas en nous-memes, mais le Christ 
vit en nous; de sorte que par cet etat le Christ dans 
son integrite, dans son unite indivisible, devient en un 
sens chacun de nous, comrae ill est tout entier dans chaque 
hostie. Les hosties ne sont pas des parties de son 
corps. (AD 48) 
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Given this intense suspicion of ioonersion in a collect-
ivity, v-rhat of Simone ltleil's critics who claim that it is 
intellectual arrogance 1r1hich provokes this response ? Is 
her hostility to the Church proof of the debt she owed to 
the rationalistic Greeks, a symptom of the division between 
religious thought, dependent upon revelation, and philosophy 
\'lhich appeals to reason for its criteria ? There is no need 
to suppose this. ~~ile the intellect obviously played an 
important part in .Simone ~'leil 1 s scheme of things, she was 
equally conscious of its impotence in the mysteries of 
religious truth. In fact, she claims that the Church makes 
a \vrong use of the intellect; it is not its task to affirm 
or deny articles of faith: 
Les dogmes de la foi ne sent pas des chases a 
affirmer. Ce sent des chases a regarder a une certaine 
distance, avec attention, respect et amour. (LH 50) 
Dans l'Eglise en tru1t que chose sociale, les mys-
teres degenerent inevitablement en croyances. Si on y 
adhere seulement en tant que mysteres, peut-on honnete-
ment entrer dans cette chose sociale ? (C2 220) 
She is thus ready to love the mysteries of Christianity, but 
not to assent to the theological elaborations with which the 
Church bas surrounded them (EL 198). In her search for truth, 
she was completely devoid of all self-seeking, of all desire 
for material or spiritual gain. Obedie.nce is for her of far 
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more value than eternal life: 
Si j 1 avais mon salut eternel pose devant moi sur 
cette table, et si je n 1 avais qu 1 a tendre la main pour 
1 1 obtenir, je ne tiendrais pas la main aussi longtemps 
que je ne penserais pas en avoir re~u l'ordre. Du 
moins j 1 aime ale croire. • •• je ne desire pas autre 
chose que 1 1 obcHssance elle-meme dans ea totalite, c 1 est-
-a-dire jusqu 1 a la croix. (AD 25 )1 
'l'he importance of the individual conscience is IDf course 
recognised more fully these days by the Church. Cardinal 
Boa, speaking of.the freedom of man, defines it as 
le droit de l 1 homme de decider de son propre destin 
librement, selon sa propre conscience. De cette liberte, 
nait le devoir et le droit de l 1 homme de suivre sa propre 
conscience, droit et devoir auxquels correspondent le 
devoir de l'individu et de la societe de respecter cette 
liberte et cette decision personnelle. 2 
Long before this, Thomas Aquinas had affirmed the obligation 
of the erroneous conscience, the obligation not to profess 
belief in something, though it be Christ himself, unless one's 
conscience could truly accept it.3 
Conscience in Simone Weil 1 s view \'ras simply the conviction 
1
rt is a mark of her integrity that she adds after this, 
'Fourtant je n'ai pas le droit de parler ainsi. En parlant 
ainsi j e mens. 1 
2op. cit., p. 180. 
'7. 
JAdam, op. cit., p. 233. 
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which she had had from adolescence that if one desires truth 
ardently and long enough, one will not be disappointed (AD 34). 
This is in no 'flay incompatible \'lith Christianity, in her vie\'/, 
because Christ is the truth. She comments on Dostoyevsky's 
statement that • .L' J.J. Christ is not truth, he prefers to be out-
side the truth with Christ, and calls it 'le plus affreux 
blaspheme' (E 212). Thus there is no real incompatibility 
between Christianity and a vocation of intellectual integrity. 
The discomfort of the intellect in the Church, which has been 
at times so evident in spite of the distinction of a whole 
tradition of Catholic scholarship, 1 stems, as far as Simone 
Weil is concerned, from an inability in the Church to establish 
a correct relationship bet\'leen the individual and the collect-
ivity: 
Le ~alaise de l'intelligence dans le christianisme, 
qui dure depuis vingt siecles, vient de ce qu'on n'a pas 
su etablir un modus vivendi satisfaisant, base sur une 
vue exacte des analogies et des differences, entre le 
1Even in recent times the Church has unfortunately been 
linked only too often l<V"ith reactionary movements in society. 
For examples of this in nineteenth-century France, see A. 
Dansette, Histoire reli··ieuse de la France contem oraine 
(Paris 194 , t. II. Bernanos for his part see Les Grands 
cimetieres sous la lune) bitterly criticises the collaboration 
between the Church and acts of repression carried out by the 
Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War, although he was 
himself a Nationalist supporter. 
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Saint-Esprit parlant au corps de l'Eglise et le Saint-
-Esprit parlant a l'ame. (CS 25) 
~his assessment is perhaps unfair in one sense, in that the 
mystical tradition in Catholicism, which is the highest form 
of 'le Saint-Esprit parlant a l'ame', has been on the whole 
successfully incorporated into Catholic orthodoxy. The 
Church has in general accepted the different outlook of its 
mystics and revered them accordingly. 
But her final answer to those \-rho accuse her of pride 
would surely be that by remaining outside the institution of 
the Church she was in a position of great weakness, dependent 
utterly and entirely upon the mercy of God, without any social 
element with its false grandeur and security to act as a screen 
between herself and the truth. In her ilievr nothing was better 
calculated to inflate a person's self-esteem than adhesion to 
a collectivity: 
La vertu d'humilite est incompatible avec le senti-
ment dlappartenance l un groupe social choisi par Dieu, 
nation (Hebreux, Remains, Allemands, etc.) au Eglise. 
(CS 264) 1 
• 
1The need for intellectual and even doctrinal humility 
was emphasised by Archbishop Eugene D'Souza at the Second Vati-
can Council. See Leeming, op. cit., Appendix VIII. 
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\</hat then \·ras the role Simone \lleil \·tanted the Church 
to play in the development of Christianity? li'irstly, it is 
to point the \•Tay for the faithful: 
Je lui reconnais la mission, corr~e depositaire des 
sacraments et gardienne des textes sacres, de formuler 
des decisions sur quelques points essentials, mais 
seulement a titre d'indication pour les fideles. 
(PSO 149) 
It has no right to impose commentaries as truth itself, or to 
use the threat of excor!lmunication or deprivation of the sacra-
ments in order to impose conformity (PSO 149-50). Dogma 
should be defined by the Church, but without the exercise of 
sanctions (C3 282). In any case, the intelligence cannot 
be compelled to adhere to dogma; attention alone is voluntary, 
and is therefore the only obligation (LR 64). The Church may 
put its members on guard against the practical implications of 
certain specu~ations of the intelligence, but on no account 
suppress them (AD 46). It may however condemn as heretical 
certain opinions which would reduce the value of the mysteries 
of Christianity (she gives as examples mitigating either the 
human or the divine element in Christ, or reducing the bread 
and wine of the Eucharist to mere symbols, C2 82). It may in 
this case prevent these opinions being taught within the Church, 
but not exclude the person concerned from the Church. The 
only case in which she envisages deprivation of the sacraments 
is where the Church has been attacked in its main function, 
that is, in its role as conserver of dogma. Since she men-
tiona Luther, saying that the Church had perhaps been right 
in excommunicating him, she presumably means anyone who at-
tempts to set up rival dogma. But Luther's novement began 
as a protest within the Church, and it is hard to see exactly 
what she means here. 1 
Finally 1 and most important in Simone \·ieil' s vie\•i 1 the 
Church is the conserver of the sacra.tilents. It seems that 
she had a very great and spontaneous love for this aspect of 
the Church, although Perrin found her;prejudiced against re-
ligious practices when he first met her in 1941. 'Elle 
n'avait qu'aversion pour les pratiques religieuses, pour les 
sacraments, et se contentait trop, la-dessus, des idees re~ues 
dans les milieux anticlericaux•. 2 In the months which she 
1In any case, she does not e~.ppear to have regarded Prot-
estantism in a very favourable light. She notes, for example, 
that 'chez les Protestants, qui n'ont plus d'Eglise, la religion 
est devenue dans une large mesure nationale. De la le regain 
d'importance de l'.Ancien Testament' (CS 174). 
2Perrin & Thibon, op. cit., p. 51. 
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spent in Marseilles however she must have moved far from this 
position, as the section 'Amour des pra~iques religieusee' of 
the essay 'Formes de l'amour implicite de Die~'• written dur-
ing this period, and the 'Theorie des sacrements' (PSO 135-45) 1 
composed in London, indioate.1 
The practical implications of what Simone Weil understood 
the Church's function to be are obviously more difficult to 
work out. Perhaps the clearest idea can be obtained from the 
•Note sur la suppression generale des partie politiques' (EL 
126-148), in which she discusses, with occasional reference to 
the Church, the impossibility of acting according to conscience 
if one always has to take into account the tact that•.one is 
representing a party. Her solution to this situation in 
political life is to take away party labels, leaving each 
man free to work out his po~cies on every issue. Those 
elected would therefore be chosen for their personal attitude 
towards certain concrete problems. In government itself, 
there would be a natural association and'dissociation among 
the elected, according to the subject under discussion.2 It 
lwe shall deal more fully with the significance of the 
sacraments for Simone Weil in III, §2, since they were for her 
a form of mediation. 
2This seems to be based on the Rousseaueaque idea discussed 
\ 
seems that she envisaged the Church as such a loose association 
of like-minded people, free to dissent or to agree because 
individuals rather than members of a collectivity whose inter-
ests must be put first. The conflict between individual and 
collectivity must be resolved in all urgency if the Church is 
to be the catholic force it ought to be: 
L 1 incarnation du christianisme implique une solution 
harmonieuse du problEnne des relations entre individus et 
collectivite. Harmonie au sens pythagoricien; juste 
equilibre des contraires. (AD 46) 
One wonders what .Simone \·Jeil 1 s reactions to subsequent 
developments in the Church \'iould. have been, and whether she 
would in fact have been brought any nearer baptism by throl'iing 
off certain previous attitudes. She certainly judged the 
tree of the Church by its fruits historically speaking, and 
was perhaps unfair in her emphasis on the Constantinian trad-
ition as opposed to the undercurrent of protest and apocalyptic 
vision which was also part of the Church. Garaudy, in his 
attempt to reconcile the ends of the Church and of Communism, 
in the previous chapter, of the natural convergence of men in 
truth. Truth is one, falsehood is diversity. The practical 
objection to Simone 1deil 1 s proposi t:Lon in political life is of 
course that among the elected, on certain issues at least, 
there would be so much divergence of opinion that nothing would 
ever get done. 
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emphasises the constant dialectic within the Church of these 
two traditions, and holds that any dialogue between the Christ-
ian and Communist \·Jorlds must come about as a result of the 
Church shedding its Constantinian past, and allowing the trad-
1 ition of social protest and vision to come to the fore. 
Garaudy is obviously convinced of the Church's ability to do 
this, and Perrin voices the same conviction \<Then he writes: 
Le Concile Vatican II, en abandonnant la forme 
d'anathimes pour ses djcisions doctrinales, en prenant 
cordialement a coeur les besoins des peuples sous-deve-
loppes et en se plac;ant au coeur du monde moderne avec 
ses aspirations et ses malheurs, avec son universalite 
et ses angoisses, en voulant montrer l'Eglise du Christ 
comme l'Eglise des pauvres, repond a bien des questions 
que Simone Weil posait a l'Eglise catholique. 2 
It is true that much excellent work \'las done at the Second 
Vatican Council, but at the same time it must be pointed out 
that the Church did not--could not--in fact abandon its ~on-
viction of its 0\'ln superiority, ho\'rever humbly 1r10rded, to 
other Churches and religions. The real value of such pro-
nouncements as the 'Declaration on the Helationship of the 
Church to Non-Christian Religions' lies in Pope John's desire 
1 De l'anatheme au:_dialogue (Paris 1965), pp. 42 ff. 
2Perrin etc., Reponses aux questions ••• , p. 10. 
to see in different religions only the elements uniting them, 
and his concept of the churity which should be extended to 
religions outside Christianity rather than in any precise 
formulation of dogma. 1 We have already quoted Pope Paul's 
encyclical defining the attitude of the Church to the other 
great rel!gions of the world. In the same encyclical he 
defines the relation of mankind to the Church: 'We think it 
can be described as consisting of a series of concentric 
2 
circles around the central point in which God has placed us'. 
The concentric circles refer to divisions of humanity, atheists 
being on the outer rim, the 'separated brethren' on the inner, 
with adherents of various other religions in between, and 
Catholicism in the centre as the depository of truth and the 
only true way to God. The terms in which it is couched may 
have evolved, but surely this is the same claim to absolutism 
(incidentally made by certain of the 'other religions' too) 
which Simone Weil found unacceptable. The same sort of att-
itude is echoed by Fr. Danielou when he says, on the subject 
1see w. M. Abbott, S.J. & J. Gallagher ed., The Documents 
of Vatican II (London & Dublin 1966), pp. 660-8. 
2Encyclical on the Church, quot. Leeming, Oj;l· cit., p. 284. 
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of the danger of changing one's religion: 
La conversion au christianisme ••• n'est pas un 
changement de religion. Elle eE;t le passage de la re-
ligion a la revelation, c'est-i-dire de la question a 
la reponse.l 
Christianity, embodied in the Church, is for him not 
only superior to other religions, but different in essence. 
0ne cannot imagine Simone 'V·leil accepting this point of viev1. 
Such a conviction indicates that v1hile the lan15uage may have 
changed, and discussion with other points of view be possible, 
all other \vays to God are somehm.v inferior to thatooffered by 
Catholicism. The implication of this is surely that if all 
ruen were to perceive the truth, they would become members of 
2 the Church; such an implication is totalitarian in essence, 
since it does not admit of any final value outside its own 
boundaries. Because of Simone Ueil's belief in things out-
1Perrin etc., Reponses aux guestions ••• , P• 26. 
2
such an implication is given direct expression by de 
Lubac. \4riting of the unbeliver v1ho comes into contact with 
the Church, he claims 'as long as she is shown to him in her 
true likeness, he has a strict obligation actually to enter 
her fold. For if in truth, by the very logic of his corres-
pondence with grace, he already aspires to her in secret, he 
v1ould deceive himself if he shirked a.nsvrering her summons. 
Those who do,,not knovJ the Church are saved by her, therefore, 
in such a \vay that they incur the obligation of belonging to 
her even outwardly directly they come to Y~ow her.' Op. cit., 
PP• 118-9. 
side the Church and of equal spiritual value to its own 
tradition, she was in the end. obliged to remain 'a l'inter-







From a study of the false resolution of those opposites which 
were outlined in section I, we now pass, in the idea of medi-
ation, to their true resolution. As was suggested in the 
Introduction to this study, Simone Weil 1 s concept of mediation 
is in effect her scheme of man's salvation, the way in which 
man can fulfil his earthly vocation of reunion with the divine. 
It is hoped to show that this reunion in no way implies contra-
diction--unless it be •contradiction• in Simone Weil 1 s sense 
of the word--with the idea considered in section I of a trans-
cendent and unknowable deity; the one in fact implies the 
other, mediation is impossible without the sense of an irre-
mediable gulf fixed between the human and the divine. 
Before passing to the discussion of mediation proper, 
there are two main points to be noted, points which cause diff-
iculty in any attempt at orderly consideration of the concept. 
The first is purely practical, and involves the way in which 
the idea is to be broken down into manageable units. Simone 
Weil's contention, that 'tout ••• est mediation divine' 
(IP 166), is splendidly all-embracing, but is unhelpful to 
the student wishing to conduct an analysis of the term. 
Moreover, and more seriously, there is in Simone Weil's use 
of the term a constant overlapping of cat~gories, a constant 
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equivalence made between apparently unrelated concepts. Her 
use of the word logos will serve to illustrate this difficulty. 
It is already a complex enough notion with a long theological 
history, but Simone Weil takes this complexity to its ultimate 
extreme, using the term extensively in her mathematical theori-
sing and in her speculations on comparative mythology, as well 
as accepting its conventional use as denoting the Incarnate 
Word in Christ. This ultimately brings a great enrichment 
to the concept, of course, but makes it extremely difficult 
to deal with. Eliade points to precisely this fact when 
discussing the complexity of moon-symbolism; as he puts it, 
there is no such thing as a symbol, emblem or power 
with only one kind of meaning. Everything hangs tog-
ether, everything is connected, and makes up a cosmic 
whole. 1 
He underlines the difficulty in handling this type of material 
by concluding 'such a whole would certainly never be grasped 
by any mind accustomed to proceeding analytically'. Any 
attempt to reduce such concepts to logical categories is there-
for in a sense doomed from the outset, but the use of cross-
references will perhaps help to mitigate the difficulty. 
1Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans R. Sheed 
(London & New York 1958), P• 156. 
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The second problem relates to the concept of mediation 
itself which presents some ambiguities which must be, if not 
resolved, at least borne in mind during any discussion of the 
subject. The first of these concerns the moment at which 
things can become mediators. To use Plato's cave-image again, 
mediation seems to be both the means by which one is able to 
leave the cave and progress towards the sun and the vision 
resulting from the sight of the sun, the 'new way' of looking 
at things on re-entry to the cave. In other words, one can-
not leave the cave without that particular perspective which 
sees all earthly things as means rather than ends, but this 
perspective is itself granted through the sight of the Good. 
This ambiguity can perhaps best be put into relief by making 
an analogy with the general concept of mediation expressed 
above; as the understanding of the distance which separates 
the Good from the necessary leads automatically to a vision 
of all things as only a means to the end which is the Good, 
so the realisation of the mediating power of the objects in 
the cave is in itself productive of the vision of the sun. 
One lays emphasis on distance, the other on the objects of 
mediation, but in the end the one implies the other. 
The second ambiguity relates to the sphere in which 
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mediation operates. In the last chapter of section I -it was 
established that it is necessary to create and to preserve a 
void in order for objects to become mediators: 'Pour penser 
les intermediaires, il ·faut supporter un vide' (C2 35). Our 
present concern will be to show how these mediators operate 
in society, how in fact Simone Weil's whole concept of the 
renewal of society and of any valid spirituality in society 
wa~ based on the idea of mediation in man's everyday social 
existence. And yet in a late note, written in America, she 
states: 'Le vide ne sert qu'a la grace. Il faut done !·~eli­
miner tant qu'on peut de la vie sociale ••• ' (CS 112). 
Even allowing for her essentially pessimistic view of 
society, she seems here to be implying that the way of sal-
vation is so exclusively personal that social life is incap-
able even of providing a 'milieu vital' for spirituality to 
grow and flourish in, a view that is not borne out by her 
more positive attitude to society, indicated for example in 
L'Enracinement. The apparent contradiction is perhaps only 
a difference in emphasis caused by her acute consciousness 
of the dangers of the collectivity, and the fact that society 
is only rarely a means of salvation. In fact, both the con-
cept of the void and that of mediation imply a refusal to 
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confuse means and ends, and a refusal of the immediate grati-
fication of one's desires. 
We mentioned above the perspective in which earthly 
things lose their illusory finality, and become what they 
essentially are, means. It will be our concern in the foll-
owing chapter to examine the conditions in which this perspect-
ive is possible, how it is brought about, and its effect on 
the way man looks at the universe in general • 
• 
III, 11 
THE BEAUTY OF !BE WORLD 
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In the last chapter of section I, we examined the idea of 
decreation, the process by which man abandons his egocentric 
view of the universe and recognises himself for what he is, 
a being subject to necessity and deprived of the Good which 
i~ the object of his desire. This chapter will attempt to 
illustrate the vision of beauty which is the result of decre-
ation, but must begin by examining an allied notion to decre-
ation, that of consent, and the relation of this concept to 
obedience, both of fundamental importance in Simone Weil's 
thought, and an understanding of which is essential to her 
idea of beauty. 
As we have seen (I, §3), necessity forms for Simone Weil 
the fabric of our universe with its physical laws to which 
all things are subject. In this sense, all things obey 
necessity, and hence obey God who has willed necessity eter-
nally. The most perfect model of this obedience is thus 
matter which obeys with complete docility; Si~one Weil inter-
prets Christ's injunction to consider the lilies of the field 
as a commandment to man to obey implicitly, as do the lilies. 
In so far as matter is subject to force as well as obedient 
to God it partakes of two orders, mediated by necessity 'comme 
un plan horizontal est l'unite de la face superieure et de la 
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face inferieure' (IP 154). 
Man, however, is more complex than mere matter, and his 
relationship with necessity is more subtle. As a desiring 
• 
individual, continually projecting into the future and engin-
eering his own self-expansion, he sees necessity as an enemy, 
or at best as an obstacle to .a. be overcome (IP 144). ~lliat 
he does not always realise though is that however much he 
asserts his individual will and struggles against necessity, 
he is still obedient to it. Obedience is the human condition 
(EL 52); the universe is a 'masse compacte d'obeissance', and 
les etres doues de raison qui n'aiment pas Dieu sont 
seulement des fragments de la masse compacte et obscure. 
Eux aussi sont tout entiers obeissance, mais seulement 
a la maniere d 1une pierre qui tombe. (IP l62) 
In this rigorously deterministic picture one may well ask 
what has happened to the idea of free will. If everything 
is subject to necessity, in what way is a human being endowed 
with consciousness different from a stone? Simone Weil's 
answer is that man alone has the freedom to consent or not 
to nec~ssity (IP 147). This consent is at the same time a 
renunciation of the power to think 'in the first person', a 
renunciation of the 'I', and consequently an act of decreation 
(IP 153). I·t is thus a mediator between blind obedience and 
God in two ways: to express the first Simone Weil compares 
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the universe to a great mass of blind obedience 'parsemee 
de points ae consentement' (IP 163), each representing super-
natural love in the soul of a thinking being. The second is 
an extension of it: every human being is composed of a mass 
of obedient matter with, in the centre, 'un point de consente-
ment' (ibid.). 1 In e~9h case consent is mediator between 
obedience and God. I~ is also a mediator in that it lifts 
the soul automatically on to a higher plane. Simone Weil 
notes, 'l'obeissance acceptee porte le centre de l'ame dans 
l'eternite' (CS 75), in the sense that it is unconditional 
and therefore a renunciation of personal desire. This crucial 
renunciation is the only liberty we know, and Simone Weil can 
thus claim '· • 0 etre libre, pour nous, ce n'est pas autre 
chose que desirer obeir aDieu' (IP 152). 2 
It is to be expected that the result of this consent is 
not a privileged position with regard to necessity; the slings 
and arrows are felt equally before and after consent has been 
1Elsewhere she expresses consent as mediating between the 
'partie naturelle' and the 'partie surnaturelle·de l'~me', 
since it is a function of the supernatural part but needs 'une 
certaine ~omplicite de la partie naturelle de l'ame' (IP 157). 
2In the political sphere too, Simone Weil defines liberty 
as 'la possibilite reelle d'accorder un consentement' (EL 51). 
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given. There is a difference however, and Simone Weil in 
expressing it uses one of her most characteristic images of 
necessity, that of the sea: 
Nous sommes comme des naufrages accroches a des 
planches sur la mer et ballottes d'une maniere entiere-
ment passive par tous les mouvements des flots. Du 
haut du ciel Dieu lance a chacun une corde. Celui qui 
saisit la corde et ne la lache pas malgre la douleur et 
la peur,l reate autant que les autres soumis aux poussees 
des vagues; seulement ces poussees se combinent avec la 
tension de la corde pour former un ensemble mecanique 
different. (IP 162-3) 
* 
Before asking in more detail what constitutes this 'en-
semble mecanique different', it will be necessary to indicate 
at least a parallel concept to that of consent: that of 
attention. There ~re two kinds of attention for Simone Weil. 
Firstly there is '!'attention intellectuelle', which by being 
'creatrice de connexions necessaires' (CS 35) is a kind of 
image of cr·eative Wisdom which brought order out of chaos (IP 
155). Although it is not creative as such, it is for us a 
source of reality, or rather of semi-reality (ibid.). This 
type of attention is a mediator in the same way as consent is, 
'a !'intersection de la partie naturelle et de la partie sur-
~S: no comma. 
naturelle de l'ame' (ibid.). (The faculty of intelligence 
is described by Simone Weil, as by Plato, as being inter-
mediary between the other parts of the soul LGS 327·> The 
second kind of attention is superior to the first in the sense 
that it is more closely allied with the supernatural part of 
the soul, and is defined by her as being 'acceptation, con-
sentement, amour' (IP 155). This 'spiritual attention' is 
thus an accept~nce of all that is and has been, a complete 
abandonment of individual will in the all-embracing divine 
1 purpose. Simone Weil defines supreme justice in a sense as 
'l'acceptation de la coexistence avec nous de taus les etres 
et de toutes les chases qui en fait existent' (IP 156)--it is 
permitted to have enemies but not to wish for their destruc-
tion. In this way one imitates the perfect absence of choice 
displayed by matter; consent is seen to be indistinguishable 
1 Acceptance of the world-order does not of course mean 
the denial of individual responsibility. Simone Weil resolves 
any apparent conflict in the following note: 'Un etre que j'aime; 
il est martel. Quelque chose en moi doit etre pret a accepter 
sa mort quand elle aura ate inscrite dans le monde, non en tant 
que sa mort, mais en tant que chose inscrite dans le monde. 
Mais s'il est en peril martel et qu'en etendant la main je puis 
le sauver? Ce pouvoir que j'ai fait partie de la realite, de 
la matiere (situation de man corps dans l'espace, energie me-
canique qu'il contient). Quant a lui, sa vie, non sa mort, 
est un fait. Man desir• qu'il vive aussi est un f~it.' (Cl 
79-80). 
from detachment, and detadhment from contemplation (IP 157). 
Thus the difference between the man who rebels against 
necessity and the one who consents to it is a difference not 
of fact but of perspective: 
Regarde du point ou nous so.mmes, selon nod1·e per-
spective, Lie mecanisme de la necessit!/ est tout a fait 
aveugle. Mais si nous transportons notre coeur hors de 
nous-memes, hors de l'univers, hors de l'espace et du 
temps, la ou est notre Pere, et si de la nous regardons 
ce mecanisme, il apparait tout autre. Ce qui semblait 
necessite devient obeissance. (AD 91 ) 
This new perspective is frequently identified. by Simone Weil 
with the Stoic amor fati. She speak~f it like consent as 
the 'oui sans condition' which makes of it 'la vertu d'obeis-
sance, la vertu chretienne par excellence' (IP 58). She 
sees it as related to the Buddhist extinction of desire, the 
abandonment of the individual will in perfect detachment (C3 
210.), the acknowledgement that my destiny is of no real import-
ance in the overall scheme of things (since the world-order is 
in no way changed by what I do) (Cl 203). 1 Although Simone 
1This attitude is in complete contrast to Claudel's, for 
whom the world-order is changed by the emergence of any new 
~~istence into it. Cf. 'L'Esprit et l'eau' (loc. cit., p. 238): 
~-·- Toute chose 
Subit moins qu'elle n'impose, for~ant que l'on s 1 arrange 
d'elle, tout etre nouveau 
Une victoire sur les etres qui etaient deja! 
Weil calls this a 'vertu chretienne', it is certainly far 
removed in spirit if not in fact from the Christian idea of 
a loving Father tending his creatures individually. But it 
arises logically from the view that everything without excep-
tion is obedient to God; in the Christian scheme of things 
it is possible .for man to disobey, in Simone \'Jeil' s it is not. 
Although Simone Weil constantly expresses admiration for 
Stoicism in its Greek form, and although much of her thinking 
is clearly influenced by it, there are developments in Simone 
Weil, or rather differences of emphasis, which makde her di-
verge from pure Stoic thought. Ottensmeyer speaks of the 
illusory nature of evil in Stoicism and assumes that Simone 
Weil holds the same views, 1 but in fact evil for Simone We.il 
was very real, and not simply a result of the individual's 
subjective view of things. Although evil for her was prim-
arily a result of the distance between God and creation (see 
I, §2), this distance was an integral part of creation, and 
not to be dismissed by a change in perspective. 'l'his change 
of perspective simply meant that the individual saw everything 
as obedient and gQverned by a single divine law. It is true 
1H. Ottensmeyer, S. J., 'Simone Weil, perspective chre-
tienne', Revue des Lettres modernes, no. 35, 1958, 1-20. 
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however, as Rouquette points out~ that this is not a Christian 
point--of view, since for Christianity it is man's sin which 
has caused the distance between man and God, rather than crea-
tion itself. 1 
Similarly, whereas Zeller sees Stoicism essentially as 
a materialist pantheism, 2 Simone Weil's system is neither 
materialist nor pantheistic. The spiritual element in her 
view is of supreme importance, as has been showm; it is that 
which makes consent, amor fati, possible. And at no time 
does she reduce God to the world-order, although it is true 
she speaks of the world-order being an incarnation of the 
Word (see below, p.375). But at the same time it is essen-
tially obedient to God, which it makes it impossible to iden-
tify the two, since the idea of obedience to something im-
plies distance from it. In addition, Simone Weil sees the 
amor fati, like consent, as a 'bridge' between microcosm and 
macrocosm, in other words, as a form of mediation between the 
natural and the s~pernatural (Cl 204), which would be impossible 
1R. Rouquette, 'Mystere de Simone Weil', Etudes, 268 ~janv. 
1951), 88-106. 
2E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. 
Reichel.(London 1892), pp. 126, 156 etc. 
if God were already identified with the universe. 
The resignation which constitutes the amor fati is not 
however for Simone Weil a negative concept. She puts a 
strong emphasis on the first element of the term, on the love 
which is necessa~y before consent is possible. She speaks 
of 'la vertu stoicienne authentique, qui est avant tout amour' 
(AD 64) distinguishing it from 'la caricature qu'en ont faite 
quelques brutes romaines' thereby establishing a sha~p con-
trast between the loving acceptance of the world-prder which 
she considered formed the essence of second-century Stoicism 
~nd its more muscular and voluntaristic form developed by the 
Romans (which, she thinks, came into French culture through 
Corneille). 1 It is the obedience of the world-order which 
claims our attention: 'L'ordre dU monde doit etre aime parce 
qu'il est pure obeissance aDieu' (E 244). In describing 
the faith which has led her to Christianity, she speaks of 
'l'amor fati stoicien' and defines it as 
l'amour pour la cite de l'univers, pays natal, 
patrie bien-aimee de toute ame,cherie pour sa beaute, 
dans la totale integrite de l'ordre et de la necessite 
qui en sont la substance, avec tous les evenements qui 
s'y produisent. (PSO 81) 
1Montaigne and Amyot in his translations of Plutarch are 
earlier and arguably more direct exponents of the Roman form 
of.stoicism in France. 
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Simone Weil here suggests a link between 'amour' and 
'beaute' which should now be considered. Love is not some-
thing which can be produced by any act of will, but is in a 
sense involuntary, the result of some external factor acting 
upon the soul. The connexion between love and beauty is the 
relationship of each with the experience of reality: 1 11 n'y 
a pas de sentiment de realite sans amour, et cette liaison 
est ala racine du beau' (C2 227). lelief in the reality 
of the external world--that is, belief that it exists indep-
endently of my particular desire concerning it--automatically 
produces love, can even be defined as love (C2 243), and this 
love, which is consent, reveals the world as beautiful: 'Par-
tout ou il y a amour il y a be~te se~le' (SG 120). Simone 
Weil· would approve the definition of love given by the Ren-
a 1 
aissance Nee-Platonist Marsilio Ficino: 'Desire for b~ty' • 
• 
Before considering in detail Simone Weil 1 s ideas on 
beauty, it would be as well to note her views on the function 
and purpose of science, since these relate directly to the 
1 Commentary I, 111, quot. M. C. Beardsley, Aesthetics 
from Classical Greece to the Present (New York 1966), p. 118. 
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concepts of 'l'ordre du monde' and of love. An exhaustive 
study of Simone Weil's scientific writings has still to be 
undertaken, although Narcy has given an outline of her ideas 
on science,1 and it is not relevant here to consider them 
except in so far as they relate to the concept of mediation. 2 
Simone Weil expresses in various ways what she considers 
to be the chief object of science: 
La science a pour objet l'etude et la reconstruction 
theorique de l'ordre du monde. (AD 127) 
La science et l'art ont un seul et meme objet, qui 
est d!eprouver la realite du Verbe ordonnateur. 
(C3 43) 
La science n'a pas d'autre objet que l'action du 
Verbe, ou, comme disaient les Grecs, de l'Amour ordon-
nateur. (EH 83) 
L'objet de la science n'est pas le vrai, mais le 
beau. (C3 205) 
There arises here a difficulty of terminology, since 'ordre 
du monde' and 'beaute' seem to be used as equivalent one to 
another. In general Simone Weil does not seem to make much 
distinction between the two, though in discussion of scientific 
1simone Weil: Malheur et beaute du monde (Paris 1967), 
PP• 55- 9. 
2Particular aspects of mathematical science will be con-
sidered in III, §6. 
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matters she uses more frequently 'ordre du monde'. The 
relation between the two is indicated in the following observ-
ation: 'La beaute du monde, c'est l'ordre du monde aime' (AD 
127). This love enables the scientist to see the real object 
of his study, and is at the same time a condition of his sue-
cess: 
L'esprit de verite peut resider dans la science a 
la condition que le mobile du savant soit l'amour de 
l'objet qui est la matiere de son etude. Cet objet, 
c'est l'univers dans lequel nous vivons. Que peut-on 
aimer en lui, sinon sa beaute? La vraie definition de 
la science, c'est qu'elle est l'etude de la beaute du 
monde. (E 221-2) 
Bearing in mind this slightly fluid terminology we can 
now pass to a consideration of what for Simone Weil was the 
function of science, as distinct from its object. In a note 
on Greek mathematics she gives a suggestion: 
Il semble clair que le chemin qui va des sciences 
mathematiques --~·•• a Dieu regarde comme le bien, ce 
chemin.doit passer par la notion d'ordre du monde ••• , 
de beaute du monde. (SG 108) 
This comment is revealing in that it implies tacitly that 
science can have a relationship with the absolute Good, and 
that a path leads from one to the other by way of the order 
of the universe considered as beauty. These are not notions 
which have wide currency in twentieth-century scientific comm-
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entary. A similar suggestion is made in a note: 
LL~idee de l'ordre du monde comme objet de con-
templation et d'imitation peut seule faire comprendre 
~··••• quelle est la destination surnaturelle de la 
science. (IP 39) 
From this it is obvious that science, like all other human 
activities, has a supernatural purpose. What she considers 
this to be is stated clearly and unequivocally in the note &-n 
~ 
Greek mathematical science referred to above: •LLe~ sciences 
Lmathematique~ sont sans valeur em elles-m~mes. Ce sont 
des intermefiaires entre l'ame et Dieu' (SG 107). She real-
ises that this is not the only way of looking at science, 
however, and enumerates the others: 
L'inter~tr·de la science. Il ne peut y en avoir 
que trois: 1) applications techniques--2) jeu d'echecs 
--3) chemin vers Dieu--(Le jeu d'echecs est agremente de 
concours, prix et medailles.) (c3 64-5) 
But in a note on the same page she indicates which of the 
'ways' she considers to be the correct one, when she states 
her policy: 'Rendre a la science sa destination de pont vers 
Dieu' (C3 64). 
If this 'destiny' is to be 'given back' to science, it 
follows that it must somehow at sometime have lost it. This 
loss forms the basis of Simone Weil's eriticism of modern 
science, which she compares unfavourably with Greek science, 
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and, in the essays of Sur la science, ~ith post-Renaissance 
science. It is basically the spiritual content of Greek 
science, which most modern minds would call 'unscientific', 
whose loss she regrets; as she says, 'la science, l'art, la 
recherche de Dieu, unis chez les Grecs, sont separes chez 
nous' (SS 266). In the long essay 'La Science et nous' she 
analyses the progressive degradation of science since the time 
of the Greeks, through the classical post-Renaissance period, 
to our twentieth-century science. Greek science, according 
to her, was based on essentially spiritual concepts, so th~t 
man cguld read in the physical univers signs of his relation-
ship to the Good; the notion of equilibrium, for example, 
dominated Greek scientific thinking and was interpreted in 
the moral sphere as the concept of justice (SS 137). This 
relationship between science and the Good was lost with the 
development of post-Renaissance thought, which substituted a 
relationship with technology (SS 138) and the relationship 
between a desire and the ~nditions of its fulfilment (SS 143D. 
It also discarded the idea of the correlation of opposites 
implicit in the notion of equilibrium, for example retaining 
only the continuous from the opposites continuous/discontinuous 
(SS 201). 
Post- Renaissance empirical science did retain a vestige 
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of the connexion with the Good which Greek science had mani-
fested, since it kept some relationship with the rest of 
human thinking, according to Simone \oleil. Twentieth-century 
science has however committed the ultimate impiety by shatter-
ing the final link with common sense (SS 157).1 Scientific 
theories are no longer accessible to the intelligent layman, 
because they correspond to nothing in the physical world. 
Simone Weil delivers a devastating attack on Planck in the 
essay 'Reflexions a propos de la theorie des quanta', in which 
she quotes Planck himself confessing that the calculations of 
modern physics have nothing to do with measurable reality (SS 
197). She attributes this detachment in large measure to 
the increase in importance of algebra, which by reducing 
everything to signs blurs real distinctions and relationships 
(SS 194). And yet, because of the prestige of modern science, 
people assume that obscurity means profundity: 
• • • lea commentateurs profanes et memes quelques 
1P. Frank holds that this common accusation is ba·sed on a 
misunderstanding. The 'common sense' la~ of classical physics 
are valid when dealing with phenomena which occur in daily ex-
perience, that is to say with large bodies and small velocities. 
Modern science however frequently deals with the behavioun of 
things which. do not occur in everyday experience, such as small 
bodies with large velocities. New laws are required to express 
such behaviou~, and these by their nature will not be expressed 
in the language of 'common sense'. Modern Science and its 
Philosophy (Harvard 1941), §7. 
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savants cherchent avec une perseverance touchante la 
signification profonde, la conception du monde contenue 
dans la science contemporaine. Bien vainement, car il 
n'y en a pas. (S& 195) 
A clear instance, she consludes, of the Emperor's new clothes. 
It is evident that if science no longer has meaning for 
man, it can no longer serve as a br.idge towards God. This 
way of mediation has, in Simone Weil's view at least, been 
temporarily eclipsed. But there are others, and it will be 
relevant now to turn our attention back to the idea of beauty 
and the ways of mediation which it offers. 
* 
On considering Simone Weil's theory of beauty in general, 
apart from its particular manifestation in science, it is 
immediately clear that it provides a rich source in a study 
of mediation. Indeed, she names 'la beaute du monde' as 
one of 1 les trois objets d'ici-bas od Dieu soit riellement, 
quoique secretement present' (AD 99). Her theory of beauty 
involves callistics rather than aesthetics properly speaking, 
as her theory of art is very much subordinate to her general 
theory of beauty, and this in its turn is a central part of 
man's quest for the Good. Thus her theory of beauty is pre-
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1 dominantly ethical in character, and critics such as More 
are wide of the mark when they suggest that her 'amour de la 
beaute du monde' was a purely aesthetic concept, and that she 
confuses religious and aesthetic experience. 2 She only 'con-
fuses' them in the sense that for her there was no essential 
difference between them, since they proceeded essentially from 
the -same source. Indeed, Veto is perhaps nearer the truth 
when he criticises her for having 'a concept of the beautiful 
which is somehow almost robbed of any distinctive content by 
its being a tautology of the real'.3 
The starting-point for this concept is to be found in 
Plato, where beauty is seen as a reflection of the Good. For 
Simone Weil, 'on ne peut pas concevoir le bien sans passer par 
1In this respect her ideas on beauty are thoroughly Greek: 
as J. G. Warry points out, 'It is no exaggeration to argue that 
for the Greeks beauty was primarily a moral term; and in support 
of such a.statement we may cite their word for beauty's contrary, 
11aischos 11 , which combines the meaning both of shame and ugliness. 
Beauty was for the Greeks pre-eminently the opposite of the shame-
ful--a thoroughly moral conception.' Greek Aesthetic Theory 
(London 1962), P• 50w 
2 Op. cit., pp. 63-4. 
3op. cit., p. 251. 
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lebeau' (C2 234). In her interpretation of Plato's cave-myth, 
the moon which is the object of contemplation: immediately pre-
ceding the sun, becomes beauty as a reflection of the Good (IP 
88). Beauty is thus a way in which the Good may be apprehended: 
'Grice a la sagesse de Dieu qui a mis sur ce monde la marque du 
bien sous forme de beaute, on peut aimer le Bien a travers les 
choses d'ici-bas' (CS 89). It is thus the sensuous form of 
the Good. Simone Weil's 'le beau, c'est le contact du bien 
avec la fa~ulte sensible' (CS 44) echoes Hegel: 'Beauty is 
1 
merely the Spiritual making itself known sensuously', and is 
a common theme of artistic and aesthetic theory. 2 
If beauty is considered as a reflection of the Good (which 
for Simone Weil represents God) then it is not difficult to see 
in beauty a proof of God's existence. Simone Weil bases this 
1Philosophy of Religion, II, 8, quot. Underhill, op. cit., 
P• 21. 
2Julien Green's definition of aesthetic experience as 'une 
irruption de l'invisible dans le monde visible' {Journal, 16 
sept. 1950, quot. Janine Carrel, L'Experience du seuil dans 
1' muvre de Julien Green, Zurich 1967, p. 57) is basee on the 
same concept, as is Baudelaire's theory of the Beautiful which 
reveals a correspondance between Heaven and earth: 'C'est c·et*-
admirable, cet immortal instinct du Beau qui nous fait considerer 
la Terre et ses spectacles comme un aper~u, comme un~ correspon-
dance du Ciel.' 'Notes nouvelles sur Edgar Poe' (1857), Nouvelles 
Histoires extraordinaires (Paris 1933), p. xx. 
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on an interpretation of Plato's Timaeus: 
Une statue grecque par sa beaute inspire un amour 
qui ne peut pas avoir pour objet de la pierre. De meme 
le monde par sa beaute inspire un amour qui ne peut pas 
avoir pour objet la matiere. (SG 129) 
Simone Weil relates this proof by the beauty of the world to 
the previously discussed ontological proof (I, §2), since 
beauty is identical with reality: 'La preuve ontologique.par 
le beau est _toujours applicable, car le beau, c' est le reel' 
(CS 21). It is hardly necessary to point out that the b.eauty 
of which she is speaking is not a mere aesthetic notion, or a 
partial admiration of nature, but a love of the order of the 
universe as it is, in its perfect obedience to the will of God. 
In one respect, however, Simone Weil goes further than 
making beauty the mere reflection of. the Good. It is in.a 
sense the real presence of the Good, the presence of God in 
matter. Simone Weil claims to find this doctrine in Plato: 
in a commentarr on the Phaedrus (250) she notes: 'Platen pense 
que dans tout ce qui est purement, parfaitement et authentique-
ment beau ici-bas, il y a presence reelle de Dieu' (SG 146). 
She notes the same elsewhere, and continues: 
Il y a comme une espece d 1 incarna·tion de Dieu dans 
le monde (Timee).dont la beaute est la marque •• · •• Le 
beau est la preuve experimentale que l'incarnation est 
possible. (C3 43) 
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This incarnation allows us to perceive God physically: 'La 
beaute du monde est celle meme de Dieu, comme la beaute du 
corps d'un etre humain est celle meme de cet etre' (IP 93). 
This sounds distinctly pantheistic,1 but should be read in 
conjunction with Simone Weil's ideas on the Incarnation of 
the.Word (Verbe). According to her, the incarnation of the 
deity in the physical world takes two forms: one is the in-
carnation of a divine being, the supreme example being Christ, 
and the other the incarnation of the 'Verbe ordonnateur' in 
the world-order (C2 140; 379). It can be argued that just 
as the presence of God in the world in the figure of Christ 
does not imply that God is reduced to the earthly figure of 
Christ, so to say that God is incarnate in the world:order 
does not reduce him to this incarnate presence, and does not 
therefore imply pantheism. 
This incarnation of the Word in the world-order is con-
sidered by Simone Weil to be beauty itse&! (SG 139, CS 28). 
And in so far as beauty is a manifestation of the real, the 
\-lord is an incarnation of Plato's Tb ~v, being or reality 
(SG 126, C2 337). Simone Weil also identifies it with the 
1
see p. j6~ above. 
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world-soul as it appears in Plato's Timaeus, defining it as 
'l'ordre du monde convu comme une personne' (IP 152). Both 
l'ame du monde and le Verbe ordonnateur are of course consid-
ered to be mediators, because they are images of the Son (02 
403), and (here Simone Weil is following Plato closely) because 
of the world-soul's special mediating position between time 
and eternity (02 347) and between this world and 'the other': 
Le fond, !'essence de l'ame du monde lChez PlatoB7 
est quelque chose qui constitue une moyenne proportionnelle 
entre Dieu et 1 1 univers materiel. La moyenne proportion-
nelle, c'est l'idee meme de mediation. (SG 134) 
Whether Plato would have developed this idea in quite the way 
Simone Weil did in this commentary on the Timaeus is doubtful. 
But the central idea of the world-soul's being an intermediary 
between the ~vine nature and matter is certainly to be found 
in.Plato. 
It is in this incarnation of the Word in the world-order1 
experienced by man through the perception of beauty, that it 
is possible to understand the function of beauty as mediator. 
and 
It is mediator firstly between the necessary .._ the Good; 
Simone Weil speaks of the 'contemplation de la Sagesse divine 
dans la beaute du monde ou s'unissent les deux contraires, la 
necessite et le bien' (CS 90). In other words, beauty is 
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composed of the network of relationships which constitute 
the physical world, and the imprint of the Good which has 
willed necessity: 'Le beau est le necessaire qui tout en de-
meurant conforme a sa loi propre et a elle seule obeit au 
bien' (C2 358). This relationship of the Good and the nee-
essary in the beautiful is not however something which can 
be comprehended by the rational intellect; it is essentially 
a mystery: 
Nous sommes regis par a. une double loi, une in-
difference evidente et une mysterieuse complicite de 
la matiere qui constitue le monde a l'egard du bien; 
le rappel de cette double loi est ce qu~ nous atteint 
au cmur dans le spectacle du beau. (SS 133) 
Sometimes Simone Weil expresses the material part of this 
liaison differently, as for instance when she defines beauty 
as 'l'harmonie du hasard et du bien' (C2 192). Since 'hasard' 
and 'necessite~ are contradicting terms, it must be assumed 
that she is viewing necessity here from the individual's point 
of view where he seems to be co~pletely subject to an appar-
ently capricious chance or fortune. 
From the point of view of the in~ividual who is sensitiv~ 
to the beauty of the world., however, the opposites united in 
this beauty perform the function of lifting the individual on 
to·a higher plane, of permitting him to grasp what is essentially 
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ungraspable: 
Les trois formes de valeur distinguees par Cousin, 
le vrai, le beau, le bien, ont la meme essence: l'union 
des contr~dictoires en tant que pinces pour saisir l'in-
saisissable. (c2 397 )1 
She sees Kant's concept of the beautiful which she defines as 
'finalite sans fin, ordre sans concept, plaisir sans attrait' 
(C3 172) 2 as coup]es of contradictory notions, and it is the 
Kantian elements in Simone Weil's theory of the beautiful that 
should now be considered. 
To explain Kant's concept of the beautiful as finality 
without end, Simone Weil uses the comparison between the uni-
verse and a work of art, and contrasts these with human activ-
ity in general:3 
1The idea of the harnony of opposites will be dealt with 
more fully in III, §6. 
2
see the Kritik of Judgement, trans. J. H. Bernard (Lon-
don 1892), Part I, lst Division, lst Bk., lst Moment, §§2, 5. 
3veto considers that Simone Weil's use of the term makes 
it completely unrecognisable as Kant: 'Simone Weil takes the 
concept out of the Kantian structure without paying very much 
attention to the manifold reasoning and premises which made it 
intelligible in its original context. Simplified and somehow 
impoverished since Simone Weil is interested in it as far as 
it could be useful for her own speculations, keeping only a 
nominal identity with its original Kantian meaning, the term 
becomes a sort of key-word of her aesthetics.' Gp. cit., P• 
272. 
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Toutes les fabricatio~humaines sont des ajustements 
de moyens en vue de fins determinees, sauf l'oeuvre d'art 
ou il y a ajustement de moyens, ou il y a evidemment fina-
lite, mais ou on ne peut concevoir aucune fin. En un 
sens la fin n'est pas autre chose que 1 1 ensemblel des moy-
ens employes; en un sens la fin est tout a fait transcen-
dante. Il en est exactement de meme de l!univers et le 
cours de l'univers, dont la fin est eminemment transcen-
dante et non representable, puisque c'est Dieu lui-meme. 
(IP 23-4) 
As in a poem, if one can explain why a particular word is in 
a particular place, the poem is not truly beautiful., so one 
should not seek particular ends in the structure of the univ-
erse (IP 40). 2 But it is equally important that one should 
have a feeling of finality in contemplating the universe, even 
thouga this can have no tangible object (IP 168). It is pre-
cisely this feeling which makes of beauty a mediator, 1 une voie'; 
beauty arrests our attention by awakening our desire for final-
ity, but does not satisfy it, allowing the soul to pass through 
it towards the Good beyond • 
. As was seen earlier, beauty for Simone Weil involves con-
sent, is the vision accorded after consent has been given. It 
]MS: l'ensemble meme. 
2Although it is true that pleasure may be had from the 
beauty of a poem whether or not it is analysed, it seems exagg-
erated to say that the possibility of analysis precludes the 
poem's being truly beautiful. But there is clearly a final 
beauty in art and in the world which cannot be explained in 
terms of its component parts. 
is the acceptance of the world-order as it is: 'le beau est ce 
qu'on ne peut pas vouloir changer' (C3 339). In the experince 
of· the beautiful there is complete absence of desire, of' the 
will to do, change, modify, take possession of: 'Souiller, 
c'est modifier, c'est toucher. • •• Prendre puissance sur, 
c'est souiller. Posseder est souiller' (ibid.) This is a 
constant theme of Simone Weil's; be~uty means renunciation, 
renunciation of possession, 'un attrait charnel qui tient i 
distance et implique une _renonciation' (C2 293), like Kant's 
definition of the beautiful as that which pleases without in-
1 terest. 'l'o illustrate this she uses the Upanishadic image 
already· quoted (I, §4) of the two birds, one of \'lhom eats the 
fruit while the other watches (CS 251-2). The contemplative 
part of the soul is content to look at the fruit, eminently 
desirable, without consuming it. This fruit is beauty: 
'Beaute. Un fruit qu'on regarde sans tendre la main' (C2 
218). There is a slightly disconcerting passage in L'Enra-
cinement, where Simone Weil criticises the 'aesthemtic' atti-
tude to beauty which consists in 'playing' with beauty and 
looking at it. The correct attitude, she feels, is that 'la 
1Kritik des Urteilskraft, pp. 208-9; see Veto, p. 266. 
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beaute est quelque chose qui se mange; c'est une nourriture' 
(E 122). But this apparent contradiction with her general 
attitude is resolved in a passage fromthe essay 'La Personne 
et le sacra' where she picks up again the metaphor of the two 
parts of the soul, and says: 
LLa beaut!/ suscite une faim, mais il n 1 y a pas en 
elle de nourriture pour la partie de l'ame qui essaie 
ici-bas de se rassasier; elle n'a de nourriture que pour 
la partie de 1' ame qui regarde • . : (EL 37) 
Beauty means the refusal to possess; it also means ref-
usal to invest an object with the particular fancies of our 
imagination, the refusal to project our desires on to the ob-
ject. Beauty is 'maked', refuses to be clothed in human 
fancy (C3 215), and ~n fact seems to refuse human aspiration 
completely except in so far as it is a channel for human de-
sire for the Good. In this respect it is for Simone Weil a 
primary means of man's 'decreation', since beauty is in her 
eyes essentially impersonal. It is the means by which we can 
lose our false and individual perspective, and be reunited 
with the whole: 'Beau. On ne peut pas dire que ce soit un 
ordre 'perspectif'. Arrache au point de vue' ~C2 140). 
Beauty and 'malheur' because of their impersonality are com-
plementary means for making contact with the real (see III, §2): 
Je suis convaincue que le malheur d'une part, 
d'autre part la joie comme adhesion totale et pure a 
la parfaite beaute, impliquant tous deux la perte de 
!'existence personnelle, sont les deux seules cles 
par lesquelles on entre dans le pays pur, le pays res-
pir~ble, le pays du reel. (PSO 83) 
Loss of the individual existence which p_rojects itself 
into th~ future, and which only sees things as objects of 
desire, is thus a necessary condition, the 'key', to reality. 
In a sense beauty and reality are revealed together, since, 
as already noted (p. -~·¥.§), the real is incarnate in the world-
order. The attitude which hopes and projects will therefore 
of itself prevent beauty from being revealed; one function 
of 'waiting' is to cause beau~y to appear: 'Le regard et 
l'attente, c'est l'attitude qui correspond au beau*· Tant 
qu'on peut concevoir, vouloir, souhaiter, le beau n 1apparait 
pas 1 ( C2 413) • This creative passivity, this waiting in the 
certainty that the Good exists and will descend if desired 
ardently enough, is linked to another idea, closely related 
but not identical with it. This is the already mentioned 
notion of attention, whereby the loving soul can, as it were, 
produce reality by a sufficiently pure degree of attention 
directed towards an object. In this loving attention, the 
soul realises that the object contemplated exists in reality, 
9-_, 
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and not merely by reference to the soul 1 s O\'m desires. All 
true human values, thinks Simone Weil, are produced by the 
attention: 
Les valeurs authentiques et pures de vrai, de beau, 
de bien, dansl·'activite d'un etre hu.main se produisent 
par un seul et meme acte, une certaine app~ication a 
l'objet de la plenitude de l'attention. (C3 58) 
Claudel was no doubt thinking of the same phenomenon when he 
wrote: 'Le genie poetique supreme ••• est une certaine Grace 
d 1 attention 1 • 1 
• 
Simone Weil's own ideas on artistic and literary creation, 
are, as has been mentioned, very much subordinate to her theory 
of beauty in general. Like Claudel, she associates inspiration 
with attention (E 185), but on the whole her concept of inspir-
ation derives directly from Plato, for whom artistic inspira-
tion had the same source as universal creation. In order for 
a work of art to be truly beautiful, inspiration must be trans-
cendant, and not derive merely from physical or psychological 
phenomena (IP 23). This, according to Simone Weil, vindicates 
1
•Introduction a un poeme sur Dante', Quvres en prose 
(Bibl. de la Pleiade 1965), p. 423. 
Plato's much-attacKed art criticism: 
Le mepris de Platen pour les artistes s'adressait 
a ses contemporains qui etaient decadents. Arts d'imi-
tation, non d'inspiration. Imitation du modele gui 
passe. (C2 348) 
(In fairness to his critics it must be added that Plato never 
actually suggested that any kind of, for example, poetry was 
possible, other than the imitative kind.) But her ·central 





Pour produire des vers ou reside quelque beaute, 
faut avoir desire egaler par !'arrangement des mots 
beaute pure et divine dont Platen dit qu'elle habite 
l'autre cote du ciel. (E 275) 
In the end, the true aim of art is to provide a reflection of 
universal and supernatural beauty, which alone constitutes 
the reality of the universe: 
L'art est une tentative pour transporter dans une 
quantite finie de matiere modelee par l'homme une image 
de la beaute infinie de l'univers entier. Si la ten-
tative est reussie, cette portion de matiere ne doit pas 
cacher l'univers, mais au contraire en reveler la realite 
tout auteur. (AD 126) 
This seems to give art a decidedly inferior role, and it 
comes as no surprise to find Simone Weil admitting that in her 
view even the most beautiful work of art is not 'really' beauti-
ful, because it is less that the total beauty of the ~niverse: 
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Les accomplissements meme les plus eleves de la 
recherche de la beaute, par example dans l'art ou la 
science, ne sont pas reellement beaux. La seule beaute 
reelle, la seule beaute qui soit presence reelle de Dieu, 
c'est la beaute de l'univers. Rien de ce qui est plus 
petit que l'univers n'est beau. (AD 132 ) 
The diminishing of the value of artistic endeavour is perhaps 
inevitable when all human values have a supernatural origin, 
and can therefore be said at best to 'partake of' the super-
natural original. One can only say that things 'ont part a 
la beaute, ••• en sont des imitations' (AD 123). But if it 
is inferior to true beauty, man-made beauty still serves a pur-
pose in Simone Weil's view: 
Toutes ces beautes secondaires sont d'un prix infini 
comme ouvertures sur la beaute universelle. Mais si on 
s'arrete a elles, elles sont au contraire des voiles; 
elles sont alors corruptrices. (ibid.) 
Here it is clear that art and perceptible beauty in general 
have become a mediator between man and universal beauty which 
is not experienced by the senses. And since to mediate is 
the highest function of creaturely things, the role of art is 
perhaps not such a mean one after all. 
The idea that beauty, in which God is so to speak incarnate, 
is a mediator, and that man's role is to wait on beauty, to con-
sent to beauty, leads in Simone Weil's thought to the concept 
of God's search for man. In her view, to say that man is 
engaged in a search for God is meaningless (Pascal's acceptance 
of this idea is yet another point for which Simone Weil re-
proved him: PSO 42, 44); 1 the only attitude which man is en-
titled to take up in relation to the deity is one of attente, 
of loving consent directed to the source of the Good. God in 
his love descends to man, and one of the ways in which he is 
able to engage our consent is through the beauty of the universe. 
While the spiritual part of the soul is still asleep, God must 
approach by the physical part: 'la beaute seduit la chair pour 
obtenir la permission de passer jusqu'a l'ame' (C2 270). 
This 'piege de Dieu' in which God 'traps' the unwary soul, 
is illustrated for Simone Weil in folklore, for example in the 
2 
'Conte des trois nuits' to which she frequently refers. This 
concerns a prince who has an animal form during the day but a 
human form at night. A princess marries him, but, tiring of 
the situation, destroys her husband's animal form. He dis-
appears, and the princess goes in search of him. After a long 
1
simone Petrement points this out as an important feature 
of dualist thinking. The idea of grace for dualist philosophers 
tends to imply that.while God can descend to man, man without 
grace cannot ascend to God. DP, p. 221. 
2 The following account of the tale is taken from IP 13-14. 
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time she finds him about to marry again, having forgotten 
her, but the princess, offering a beautiful dress to the new 
fiancee by means of a magic nut she has been given, obtains 
permission to spend three nights with the prince. He however 
sleeps during two of them, and only awakens at the end of the 
third night. He recognises the princess and sends away the 
new fiancee. 
In Simone Weil's interpretation, the princess represents 
God searching for the soul, represented by the prince. When 
God wishes to strip the soul of its animal nature, the soul 
flees and prepares for an adulterous union with the flesh. 
God then searches for the soul, painfully and le~hily, and 
finally obtains access to it, having seduced it with beauty. 
The soul is still asleep, however, and only awakens and gives 
consent at the last minute. Simone Weil gives an abbreviated 
account of the symbolism involved in a short note: 
La princesse, c'est la divinite descendante. Elle 
s'unit a l'etre charnel dans la nuit. Mais a la prem1ere 
lueur de grace la creature se derobe. L'ame s'evanouit. 
Le bien doit seduire la chair pour pouvoir se montrer a 
l'ame. La beaute est cette seduction. (C2 343) 
She gives a similar interpretation to a better-known 
1 legend, this time the Greek myth of Kore or Persephone. In 
1
simone Weil interprets the figure of Kore as an image 
this myth it is Kore who becomes for Simone Weil a symbol of 
the soul, Hades that of God, and the narcissus that of beauty. 
(Narcissus is a symbol of the only beauty that can be an object 
for itself, divine beauty: IP 11; this interpretation obviously 
depends on the idea of God incarnate in the beauty of the 
universe.) She thus constructs with great assurance and 
interpretative. skill a pre-Christian account of the salvation 
of the soul. God, in order to entice the soul, lays a 'trap' 
of physical beauty which takes the soul unawares, just as Kore 
was taken off her guard at the sight of the narcissus. The 
soul is then abducted in spite of itself, but released later 
into the world, not however before eating the fateful ,·grain 
de grenade', which represents the consent given by the soul 
to God. 
Simone Weil recognises the rather special natu~e of this 
'consent' : 
Le grain de grenade, c'est le consentement que l'ame 
a.ccorde a Dieu presque a 1 I insu d I elle-meme et sans se 
l'avouer, qui est comme un infiniment petit parmi toutes 
les inclinations charnelles de l'ame, et cependant decide 
pour toujours de son destin. 
sometimes of the soul, sometimes of Christ. 




'Consent' here does not seem to mean what is normally meant 
by the idea, a willing acceptance of certain conditions made 
in a state of mind as free as possible from external pressures 
which would prejudice the issue. Even if Kore did in fact 
'consent' to eating the pomegranate seed, she had been placed 
in exceptional circumstances against her will (though as a 
result of her own action), and in any case was unaware of the 
consequences of eating the seed. But there is no need to 
suspect that Simone Weil was unaware of the blow she dealt 
at the modern concept of the liberty of the individual by this 
interpretation of consent, since liberty to Simone Weil was 
always a very relative term. Although, as has been shown, 
she lays great stress on the difference between obedience and 
&onsent, in the London notebooks she describes beauty as 'un 
piege de Dieu pour nous faire consentir a l'obeissance dans 
laquelle il nous ramene par contrainte' (CS 316). It seems 
as if once the vision of the beauty of the universe has been 
granted, the soul would find it very difficult to refuse the 
God manifested in this beauty. This is a natural consequence 
of Simone Weil's concept of unconditional consent; the soul 
does not consent 'provided that' but consents to what is essen-
tially unknown (C2 395). Otherwise consent would be limited 
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like earthly phenomena and would be incapable of transporting 
the soul to a higher plane. As Simone Weil puts it, 
L'ame accorde ce consentement presque par surprise 
et sans le savoir, en un instant de joie surnaturelle, 
et quand elle a le loisir d'y reflechir, elle est deja 
engagee. Grain de grenade de Core. (C2 365-6) 
The images of rape and death which she uses in connexion 
with this myth to describe the action of the Spirit on the 
soul are certainly violent, and their tone is different from 
traditional Christian expression on the subject, but the notion 
of the death of carnal man in order that a spiritual man may 
be reborn is at the centre of Christian mysticism. On a 
purely textual level, her interpretation displays well the 
connexion of the myth with the Greek mysteries, which had at 
their heart the same cycle of death and rebirth. The death-
-and-resurrection myths which Simone Weil used will be exam-
ined later in this section (§3), but in the next chapter it is 
proposed to consider the more general theme of suffering as a 
form of mediation, to which they are clearly linked • 
• 
III, §2 
THE WAY OF SUFFERING 
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Few thinkers of this century have returned so constantly to 
the theme of suffering as Simone Weil, and few have analysed 
it so rigourously or defined so clearly the part it has to 
play in the human condition. When suffering is evoked by 
modern thinkers it is usually to justify a pessimistic or 
nihilistic view of the world, or to prove the lack of spirit-
ual forces at work in the universe. Simone Weil departs com-
pletely from modern pessimism and returns to archetypal myth 
to establish the universality and inevitibility of suffering, 
and, more important, the part it plays in man's salvation. 
The link in Simone Weil 1 s thought between suffering and 
'la beaute d~ monde' which we noted at the end of the last 
chapter in connexion with the myth of Kore, showed that con-
sent implies suffering. In general, suffering is looked on 
by Simone Weil as a way towards the vision of the beauty of 
the world, as this chapter will attempt to illustrate, but 
occasionally the two are looked on as separate paths. This 
occurs for example when Simone Weil is discussing the condit-
ions necessary for the soul to perceive reality (she uses 
here the metaphor of the silence of God which pierces the 
soul and joins with the soul's silence). 1 11 n'y a que deux 
voies possibles pour cette operation, a l'exclusion de toute 
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autre .• Il n 1 y a que deux.pointes asse~ per~antes pour entrer 
ainsi dans notre arne, ce sont le malheur et la beaute' (PSO 
129-30). 1Malheur' and beauty are here considered as s,parate 
means used by God to procure the soul's salvation. Later in 
this same argument she notes: 1 Ne pas accorder d'attention 
ala beaute du monde est peut-etre un crime d'ingratitude si 
grand qu'il merite le chatimant du malheur• (PSO 130), which 
certainly indicates a difference between the two. 
A difference is als.o indicated in the following passage, 
where Simone Weil is discussing man's instinctive urge to 
ask finality of the universe: 
C1est seulement le malheur qui nous oblige a la 
demander, et aussi la beaute, can le beau nous donne 
si vivement le sentiment de la presence d'un bien que 
nous cherchons une fin sans jamais en trouver.(PSO 128)1 
If however we consider the word used by Simone Weil in a rel-
ated sense to that of 1malheur', 'douleur•, we see that it is 
most often opposed to 'joie' as a way of experiencin-g .1 la 
beaute du monde'. This occurs for example in the following 
passage: 
La joie et la douleu~ sont des dons egalement pre-
1cf. also the passage from the letter to Joe Bousquet, 
quoted above, P• 383. 
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c1eux, qu'il faut savourer l'un et l'autre inte-
gralement, chacun dans sa purete, sans chercher a les 
melanger. Par la joie la beaute du monde penetre dans 
notre ame. Par la douleur elle nous entre dans le 
corps. (PSO 101) 
'Joie' and 'douleur' seem here to be the same experience re-
lating to different parts of the human being. 
The difficulty may well concern Simone Weil 1 s terminology, 
and some attempt should now be made to establish what she meant 
by the three separate. but related concepts: 'malheur', 'dou-
leur' and 1 souffrance'. They seem frequently to overlap, but 
some basic distinctions can nevertheless be drawn. The clear-
est indication of both the distinctions and the overlapping 
is perhaps to be found at the beginning of the first of the 
two long essays, 1 L1 Amour de Dieu et le malheur•. The essay 
starts: 'Dans le domaine de la souffranc~, le malheur est une 
chose a part, specifique, irreductible' (PSO 85). 1 Souf-
france' is here the general term, •malheur' a specific example 
of it. She continues: 1 11 est tout autre chose que la simple 
souffrance', an~ here 'souffrance' seems to be reducible to 
physical suffering. This interpretation is borne out by the 
following paragraph which begins: 1 Le malheur est inseparable 
de la souffrance physique~ et pourtant tout a fait distinct•. 




She then elaborates the concept of 'souffrance': 
Dans la souffrance, tout ce qui n'est pas lie a 
la douleur physique ou a quelque chose d'analogue est 
artificiel, imaginaire, et peut etre aneanti;par une 
disposition conven~ble de la pensee. (PSO 85) 
Here we have a distinction made between 'souffrance•, which 
reverts to its earlier meaning of suffering in general, and 
'douleur•, which is physical pain. This physical pain has 
however a wider meaning than general, since Simone Weil ex-
plains that it can include a feeling of loss at the death of 
a loved one, which is experienced physically if it is real. 
This physical pain forms the 'noyau irreductible' around which 
all real suffering is centred (PS0"86). But Simone \1ieil 
seems to realise that this is~retching the idea of pain a 
little, since she adds that pain which is onlr physical is 
of very little account, and is soon forgotten when it is over. 
'Bouleur• thus seems to be restricted in Simone Weil 1 s 
terminology to physical pain of one sort or another, even 
though this category is broader for her than is normal. 
'Souffrance• however seems to be a much more floating term, 
meaning both physical pain and something more • This can 
perhaps be illustrated in Simone Weil's use of Aeschylus• 
formula ~ n&9E~ ~&9~, which she translates 'par la souffrance 
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la connaissance 1 (e.g. SG 43). Since the phrase is here 
applied to Prometheus, and Simone Weil extends it to cover 
all types of suffering or redemptive figures, it is clear 
that the kind of 'souffrance' involved is not merely physical. 
Simone Weil indicates her awareness of the inadequacy of the 
term in the following comment: 
J'aimerais presque autant mettre: ceux qui ont 
sub.i, au lieu de ceux qui on t souffert , pour bien mar-
quer que ceux qui savent, ce sont ceux qui ont subi le 
malheur, non ceux qui se tourmentent par pure perver-
site ou par romantisme. · (SG 45) 
A link between 1souffrance' and 1malheur' is thus established. 
On the meaning of 'malheur' Simone Weil is much more 
precise. The essay referred to above on 'L'Amour de Dieu 
et le malheur' indicates quite clearly what she means by it: 
Le malheur est un deracinement de la vie, un equi-
valent plus ou moins attimue de la mort, :mndu irresis-
·tiblement present a l 1 ame par 1 1atteinte ou !'appre-
hension immediate de la douleur physique. (PSO 86) 
The presence of physical pain is necessary, Simone Weil ex-
plains, because only physical pain has 'la propriete d'en-
chainer la pensee' (ibid.). If physical pain is absent, 
then the mind can hide the reality of its condition by flights 
of imagination. 
In addition, for 'malheur' to be experienced, every part 
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of the soul must be affected, physical, psychological and 
social. 'Le facteur social est essential. 11 n'y a pas 
vraiment malheur la ou il n'y a pas sous une forme quelconque 
decheance sociale ou apprehension d'une telle decheance' (PSO 
87). 
'Malheur', then, which has usually been translated 'aff-
liction' by Simone Weil's translators (although she herself 
suggested 'misery' for it1 ) is by far the broadest of the 
three terms we have been considering, and together with the 
wider meaning of 'souffrance' indicated above will form the 
central concept of this chapter • 
• 
It is clear that any consideration of the concept of 
affliction in Simone Weil's thought must begin with her own 
experience, since it was largely through this that the ~ 
term came to have so profound a meaning for her. Narcy is 
the latest critic to point out the importance of Simone Weil's 
personal experience in any evaluation of the concept. He 
underlines the significance of her factory year, and connects 
1Letter to an Englishman, unpub. MS. 1938-9? See Veto, 
op. cit., p. 212. 
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: 
this 'disco'YeJ."y· of realit.f' with her awakening spiritual voc;-
ation: 
Cette decouverte est oelle du passage ~n usine, et 
c'e$t celui•ci qui v6r1tablement ouvre l'biatoire sp1ri-
tu~lle• -. •. • Entre ce'moment e~ tout de. suite il y. a 
1 1uni.t6 d1une histoire; et s'il ~11 a eu c;onver$1on, 
c'~st la qu'elle a commence.l 
S~one Wail berself indicates the dec,isivaJle·•s 9f this &Qer-
ience in her 'Autob:lofP"aph1e spiri tue.lle • , emp.hasi~ing· the · 
differe~ce between-.. ••••••••·the fa~tuali ~bjectivo know-
ledge of affliction which s~~ had prQvious t~ it, and the 
in·timate, personal contact which, resulted from it: 
Jusque-la je n 'avais pas eu l' exP6rien.ce du mal-
heur • • • Je savais bien qu 1il y .. avait beaucoup de 
malheur dans le mondet j•en etaia oba6d6a, mais je ne 
l'avais jamais constat6 por un contact prolonge. 
(AD ,36) 
It has been suggested that Simona Wail over-dramatised 
her account of working conditions at that time, and that be• 
cause of her physic·al cons:titution an,l acade~io backgro"Qncl 
she recoiled from what was accepted as perfectly ~ormal by 
the average worker. It is probably true that sh~ suffered 
more pbysioal~ than people brought up to that tJPe. of work, 
~ioheL Maroy 1 Malheu~ et beaute. du .mon4e (Paris 1969), 
P• 14. 
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but in her accounts of her experience she invariably lays 
emphasis on the psychological rather than the physical asp-
ects; indeed, she accepted that a certain amount of physical 
suffering was probably necessary in factory work, and could 
be borne quite easily in the right psychological conditions 
{CO 243). As to her background, she was aware that someone 
coming from the outside ran the risk of making false judge-
menta, and would not necessarily see things in the same light 
as someo~e who worked there on a permanent basis. She did 
not feel that this was necessarily the case, however: 
Mais si, etant parvenu a oublier qu 1il vient d'ail-
leurs, retournera ailleurs, et se trouve la seulement 
pour un voyage, il compare continuelaement ce qu'il 
eprouve pour lui-meme a ce qu'il lit sur les visages, 
dans les gestes, les attitudes, les paroles, dans lea 
evenements petits et grands, il se cree en lui un senti-
ment de certitude •••• {CO 252) 
If affliction does not often find the kind of expression 
Simone Weil gave it then it is presumably because in her 
eyes the essence of affliction is to render expression im-
possible (CO 251); if a man fights back, it is because he 
is wounded rather than afflicted. There is no reason to 
doubt the authenticity of Simone Weil's testimony, or to sus-
pect her of 'literature' when she observes 'lea visages con-
tractes par l'angoisse de la journee a traverser et lea yeux 
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douloureux ·dans le metro du matin' (CO 252). 
The workers' condition corresponds in Simone Weil's ana-
lysis to the elements outlined above which must be present for 
affliction to be experienced. Firstly there is physical suff-
ering. Simone Weil describes graphically the state of cons-
tant exhaustion which she experienced, owing not so much to 
her frail physique as to the necessity of working at an inhuman 
speed, since she and the other workers were on l~w-paid piece-
work. A moment wasted' meant a lower wage, hunger, hardship. 
Particularly painful was the complete destruction of the nat-
ural rhythm of a man 1 a work, the rhythm which demands a momen·t 
of respite between each mouvement. As Simone Weil says, 
Il est naturel a l'homme et il lui convient de s 1ar-
reter quand il a fait quelque chose, fut-ce l'espace 
d'un eclair, pour en pr-endre conscience, comme Dieu dans 
la Genese; cet eclair de pensee, d'immobilite et d'equi-
libre, c'est ce qu'il faut apprendre a supprime·r entiere-
Ir,J.e·nt dans 1 1 usine ' quand on y tra vaille. (CO 248) 
The unnatural speed at which a man is obliged to work is, for 
Simone Weil, a result of factory rationalisation, 'tayloris-
ation' as time and motion study was then called, which con~ 
sists in bre~king down each job to be done into its element-
ary 'work-units', timing these, and from this estimating the 
time necessary for the whole job--assuming a first-rate work-
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man (co 223-4). Obviously this method leaves no room for 
the moments of respite in between each movement. 
The other elements of affliction--psychological and social--
present in factory-work at the time spring from the same source. 
They have as their common feature the sense that man as an in-
dividual or even as a human being counts for nothing in the pro-
cess of production. He is merely an extension of the machine. 
Simone Weil's thinking has Marxist overtones when she says: 
Les pieces ont leur histoire; elle passent d 1 un 
stade de fabrication a un autre; Ll'ouvriei7 n'est pour 
rien dans cette histoire, il n'y laisse pas sa marque, 
il n'en connait rien. (CO 250) 
Man is thus reduced to the state of a tool where he should be 
creative, feels himself a stranger where he should have a 
sense of belonging, of identity. He lives in a nightmare 
world where normal values are reversed: 1 Les choses gouent 
le role des homme·s' les hommes j ouen t le role des chose a; 
c·' e·st la racine du mal' (CO 248). 
One of the ways in which Simone Weil seems.to have suffer-
ed most acutely this reduction to the status of a mere thing 
was in the humiliations she suffered in every aspect of her 
work in the factory. As she noted in the Journal d'usine, 
1 le fait capital n 1 est pas la souffrance, mais !'humiliation' 
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(CO 107). The orders of the foremen in particular, she 
found, constituted a continual denial of humanity in the 
workers. It seems to have been not so much the fact of 
the implicit obedience necessary, but the manner in which the 
orders were given which caused her anguish: 'Le tr~vail nou-
ve~u est impose tout d'un coup, sans preparation, sous la 
forme d'un. ordre auquel il faut obeir immediatement et sans 
replique' (CO 244). It is easy to understand the humiliation 
she must have felt when obliged to carry out without question 
orders she did not always understand, thus being totally at 
the disposal of the production-line down to the last second 
of her time. Thus, although the monotony of the work was 
at times unbearable, relief was only obtained at the expense 
of humiliation, and was therefore unwelcome: 
Si la pensee veut eviter cette monotonie, 1maginer 
du changement, done un ordre soudain, elle ne p~ut pas 
voyager du moment present a un moment a venir sans passer 
par une humiliation. (CO 245) 
Simone Weil's whole-attitude towards her experience is 
of course based om the conviction that what she suffered, 
the great majority of the workers suffered too• The fact 
that they were silent about it meant nothing; as she notes 
in her Journal d'usine: 
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C~ux qui so~ffrent ne peuvent pas se plaindre, 
dans cette vie-la. Seraient incompris des autres, 
moques peut-etre de ceux qui ne souffrent pas, con-
sideres comme des ennuyeux par ceux qui, souffrant, 
ont bien assez de leur propre souffrances. {CO 83) 
Even for her, it was a constant effort to go on r~acting, to 
note her own impressions, to keep alive the power of sensation 
whi.ch:..;meant suffering: 
L 1 6puisement finit par me faire oublier lea raisons 
veritables de mon sejour en usine, rend presque invin-
c·ible pour moi la tentation la plus forte que. comporte 
cette vie: celle de ne pas penser, seul et unique moyen 
de ne pas en souffrir. {CO 51) 
Only by accepting the state of inert object to which one was 
reduced could one hope to escape from suffering. But although 
Simone Weil did not entirely succumb to this experience of 
affliction, it marked her for life. She describes later how 
1 ce contact avec le malheur avait tue ma jeunesse 1 {AD 36), 
and the difficulty she has in believing she counts for some-
thin:g a~ ~ human being: 
Ce que j 1 ai subi la m1 a marquee d 1 une maniere si 
dural;)le qu·1 auj"ourd 1 hui encore, lorsqu 1 un etre humain, 
q~el qu'il soit, dans n 1 importe quelles circonstances, 
me parle sans brutalite, je ne peux pas m1 empecher d 1 avoir 
1 1 impression qu'il doit y avoir erreur et· que 1 1 erreur va 
sans doute malheureusement se dissiper. (AD 36) 
The image of siavery recurs constantly in her writing, and it 
seems .as if in this experience she learnt for the f.irst time 
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the real nature~of slavery, which she was to write'of later 
for instance in the Iliaq essay: 1 
J'ai reyu la pour toujours la marque de l'esclavage, 
comme la marque au feu rouge que les Remains mettaient 
au front de leurs esclaves lea plu~ meprises. . Depuis 
je me suis toujours regardee comme une esclave. 
(AD ,36) 
This seems to have been the decisive experience for 
Simone Weil, which provided the material.and ..a the conv.ic-
tion for the later elaboration of the theory of atfliction. 2 
Like any other human phenomena, affliction is for Simone Weil 
capable of analysis, and it is this capacity which enables 
her to make use of the affliction which in any case existed. 
Affliction is a way of salvation, and as such can be charted 
accurately, while, like beauty, remaining a mystery in the 
sense that it is incomprehensible (PSO 87), will not answer 
our demands for finality. 
As was noted in I, §5 on 'decrea t.ion' , it is important 
to emphasise that affliction in Simone Weil's view must not 
be sought for its own sake, as a way perhaps of speeding up 
1sG 11-42; cf. also PSO 80-1 (Lettre a Joe Bousquet) and 
I, §3. 
2The relationship between work and affliction and decreation 
is discussed by M. Bourgeois in 'La Spiritualite du travail 
selon Simone Weil', unpubl. thesis (Paris 1961), passi~. 
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the sa~vatiQn-process. In a marginal note in the early 
notebook which she set aside from the main body of the 
Cahiers, writ~ng on it 'Ne compte pas', she comments: 'Je 
crois ala valeur de la souffrance dans la mesure.ou on fait 
:tout (ce qui est honnete) pour l'eviter' (Cl 11, NE). De lib-
erately to court suffering as a way to salvation would in any 
case be contradictory, since affliction which is sought is no 
longer affliction. It is by definition something which is 
unde:r;-gone against the wishes of the sufferer·: 
Le malheur est ce qui s'impose a un homme bien 
·maigre lui. Il a pour essence et pour definition cette 
horreur, cette revolte de tout l'etre chez celui dont il 
s'empare. (PSO 122) 
But it is just this, from which a man's whole being turns in 
revolt, that Simone Weil says we are to love. Even where a 
man is not in fact subject to affliction he must constantly 
be~r i~ mind the possibility of affliction, and love that 
. poss_i~~~_i"ty (PSO 111), because it is an expres·s·ion of the 
human cdndi ti.on: ., Etre deax creatures, ce n' est pas necessaire-
- ment etre malheureux, mais c'est necessairement etre expose 
au malheur' (PSO 123). There is nothing morbid about such a 
love: it is a simple recognition of fact. This is what Simone 
Weil under-stands by man 'bearing his cross': 'Porter sa croix, 
'c'est porter la connaissance qu'on est entierement soumis a 
ll!l necessite ·aveugle' (PSO 110). In this way it i~ possible 
for a man to enjoy the good things of life, and 'bear his 
cross' .at t"lle same time : 
Un homme parfaitement heureux peut e.n meine temps 
pleinement jouir' du bonheur et porter sa croix,.- s•·il-,a-
reellement t concretement et a tous moments la connais~ 
sance de la possibili te du malheur .• (PSO 110-1) 
It is clear that this 'knowledge' is simply another expression 
of the '~onsent to the order of the world 1 already discuss~d .• 
Con·sent to the possibility of affliction is the reverse side 
of· consent to the order and. beauty of the world, ah.d ne·cessity 
is the common element in them, mediating between them, since 
necessity is both obedience and constraint. 
This recognition, in Simone Weil's eyes, has the effect· 
of putting man into perspective, and revealing his".frail.ty. 
Some of Siin.one Weil 1 a most remarkable insights stem from her 
"intense cons-ci:ousness of man's vulnerability; when discussing 
it she takes no destruct.i ve pleasure in maD' a weakness, and. 
aoes not exult in his self-deception. There is only a great 
compass.ion based on what she felt to be a recognition of the 
trutli: 
Lea trois faces de notre etre • • • sont to~jours 
exposees {;.u malheuy. Notre chair est fragile.? n' im-
pcrte quel morceau de matiere en mouvement peut la percer, 
la dechirer, l'ecraser ou encore fausser pour·toujours un 
4o8 
des rou·ages interieurs. Notre arne est vulnerable, 
sujette a des depressions sans causes, pitoyablement 
dependante de toutes sortes de cho~es··et-d 1 3tres eux-
-memes fragiles ou capricieux. Notre personne sociale, 
dolit depend presque le sentiment de no.tre existence, 
est constamment et e~tierement exposee a .tous lea hasards. 
(PSO 109) 
This fra·il ty, far from diminishing man 1 s sense of joy in :!;he 
·world, on the contrary increases it: lLa joie en devient 
seulement d 1une douceu·r plus penetrante et plus poignante, 
comme la £ragilite des fleurs de cerisiers en accroit la beaute 1 
(PSO 110).1 Here the relationship between affliction and 
beauty is obviously very close. 
There are other similarities in the workings of beauty 
and affliction. Affliction, like beauty, compels man to 
recognise his inability to alter the world-order, to:.·recogriise 
the perfed·tion of creation apart from our particular desires: 
Teil·e est la destination du malheur, de nous per-
inet·tre· de penser que la creation de Dieu est bonne. Car 
tant. que les circonstances ae·jouent ·autour de nous en 
lais~ant notre etre a 'p,eu pres intact' ou seulement a 
demi entame, nous croyans plus ou moine que .notre volonte 
a cree le monde et le gouverne. Le malheur nous apprend 
tout d 1 un coup, a notre tree grande surprise, qu 1 il n 1 e·n 
est · rien. Si alors nous louons, c 1 est vraimen t la c·;r"ea-
tion de Dieu que nous louons. (PSO 122 ) 
1The idea that transience heightens beauty is a constant 
theme of French poetry from Baudelaire onwards • 
. , 
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In Simone Weil's eyes, it is the element of physical pain in 
affliction which has the power to st~ip us of our illusions. 
We can accustom. ourselves to anything, she says, delude our-
.selves into thinking we have 'chosen• what happens to us in 
every case except th~t of prolonged physical pain. When a 
human being is transformed into a kind of paralysed animal, 
particularly when this transformation is accompanied by social 
rep~obation, he can no longer have the illusion that he is in 
qontrol (PSO 112). 
Thus ~ffliction removes from man his individuality, 
~verything which he has considered makes him a human being. 
Tliis is why. Simone Weil constantly uses the slave-image for 
the af;flic~ed .person; like t'he slave,. 1 {I.es malheureu.!7.ne 
. 
croiront· jamais plus qu'ils sont quelqu 1 un 1 (PSO 93). Aff-
lic·tio:q, l:i,.ke slavery, is anonymous, 1 il prive ceux qu'~l prend 
de·l~u:r responsabilite et en fait de.s choses 1 (ibi.d.). The 
afflicted one is entirely. defined 1 in his own eyes and thos·e 
of other people, by his relationship to affliction, he becomes 
. . 
an ·• example 1 of a particular 1 kind 1 of affliction (PSO 118). 
It is typical of Simone Weil's thought however to develop this 
idea of anony~ity by indicating that in fact the afflicted one 





.. ·what was true ·all along, namely that he is noth~ng. Inter-
preting Plato 1 s de fini tio;n of the .philoso.ph,e.;r' s task, 'Phiio-
aopher, c'est apprendre a mourir', in the light of her concept 
of affliction, she says: 
Il ne s'agit pas en realite pour l'ame de ~ourir, 
ma·is. s;i,mplement de reconnaitre la verite qu' elle est 
-u.ne cho.Ejfe morte, une chose analogue a la matiere • • .•• 
• • • ce qu~ nous crqyo:ilQ etre :metre moi est un produi t 
aussi fugitif et· aussi automati~ue des circonstances 
exterieures que la forme d'une vague de la mer. 
(PSO 115) 
1~ thi$·~ay affliction is a means for wearing down tQe 'I', 
the illuso!y self which must be decreated for the soul to 
come into contact with reality (C2 232). 1 
If affliction serves the purpose of revealing to man the 
truth about his condition, it is clear that anything whi.ch 
attempts t.o .. caver up the truth will be an evil. This explains 
Simone We'il"'s attitude towards the consolation of affliction • 
. 4s· she says in .·.a_ letter to JQe Bousquet: 'Pour ~uiconque e·st 
dans le ~~lheur le mal peut peut-etre se definir comme etant 
tout ce qui procure une consolation' (PSO 83). She adds, 
·f A similar duality of selves is expressed by Valery's M •. 
Teste: 'Je· ne sais pas telle chose; je ne puis pas saisir telle 
chose, mai~ je sais Portius qui la possede. Je possede men · 
Portius, que je manoeuvre e~ant qu'homme et qui sentient ce 
que je ne sais pas.• 'Monsieur Teste', Oeuvres (B~bl. de la 
Pleiade, Paris 1960), II, 37· But for Teste it is specific~lly 
the senses which prevent him from experiencing reality-,· whereas 
: .. -~ · ... - ·- :. :· ·- ~ . ~ 
.. .:. 
. .. ".: : ., ... - : . ~ 
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howeve~, that 'lea j oiea pures. 1 wh;ich one can~ exper~~nce 
while suffering are not consolation, and, on the co~trary, 
consola.tion can be sought in a· kind of mor.bid aggravation of 
suffering. (presumably because this gives the victim s~me 
.. 
fee~ing of -power over his destiny, and some imaginary enjoy-
men:t). :J!:ar;t.ier in the same letter she elaborates on th·e 
same· idea ·in the form of 'la reverie' which she sees as 'la 
rac~ne d:u mal.' ('PSO ,78). SliLe almost seems to admit t~at it .. 
is indispens·ab~e ·for anyone who is afflicted, since it ie lil 
w~r.of projecting into the future and escaping from the horror 
of. the_ pr,esent, but demands that we should recognise it for 
what it is:. 'sous toutea ses formes sans exception elle est 
le mensonge' (PSO 79). 
·· If the afflicted· person lies to hims·elf he may find-
c·bil~o·la~:i;dn·. fo_r h;i,.s .affliction, l:Jut he will miss the unique 
·= ;. 
-~~portunity of a real contact with God, miss the mediating 
-~. i· 
·powe-r ·of af.t1i£tion; 
... ., 
Simone Weil insists that it is the 
physical pa~n in affliction which renders this contact possible. 
Simone Weil's 'natural man' includes every part of the indiv-
idual, including his intellectual faculties. 
:.·· 
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Only physical pain is radical enaU.gh to t~ch · ma11: ·Q-bedience, 
or rather., to teach him that everything is in fact obedient 
to God (PSO 100). Physical pain is the world-order entering 
our body (cf. Cl 40, 210): 
Chaque fois que nous subissons une douleur·, nous 
pouvons nous dire avec verite que c'est l'univers, 
1' ordre du monde, la beaute du ·monde, -1' obe.issance de 
la creation a Dieu qui no.u·s entr·e~;t dans le c-orps. 
(PSO 100). 
To r.ealise this is to give . c. on sent to ·it;_ . · the experienc-e of 
pain and rebellion agains.t it gives w~y to the experience of 
the world-order. Not that pain i~ .any the less once the 
vision of the world-Qrder has been attained; as we saw earlier, 
consent to necessity does not alter su~jectien to necessity: 
La douleur est la colorat~on ·de certains evenements. 
· Devant une phrase ecrite a l'encre·rouge, celui qui sait 
lire ·et ce;Lui qui ne sait pas vo.ient pareillem~nt du 
ro.u,ge i maiS la .COlOration ;fOUge n I a paS la meme impor-
tance pour l'un et pour .l'autre.· (PSO 100) 
Pain is a way to experien£e the order of the world; 
suffering in general is the experience of contradiction, 
contradiction between man's desire for good and the reality 
to which he is subjected, between his aspirations to being 
and the destruction of that being, through affliction. We 
experience this contr4diction, according to Simone Weil, in 
.·· .· 
.... .. · . 
' I ~ 
, ... · 
-;,• .. · 
.,, 
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the feeling of impossi.bili ty whic·h. ~ccompanies ·extreme s~ffer-
i:q~ (C2 369; cf. Cl 228, C2 .18). It is essential th~t ~his 
~xpe·:f.::ie:nce of contradiction be kept alive, althou~h ttie soul's 
automatic impu;:J.se is to s~ek. refuge in in~~nsibiiity (~bid• >:• 
. I '• .~ 
Oni~ the~ can· it be used as a way of transporting the sou~ 
. 1 on to a h;ig~er·plane: 
Il. faut user de la souffrance en tant que contra-
d:~.ction eprouve~. P~r cet usage elle est media trice, 
·: -et. par·· SJli. te redemptr;ice. Il fa:ut. en use.r en _tant · 
. . · :· --·.-_/;q~··· .. ~:~art: eiemen t • .. ( C2- }6.9~): . 
It. is in t=he us~ of suffering (tho~gh not in seelt:.irig it') ·~a· 
ppp~sed to the attempt to find a way out of it, that S±m~ne 
• I· . . 
W~ii see=s· the greatness of Christianity (ibid.). To.~a-:r 
that: -c~r~~tiB:n~ty is not merely an insurance policy agai,nst 
su~,;t'e;r~n~ in this world is no:t. of course saying very much, ~ 
. i .• t •. • .... 
. 'll~~hou·gh, ~n this, respe·ct Simone Weil would appar.,n,tly rl!!lte. 
C:Q~i.a~i.ani(y higher. than Buddhism, founded as it is on the 
~ :· ~ : : . . . . . 
'i~'e.a :· ;~ '·a;n· ~·Ef~¢.~pe from suffering through the an.nilii:la-ti~n of 
• - . ··- ·, ·-=· . . • 
. '- ~ ·' . 2 . -
desire. ' But she does seem c~aracteristically to neglect 
the Ch~tian notion of resurrection as a triumph over death. 
1 For the mechanism of contradiction see §6 below. 
2' . C.f. 1 The Four Holy Truths', Buddhist Scriptures, trans. 
E. Conze (Harmondsworth 1959), pp. 112-3. 
.~ ~· 
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For Simone Weil the Cross suffices, and is its awn ~~y of 
salvation; the Resurrection· ;is not dis·puted, it is'. simply 
ignored. 
• 
The idea of suffering being experienced as contradiction, 
as I ecartelement I ' is developed in. Simone Weil' s th~ugh_t. in 
another concept, that of distance. For her, the d:i,.s.tanc"e 
between God and creation is mirrored and intens~fied in the 
dist-ance between God aJ,ld God in the pe;r;;s·on of Christ on . the 
Cross. Christ was the"'malheureux par excellence', condemned 
by man and stripped not only of his divinity, but even of his 
humanity C"cf. PSO 92). As we shall indicate in a later:chap-
ter (III, §?), for Simone Weil this distance between God and 
God was at the same. time supreme harmony and union, and man, 
therefo;re _;. by association with. the ·cross of Chlist, can parti-
cipa te in this union •. An afflic.ted man is already at the 
·. . 
foot of the Cross; ·.al that he ·has to do is to contin·U:e- to 
desire Good in the depths of his affliction, and the exper-
ience of distance between himself and God will become one of 
.. 
union, 'une harmonie pure et dechirante•· (PSO 92). And then 
i ceux qui pers~verent ·d-ans 1' aJQou,r· e~tendent c.ette not·e tout 
au fond de la decheance ou lea ~is' +e malheur' (ibid.) • 
· .. 
. -·~ .. _. .: :•'"' 
...... 
. " .. :. ' 
.. · . 
··'' 
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Simone Weil sometimes develops this image of union arising 
from 4:-istance in a different way, a way connected with:. the. idea 
of co~·eent discussed in the previous chapter. In is a w~y 
which seeJD.s t·o indi~ate a certain ambiguity which .s_h,ould now 
. 
be considered. 4s was·· noted, in Simone Weil' s vielrl1. t · i·s G.od 
who descends to man, and not man who ascends to God. when 
God in his love comes to man, he plants a seed in the receptive 
. 
·' ·soul, w~en: once consent has been g;iven (/_PSO 10y. 
-~ . r. 
·be. ·rememb·ered that for Simone Weil hhis giving of c.onsent is 
man~s only positive act in tbe work of salvation.) When one~ 
the seed·has been planted man has nothing more to do but to 
-~:!l.rt1;1~e i~ and remove the weeds which might impede: its growth; 
. . 
the ~eed do~s the rest. But God, having planted the seed, . < 
· · ··ret.urns .. whence ·he came·' and the distance between the soul. and . 
.. 
.. ·· ,Go·q.. ,i~ ~s gr.~at _ar;; _b~f~re. 
·•· • ·• .•. : ' •• ' • r 
How is that distance to be bridged?" 
'· The solfl ·still.-cannot ascend towards God of i:f?~- o~:g. agC_9:r.d, 
.... '· • ... 
The answ!!r is. __ that the seed has now grown into a tree, and that 
tree is the _Ct-oss. The soul, without knowing it, has conse:nt-
ed .. to.the suffering of the Cross (PSO 103). 
In ·this imag~ Simone Weil appears to be saying that aff-
liction is the necessary result of consent to God. Even if 
tbis were not difficult to square with her affirmations already 
·. ; i • • 
,::, .. _ .. _, • . 
.· ..... 
"•• :~·· :I • 
.. 
· ... , ... 
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noted that joy in beauty was an equally valid way of approach 
to the divine, it would still leave the •question of the value 
of the affliction which is not a result of consent. Affliction, 
in Simone Weil's terminology, is part of the human condition, 
the result of our subjection to necessity, and not merely a 
divine technique for the saving of souls. 
The same criticism applies to the image of the nail which 
follows it (PSO 103-4), which has the added disadvantage of 
being horrific in its portrayal of the divine plan. The 
nail represents affliction, its head being the whole weight 
of necessity spread through time and space. The point of 
the nail is applied to the centre of the soul, and Simone Weil 
describes the whole exercise as follows: 
Le malheur est une merveille de la technique divine. 
C'est un dispositif simple et ingenieux qui fait entrer 
dans l'ime d'une creature finie cette immensite de force 
aveugle, brutale et froide. La distance infinie qui 
separe Dieu de la creature se rassemble tout entiere en 
un point pour percer une ame en son centre. (PSO l04) 
The visual image of the divine carpenter taking obvious pleasure 
in the efficiency of his scheme is difficult to accept. And 
yet the message is clear. The soul must go on loving in spite 
of the torment, must remain orientated:' in the right direction, 
and then will find itself nailed to the very centre of the 
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universe, 'le vrai centre, qui n'est pas au milieu, qui est 
hors de l'espace et du temps, qui est Dieu' (PSO 104). The 
nail takes on the symbolism of the cosmic tree, the axis mundi, 
as Simone Weil describes the union with the divine which 
results from persistence in love in the midst of affliction: 
Selon une dimension qui n'appartient pas a l~space, 
qui n'est pas le temps, qui est une tout autre dimension, 
ce clou a perce un trou a travers la creation, a travers 
1 1 epaisseur de l'ecran qui separe l'ame de Dieu. 
Par cette dimension merveilleuse, l'ame peut, sans 
quitter le lieu et !'instant ou se trouve le corps auquel 
elle est liee, traverser la totalite de l'espace et du 
temps et parvenir devant la presence meme de Dieu. 
(PSO 104-5) 
* 
So far mention has been made only of affliction with 
regard to oneself. And yet a right attitude to the affliction 
of others is indispensable, according to Simone Weil, if it is 
to be used as a way of salvation. The •automatic reaction in 
the face of others' suffering, she says, is disgust and hatred; 
in fact, we behave exactly as if the afflicted man were r~s-
ponsible for his affliction, as if it were a crime: 
Tout le mepris, toute la repulsion, toute la haine 
que notre raison attache au crime, notre sensibilite 
!'attache au malheur. Excepte ceux dont le Christ 
occupe toute l'a•e, tout le monde meprise plus ou moins 
les malheureux. (PSO 90) 
Compassion for affliction is indeed very difficult, since those 
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who have not experienced it do not understand it, and those 
who have are in no position to share their experience or help 
others in the same situation: 
Ainsi la compassion a l'egard des malheureux est 
une impossibilite. Quand elle se produit vra~ment, 
c'est un miracle plus surprenant que la marche sur les 
eaux, la guerison des malades et meme la resurrection 
d'un mort. (PSO 88) 
The only way for compassion to be shown to someone in afflict-
ion is for the one who wishes to help to transfer his own being 
into the afflicted one, thus restoring, even momentarily, the 
being of which affliction ha~ deprived him (PSO 118). This 
is obviously a~mpossibility, since it involves assuming aff-
liction voluntarily, whereas the essence of affliction is to 
be imposed against a man's will (PSO 119). 
What is impossible to the natural man, however, can be 
accomplished supernaturally, and Simone Weil seems to imply 
that there is a technique for achieving it. In a recurrence 
of the nail-image, she writes to Joe Bousquet: 
Pour penser le malheur, il faut le porter dans la 
chair, enfoncer tres avant comme un clou, et le porter 
longtemps, afin que la penseeait le temps de devenir 
assez forte pour le regarder. (PSO 75) 
If in his sufferings a man can take upon himself the sufferings 
of his epoch, then affliction can become very much more than a 
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means to personal salvation: 
Heureux ceux pour qui le malheur entrait dans la 
chair est le malheur du monde lui-meme a\ leur epoque. 
Ceux-la ont la possibilite et la fonction de connaitre 
dans sa verite, de contempler dans sa realite le malheur 
du monde. C'est la la fonction redemptrice elle-meme. 
(PSO 78) 
The idea of redemptive suffering which must now be con-
sidered plays an important part in Simone Weil's thinking. 
For her it was not enough that man should through affliction 
be able to bridge the gulf between himself and the divine; 
there must in addition be models of this to which man could 
assimilate himself, divine or perfectly puEe beings who could 
take upon themselves the evil of humanity and transmute,it 
into suffering. It is appropriate therefore to turn our 
attention to the use made by Simone Weil of various mytho-
logical figures and deities who represented for her some 
aspects of the archetypal salvation-through-suffering theme • 
• 
III, §3 
SAVIOURS AND REDEEMERS 
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The difficulties of exam1n1ng the vast collection of mediator-
groupt:. 
-figures whom Simone WeilAunder the same heading are obvious 
at a glance. The 'liste des images du Christ' drawn up in 
America (CS 290-1) shows the extent of the problem. Leaving 
aside the question as to whether these figures can in fact 
be related to the figure of Christ, 1 we are confronted with 
a list of mythological personages who have their origin in 
Greece, in India, in the t-'Iiddle East, in Scandinavia, in China, 
some of whom are deities properly speaking, some characters in 
folk-tales, one a figure of Greek geometry ('la moyenne pro-
portionnelle'), and one which is much more a philosophical 
concept than a religious figure (the Tao). She clarifies the 
issue a little when writing of her interpretation of the 
Hamitic tradition in the essay 'Lea trois fils de Noe et 
l'histoire de la civilisation mediterraneenne', when she says 
that this tradition gave to the world 
la connaissance et l'amour d'une seconde personne 
divine, autre que le Dieu createur et puissant et en meme 
temps identique, a la fois sagesse et amour, ordonnatrice 
de tout l'univers, institutrice des hommes, unissant en 
soi par !'incarnation la nature humaine a la nature divine, 
mediatrice, souffrante, redemptrice des ames. (AD l8l) 
1The figure of Christ will be considered separately in 
III, §7. 
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This 'seconde personne divine' was known by many different 
names, among which were 'Dionysos, Promethee, Amour, Aphrodite 
celeste, Hades, Core, Persephone, Minos, Hermes, Apollon, Ar-
temis, Ame du Monde. Un autre nom qui eut une merveilleuse 
fortune est Logos, Verbe ou plutot Rapport, Mediation' (AD 182). 
Some of these appear in the previous 'liste des images du 
Christ', some do not. 
The question inevitably arises as to whether one can make 
any legitimate comparison between these myths and figures, and 
this in turn leads to the whole problem of Simone Weil's so-
-called syncretism. It is true th*t in her account of mytli 
she tends to ignore national variations of a theme, and sees 
only the similarities running through each version. But as 
Raper notes: 
A syncretistic approach makes many into one, by 
affecting a synthesis, whereas Simone Wail's approach 
finds that the many are one, anyhow, at the deepest level 
which attention can reach. . •• Thus the radical 'mmnism' 
of Simone Weil's concept of religion is by no means syn-
thetic. The-adding together of all the 'languages' of 
religion into some sort of religious Esperanto would cer-
tainly represent a misinterpretation of her view.l 
Other points can be noted too. Firstly there is the fact 
1 Op. cit., PP• 132, 134. 
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that when dealing with the myths of a suffering and redeeming 
deity, Simone Weil draws largely on the various myths assoc-
iated with the Mystery religions of the early Chrlstian centuries, 
when 'syncretism' was a prominent feature of religious life, 
and deities were considered to be equivalent from one culture 
to another. Isis at this time is represented as saying: 
'The whole earth worships my godhead, one and individual, under 
many a changing shape, with varied rites and by many divine 
names.• 1 Secondly, the fundamental nature of myth must be 
borne in mind. Although it is obvious that an individual 
myth grows up in a geographically and temporally determined 
milieu, the similarities between myths the world over, even 
where no historical connexions can be established, leads one 
to suppose that these are different expressions of a basic 
human vision. A m~th concerns itself with the fundamental 
experiences of humanity--the cycle of birth and death, the 
rotation of the seasons, suffering and self-preservation--and 
not with the accidental, and these are basically the same in 
all parts of the world. The originality of Christianity itself 
1Quot. in s. Spencer, Mysticism in World Religion (Har-
mondsworth 1963), P• 154. 
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is said to lie in the fact that in spite of the striking res-
emblances between the Gospel accounts of Christ's birth, life 
and death, and pagan myths of the time, the Gospel account is 
based on historical fact whereas the pagan versions are •merely' 
myths. In other words, Christianity is superior because it 
is not a myth, not because it is a superior myth. A large 
part of strudturalist anthropology is based on the comparability 
of myths in different parts of the world; Levi-Strauss emphas-
ises the eminently translatable nature of myth, that in spite 
of the most severe linguistic deformation it can still retain 
its original sense,1 and claims that to analyse a myth correct-
ly it is necessary to have as many variations as possible. 2 
In view of this we do not propose to take separately 
every singl~ one of the mediator- or saviour-figures enumerated 
by Simone Weil and examine to what extent her use corresponds 
to accepted practice. It will be a question rather of consid-
ering how these figures fit into her general scheme of mediation 
and salvation. It is proposed in this chapter· to consider only 
11 The Structural Study of Myth', Structural Anthropology 
trans. Claire Jacobson & B. G. Schoepf (New York 1963), p. 210. 
2Ibid., P• 218. 
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mythical figures of one sort or another, and to leave figures 
of a mathematical nature to another chapter (III, §6). 
Even when the field is restricted in this way, the question 
of how these myths are to be categorised still remains. Owing 
to the interchangeability of the myths in Simone Wei~'s use of 
them, it is impossible to divide them in·any absolute way; 
but on scruti·ny they do seem to fall into two categories, 
although these overlap a gre~t deal. One category relates 
to the .Mystery-gods, to the concept of an incarnate divine 
figure who suffers death for the sake of humanity. In this 
category1belong too those deities whom Simone Weil identified 
with the Mystery•gods. The second category eontains those 
figures of which the prototype is perhaps Plato's ideally just 
man. Here it is a question again of justice suffering at the 
hands of men, but the emphasis is on the humanity of the figure 
involved, and although he suffers, it is not usually a case of 
a ritual death and resurrection. It must be emphasised however 
that these categories are ~ery artificial, and are adopted only 
for the sake of handling the material. 1 
1The whole concept of the mediator-saviour, its univers-
ality as well as the different emphases indicated above, is 
illustrated ~y C. J. Bleeker: 'The saviour is an essential fac-
tor in religion, because many religious people are convinced 
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As a prelude to a discussion of these two expressions 
of the saviour in Simone Weil's thought, we may take the figure 
of Love which she developed from Plato, and which embraces 
many of the characte·riartics of both categories. Plato's 
figure appears in Socrates' speech in the Symposium, where 
the characters concerned are discussing the nature of love. 
that the domain of men and the world of the gods are separated 
by a deep cleft. In order to link up these two worlds a 
bridge must be laid across the cleft. Man is unable to per-
form this act. It should be done by a creature who unites 
the two worlds by his nature. That is the saviour. He is 
a divine or semi-divine Heing, who descends from the domain 
of the gods to the dwelling-places of men, or who operates 
through other gods for the benefit of men. The figure of the 
saviour shows many varieties. As he combines in himself a 
human and a divine element, the emphasis may alternatively be 
put on the one or the other side of his nature. Saviours, in 
whom the human factor dominates, are the sacral.king, the hero, 
the prophet, the sage and the saint. It is evident that in 
the saviour-god, i.e. the god who functions as saviour, the 
divine nature fully prevails. Yet the human factor is not 
absolutely absent. It finds its expression on the one hand 
in the human feelings~:.which the god displays and on the other 
side in his interest in the destiny of men. Moreover, he 
often passes ~ severe trial, so that he is a consoling example 
to suffering humanity, ~nd he conquers death, so that in man 
the hope of immortality awakens. The saviour-god thus shows 
two striking and nearly related features: he is a dynamic 
personality and he cares for the welfare of men, indeed he 
sometimes. takes part in human sufferings.• The Saviour God: 
Com. arative Studies in the conce t of Salvation resented to 
Edwin Oliver James, ed. s. G. F. Brandon t~nchester 19 3 , p. 
2. 
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Socrates reports what the wise woman Diotima told him con-
cerning Love. He is 'half-way between mortal and immortal', 
'a great spirit (dal~wv)', 'half-god and half-man', 'being of 
an intermediate nature, a spirit bridges the gap between them, 
and prevents the universe from falling into two separate 
halves. • God does not deal directly with man; it is 
by means of spirits that all the intercourse and communication 
of gods with men, both in waking life and in sleep, is carried 
on. • •• Spirits are many in number and of many kinds, and 
one of them is Love.• 1 Simone Weil comments on this passage, 
and on the use of the word dal~wv, by saying that sometimes in 
Greek it bears the meaning of 'god', sometimes that of a being 
above man but below the gods, like an angel, and sometimes, as 
here, 'lea mediateurs, lea intermediaires entre l'homme et 
Dieu' (IP 64). 2 
She goes on to interpret Plato's account of Love's birth. 3 
1symposium, 202-3. 
2P. Friedlander also claims that Plato uses gods and 
demons interchangeably, but that he use~ these two categories 
nevertheless, 'placing the demonic as a sort of proportional 
mean between the human level and the divine'. Plato: An 
Introduction, trans. H. Meyerhoff (London 1958), p. 42. 
3symposium, 203-4. 
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On the day Aphrodite was born, Poverty (Simone Weil calls her 
'Misere') lay with the god Contrivance ('Ressource') who was 
drunk with nectar, and conceived a son, Love. Love is thus 
amn of God, 'auteur de l'harmonie la plus complete, au sens 
pythagoricien, c'est-a-dire de l'unite entre les contraires 
les plus contraires possible--a savoir Dieu et la misere' 
(IP ?0). But she reminds us that as well as being the son 
of a God, Love is also described as equal with God. Quoting 
Ag~thon's speech, she says, 'J'-affirme que parmi les dieux, 
l'Amour est le plus heureux, le plus beau et le plus parfait' 
(195, quot. IP 49). Simone Weil has no scruples about assim-
ilating the two speeches, and concludes that this makes Love 
both the supreme God and a mediator between God and man. 
Concerning the nature of Love, and the life he leads, 
she again refers to Socrates' speech, and translates: 
D'abord il est perpetuellement miserable, et il s'en 
faut qu'il soit delicat et beau comme la multitude le 
cr·oi t. Il est durci et desseche, nu-pieds, sans abri, 
toujours gisant a terre a meme le sol, dormant·dev~nt 
lea portes et sur les routes, en plein air. Ayant la 
nature de sa mere, il est toujours le compagnon de la 
privation. . (204, quot. IP 66) 
She comments: 'Cet Amour represente tout a l'heure comme rei 
des dieux est ici un miserable vagabond. C'est qu'il l'a 
vouilw. Il a voulu naitre fils de la Misere' (IP 68). So 
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Love is poor, wanders from place to place, is homeless and 
wretched. The son of God suffers. His wanderings and 
sufferings are a parallel of course to those already consid-
ered in the folk-tale of the 'Duke of Norroway', 111here God 
seeks the soul, and are equivalent for Simone Weil to any 
similar account, for example Orestes' wanderings before his 
reunion with Electra (CS 262). 
But what Love suffers he does so willingly. He is an 
image for Simone Weil of consent, consent to affliction. 
Referring back to Agathon'a speech, she translates linea which 
she considers to be· 'peut-etre lea plus belles de Platon': 
Le plus important, c'eat que l'~our ne fait ni ne 
aubit injustice, soit parmi les Dieux aoit parmi lea 
hommea. Car lui, il ne souffre pas par force, quand il 
lui arrive de aouffrir, car la force m'atteint pas l'Amour. 
Et quand il agit, il n'agit pas ...- par force, car chacun 
consent a obeir en tout a l'Amour. L'accord qui se fa-it 
par conaentement mutuel eat juste, aelon les lois de la 
'cite royale'. (196, quot. IP 52-3) 
Another characteristic which should be mentioned is that 
of divine healer. Love is described by Ariatophanes as 'le 
medecin des maux dont la guerison serait pour l'espece humaine 
la supreme felicite' (189, IP 43), and Simone Weil interprets 
this in common with Christ's healing·mission, as the healing 
of original sin. Whether or not her interpretation is correct 
--or whether it is even possible to speak of 'original sin' 
in connexion with the Greeks--it affords an interesting para-
llel with Serapis, a form of Osiris worshipped in the Egyptian 
Myteries. Serapis was identified with Asclepius, the divine 
healer, and also with Zeus, Dionysos and Helios. 1 (Apollo 
himself, father of Asclepius, was also a healer.) 
Simone Weil uses several images to describe the action of 
Love, Love's 'descent', and these seem to apply to the very 
concept of a mediator-'-igure in her thought. One of the most 
common is that of the thunderbolt, or a 'descending fire'. 
She finds this in the Stoic concept of nvEu~a, the energy which 
supports the universe, of which the celestial form iS' the 
thunderbolt (SG 162, comm. Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus). She 
continues: 
D'apres la conception antique, le lieu naturel du 
feu est en haut, comme celui de la terre en bas. Le 
feu tend a monter comme les corps·solides a descendre. 
Un feu qui descend est contre nature. - Par la la foudre 
est l'image de la folie d'amour qui contraint Dieu a un 
mouvement descendant vers les hommes. (SG 162) 
Elsewhere she writes again of the thunderbolt being 'le lien 
d'amour entre le Ciel et la Terre' (CS 255). The difficulty 
1 Spencer, op. cit., P• 156. 
of her interpretation here is that she identi~ies Love with 
the Holy Spirit rather than with the incarnate mediator-figure 
(cf. SG 162). Love is the fire which Christ came to give to 
men, the fire which Prometheus stole, and given the Gospel 
identification of fire with Spirit, the relationship is an 
obvious one. Presumably this was for Simone Weil simply 
another manifestation of Love, since the mediator-figure and 
the Spirit are different ·aspects of the same divine Being. 
A more puzzling image, but one which seems to be related 
to that of a 'descending fire', is that of chlorophyll, whose 
property of capturing the sun's energy Simone Weil sees as an 
image of divine love (IP 62). It almost seems as if the sun 
ought to be the mediator here, since it is a 'descending fire' 
which will cause the plant which receives it to grow upwards. 
But perhaps she is thinking on a more literal ·level, of the 
chlorophyll mediating solar energy and transferring it to the 
plant. (Compare for instance the note: 'Si nous avions de la 
chlorophylle, nous nous nourririons de lumiere, comme les 
arbres', CS 245.) She makes this more explicit in the follow-
ing passage: 
La chlorophylle est l'intermediaire entre l'energie 
solaire et nous, comme la lune nous permet de contempler 
face a face et longtemps la lumiere solaire, ainsi la 
chlorophylle nous permet de manger et de boire l'energie 
solaire. (C3 198) 
With this may be compared Claudel's use of the image of 
chlorophyll as mediator. 1 
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According to Simone Weil's analysis outlined ·above then, 
Love is both equal to God and the son o.f God; a mediator 
between God and human misery, he suffers and is outcast when 
on earth, but suffers willingly. He benefits mankind by 
providing a remedy for the.ir evil-doing, and yet the very act 
of his descent to earth is against nature. These are all . 
characteristics which will recur in the consideration of other 
mediator-figures which should now be undertaken • 
• 
The death-and-resurrection myths which form the first 
category to be discussed are often considered to derive from 
one of the oldest and most widespread forms of religion in 
. 2 
Europe, the cult of the Earth-mother. As the male role in 
human procreation came to be underst~od, so this divine figure 
of fertility was. joined by a consort, a lover or a son, w~o 
died and was resurrected with the decay and rebirth of the 
1see 'Traite de la co-naissance du monde et de soi-meme' 
in Oeuvre poetique (Bibl. de la Pleiade, Paris 1957), P• 162. 
2
cf. A. H. Krappe, La Genese ~es mythes (Paris 1952), P• 
73: 'Tous Lies peuples de langue indo-europeenni7 ont connu 
ou connaissent toujours une terre-mere, sous une gande variate 
de noms. 1 
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natural world. The cult of this pair became especially 
vigorous in the Near East and Mediterranean regions, and as 
H. B. Parkes tells us, 
with regional variations, they were worshipped 
under the names of Ishtar and Tammuz in Mesopotamia, 
Isi·s and Osiris in Egypt, Astarte and Adonis in Syria, 
and Cybele and Attis in Anatolia, while in classical 
Greece a similar tale was told of the harvest goddess 
Demeter and her daughter Persephone.! 
This fertility god, alternatively consort or child of the 
Great mother, followed the cycle of the seasons i:p. his growth, 
death and subsequent resurrection, and very early came to be 
symbolised by the moon, whose phases seemed so intimately c.on-
nected with the universal cycle of birth and death. Many 
scholars have underlined this intermingling of moon and vege-
tat ion. Eliade points out that a large number of fertility 
gods are also moon-deities, including Dionysos and Osiris, 2 
and it.is certainly one of the mgrits of Simone Weil's use of 
this theme to have perceived the connexion between such medi-
1Gods and Men (London 1960), p. 45. Cf. Sir J. G. Frazer, 
The Golden Bough (abridged edn, London 1949), pp. 324-5. 
2Patterns in Comparative Religion, tr.~R. Sheed (London & 
New York 1958), p. 162. Cf. R. Graves, The Greek Myths (Har-
mondsworth 1955), pp. 15 ff and G. Durand, Les Structures An-
thropologigues de l'imaginaire (3e edn, Paris 1969), pp. 341-351. 
ator-gods and the moon. As regards the mediator-gods, she 
sees moon-symbolism in various of their attributes: 
Tous les dieux mediateurs, assimilables au Verbe, 
sont des dieux lunaires, porteurs de cornea, de lyres, 
ou d'arcs qui evoquent le croissant (Osiris, Artemis, 
Apollon, Hermes, Dionysos, Zagreus, l'Amour ••• ). 
(LR 25) 
Such a connexion is of course heightened for her by her read-
ing of Plato; in the cave-myth the moon is obviously a re-
flection of the sun, more easily perceived by man who is 
blinded by the direct light of the Good. There is a mingling 
of Platonism with modern theories of religious symbolism in 
her claim that 
si le solei~ est l'image du Pere, la Lune, reflet 
parfait de la splendeur solaire, mais reflet qu'on peut 
contempler, et qui souffre la diminution et la dispari-
tio~, est l'image du Fils. (ibid.) 
Although she does not expressly state the relationship noted 
above between lunar and chthonian deities, she seems to ind-
icat~ such a r-elationship in the following affirmation: 
Beaucoup de choses se trouvent eclaircies dans la 
mythologie si on suppose que tout ce qui a rapport a la 
lune, a des cornea parce qu'elles sont images de la 
lu_ne, et a la seve vegetale, symbolise le Verbe. 
(IP 89) 
She uses this relationship for example in her treatment of 
the Kore myth. As was indicated above (III, §1), Kore for 
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Simone Weil symbolised the soul which by eating the pome-
granate seed gave its consent to God. Kore, in her inter-
pretation, is also however a figure of Christ. She is an 
instance of tbe god which is 'autre que le Dieu supreme et 
en meme temps identique a lui' (AD 182), and in a note re-
presenting a brief speculation on the subject, she is also 
equated with Osiris: 'Si Demeter est Isis, Core est Osiris, 
le Verbe incarne, et Zagreus n'est pas le fils de Core, mais 
le meme etre' (C3 88). 1 
Another parallel which Simone Weil makes between Core 
and Christ, which is less improbable than it sounds, is in 
the connexion of each with corn and hence with bread. When 
she notes: 'Si Core (Persephone) represente vraiment le grain 
de ble, c'est une figure du Christ' (C3 244), she is probably 
thinking of the symbolism of the Eucharist. Clearly s-he is 
not· attempting to reduce Christ's function to that of a corn-
-god, but the identification of Christ's body with bread in 
1Krappe associates Isis and Demeter when referring to the 
former as 'la Nature, mere des choses ,;1.maitresse de tous les 
elements' (after Apuleius) and to the former as 'Terre-Mere des 
peuples de langue indo-europeenne'. Op. cit., PP• 103 & 58. 
Simone Weil calls them both 'la divinite maternelle dont le 
symbole est la terre' ( IP 88) ·• Cf. Larousse Encyclopaedia of 
Mythology, P• 17. 
the Eucharist points to a symbolism which did not originate 
with Christianity. 
When Simone Weil denotes Hades, the god normally assoc-
iated \tlith the Kore myth, as a mediator-figure too, she s·eems 
to be on flimsier ground. She puts him, with Kore and others, 
in the category of gods who are the same as the supreme God 
and at the same time different from him (AD 182), and when 
considering Kore as the human soul makes Hades a figure of 
the Word: 
Core (il est si evident que c 1 est l 1 ame) est fille 
de Zeus et de Demeter, de Dieu et de la Terre; c 1 est 
Zeus qui dans sa sagesse la donne pour epouse a Hades. 
1 Nul ne vient a moi, sinon ce.ux que me donne mon 
Pere 1 • (C2 353) 
The interpretation is ingenious, but does not carry the con-
viction of some others; there seems to be no case for con-
s.idering Hades to represent here anything but death, which is 
overcome by the rebirth of the moon or of vegetation. Follow-
ing Heraclitus, she also identifies Hades with Dionysos, which 
would seem to add weight to her argument, but it is to inter-
pret them as figures of the Spirit, rather than of the Word 
(C2 353, C3 8g). 
Simone Weil moves easily between the various aspects of 
a deity, however, and it is natural that when considering 
Dionysos it is primarily hj,s character of me-diator-god which 
should concern her. The death-and-resurrection of the god 
becomes a symbol of man's spiritual death and regeneration, 
and this symbol is played out in the drama of the mystery-
-religions {SG 86). Eliade indicates the necessity for this 
regeneration by 'death', linking it with human symbolism: 
Dans la 'perspective lunaire', la mort de l'bomme, 
comme la mort period:!..que de l'humanite, sont neces~aires, 
t tout comme le sont les trois jours de tenebres qui pre-
cedent la 'renaissance' de la lune. La mort de l'homme 
et celle de l'humanite sont indispensables a leur rege-
neration.l 
And so when criticising Nietzsche's interpretation of Dionysos, 
Simone Weil identifies the god as 
le Dieu que l'homme doit imiter pour sauver son arne, 
qui a rejoint l'homme dans sa souffrance et la mort, et 
que l'homme peut et doit rejoindre dans la perfection et 
la felicite. Exactement comme le Christ. {SS 232) 
Dionysos is a lunar deity, ~ike other mediator-figures; 
Simone Weil seems to dedu~e this mainly from the·fact that 
he was a horned deity, horns being a lunar symbol {IP 12, C3 
185), and from the passage where Sophocles calls him 'Feu, 
chef du chmur des astres qui respirent, gardien des voix 
1Le Mythe de l'eternel retour· {Paris 1949), pp. 132-3. 
~octurnes, repartiteur' (IP 89).1 She could equally well 
have referred to the new-moon boat in which he made his 
2 
voyage --or for that matter to the fact that his mother was 
Semele, 'la souterraine', whose chthonic nature has obvious 
lunar implications.3 As a moon-god, he suffered eclipse, 
in his case being torn in pieces by the Titans. Simone Weil 
notes a s~milarity between this treatment and crucifixion and 
links the two with the Manichean image of the spirit crucified 
and scattered across time and space (C2 354). 
Dionysos was also of course a wine-god, and Simone Weil 
does not hesitate to draw from this a parallel with Christ 
when he said 'I am the vine' (PSO 61). The fact that Dian-
ysos was credited with planting the fiEst vine leads her to 
identify him with Noah, who was held to have performed a 
similar service for humanity (AD 178). 4 He resembles Noah 
lwe have been unable to locate this reference. 
Lexicon Sophocleum (Hildesheim 1958) gives only two 
to Dionysos, neither of which-is appropriate. 
F. Ellendt, 
referen~es 
2 . Graves, §27.6. In other traditions the moon-god journeys 
or crosses the sky in a boat. The Egyptian Khans identified by 
the Greeks with Heracles, the saviour god par excellence, is an 
example of this. See Larousse Encyc. of Mythology, P• 34. 
3c. Kerenyi, La Mythologie d~s Grecs tr. H. de ·Roguin (Paris 
1952), p. 252. Cf. H. J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Mythology 
(6th edn, London 1964), p. 149. 
4
aenesis ix. 20. 
also in being 'un redempteur dont le sacrifice a sauve 
l'humanite' (CS 57). Again, to make the parallel, she 
could have mentioned Dionysos' voyage, which is supposed 
to be a similar excursion to that undertaken by Noah in his 
1 Ark. This parallel would strengthen her case, since it 
would presumably give Noah lunar connexions, and thus make 
of him a kind of 'dieu mediateur'. 
Simone \t/eil makes the usual association between Dionysos c:L. :.; 
and Zagreus, the Cretan child-god who, like Dionysos, was a 
'son of God' i.e. of Zeus, and like him was torn to pieces 
and devoured. 2 Because of his horns, Simone Weil considers 
him to be a lunar deity (IP 184, CS 291), and as such one who 
suffers a passion, an 'eclipse' (IP 174). She gives a curious 
interpretation of the mirror given to Zagreus, finding an 
analogy between the idea of a reflected god in the case of 
Zagreus, a nailed God in the case of Christ, and a measured 
god in the case of Osiris (Osiris in his coffin). 
case, God is limited, 'trapped' (C3 131). 3 
1 Graves, §§27.6, 38.3. 
2 Rose, op. cit., p. 51. 
In each 
3Graves explains the mirror as one of the instruments used 
in the Orphic mysteries, representing the other self, or ghost, 
of the initiates (§30.1). 
r .• r 
~I-~. 
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This parallel with Osiris is a natural one, and Simone 
Weil carries it out to its fullest extent. Osiris, like 
Dionysos, is a god who has lived on earth, suffered and died, 
and was resurrected (C2 323, PSO 47). The manner of their 
deaths--being torn to pieces--is also similar (C2 354, 368), 
and Osiris too bears lunar attributes, for example when he 
appears in his form as the bull Apia (IP 12); 1 or in his in-
carnation as Onuphis (IP 88). Like other redemptive saviours, 
Osiris instructed man in the civilised arts (CS 313, E 252)·. 2 
Simone Weil notes an interesting parallel between Osiris and 
Deucalion, claiming that the same Greek word was used for 
Deucalion's ark as for the coffin in which Osiris was cast into 
the Nile and carried out to sea (AD 178). In relation to this 
she sees a symbolism in the wood used for their construction: 
Le bois de l'arche Lfte No!/ a rapport au symbolisme 
du bois qui apparait dans l'arbre du peche originel, 
dans le coffre en bois d'Osiris, dans les obelisques 
de bois en son honneur ••• , dans la Croix. (C3 232 ) 
1The bull was the most important of the Egyptian sacred 
animals, and when he died was worshipped, as were all the .... 
dead, as an 'Osiris' under the name Osiris-Apia (Greek Osorapis). 
In life he was supposed to be the reincarnation of Ptah. La-
rousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology, p. 44. 
2simone Weil does not mention it, but like Dionysos he is 
credited with the introduction of the vine. 
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There is certainly a relationship between 'l'arbre du peche 
1 
originel'and the Cross, and the tree-symbolism could well 
have extended to Osiris as he was originally a vegetation-god, 2 
but on the other hand wood is the natural material for making 
a boat or floating coffer, and the symboih!l.sm should not be 
pressed too far.3 
Another figure identified by Simone Weil as a 'figure du 
Christ' (CS 290) is Adonis, the Greek version of the Syrian 
Tammuz, spirit of vegetation. 4 He seems also to have been 
the equivalent of Kore, since he suffered the same division 
of the year between the ea~th and the anderworld. Simone Weil 
mentions the tradition that he was killed as were Osiris, 
Zagreus and others, by a wild boar (C3 274). 5 Rose interprets 
l See III, §4. 
2 Larousse Encyclopae~ia of Mythology, p. 16. 
'see however P• SQ~ below. 
4K . ' "t 67 ereny1, op. c1 ., P• • 
5Frazer suggests that Demeter and Persephone, as well as 
Attis and Adonis, were believed to be embodied as pigs, and that 
these in connexion with the rites of Osiris were sacrificed an-
nually to the moon, giving them lunar symbolism. Op. cit., PP• 
471-2 •. 
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the story as 'an Oriental myth of the Great Mother and of 
her lover who dies as the vegetation dies, but comes to life 
again' ,1 and Simone Weil is obviously considering Adonis as 
a vegetation-god when she writes of 'les fetes d'Adouis, 
dont les_cultes mystiques enseignent que c'est un simulacre 
des moissons mures' (CS 202). 
Parallel to Adonis is Attis, another 'figure du Christ' 
whom Simone Weil identifies specifically with Kore as being 
a vegetation-god, and hence with Christ: 
Toutes les divinites mortes et ressuscitees figurees 
par le grain, Persephone, Attis, etc. sont des images du 
Christ, et le Christ a reconnu cette ressemblance par la 
parole 'Si le grain ne meurt ••• •. 
(PSO 61, cf. LR 21) 2 
• 
The deities so far considered have all followed a fairly 
recognisable pattern. The~ have all been lunar and vegetation 
gods who suffer and die with the dying vegetation, and are re-
1Rose, op. cit., P• 125. 
2His affinities with other deities already mentioned, al-
though these are not specifically discussed by Simone Weil, 
include his death; according to one tradition, he was killed 
by a wild boar, like Adonis, and to another he castrated him-
self, as Osiris was castrated. See Frazer, op. cit., P• 347. 
surrected with its rebirth. Simone Weil however sees lunar 
symbolism in a great many other deities, and thus considers 
them to be mediator-figures, even where no death-and-resurr-
ection is involved. At first sight her case for considering 
them thus does not seem to be particularly strong, since the 
element of suffering would seem to be a prerequisite of the 
mediator-god, but in fact many of them did have lunar connex-
ions. In any case, they provide an interesting example of 
her extension of a series of symbols outside their normally 
~ccepted sphere. 
Firstly there is Hermes, whom Simone Weil identifies with 
Osiris, Dionysos, Prometheus, Love, Apollo, 'et beaucoup 
d'autres' (IP 12). She thinks that the lyre which Hermes 
invented bears the same symbolism as the bow of Artemis and 
1 Apollo, and represents the moon (IP 8g). Presumably the 
cattle which he stole as a child are also in the north of 
Greece recognised as lunar symbols, being horned. Kerenyi 
claims that Hermes was the spouse and son of a great goddess 
of fertility, 2 and elsewhere notes that both he and Prometheus 
1For the myth of Hermes see Keremyi, op. cit., pp. 162-179· 
2Ibid., pp. 171, 175· 
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1 
were moon-gods. In his role as messenger of the gods Hermes 
is seen by Simone Weil as a mediator of the same kind as Love 
(IP 65), and as the inventor of fire forms a parallel with 
Prometheus (C3 251). Graves suggests that 'the invention of 
fire-making was ascribed to Hermes because the twirling of the 
male drill in the female stock suggested phallic magic•, 2 and 
if this is correct it affords an interesting parallel with the 
Vedic figure of Agni 111ho produced fire in the same way, and 
about whom there is a legend strongly resembling the story of 
the birth of Christ.3 
1Kerenyi, Prometheus: Archet 
tr. Mannheim (London 19 3 , P• 52. 
2 Graves, op. cit., §17·3· 
3cf. H. F. Narcy, Le Mythe du feu et le symbole de la 
Croix (Paris l~St ) ' p 0 7: he writes of I la premiere etincelle 
qui parait dans la. cavite oil reside la "vierge 1'1aya"' le "petit 
enfant", la "frele et divine creature" que lea pretres deposent 
sur de la paille qui s'enflamme. On amene a cote du feu nais-
sant la vache qui a fourni le beurre, l'ane qui porte le soma, 
la paille et le bois. • •• Puis Agni est porte sur la paille 
et les branches amassees sur l'autel; on verse sur. lui le 
soma liqueur spiritueuse qui lui donne la force, puis le beurre 
qui le nourrit; Agni devient alors l'oint (~ en sanskrit, 
christos en grec), et la flamme surgit, semble monter au ciel 
au milieu d'un nuage de fumee. Agni va retrouver Savistri, 
la pere celeste, qui l'a envoye sur terre pour le salut du 
monde. Et le soma et le pain (farine et beurre) sont alors 
presentee a Agni sur l'autel: il les consume et l'offrande 
monte avec lui en vapeur et fumee, vers le soleil; le Feu est 
a la fois sacrificateur et victime et les pretres, les fideles 
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Apollo too, as we saw, has lunar attributes according 
to Simone Weil's interpretation, since he is both a god of 
hunting equipped with a bow, and the patron of music bearing 
the lyre (IP 89). The opposition made by Nietzsche between 
Dionysos and Apollo she describes as 1 de la pure fantaisie, 
car lea Grecs lea melaient dans les mythes et semblent parfois 
lea identifier' (SS 232). She sees him as both a solar and 
a lunar deity, and thinks that it was as the moon that he was 
banished !rom Olympus for offending Zeus, since 1 le soleil ne 
disparait jamais, meme a Noel. La lune seule disparait' (C3 
198). Since Apollo's offence was to have sided with his son 
Asclepius who had resurrected a dead man, a parallel could be 
indicated with Prometheus, whose crime too was to have loved 
mankind too well. Simone Weil also notes his functions as 
1 
shepherd (CS 217), which could account for his use of the bow, 
and as healer (IP 61), recalling 'l'Amour medecin' already 
referred to (p.429 above). 
The lunar attributes of Artemis, described with others 
as 'le dieu qui est autre que le Dieu supre~e et en meme temps 
boivent et mangent une partie de l'offrande qui n'a pas ete 
consumee et qui est consideree comme renfermant Agni qui s'en 
va renforcer dans lea corps le principe de vie.• 
1cf. Rose, op. cit., p. 136. 
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identique a lui' (AD 182), are more debatable, according to 
Rose, who holds that lunar s~mbolism came late into her cult. 1 
In any case she was originally a mother-deity, and hence iden-
tifiable with Isis rather than with Osiris, with Cybele rather 
than \"lith Attis. Simone Weil correctly assumes her silver 
bow to be a lunar symbol (C3 137) but her. identification of 
Artemis with Dionysos (IP 89) seems to confuse the goddess 
and her consort. 
In describing the god Pan as the Logos, Simone Weil is 
following Plato in the Cratylus (IP 89, LR 27). She elabor-
ates on this however by emphasising the god's goat-character-
istics (CS 20)--his horns would thus be a lunar symbol--and 
the fact that he was a sh~pherd (CS 217). 2 The death of Pan 
caused her to speculate that Christ came to replace him: ''Le 
grand Pan est mor~L-Ce n'est pas le Christ qui a tue le grand 
Pan. C'est parce que Pan est mort que pour le remplacer il 
a fallu que le Christ naquit' (C2 285).3 
1 Op. cit., P• 113. 
2 Graves, op. cit., §26.e. 
3The quotation at the beginning of this note derives 
from the myth of the announcement of Pan's death as told by 
Plutarch; it was shouted from the shore of the island of 
Paxos to the Egyptian Thamuz, pilot of a ship becalmed near 
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A god who attracted Simone Weil's attention, but whom 
she does not think fits into the uategory of lunar or vege-
tation gods, is Prometheus. Kerenyi however, as has been 
noted, considers Prometheus along with Hermes to be a moon-god. 
Like Hermes too he was a giver of fire to mankind; Graves 
thinks that the name 'Prometheus', 'fore-thought', might have 
originated in a Greek misunderstanding of the Sanskrit 'pra-
mantha', the swastika or fire-drill, 1 and if this is so then 
the same comment would apply to the parallel with Agni as was 
made for Hermes. For Simone Weil his name means 'pour la 
the island. Rose holds that this story is true, but that 
what the pilot really heard was 8aJ,IoU'c;, 8cxJ,Io\ic;, 8cxJJo\1c; lTcxJ,IJ,Ityac; 
~S~KE, 'Thamuz, Thamuz, Thamuz the all-great is 
dead', flhv J,lty~ and n«JJJ,Ity~ being indistuinguishable at that 
distance. The people were thus lamenting ceremonially for 
Thamuz (Tammuz), .or Adonis, and not mourning Pan's death. (Rose, 
PP• 170, 179 n. 17.) 
Elsewhere Simone Weil suggests that 'le grand Pan est mort' 
might refer in fact to the death of Christ, he being 'le grand 
Pan, le grand Tout' (LR 27). Rose states that the name Pan is 
derived from the same root as the Latin p)sco, and means 'the 
Feeder', 'the pasturer of flocks' (p. 167. The association 
of Pan with Christ is an old idea. E. B. Browning's poem 'The 
Dead P.an' is a protest against Plutarch's myth that in the hour 
of Christ's agony the cry of 'Great Pan is dead!' went up. 
Poetical Works (London 1897), pp. 282-6. 
For an account of the whole Pan legend and its development, 
see W. R. Irwin, 'The Survival of Pan', PMLA, LXXVI (1961), iii, 
159-167. ----
1 Op. cit., §39.8. 
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connaissance' which, because of the sufferings he endured, 
she associates with the Sophoclean 'par la souffrance la 
connaissance' (PSO 58). His giving of fire to mankind she 
relates to Christ's mission of bringing a fire to earth, and 
notes other similarities between the two: 
Promethee est le Christ meme, avec la determination 
du temps et de l'espace en moine; c'est l'histoire du 
Christ projetee dans 1 1 eternite. Il est venu jeter un 
feu sur terre. Il s'agit du Saint-Esprit comme plu-
sieurs textes le montrent (Philebe, Promethee enchaine, 
Heraclite, Cleanthe). Il est redempteur des hemmes. 
Il a subi la souffrance et !'humiliation, volontairement, 
par exces d'amour. (PSO 60) 
Kerenyi too is aware of the parallels between the two, partie-
ularly of their common intercession for man, but notes that 
whereas Christ is a God made man, Prometheus remains a god. 
He queries whether there is not 
a profound bond between him LPrometheu~ and the 
still more unfortunate human race ? This question • 
does not necessarily point to a need of salvation in the 
Christian sense. However, it is a question that we shall 
do well to keep in mind as we make our way through the 
classical texts to this mysterious god of Greek mythologl, 
wounded, in need of redemption, and also redeemed ••.•• 
The essential features of Prometheus for Simone Weil are his 
great love for humanity which caused his suffering (SG 111), 
1 Prometheus, p. 32. 
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his teaching mission (SG 45), and the way of knowledge through 
suffering which he opened up for humanity by his own example 
(C3 74). He seems to be for Simone Weil the archetypal 
suffering saviour, a universalisation of the Christ-figure, 
who, because he was not limited to a single historic incarn-
ation, reached back in time to the affliction of men long 
before Christ. 
In co~nexion with the sufferings of Prometheus another 
figure should be mentioned, and that is the World-Soul, whose 
functions have already been noted (I, §2, III, §1). Simone 
Weil finds it significant that the World-Soul should have been 
'crucified' as was Prometheus, and thus suffered (SG 135, 
Timaeus, 36). The World-Soul by its very composition she 
felt was a mediator, since it was fashioned 'de la substance 
indivisible, eternellement identique a elle-meme, et de celle 
qui est relative au corps, laquelle est devenir et divisibilite' 
(SG 134, Timaeus, 35). But from these cosmological theories 
of Plato to the sufferings of the anthropomorphic Prometheus 
the distance seems greater than Simone Weil recognises. 
Another suffering figure, a mysterious one too, in whom 
Simone Weil read Christian symbolism, was the Nordic Odin. 
Odin was a god of battle and al·so a god of the dead, but it is 
the episode of his sufferings which holds Simone Weil's 
attention. In the Havamal Odin recounts how he was pierced 
by a spear and hanged on a tree where, by lifting the runes 
which lay at his feet, he attained wisdom. 1 The fact that 
Odin says here that he was offered 'to himself' aroused Simone 
Weil to speculate on similarities with Christ's sacrifice 
(CS 56), and his attainment of wisdom through his sufferings 
reminds her both of Prometheus and of the conviction of St. · 
John of the Cross 'qu'on penetre seulement par la croix dans 
lea secrets de la Sagesse de Dieu' (CS 56). H. R. Ellis 
Davidson notes that Odin's was a voluntary sacrifice, and 
that this image of the suffering god hanging from the tree 
was at one time thought to derive from the Christian tradition: 
But despite certain resemblances, it would seem 
that here we have something whose roots go deep into 
heathen thought, and which is no late copy, conscious 
or unconscious, of the central mystery of the Christian 
faith. By hanging on a tree, Odin is not sharing in 
the suffering of the world or saving men from death, 
he is there to win the secret of the runes.2 
Although the difference in the purpose of the sacrifice is 
important, this \'rould be unlikely to deter Simone vleil who 
tended to emph~sise the gaining of wisdom through suffering, 
1see H. R. Ellis Davidson, Gods and Myths of Northern 
Europe (Harmondsworth 1964), P• 51. 
2Ibid., p. 144. 
451 
and the exemplary role of Christ rather than his saving pur-
pose. Nor would the fact that direct Christian influence 
on the Odin myth is slight bother her, since she was not con-
cerned with detecting 'anfluences', but rather the universal 
and spontaneous representation of the same truths wh~rever 
they occurred and at whatever period in t~me. 
One last figure in this first category should now be 
mentioned, although in the interpretation given to him by 
Simone Weil his f~nctions often fit him rather for the second 
category. This figure is Y~ishna, who at first sight seems 
to have little in common 1r1ith the Western saviour-gods who 
have been considered up to this point. Simone Weil seems to 
have had a particular affection for this deity, as is shown 
by the frequent references to him in the personal letters 
\·lritten at the end of ::her life (EL 216-257). Krishna is 
an incarnation of Vishnu, who is a friend of mankind in that 
he comes to earth whenever 'righteousness is weak and unright-
eousness exults in pride 1 • 1 Simone Weil suggests that he is 
one in the line of deities belonging to the religious tradition 
in which revelation implies incarnation (C2 317). He is the 
1 . Bhagavad Gita, IV, 7• 
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incarnation of the peEsonal deity, Vishnu, as opposed to the 
impersonal Brahma (C2 429), and an incarnation of the Word 
(LR 18). Durand indicates an interesting etymological link 
between Krishna and Christ, Khristos meaning 'anointed', and 
Krishna meaning oil or perfume, derived from the verb khrio, 
'1 anoint, I rub'. 1 There ar~ther parallels however with 
the deities we have been considering; his prodigious youth 
in which he performed feats of skill and daring, often mis-
chievous, recalls the child-god Hermes, and like Hermes he 
had an early encounter with cattle, being brought up by a poor 
2 
cow-herd. His death recalls that of Achilles, since he was 




op. cit., P• 380. 
2Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology, PP• 380-1. 
3Graves notes that the Thessalian sacred king was ritually 
killed by his tanist by this method, an~ that the hunter Jara 
who killed Krishna is sometimes referred to as his brother, i.e. 
tanist (§92.10). He also notes (ib-id.) that Krishna was iden-
tified by Alexa~der's Greeks with Heracles, the type of the 
divine saviour. Although Simone Weil does not mention these 
details, they provide a fruitful source of parallels for her 
theme. 
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The other function of Krishna, that of redeemer who 
transforms evil into pure suffering (C3 173) brings us to 
our second category, that of 'perfectly pure beings', who in 
one way or another redeem mankind, by ·taking upon themselves 
the evil done by others. The notion of redemptive suffering 
elaborated by Simone Weil is a characteristically mechanistic 
one, and is related to, or an extension of her ideas already 
noted on the 'gravity' which makes an individual want to res-
tore the psychological balance which evil or hurt has upset, 
and transfer that evil to another (I, §5). This chain re-
action of evil being passed from individual to individual can 
only be broken by one person refusing to pass it on and retain-
ing it in the form of suffering. We have noted the \·ray in 
which this can be done within the individual, by transferring 
the evil from the impure to the pure part of the soul (ibid.). 
In addition to this, Simone \•leil clearly believed in the 
existence throughout history of certain perfectly pure beings 
who were able to perform this neutralising of evil for humanity. 
Sometimes these are preserved in folk-tales to which we have 
lost the key, for example the tales of Snow-White and of the 
Almond-tree, both of which, according to Simone Weil, tell 
the story of the death and resurrection of a perfectly pure 
being (C3 257). This redemptive fanction of certain indiv-
iduals reveals, she thinks, the profound meaning of 'fate' 
in connexion with Greek tragedy: 
On a tres mal compris ce qu'on nomme la fatalite 
dans la tragedie grecque. Il n'y a pas de fatalite 
mais cette conception de la malediction qui, une fois 
produite par un crime, est transmise par les hommes 
les uns aux autres, et ne peut etre detruite que par 
la souffrance d'une victime pure, obeissante aDieu. 
(IP 20) 
The notion of purity here is important, since in Simone Weil's 
view only purity has the power to ciissolve the mixture of sin 
and suffering which makes up evil. She analyses the mechanics 
of it: 
Le contact avec la purete produit une transformation 
dans le mal. Le melange indissoluble de la souffrance 
cesse d'etre melange de peche; d'autre part le peche ae 
transforme en ~ simple souffrance. (PSO l6) 
Simone Weil finds one example of this in the Hindu king 
Rama (another incarnation of Vishnu), who is obliged to harm 
his wife and kill the Sudra, in each case because his partie-
ular status obliges him to, he is constrained to it by 'necess-
ity': 
Souffrance redemptrice en Rama. L'etre parfaite-
ment pur, s'il est contraint par obligation d'etat de 
faire le mal, subit passivement cette contrainte; il 
n'est que le lieu par ou passe du mal venu du dehors; 
et la encore, passant par lui, le mal se transforme en 
douleur pure. (C3 146) 
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A figure whom Simone Weil considers could have been the 
'same incarnation' as Rama and Krishna is Melchizedek (C3 226). 
From the biblical references to him l-Ie learn only that he was 
a king of Salem, and a 'priest of the most high Go~. 1 Other 
biblical references simply confirm his priesthood, 2 except for 
one crucial passage which Simone Weil ases as a basis for her 
interpretation of Melchizedek as an incarnation of the Word. 
She quotes it in a note (without giving a reference): 
'Roi de la paix L'King of Salem~, sans pere, sans 
mere, sans genealogie, n'ayant ni commencement de sa 
vie ni fin de ses jours, rendu semblable au fils de 
Dieu, il demeure pretre a perpetuite'. (CS 6l)3 
Graves recognises the mythological elements connected with 
this figure, suggesting that the fact that he is reputed to 
have no mother makes him resemble other divine children or 
future leaders around whom myths have accrued; in the stories 
of Moses, Romulus, Cretan Zeus, the child is removed from his 
mother as soon as he is born. 4 Simone Weil concentrates on 
lG . . enesJ.s Xl.V• 18; Reb. vii. 1. 
2 Ps. ex. 4; Heb. v. 6, 10; vi. 20; vii. 17, 21 etc. 
3H b . . 3 e • VJ.J.. • 
4The White Goddess (London 1961), p. 162. 
the symbolic purity of the figure (C3 233, 239), suggesting 
that he is one of the biblical 'personnages parfaits en tout' 
(CS 245), Abel, Enoch, Noah, Ham, Nimrod, Job and Daniel being 
the others. 
The list is a curious one, and illustrates the way in 
which Simone Weil looked for a single unifying feature 1:among · 
diverse figures. We shall concern ourselves in detail with 
only two of the principal ones, Noah and Job, except to note 
in passing that Abel was possibly a~version of Heracles, as 
agricultural and pastoral king reigning alternately with his 
twin, 1 which would link him with the saviour figures already 
discussed. Raper has dealt fully with these Old Testament 
figures, especially with Ham and what Simone Weil considered 
to be the Hamitic tradition. 2 
Noah, as well as being a 'personnage parfait', was in 
Simone Weil's interpretation a redeemer whose sacrifice~had 
saved humanity from destruction (CS 57). She suggests that 
along with other figures of perfection he may have been an 
incarnation of the Word (C3 232), and hence a prefiguration 
1Ibid. ' p. 127. 
2op. cit., PP• 27 ff. 
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of Christ (CS 291). On the symbolism surrounding Noah she 
has several interesting things to say, which link him closely 
with mediator-figures already mentioned. The rainbow aft~r 
the flood is a fairly obviour:fsymbol of n1ediation, and repre-
sents God's mercy '~u~ comble cet abime que la creation a 
etablie ~entre Dieu et la creature' (CS 49). She con-
trasts it \flith the tower of Babel: 
L'arc-en-ciel de Noe ••• est une mediation entre 
le ciel et la terre, une voie de salut. La Tour de 
Babel voulait etre cela; mais elle venait de la terre 
et non du ciel; c'est pourquoi elle etait mauvaise. 
(cs 289) 
The Ark in which he sailed recalled for Simone Weil the 
coffer in which Osiris was put out to sea, both of them being 
'bois qui ont sauve l'humanite avant celui de la Croix' (LR 
29), and this parallel is confirmed by Graves, who writes of 
Noah being a 'counterpart' to Osiris.1 He thinks too that 
both vessels were made of the same wood, wild acacia or 'shittim-
-wood', as was the Ark of the Covenant. If there is a parallel 
\olitli Osiris, it is likely that there should be one with Dionysos 
too, and Simone Weil finds it in the tradition concerning Noah's 
drunr~nness (C3 233). Here again Graves parallels her hypo-
1The White Goddess, p. 264. 
thesis by noting that 'the moral story of Noah's drunkenness 
and the bad behaviour of his son Canaan (Ham) recalls the myth 
of the wine-god Dionysos•. 1 
* 
The figure of Job plays an imp~rtant role in Simone Weil's 
thinking, representing for her one of the most perfect of all 
the prefigurations of Christ, a suffering redemptive figure 
granted a mystical vision of divine beauty at the end of his 
trials. 2 The accepted relationship of the Book of Job to the 
1Ibid., p. 467, n. 1. 
2
simone Weil is not of course the first to make the para-
llel between Job and Christ. The tradition relating to this 
is noted by Hastings (A Dictionary of the Bible, Edinburgh 1889, 
s.v. Job): '·It has often been said that Job is a type of Christ. 
The Christian holds that throughout the OT there were-hints and 
foreshadowings of spiritual ..... •••••••••••••.._ truth more 
fully re~ealed in the -NT, and the suffering of the upright man 
under the earlier disposition prepared the way for and was .in 
time explained by the suffering of the only Sinless Man, the 
Mediator of a new covenant. Mozley says, "The Crucifixion is 
the one consummate act of injustice to which all others are 
but distant approaches." The Cross of Christ is at the same 
time the darkest and the brightest spot upon earth, because 
there is most fully seen the meaning of that world-old problem 
of the suffering of the righteous in an evil world. What 
appears 'injustice' is intended to be a part of redemption. 
The autho:r of Job did not clearly see, perhaps hever dimly 
guessed at that mysterious solution of a mystery. But he 
grappled with the moral difficulties of his own time like a 
giant and left upon record some lessons concerning suffering 
and its significance, which neither the world nor the Church 
has fully learned yet. 
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Old Testament tradition, and the divergences from it in Simone 
Weil's interpretation, have been studied by Raper, 1 who doubts 
whether Job could ever be classed as a mediator-figure, since 
his right is never maintained by God, and Job learns in the 
end to submit to God's sovereignty~ 2 Simone Weil suggests 
that he may well have been an incarnate deity (CS 2t8) rather 
than a historical figure (PSO 89), and puts forward the idea 
that in 'another version' of the Book of Job he may have been 
described as dying and resurrected (CS 291). This is a some-
what flimsy hypothesis, and she gives no evidence for the exis-
tenc·e of this 1 other version' ; Raper tends to discount any 
idea of Job's death and resurrection.3 
The most important feature of Job's story for Simone Weil 
howe~er is undoubtedly the account of his sufferings and sub-
sequent vision. Job is afflicted, suffering physical pain, 
moral outrage and social reprobation in a society where mis-
fortune was ~onsidered to be the direct consequence of sin, of 
1op. cit., pp. 15 ff. 
2Ibid., P• 17. 
3Ibid., PP• 17-19. 
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displeasing God. The link between physical pain, 'douleur', 
and the vision of the beauty of the world is emphasised by 
Simone Weil (SG 46, IP 37); pain tears the 'veil' of the 
flesh which separates us from beauty (IP 164, PSO 112). It 
alone is capable of bringing about that 'detachement' .consid-
ered in the last chapter, and is a way of passing from time 
which is future-orientated, to a vision of eternity (C2 111). 
Job in his rebellion against his torment asks the vital ques-
tion why, and illustrates the impossibility of submission to 
necessity, the contradiction which must be faced for the soul 
to perceive reality: 
Job. Comment le cri pur de la misere humaine, 
imite, est-il si beau? Ce que la realite ne nous donne 
·jamais, jamais. Et c'est la realite pure, nue. · 
C'est ~~a ~~a qui apparait. L'ame absolument 
soumise, par contrainte, a cette necessite, et le car~c-
tere impossible de cette soumission. (C2 !84) 
This affliction is necessarily meaningless: 
Si je pensais que Dieu m'envoie la douleur par un 
acte de sa volonte et pour mon bien, je croirais etre 
quelque chose, et je negligerais l'usage principal de 
la douleur, qui est de m1 apprendre que je ne suis rien. 
(CS 185) 
Job has only to continue to love God, or if this is impossible, 
to desire to love God, throughout his affliction, ignoring the 
advice of his friends who in Simone Weil's interpretation 
1 laissaient fonctionner en eux !~imagination compensatrice' 
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(C2 22~). He has only to pay attention to his affliction; 
that most difficult of all acts of the soul, and the rest 
follows automatically: 
La contemplation ~ttentive de la misere, sans com-
pensation ni consolation, pousse jusque dans le surnaturel; 
et alors on ne peut pas ne pas en aimer la source. 
(C2 226) 
Job, au bout de sa nuit obscure, qu 1 il a traversee 
sans consolation, voit manifestement la beaute du monde. 
Il f~ut avoir passe par la misere totale. (C2 185) 
Raper notes that in the text the beauty of the world serv-
es to remind Job of his smallness and of the creative majesty 
of God, rather than indicating a perfection beyond this world 
and a grace granted to Job after his suffering. 1 But in 
Simone Weil 1 s interpretation Job indeed sees his 'smallness•, 
his insignificance in the dimension of cosmic order as a self-
willed ~ndividual. The nature of Job's suffering as Simone 
Weil sees it, and the parallel she makes with Christ's sacri-
fice, is however questionable, since at no point is it indicat-
ed that Job's suffering is redemptive, that it is suffering 
for anyone else. The mystical vision which according to 
Simone Weil he receives at the end is comparable perhaps to 
that of the saint who passes through the dark night of the 
l Op. cit., P• 16. 
• 
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soul, but hardly to the universally redemptive figure of 
Christ. As in the case of Odin's agony, it is a question 
of Job's attaining wisdom through. suffering, rather than ob-
taining salvation for the sins of man. 
Simone Weil links both Job and Noah with another concept 
which has already been mentioned as a sort of prototype for 
this category, that is, the perfectly just man (AD 84, LR 43). 1 
This is a figure developed from the passage in the Republic 
(361-2) where Plato describes the perfectly just man stripped 
of all pre·stige, of e~rything except his justice, so that 
he h~s the appearance of injustice. He will be tortured 
and crucified, appearing unjust, and it is only by appearing 
thus that he will in fact be just. Simone Weil speculated 
on the cont-r~dic-tion which is evident here: 
Le juste parfait: union de l'extreme justice a 
l'apparence 4e l'extreme injustice. Le Christ n'~ pas 
simplement souffert, il a souffert une souffrance penale, 
le traitement des criminals. Il n'a pas ete traite en 
martyr, comme les saints, mais en criminel de droit com-
mun. L•extreme justice unie a l'apparence de l'extreme 
injustice, c'est un exemple de la contradiction qui meae 
a Dieu. ( C2 367-8) 
The sufferings of Christ as a perfectly just man form the 
1The mathematical implications of 'le juste' will be 
considered in III, §6. 
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common element according to Simone Weil in such figures al-
ready mentioned as Prometheus, Dionysos, the World-Soul, 
Love (in the Symposium), who is also desribed as 'perfectly 
just', and who only suffers evil voluntarily. Conscious as 
always of the corrupting power of affliction, Simone Weil 
concludes that a truly just man, that is, one who is not 
corrupted by suffering, must be God inc~rnate: 
Dieu seul peut subir l'injustice sans que cela 
lui fasse aucun mal. Pour etre parfaitement juste, il 
faut pouvoir subir l'injustice sans en recevoir aucun 
mal. Autrement on deviant vite injuste sous l'oppres~ 
sian. Le juste parfait ne peut etre que Dieu incarne. 
(C3 323) 
The association of perfect justice with the appearance 
.. : . .. : :· . . .~.1. ..: '· ~ i.\ ~ -; ·' . 
of injustice is seen by Simone Weil also in the Greek Hipp-
olytus (C2 360), who suffers because he has loved God too 
we11. 1 She sees in him an illustration of the conviction 
that there can be no commerce between God and man without 
suffering (C2 274, 127), and a kind of inversion of the sym-
bolism of Prometheus, who suffered because of his great love 
for mankind: 
La fonction de mediation, par elle-meme, implique 
l'ecartelement. 
l See Frazer, op. cit., pp. 4, 5, 301, 477• 
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C'est .pourquoi on ne peut concevoir la descente 
de Dieu vera l'homme (Promethee) ou l'ascension de 
l'homme vera Dieu (Hippolyte) sans ecartelement, sans 
souffrance. (C2 359) 
• 
The themeJ. of redemptive suffering, of the just man 
who appears unjust and who is afflicted because of it, 
finds its expression in Simone Weil's CJflll work in the figure 
of Jaffier, the hero of her unfinished tragedy Venise sauvee.1 
The connexion with the figures which we have been consi~ering 
is obvious immediately in her intention in writing the play: 
'Reprendre, pour la premiere fois depuis la Grece, la tradition 
de la tragedie dont le heros est parfait' (P 52). If he were 
not perfect, he would be unable to perform the act of redemp-
tion. Briefly, the play, based on the Abbe de Saint-Real's 
narrative of the Spanish conspiracy against Venice in 1618, 
concerns Jaffier and the band of adventurers who prepare the 
plot against the city. Jaffier at the last moment cannot 
bring himself to destroy the city, and reveals the plot to 
the leaders of the city, having been given assurances that 
his companions would not be victimised. Thep. are however 
1Richard Rees has ou·tlined the theme of redemptive suff-
e.ring to be found in this play in Brave Men. .A Study of D. H. 
Lawrence and Simone Weil (London 1958), § 10. 
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arrested, and Jaffier has to bear the knowledge that he has 
betrayed them, as well as the contempt and punishment meted 
out by the city itself for having plotted against. it. He 
goes to his death in the knowledge that the city is safe, but 
that he as an individual must perish. Jaffier accepts the 
void,.refuses the compensation offered by 'gravity' and by 
the imagination, by refusing to pass on to Venice thewil 
repr.esented by the Spanish·. Empire and the conspiracy. There 
is thus 'transmission automatique du mal jusqu'a la souffrance 
redemptrice' (P 48). 
The significance and purpose of Jaffier's 'passion' is 
further elaborated in the following note: 
Jaf:fier. Passion. Un des setts de la passion emt 
peut-etre ~ue la douleur, la honte, la mort qu'on ne veut 
pas infliger auteur de soi retombe sur soi, sans qu'on 
l'ait voulu. Comme si rnathematiquement le malheur 
devait compenser le crime ecarte, pour que l'am.e reate 
soumise au mal (mais autrement soumise); reciproquement, 
·la vertu consist.e a garder en soi le mal qu' op. souffre, 
a ne pas s'en delivrer en le repandant au-dehors par les 
actes ou !'imagination. (Acceptation du vide). 
(P 44) 
Redemption thus consists in accepting what one has not wished 
for. Jaffier could not possibly have wanted the affliction 
which he suffered, he was in no sense a martyr. His afflic-
tion destroyed his 'I', and plunged him into a nightmare of 
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unreality (P 45). In another sense however by obliterating 
the 1realj.ty' of the outside \'rorld, Jaffier was able to accede 
to a higher reality. Like Job, detachment born of suffering 
revealed to him the beauty of the world: 
. . . Le detachement parfait permet seul de voir 
les choses nues et sans ce brouillard de valeurs men-
songeres. c•est pourqumi il a fallu a Job les ulceres 
et le fumier pour la revelation de la beaute du monde. 
Car il n'y a pas de douleur supportee sans haine ~t sans 
mensonge qu'il n'y ait detachement. 
(Que la Venise sauvee reproduise ce mouvement.) 
(P. 46) 
The detachmv:nt which Jaffier attains to is a result of 
his truly paying attention to the reality of Venice. In the 
mement of attention the city j_s no longer an object of desire 
on to which Jaffier projects his own wishes and aspirations, 
but an object which is beautiful in its own right and which 
therefore claims his love. Love is simply this act of be-
lieving in the reality of an object, and as soon as J·affier 
realises that Venice exists he can no longer plot to destroy 
it. (P 48). He has put a distance between himself and the 
city, the distance ahrays demanded by beauty, and through 
beauty the supernatural has irrupted into the natural sphere: 
La miser-icorde est un attribut proprement divin. 
Il n'y a pas de misericorde humaine. La misericorde 
implique une distance infinie. On n'a pas compassion 
de ce qui est proche. Jaffier. (P 48) 
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By his action Jaffier has broken the monotonous sequence of 
'natural' time and has received a glimpse of eternity (P 47.). 
The play ends with Jaffier contemplating the city as he goes 
to his death. But already his torment is ended, han has ex-
pia·ted the evil, and is capable of seeing the beauty in what 
is before him: 
La mort vient me prendre. A present la honte est 
passee. 
Ames yeux bientot sans regard que la ville est belle! 
Sans retour il faut m'eloigner des lieux des vivants. 
On ne voit nulle aube oil je vais, et nulle cit.e. 
(P 133) 
This is perhaps Simone lrleil's fullest expression of the 
idea of the use of suffering by the affliction of a perfectly 
pure being, which grants a vision of the beauty of the world-
order at the same time as it prevents evil from being trans-
mitted by the trans~rmation of that eyil into pure suffering. 
Th~ horizontal movement of evil in time and space has been 
replaced by a vertical mediating movement, the descent of div-
ine love in the form of beauty, and the subsequent ascent of 
the consenting soul to God. 
The mediating power of perfect purity is not restricted 
to human or divine persons however. It can also be present 
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in an object possessing the same purity, and a consideration 




GOD IN MATTER 
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Simone Weil's belief in the mediati~g power of matter in 
its various manifestations is a result of her conviction 
that God can be present in matter here on earth. This in 
its turn is based on her belief that in certain circumstances 
matter can be perfectly pure, transparent, a vehicle for div-
ine gra.ce and a fit receptacle for the incarnation of ~e.:lt.y. 
The ideas on matter which have already been outlined (I, §3) 
predispose her of course to such a view; again and again 
. the passivity of matter, and its consequent obedience to 
God, are emphasised (e.g. PSO 97, 98). Matter is impartial, 
indiffe:rent to man and his desires, and forms a counterpart 
to the impersonal Providence of God, the only form of PrQv-
idence which Simone Weil recognised (E 223). Water is the 
most perfect example of matter's docility to necessity, and 
Simone Weil takes up a very ancient image in relating 
1 matiere, m·ere·, mer, Marie' , which, she says, 1 se ressemblent 
au point d'etre presque identiques' (IP 143}. 1 She contin-
ues this idea in a note where she writes: 1 Cette docilite de 
1claudel uses the same parallel matiere-mere-mer in 'L'Es-
prit et l'eau• (Cing grandes odes, Oeuvre poetiQUe:-Bibl. de 
la Pleiade, Paris 1957, p. 236). This whole ode illustrates 
the way in which matter can mediate between man and God. 
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maternelle 
la matiere·, cette qualite/de la nature, a tHe incarnee dans 
la Vierge' (CS 89). 
The docili~y of matter thus renders it eminently suitable 
to reveal the presence of God. Sometimes this presence is 
reveale.d through what are traditionally held to be sacred ob-
jects, sometimes through the artistically beautiful (which 
may or may not surround religious objects and practices), 
sometimes through objects which, by virtue of th·e correspond-
ence between the natural and the supernatural realms, become 
symbols of what is beyond them. All these mediators for the 
prese~ce of God are of equal value in Simone Weil's eyes, and 
if we begin with traditionally acknowledged religious manifest-
ations it is only for the sake of convenience. 
In her essay on the 'Formes de l'amour implicite de Dieu', 
Simone Weil compares love of religious practices with love of 
one's neighbour and love of the beautJ:i. of the world, and con-
eludes that all are implicit rather than explicit forms of 
love, all are equally valid: 'Dieu est present dans les pra-
tiques religieuses, quand elles sont puree,· de la meme maniere 
que dans le prochain et dans la beaute du monde; non pas 
davantage' (AD 137-8). It is the purity of religious prac-
tices which assures their efficacy. As was seen in the last 
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chapter in the case of redemptive figures, only absolute 
purity has the power to destroy evil: 'La vertu des pra-
tiques religieuses consiste dans l'efficacite du contact avec 
ce qui est parfaitement pur pour la destruction du mal' (AD 
141-2). Prayer and sacraments in general are able to trans-
mute ·s"in into suffering (C3 143). 
One may ask however what is the meaning of 'purity' in 
this context. The innate purity of matter, as has been indi-
cated, pr~disposes towards a view of the purity of religious 
practices, but it is not the whole answer. Simone Weil ex-
plains the mechanism of the soul's contact with the Good· 
through the purity of matter in the 'Theorie des sacraments' 
(PSO l35-45):, the first part of which should now be resumed 
briefly. The argument is based on the assumption, expressed 
in the first paragraph, that a spiritual, or 'non-corporea~' 
desire must have its corresponding manifestation in the body 
for it to. have any reality. The most fundamental human 
desire is a desire for pur~ good. We do not possess this 
pure good, but it will come to us infallibly if only we fix 
our attention and our desire on 'le bien pur, parfait, to.tal, 
absolu'. But this desire must be rooted in the physical, 
must have its corresponding object in earthly things. The 
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problem is thus to prevent this desire from stopping short 
in earthly things, and failing to find its true object. As 
Simone Weil puts it, 
••• lea mouvements et attitudes du corps ne 
pouvant a voir .d' objets qu' ici-bas, comment pourrai-t,.. 
il y avoir pour ce desir passage dans l'etat de realite 
a travers la chair? (PSO 136) 
She explains how this is possible: 
Pour que le desir de bien absolu passe a travers 
la ·chair, il faut qu'un objet d'ici-bas soit par ra,pport 
a la chair le bien absolu, a titre de signe et par con-
vention. 
Qu'il soit le bien absolu par rapport a la chair, 
c~~a ne veut pas dire qu'il est un bien de la chair. 
Il est par rappo.rt a la chair le bien absolu de 1' esprit. 
(PSO 136-7) 
In the symbolism of the Eucharist for example, a piece of 
bread signifie~ the person of Christ, 'par une convention 
etablie par Die·u entre Dieu et les hommes' (PSO 137), and 
th~ bread, while retaining its nature and appearance of ~read, 
takes ·on a transcendent and superior 'reality•. 
Simone Weil has been taken to task by various critics 
for her uae of the word 'convention' in relation to the 
Christian Eucharist. 1 But these criticisms seem to be 
1see e.g. More, P• 52. 
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based on the nqtion that 1 convention 1 signifies ·something 
rather less than real, which is not the case in Simone Weil's 
qse of the word, indeed, given her premi~es, it is difficult 
to see what other term she could have used. Desire for per-
feet goodness needs an earthly object, but no object by itself 
has the power to lift the soul beyond the earthly. It is 
then inevitable if this desire is to be satisfied that a 
·'convention' ~hould be established whereby the object may 
be given powers it did not .originally possess. Simone Weil 
emphasises that this is a convention established by God, im-
plying a direct revelation from God, even an Incarnation (PSO 
137), and notes the difference between an earthly convention 
established between men, and a convention established by God: 
Dans lea conventions etablies entre hommes, la 
significa~ion d'une chose a moins de realite.que la 
m~tiere qui la compose. Dans une convention etablie 
p(lr Dieu., c 1 est le contraire. Mais la signification 
divine l'"einporte infiniment plus en degre" de realite 
sur la matiere que ne fait la matiere sur la signifi-
cation humaine. · (PSO 137) 
Another way in which Simone Weil describes this ~envention' 
is by saying that the sacraments are pure 'par hypothese' (e.g. 
AD 142), in the same way as a triangle is a triangle by hypo-
thesis, by definition. It is in no way dependent on the 
accuracy with which it is drawn, just as the purity of 
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religious practices does not depend on the purity of their 
material constituents. Although the expression is mathematical, 
Simone Weil is saying something of great s-piritual value when 
she writes of ·the independence of this purity: 
L'~glise peut itre laide, les ehanis faux, le pr3tre 
corrompu et les fideles distrai ts. En un· sens cela n 1 a 
aucune importance. C1est ainsi que si·un g~ometre, pour 
illustrer une d~monstration correcte, trace u·ne figure ou 
les droites sont tordues et les ce~cles allong~s, cela 
n'a aucune importance. Les choses religieuses sont pures 
en droit, th~oriquement, par hypothese, par d~finition, 
par convention. Ainsi leur puret~ est inconditionn~e. 
Nulle souillure ne peut les atteindre. (AD l42 ) 
There seems to be one condition only for the efficacy of 
this convention, that of belief and desire. The soul has 
only to believe that this contact with bread is in fact a 
contact with God, to wish to put the desire for contact to 
the test by submitting it to the 'reality' of bread, and con-
tact with God w-ill automatically follow (PSO 137-8). Belief 
which in the natural sphere is productive of illusion is in 
the supe-rnatural sphere 'productriae de r~alit~' (PS"O 138). 
Simone Weil emphasises that tHe. is not merely a matter of 
suggestion, but of a precise mechanism which in .the same con-
ditions will always oper~te in the same waf (CS 257). 
It is to be noted that this concept of 'convention' 
provides the clearest possible refutatio~ of any charge of 
'aesthe*ticism' in Simone Weil's religious·experience. She 
was certainly susceptible to the beauty of the iatholic litur-
gy, a~d considered that in fact the purity of 'lea chases reli-
gi~uses' was invariably manifested in the form of beau~y--
music, architecture and so on (see e.g. AD 142-3: 
Mais au centre m3me il y a quelque chose qu~ est 
entierement depourvu de beaute, ou rien ne rend la 
purete. manifeste, quelque chose qui est uniquement 
convention. • •• L'arii.hitecture, lea chants, le lan-
gage ••• tQut cela est autre chose que la purete ab-
solue. La purete absolue presente ici-bas a nos sens 
terre~tr~-s c.omme chose particuliere, c·ela ne pelit jtre 
qu'une convention qui soit convention et rien d'autre. 
(AD 143) 
This 'convention' remains a mystery however; it is not a 
matter of rationally ascertainable 'fact•, one which can be 
demonstrated, but of •verification experimentale' (AD 142). 
The experience afforded by the intermediary of the host is 
a real one; Simone Weil indicates her interpretation of the 
'real prese-nce i i.n the following. note: 
.Eucharistie. Le dogme signifie seulement que ce 
morceau. de pain est l'intermediaire d'un contact reel 
avec Dieu. S'il etait seulement un symbole, il serait 
seulement intermediaire entre nous .. et notre idee de 
Dieu (ce qui est le cas de la plupart des gens). Mais 
ceux qui le meritent, il lea tire vera Dieu. Il lea 
deplace reellement. (C2 391) 
Her definition of the Eucharist as a 'convention' does no~ 
seem to involve any diminution of the miracle of Christ's 
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real presenc·e in it. 
She is unorthodox however in her division of the faithful 
into those that deserve and therefore obtain the. true contact 
with God and those that do not, as implied in the above pass-
age. More has accused her of Catharism fo~ this.supposed 
1 division into 'parfaits' and 'croyants'. and it is· certainly 
possible that she was influenced by what she knew of Catharist 
practices in making this distinction, altho~gh there is no 
i:'eason why this should represent an 1 a·ccusation 1 • She elab-
orates her views in a letter to father Perrin, describing the 
value of the sacraments as of two kinds: as a real ·contact 
with God, and as symbols and ceremonies having a purely human 
value (AD 15). She continues: 
Je crois que la plupart des fidele.s ont contact avec 
les sacrements s~ulement en tant que symboles e·t ·Cer~­
monies, y compris certains qui sont persuades du contraire·. 
(ibid .• ) 
. . 
This is a nec~ssary step on the road to true parti·cipation·• 
Pourtant ce n'est pas la u'ne participation aux 
sacraments comme tels. Je crois que seuls ceux qui 
sont au-dessus d'un certain niveau de spiritualite 
peuvent avoir part aux sacraments en tant que .tela. 
Ceux qui sont au-dessous de ce niveau, quoi qu'ils 
1 Op. cit., p. 49. 
fassent, ausai longtempa qu'ils ne l'ont pas atteint, 
n'appartiennent pas a proprement parler a l'Egliae. 
(AD 15-16)1 
The 'Church' seems here to be something quite different from 
what is normally understood by the term. Her expression on 
the subject of the sacramenta is certainly far from strictly 
orthodox, but is perfectly consistent with the rest of her 
thought, and frequently contains real spiritual insight. As 
Perrin said of her interpretation of the Eucharistic Bread, 
iaes formulationaseront parfois tree inexactes, mais elles 
diront cette orientation profonde de sa pensee religieuse•. 2 
• 
The relationship between the sacraments and grace would 
seem to be an obvious one, since the efficacy of the sacra-
·menta implies a grace which is not of man's making. Simone 
Weil elaborates a vary coherent theory of the workings of 
grace, which should now be considered, as it is the basis for 
1This distinction seems to rest on. the assessment of the 
whole being of man in hi.s relationship to the Good, and not 
just his moral or intellectual life. In the same way, when 
Simone Weil divides Christians into those who 'deserve' true 
contact with God through the sacraments, and those who do not, 
she is not really making an intellectual distinction, but one 
which involves man's soul in its integrity. 
2
simone Weil telle que noua l'avons connue, P• 53· 
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any theory of the presence of God in matter. She was con-
vinced of the po·ssibility of defining the 'laws' of grace, 
just as one .could define the laws of any other phenomena; 
as she puts it, 'pour etre gratuite, la gr~ce n'est pas arbi-
traire' (C2 62). 
Sh~ identifies the working of the sacraments with the 
working of grace: 
Le sacrament est un arrangement qui correspond 
d'une maniere irreprochable, parfait, au double carac-
tere de !'operation de la grace, ala fois subie et 
consentie •••• (PSO 138) 
This refers to the idea that God gives his grace equally to 
all_men--this is his 'impersonal Providence', illustrated 
for her in the parable of the sower (E 223)--but claims that 
it is necessary for a soul to sonsent to grace for it to have 
any reality (there is an obvious parallel here with the dual 
~ature of .the sacr~ents mentioned above). Another way of 
e~pressing this 'consent' is that the soul should remain 
orientated towards the Good (SG 124), or that the soul should 
desire the Goo·d. She speaks of her early conviction of the 
relationship between desire and grace: 'La certitude que 
j'avais revue, c'etait que quand on desire du pain on ne 
re·voi t pas des pierres' (AD 34) • The mechanism is rigo•rous, 
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and works infallibly given the right circumstances: 
Tout desir d'un bien pur, atpartir d'un certain 
degre d'intensite, fait descendre le bien correspondant. 
Si l'effet ne se produit pas, le desir n'est pas reel, 
ou il est trop faible, ou le bien desire est imparfait, 
ou il est melange de mal. (E 223) 
She opposes this kind of desire, 'attente', to any use 
of the will, illustrating this by reference to the folk-tale 
about the giant and the little tailor who had a contest to 
see who could throw the further. The giant threw a stone 
a great distance, thinking that the tailor would not be able 
to do as well, but the tailor released a little bird, who flew 
up and ·away and disappeared from sight. This for Simone Weil 
is an image of grace: 'Ce qui n'a pas d 1aile1 finit toujours 
par retomber·• (AD 149). She uses elsewhere the wing as an 
image of grace, interpreting for example the passage in Plato's 
Phaedrus (246), 'la propriete essentielle de.l'aile est d'ame-
ner en haut ce qui est pesant', by saying: 'Impossible de dire 
. . . 
plus clairement que"l'aile est un organa surnaturel, qu'elle 
est la g:race' (SG 113; Simone \>Ieil's italics). In another 
no~e she compares genius with grace, saying that it is 'l'aile 
qui fait aller en haut ce qui est pesant' (C3 158). Grace is 
1Ms: ailes. 
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thus figured by an ascending movement. 
It is also however a descending movement. There is a 
passage in the Cahiers describing the way in which the uni~ 
versal (God) joins t~e particular (C2 255). She gives in-
carnation, the Eucharist, and inspiration as instances of 
this, and c.oncludes: 'La grace, c' est la loi du mouvement 
descendant. Le montant est naturel, le descendant su·rnatur-
el' (ibid.). lhis appears to be in contradiction with the 
idea that natural phenomena can only 'rise' when as~isted by 
grace. BU. t Simone \.Jeil clarifies the issue a li t.tle in a 
later note: 
La creation est faite du mouvement descendant de 
la pesante&r, du mouvement ascendant de la grace, et d~ 
mouvement descendant de la grace a la deuxieme puissance 
. . .. (C2 372) 
It seems that gr-ace can·be seen as an ascending movement--
like the bird--or as a descending movement--in·carnation in 
one form or another. The only difficulty which _r.emains is 
that logically one would expect the descent of grace to pre-
cede it~··ascent, since incarnation, whether the physical in-
carnation of a divine being or the indwelling presence of the 
divine in some physical object, is a prerequisite of the soul's 
salvation, of its abilit~ to 'ascend'. 
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As well as taking the wing as an image of divine grace, 
Simone Weil makes use of another group of images, connected 
with the sun and the growth of plants. Grace is like solar 
energy which descends into plants and animals and can thus 
be used by man, but over which man has no power: 
-
Nous ne pouvons pas capter l&energie solaire. 
C'est elle qui d'elle-meme se trans~erme, prend une 
forme telle que nous puissions la saisir. C1est une 
grace. Nous ne pouvons que disposer les choses pour 
qu'elle y descend. Nous ne faisons rien. (C3 199) 
This is reiterated in another passage, this time marking clear~ 
ly the distin~tion between descent according to the laws of 
gravity, descent according to the laws of gr~ce, and ascent 
in response to this: 
La seule puissance capable de vaincre la pesanteur 
est l'energie solaire. C'est cette energie descendue 
sur terre .dans les plantes et re~ue par elles qui leur 
permet de pousser verticalement de bas en haut. • · • • 
Cette energie solaire, nous ne pouvons pas aller la 
chercher·, D,ous pouvons seulement la recevoir. C 1 est 
elle qui descend • • •• Elle est l'image de la grace, 
qui descend slensevelir dans les tenebres de nos ames 
mauvaises et ·y· constitue la seule source d 1 energie qui 
fas~e "contrepoids a la pesanteur morale' a la tendan.c;e 
au mal. (PSO 17-18) 
We have already noted (III, §3) the power of chlorophyll 
in Simone Weil's interpretation to mediate the sun's energy 
for our use. Chlorophyll, or 'sap' as 'the Ancients' called 
it, 'qui capte l 1 energie solaire, qui fait monter les plantes 
et l~s arbres tout droit centre la pesanteur' (PSO 19), is an 
-image of the mediating Son. In a somew~t complex image 
Simone Weil also defines grace as 'notre chlorophylle' (C2 
}41). By this she appears to mean the power which operates 
the synthesis between the descending nVEu~a and the 'water' 
which the soul has become, in the operation of the soul's 
regeneration. 
In addition to these images connected intimately \>lith 
the mec~~nics of grace, Simon-e Weil uses a great man~ images 
taken from the physical world to symbolise spiritual truths. 
Constantly present here as before is the idea that the micro-
cosm is an image of the macrocosm, and the laws of each, in 
so far as they refer to physical phenomena, can be established. 
In this way earthly phenomena have the power to lead the soul 
upwards by virtue of their purity which arrests the normal 
progress of time an-d allows a momentary glimpse of eternity. 
I-n her study of Julien-Green, Janine Carrel defines this 
attitude of atten~iveness to phenomena which will transport,. 
the soul into another world as 1 la· position de seuil de Green; 
une position d'ouverture vera ce qui fait irruption dans notre 
vie·de la part de Dieu ••• • ,1 and this would be an apt 
1op. cit., P• 59. 
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characterisation of Simone Weil's position too. 
Some of the images derived from earthly phe~omena repre-
sent the mediating process itself, and are illustrative for 
Si-mone Weil of the gulf which separates us from where we 
truly belong. Such an image is the well-known one of ·the 
bridge, which is used by Simone Weil to illustrate the ~apa-
city of every.activity, rightly envisaged, to bring us nearer 
God. She states the three positions it is possible to take: 
On ne peut prendre que l'un de ces trois partis: 
ou abandonner Dieu. Ou abandonner toute activite •••• 
Ou faire de toute activite, sans exception ••• , un pont 
ve.rs Dieu. (C2 247-8) 
Modern Europe has adopted the first course of action; Greece 
tried the third, but because she excluded worlt, perished in ·· 
modern i~~ustrial society. 
Greece howeV.er remained for Simone Weil the finest example 
of a s~cie~y ded·icated to the building of bridges. Again and 
again she refers to Greece in this context, and it is clear 
that this constituted in her eyes one of the most important 
features of Greek civilisation. It was a con~equence of the 
revelat.ion de la misere humaine' de la transcen-
dance de Dieu, de la distance infinie entre Dieu et l'homme. 
Hant~e par cette distance, la Grece n'a travaille 
qu' a construire des ponta·.. Toute sa civilisation en est 
faite. Sa religion des Mysteres, sa philesophie, son 
art merveilleux, cette science qui est son.invention 
propre et· toutes les branches de la science, tout cela, 
ce furent des ponts entre Dieu et 1 1 homme. (EH 77) 
The temporal as such was thus a bridge for the Greeks (C3 70), 
as it was also for the Proven~al civilisation of the twelfth 
century (C3 54). vie have inherited these bridges' says 
Simone Weil, but we no longer·know what to do with them: 
Nous crayons maintenant qu'ils sont faits pour y 
habiter. Nous ne savona pas qu'ils sont la pour qu'on 
y passe; no us ignorons, si 1 1 on y passai t, qui 1 1 o·n 
trouverait de l 1autre cote. (EH 77, cf •. C2 344) 
The sin of idolatry is thus .everywhere in the moderm·world. 
It is interesting to contrast Simone Weil's use of the 
bridge-image with other writers' use of it. Hugo, for example, 
in the poem entitled 'Le Pont', names the figure of Prayer as 
the builder of the bridge that will span 
l'abim.e, 
Qui n'a pas de rivage et qui n'a pas de cime 
between the soul and God. 1 Certainly for Simone Weil prayer 
was a form of mediation, an 'attente' w~ich by the force of 
its desire would bring about a descent of grace. But it is 
2 
noteworthy that s~e never refers to it as a 'b+idge'. Her 
1Les Contemplations, VI, 1. 
2It is however sometimes described as a 'levie-r' • See 
below, p. 50~. 
486 
1 brid"ges 1 are essentially natural activities which can be 
directed to ~upernatural ends by rendering them transparent 
and devoid of personal desire. 
Another contrast can be made with the dualist philosophers' 
use of the bridge-image. In the Ode of Solomon rushing tor-
rents are "described, symbolising the gulf between man and the 
div:i,ne: 
Le Seigneur y a jete un pont par sa parole; 
Il y entra et l pi~d traversa. 
Ses traces sont restees dans l'eau intactes; 1 Elles sont comme un bois solidement enfonce •••• 
The bridge is for the descent of the Saviour, however (although 
one supposes that the soul will ascend afterwards by means of 
the same bridge). ~ut as has been noted, for Simone Weil the 
bridge is a natural object of function, which reaches out 
s 
towa.rds the divine by virtue of the grace which has df(cended 
into it. The descent is of primary importance, but the 
descent o.f. it·self is not a bridge. 
'l'he same c"omment applies to another image extensively 
usee by Simone Weil, that of the door. In the Ginz& this 
image is used in the following manner, referring again to the 
Saviour: 
l Quot. D~, p. 174. 
•. 
Il ouvrit les portes et vint, 
Il fendit le firmament et se manifesta. 
Il ouvrit les port.es et vint. 
Il ouvrit devant moi le.s portes, 1 Et il ecarta les Sept de mon chemin. 
4·8t9 
Here the door is something which the Saviour opens in order 
to descend to man. For Simone Well it is opened for man. to 
receive a vision of the divine. Man is passive in this 
operation, can only knock and wait for the door to be op~ned. 
Sometimes the door is described by Simone Weil as '1 ~.impossi-
bilite.' : 
L'impossibilite--l'impossiblite radicale, claire-
ment perque, l'absurdite--est la porte vers le surnaturel. 
On ne peut qu'y frapper. C1 est un autre qui ouvre. 
(C2 409) . 
This mention of impossibility recalls Simone Weil's definition 
of.affliction as a feeling that what one is suffering is im-
possible, and this association is borne out by various other 
references to ·the two concepts. In her poem 'La Porte•, the 
waiting which opens the door to the mystical _v.i.sion .seems to 
be accompanied by physical pain and distress (P 35-6). The 
identification of suffering \'tith the door itself is made ·else-
where; the Cross of Christ is described as 'la seule porte 
de la connaissance' (C3 50), and 'la porte 1 vers lee profondeurs 
lG. "' J.nza, 586, 23-27. Quot. DP, P• 174. 
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de la sagesse de Dieu' (C3 192). In another note she writes 
that 'la douleur' turns the key representing harmony which 
opens the door and allows the soul to pass to the other side, 
so that finally, after passing through many such doors, the 
soul arrives at the 'chambre centrale ou Dieu nous attend de 
toute eternite' (C3 246; cf. IP 164). 
When Simone Weil identifies the door with Christ himself, 
she would seem to be following the tradition established by 
Christ with his words 'I am the door' (of the Kingdom) (John 
x. 9). But the expression is characteristically hers. 
She epeaks of the three mysteries in human existence, beauty, 
the workings of the intellect in the contemplation of theor-
etical necessity, amd 'les eclairs de justice, de compassion, 
de gratitude qui surgissent parfois au milieu de la durete et 
de la froideur metallique des rapports humains' (IP 165). 
These three supernatural mysteries present in human experience 
are 'trois ouvert~res qui donnent directement acces a la porte 
centrale qui est le Christ' (ibid.). But in the end every-
thing can be a door to the supernatural, if it is viewed corr-
e~tly. Simone Weil shows a keen sense of the ambivalence of 
the image of the door when she writes: 'Ce monde est la porte 
fermee. C'est une barriere, et en meme temps c'est le passage' 
(C3 121). 
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An image connected intimately with the metaphor of the 
door is that of the threshold, which contains an obvious 
symbolism for someone as conscious as Simone Weil of man's 
supernatural vocation. The two worlds, the natural and the 
supernatural, are sharply divided, and the threshold lies 
between the two, both commanding man to wait _until summoned, 
and giving him t~e promise of access. Like the door, it is 
at once barrier and passage. 1 In fact Simone Weil invariably 
uses the image in this sense; it is a critical point on the 
road to knowledge of the divine, where the natural faculties 
are no longer of any help and the soul must wait for grace to 
descend to open the door. This is indicated clearly in the 
following note: 
Le passage au transcendant s'opere quand lea facul-
tes humains--intelligence, volonte, amour humain--se 
heurtent a une limite, et que l'etre humain demeure sur 
ce seuil, au dela duquel il ne peut faire un pas, et 
cela sans s'en detourner, s~~s savoir ce qu'il desire et 
tendu dans 1 1attente. (CS 305) 
She says the same thing of intellectual attention, which 
must be exhausted before the soul can be released from the 
cave: 
1M. Eliade, Le Sacre et le profane (Paris 1965), p. 24. 
For the use of this image by a poet, see Roger Little, 'The 
Image of the Threshold in the Poetry of Saint-John Perse', 
Modern ~anguage Review, LXIV, 777-792. 
490 
Quand on a atteint ••• la limite de l'attention, 
fixer le regard de l'ame sur cette limite avec le desir 
de ce qui est au dela. (N'est-ce pas le seuil de la 
caverne ?) La grace fera le reste. Elle !era monter 
et sortir. (C3 174-5) 
Here again the soul is passive in the operation; it can 
only wait on the threshold and desire what is on the other 
side. The most active term used by Simone Weil to des.cribe 
the soul's attitude at the threshold is that of consent: 'Le 
seuil, c'est la consommation du grain de grenade, c'est un 
instant de consentement inconditionne au bien pur! (C2 410). 
Sometimes Simone Weil considers that there are two thresholds, 
and in that case the threshold of consent would be the second 
of the two: 
Deuz seuils, l'un quand Dieu nous arrache a ce 
monde, l'autre quand il fait entrer dans notre ame un 
atome de la joie de l'autre monde. Sauf trahison, ce 
second seuil est definitif. (C2 363) 
The passage between the two thresholds, when links with the 
world have been broken but union with the divine has not yet 
been achieved, is of course the 'dark night of the soul', the 
suffering experienced by the soul which feels abandoned b~ 
both natural and supernatural. Simone Weil indicates as much 
by relating it to Plato's cave-image: 'Les deux seuils sont 
dans la Caverne de Platon: chute des chaines avec mise en 
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mouvement du corps, entree dans la lumiere' (ibid.). 
A final image denoting the link between the two worlds 
must now be indicated. This is the image of the way. Like 
the others, it is by no means original to Simone Weil, but 
unlike her use or for example the door-image, she does not 
really deyelop it very far for her own purposes. She applies 
it f~rst of all to God, in a passage illustrating God's medi-
ating function in the world: 'On ne peut passer de rien a 
rien sans passer par Dieu. Dieu est l'unique chemin. Il 
est la voie' (IP 165). The way is also a means by which God 
can make his presence known to us. In the 'Formes de l'amour 
implici te de Dieu' she writes of the beauty of the 'lllorld being 
'presque la seule voie par laquelle on puisse laisser penetrer 
Dieu' (AD 121), the modern world having destroyed all other 
possible 'ways'. 
This ambivalence of the concept, the idea that the way 
is both God himself and a means of access to him, is developed 
most clearly in Simone \ljeil 1 s association of it 'IIi th a mediator-
figure. This is generally done by comparison with the Chinese 
!!£, as in the following passage: 'Taoistes. Nommer du meme 
nom, tao, voie, d'une part la voie vers Dieu, d'autre part 
Dieu meme, cela n'implique-t-il pas une idee de mediation? 
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"Je suis la voie" 1 (C3 70). She qualifies this definition 
of the tao as God elsewhere by pointing out that it refers to 
God in his impersonal aspect: 
fLa parole du Chrisi7: 'Je suis la voie' est a 
rapprocher du Tao chinois, mot qui veut dir.e litterale-
ment la voie, et metaphoriquement, d'une part la methode 
du salut, d'autre part le Dieu impersonnel qui est celui 
de la spiritualite chinoise, mais qui, bien qu'impersonnel, 
est le mod~le des sages et agi~ continuellement. 
(LR 28) 
The definition of the tao as 'l'action non-agissante', implied 
here, she considers as another parallel with 'Je suis la Voie', 
since the :way is a means of action while not itself being 
active (C2 221). 
The identification made by Simone Weil between the tao 
of Chinese tradition and the Christian Way in Christ seems to 
stretch both concepts a good deal. The ~ was certainly a 
means of mediation between Heaven and Earth, a sort of axis 
mundi along which Heaven and Earth entered into communion at 
given sacred moments. 1 But this bears little relationship 
to the person of Christ who by his death and resurrection 
mediated between man and the Father. vlha"t could be said is 
that Christ by choosing the image of the Way deliberatelly 
1 See 1·1. Granet, La Pensee chinoise (Paris 1950), P• 325. 
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de-personalised the idea of mediation; the Way is the least 
anthropomorphic of all its expressions. 1 
• 
There is another series of images used by Simone Weil, 
concerning not so much objects in the world but the forces 
which govern them. These are frequently condensed into 
symbolic objects, but objects which owe their spiritual poss-
ibilities to the forces inherent in them. Such a •:symbolic 
object is the cross, which in Simone Weil 1 s use has a signif-
icance far beyond that of the instrument of Christ's torlure, 
2 
although th~s. is included as well. As usual, in her view 
to reduce anything to its mere historical function was to 
impoverish it, and she would no doubt have greeted with 
1It remains closely related however to the idea of Christ 
as a historical figure, as is indicated by C. K. Barrett's 
commentary on John xiv. 6: 'The second half of the verse shows 
that the principal thought is of Jesus as the way by which men 
come to Go~; that is, the way which he himself is now about 
to take is the road which his followers must also tread. He 
himself goes to the Father by way of crucifixion and resurrec-
tion; in future he is the means by which Christians die and 
rise.• The Gospel According to St. John (London 1958), p. 382. 
2
see J. P. Little, 'The Symbolism of the Cross in the 
Writings of Simone Weil 1 , Religious Studies, VI, 175-183. 
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enthusiasm Guenon's statement of the universalit~of the cross 
as symbol: 
La croix est un symbole qui, sous des lormes diverses, 
se rencontre a peu pres partout, et cela des les epoques 
les plus reculees • • •• Le christianisme tout au moins 
sous son aspect exterieur et generalement connu, semble 
avoir quelque peu perdu de vue le caractere symbolique 
de la croix pour ne plus la1regarder que comme le signe d 1 un fait historique •••• 
She would also have appreciated Rylands' analysis of the cross 
as a sacred symbol long before Christianity. 2 He mentions 
the outstretching of Moses' arms during the battle with the 
Amalekites and its symbolic significance in the e.ult of Osiris, 
as well as the representation of Prometheus in a crucified 
position, and the sufferings of ~late's ideally just person. 
Simone Wei~ herself does not seem to differentiate between 
the various types of crosses, and her use of the symbol implies, 
generally speaking, either the Greek or Latin type. She does 
not mentio-n the Egyptian ansate croes, although this would no 
doubt have been of great interest t~ her, given its symbolism 
1R. Guenon, Le Symbolisme de la croix (Paris 1957), p. 12. 
Le Comte Goblet d'Alviella, in La Migration des Symboles (Paris 
1891), gives a very full account of the development of the cross 
as symbol. 
2The Beginnings of Gnostic Christianity (London 1940), 
P• 188. 
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as the 'key of life'. Nor does she comment on the misapprop-
riation of the swastika by the Nazis, although one would expect 
this to have struck her. In her development of the idea of 
the cross as balance or lever however she seems to presuppose 
either consciously or unconsciously the tau cross. 
Her use of Plato's description of the composition of 
the World-Soul in the Timaeus has already been noted in the 
context of the World-Soul's suffering (I, §2). Simone Weil 
comments on the disposition of the demi-god: 
Les deux moities de l'Ame du Monde sont croisees 
l 1 une sur l 1 autre; la croix est oblique, mais c'est 
quand meme une sorte de croix. • • • Les deux cercles 
qui servent ici d'image a Platon sont celui de l'equateur 
qui determine le mouvement diurne du ciel des etoiles 
fixes, et celui de l'ecliptique qui determine le mouve-
ment annuel du soleil. (IP 27 )1 
Simone Weil associ~es this disposition with the suffering 
occasioned at the origins of the world by the World-Soul's 
contact with space and time. The use of the cross in general 
1J. M. Robertson makes the following comment: 'Plato's 
doctrine is doubtless a mere theosophiz·ing of the usage of 
~epresenting the earth as a globe divided in four by crossing 
bands', Christianity and Mythology (London 1936), P• 375, n. 4. 
The astronomical significance of the cross recognised here by 
Simone Weil is of course common to a whole tradition of her-
metic philosophy. See e.g. J.-M. Ragon, Rituel du grade de 
Rose-Croix, PP• 25-8, quot. Guenon, op. cit., p. 26. 
as a spatial and temporal symbol is of course not original 
to Simone Weil, but she develops it in a way that is personal 
to her. In relationship to time the cross is a way of medi-
ation: 
Un mediateur est necessaire parce qu'il n'y a aucun 
rapport possible entre Dieu et le temps. 
L'etre dechire le long du temps. Dieu sur la 
croix. (C2 162) 
It becomes thus the 'intersection of the timeless with time', 
a way of arresting the forward movement of time and thrusting 
it upwards into eternity. The cross whether as temporal sym-
bol or instrument of affliction provides a path of mediation. 
Its use as a spatial symbol is also noted by Simone Weil 
(cf. Cl 28). Again, it is not difficult to see the signifi-
cance of this particular symbol, uniting within itself the 
total dimensions of the universe. Of particular interest 
here is Simone Weil's use of the three-dimensional cross (of 
which the weather-vane is of course a common example). She 
brings together both temporal and spatial significance to 
describe the 'dimension merveilleuse' where one is enabled 
to re'ach God himself at the centre of the universe, \"lhich is 
'le vrai centre, qui n'est pas au milieu, qui est hers de 
l'espace et du temps' (PSO 104). She notes the 'role 
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1 
mediateur et synthetique du Centre de l'espace', describing 
this point as being 
a !'intersection de la creation et du Createur. 
Ce point d'intersection, c'est celui du croisement des 
branches de la Croix. 
Saint Paul songeait peut-etre a des chases de ce 
genre quand il disait: 'Soyez enracines dans l'amour, 
afin d'etre capables de saisir ce que sent la largeur, 
la longu~ur, la hauteur et la profondeur, et de connaitre 
ce qui passe toute connaissance, l'amour du Christ'. 
(PSO 105) 2 
The third dimension indicated here is also implicit in 
Plato's description of the World-Soul noted above, since the 
four branches of the cross which compose it are described as 
joined together in pairs to form a sphere. The connexion 
between the cross and the circle is of course of very ancient 
origin; Jung would claim that in the form of the mandala it 
is fundamental to the human psyche. 3 Simone Weil notes the 
relationship thus: 'Rapport de la roue, du cercle, et de la 
croix. "Rose-Croix". Croix du Timee formee par deux cercles' 
1 Durand, op. cit., P• 58. 
2Guenon also comments on this use by St. Paul of· the three-
-dimensional cross, and the description (which he attributes 
to Clement of Alexandria) of God at the 'hear~ of the universe, 
op. cit., PP• 30 ff. 
3s. G. Jung and C. Kerenyi, Introduction to a Science of 
Mythology (London 1951), p. 18. 
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(C3 131). This is somewhat obscure, but is clarified by 
what follows a little later: 'La croix. Diametre, lieu du 
mouvement droit oscillant, et elevation verf le cercle par 
le perpendiculaire au diametre' (C3 159). If the following 
definition is added: 'Le mouvement alternatif du point qui va 
et vient sur le diametre, enferme par le cercle, est l'image 
du devenir ici-bas, fait de ruptures d'equilibre successives 
et contraires' (IP 159), we have the idea expressed in the 
widespread image of the relationship between the cross, time, 
and the two-strands used in weaving, the warp being the eter-
nal principle (the vertical branch of the cross) and the weft 
the contingent (the horizontal branch). In the Avesta, 
Night and Day are two sisters who weave the fabric of passing 
time, 1 and the alternating movement of weaving is brought out 
in the story of Penelope, who undoes by night what she weaves 
during·the day, a Greek anthropomorphising of the lunar deity 
who undoes during the day her previous night's weaving, by 
which the ancients explained the phases of the moon and the 
2 
recurrent nature of her work. It is perhaps not unreason~ble 
1 A. H. Krappe, 
2Ibid., P• 122. 
Religion, PP• 180-1. 
to the spider's web, 
~ 
La Genese des mythes (Paris 1952), P• 125. 
See also Eliade, Patterns in comparative 
An extension of the same weaving image 
where the radiating threads are the verti-
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to see in this another parallel between the crucified saviour-
god and the moon. 
The comparison of the cross to a tree also held Simone 
Weil's attention; such a comparison, she felt, 1 doit avoir 
rapport a des mythologies aujourd'hui disparues' (LR 21). 
The connexion between the cross and tree is well attested in 
mythology; and in the various manifestations of a tree-god 
ritually sacrificed is an extension of the death and resurrec-
tion of vegetation deities already considered (III, §3). 
Robertson gives several instances of the ritual worship of a 
tree symbolising a god, and cites in particular the custom in 
ancient Mexico of making the sacred tree into a cross on which 
1 
was exposed the baked-dough figure of the god. Simone Weil 
is fascinated in particular by the relationship between the 
trees of Paradise (the Tree of Life and the Tree of the Know-
cal elements and the concentric circles connecting them are 
the horizontal, could be indicated as a parallel to Simone 
Weil's mention of the wheel. The spider is of course widely 
associated with the moon; the Paresi of Brazil believe that 
the moon is a spider, and in Borneo the lunar god took the 
form of a spider in order to create the world (the spider's 
apparent ability to spin its web from nothing, g1v1ng it mys-
terious creative power, could account for some of the symbol-
ism here). See Krappe, P• 24. 
1 Op. cit., PP• 372 ff. 
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ledge of Good and Evil) and the Cross of Christ. She does 
not mention specifically the mediaeval Legend of the Cross, 
in which the Cross of Christ was made from the wood of the 
Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, 1 so that the instru-
ment of the fall of man becomes the instrument of his salvation, 
but she was obviously thinking on similar lines when she noted: 
Le bois de l 1 arche Lde No!7 a rapport au symbolisme 
du bois qui apparait dans l 1 arbre du peche originel, dans 
le coffre en bois d 1 0siris, dans les obelisques de bois 
en son honneur • • • dans la Croix. (C3 232; cf. III, §3) 
She makes a similar parallel between the two in the following 
paradox: ·1 1 L 1 arbre qui nourri t tue , e t 1 1 arbre du supplice 
sauve 1 (C2 197), which she later develops in an original and 
typical manner: 
L 1arbre du peche fut un vrai arbre, l 1arbre de vie 
fut un poutre. Quelque chose qui ne donne pas de fruits, 
mais seulement le mouvement vertical • • •• On peut 
tuer en soi l 1 energie vitale en conservant seulement le 
mouvement vertical. Les feuailles et les fruits sont 
1An excellent plastic illustration of the relationship 
between the Tree of Life (this being identified with the Tree 
of the Knowledge of Good and Evil) and the cross is to be 
found in the absidial mosaic of the Upper Cha.ch of St. Clement 
at Rome. The Tree of Life is shown on the mountain of Para-
dise, and the Cross emerges from it. Illustrated in Gerard 
de Champeaux & Dom Sebastien Sterckx, O.S.B., Introduction au 
monde des symboles (La-Pierre-qui-vire 1966), pl. 66. 
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du gaspillage d'energie si l'on veut seulement manter. 
(C3 160)1 
One may compare the relationship established by Durand between 
tree and cross and the principle of ascension: 
La croix est souvent identifiee a un arbre, tant 
par l'iconographie que par la legende, elle devient par 
la echelle d 1ascension, car l'arbre ••• est contamine 
par les archetypes ascensionnels.2 
The notion that Christ was 'hung' on the Cross, associated 
in Simone Weil's mind with the passage concerning Odin's 'hang~ 
ing' already mentioned in connexion with this god as a mediator-
'igure (III, §3), gives rise to several original images connected 
with the relationship of weights and the counterbalancing of 
natural forces. It is noteworthy that in these images Simone 
Weil seems to be using 'the tau cross rather than the Latin or 
1one is reminded here of Thibon's comment, when ·he says 
that for Simone Weil what mattered was the direction taken, 
rather than the countryside crossed in the process: '• •• 
Simone Weil est avant tout un guide sur le chemin entre l'ame 
et Dieu, ••••p••••• et beaucoup de ses formulas gagnent a etre 
interpretees, non pas comme une description du pays traverse, 
mais comme des conseils aux voyageurs. Le premier de ces 
conseils e~t de ne pas emporter de bagages: le moindre poids 
alourdit et paralyse la marche vers Dieu.' Simone Weil telle 
gue nous l'avons connue, p. 170. 
2
op. cit., P• 379· 
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l Greek. 
The tree is, firstly, a symbol of the union of contrary 
forces: 'Symbolisme de l'arbre. L'energie solaire descend 
dans un arbre et le fait manter' (C3 248). This same principle 
can be applied to the notion of an object suspended from a 
tree: 
Quand on pend un objet (notamment un supplicie,~~) 
a une branche d'arbre (et il en est de meme aussi pour 
un fruit), c'est la pesanteur qui tire dessus, mais c'est 
l'energie solaire cristallisee dans l'arbre qui le main-
tient au-dessus du sol et permet que la pesanteur le tire. 
Combinaison, equilibre de la force descendante et de la 
force ascendante. (C3 200) 
The cross is thus seen as a kind of balance, in which descent 
of one ele~ent is a condition of the elevation of the other: 
'Croix comme balance, comme levier. Descente condition de 
la mantee. Le ciel descendant sur terre souleve la terre au 
ciel' (C3 224). 2 Cle¥1Y this is a parallel for Simone vleil 
. ~arcy maintains that the cross on which Christ was 
crucified was in fact a kind ofT-shaped gibbet, a 'tau cross', 
and this would lend weight to Simone Weil's argument. 2E.!_ 
cit., p. 12. 
2A poetic parallel to this can be seen in Saint-John Perse, 
'Neiges', Oeuvre poetigue (edn revue et corrigee, Paris 1960), 
p. 213. The falling snow creates an optical illusion in which 
its descent is necessary to the 'growth' of the New York sky-
-scrapers: 'Et toute la nuit, a notre insu, sous ce haut fait 
de plume, portant tres haut vestige et charge d'ames, les hautes 
villes de pierre ponce forees d'insectes lumineux n'avaient 
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to her interpretation of grace noted above (p. 481), and 
gives added significance to the aphorism 'l'arbre qui nourrit 
tue, et l'arbre du supplice sauve' (C2 197); or in other 
words, 'le salut s'opere par mouvement non ascendant, mais 
descendant'. (ibid.). Simone Weil elaborates this mechanical 
symbolism by reference to Archimedes and his principle of 
the lever: 
Levier. 'Donne-moi un point d'appui, et je sou-
lave le monde'. La Croix a ete ce poiqt d'appui. 
Levier, mouvement descendant comme condition d'un mouve-
ment montant. (C3 220-1) 
This lever-image is given a notable development in the fell-
owing passage: 
La theorie de la balance ou levier • • • qui est 
chez lui [Archimed!l rigoureusement geometrique, repose 
entierement sur la proportion. Il y a equilibre quand 
le rapport des poids est l'inverse du rapport des dis-
tances de ces poids au point d'appui • • •• La croix 
fut une balance ou le corps du Christ a fait contrepoids 
au monde. Car le Christ appartient au ciel, et la dis-
tance du ciel au point de croisement des branches de la 
croix est a la distance de ce point a la terre comme le 
poids du monde est a celui du corps du Christ. (IP 178) 
cease de croitre et d'exceller, dans l'oubli de leur poids.' 
J. Paulhan, in Lea Fleurs de Tarbes (Paris 1941), mentions 
the same sort of illusion, this time in connexion with a 
waterfall, where the rocks behind it appear to rise as a re-
sult of the water's descent {pp. 123-4). 
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In order that the world might be lifted up, the ~oint 
d'appui' had to be outside the world, but at a finite distance 
from it, while being at an infinite distance from 'la main 
qui agit', that is, God. The Incarnation was this 'point 
d'appui'. The imagery is not easy to follow at this point, 
since the essence of the Incarnation was that Christ came 
into the world. It becomes clearer when Simone Weil speaks 
of the same 'point d'appui' being provided by 'tout etre 
humain qui obeit parfaitement a Dieu ••• car il est dans 
le monde, mais non pas du monde' (IP 179). The power poss-
essed by 'Ll~etre qui obeit parfaitement' is in inverse 
proportion to his own strensth vis-a-vis that of the world. 
It is by virtue of Christ's ·perfect obedience that he was able 
to raise men to God. 
Both the lever and the balance images are developed by 
Simone Weil apart from their specific use in connexion with 
the cross. The lever image serves to indicate the mechani-
cal process by which the soul is able to come into contact 
with the supernatural in one form or another. Sometimes she 
describes the process in relation to the two parts of the 
soul: 'Par la descente de ce qui appartient au bas, ce qui 
appartient au haut est eleva' (CS 58). Sometimes it is 
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described as •LCe qui7 arrache l'etre du paraitre' (C2 142). 
Always it is an instance of the law of man's ability only to 
rise through descent. The physical use of a lever in every-
day life has for Simone Weil deep spiritual significance: 
Homme qui souleve une pierre directement (effort) 
et par l'intermediaire d'un levier: relation avec la 
contemplation des rapports arithmetiques et geometriques; 
avec la vertu; avec lebeau •••• (Cl 210) 
This is made more explicit when she notes: 
Le levier, dans l'ame, est !'attention ou la pr1ere. 
Le levier dans la societe, c'est le beau, lea· cere-
monies, etc. Par suite la religion. (C2 118) 
The lever for Simone Weil is perhaps the best example 
of the use of the intermediary, as opposed to idolatrous 
desire which reaches straight out for the infinite. It is 
a kind of 'lateral thinking', or 'action non-agissante' as 
she calls it, requiring a step backwards in order for progress 
to· be made. She gives an excellent example of the mediating 
role of the lever in the following passage: 
~ierre sur le chemin--Be jeter sur la pierr~ comme 
s1 a partir d'une certaine intensite de desir (l'effort 
n'est que desir) elle devait ne plus exister. Ou s'en 
aller, comme si, soi-m&me, on n'existait pas. 
Penser ensemble !'existence et de la pierre comme 
chose limitee, et de soi comme Stre limite, et le rapport 
des deux; levier. Si on s'appuie simplement sur le 
levier, tout effort peut meme etre inutile. 
Il faut etre detache de son.desir pour concevoir 
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l'equivalence, par transposition, entre abaisser et 
elever. 
The use of the lever is thus an instance of detachment, of 
renunciation of the world and of our desires in relation to 
it. For the natural man, 'le desir saute dans le temps par-
-dessus les intermediaires• (C2 35); the decreated man learns 
that 'pour penser les intermediaires, il faut supporter un 
vide' (ibid.). 
The symbolism of renunciation, of •action non-agissante• 
which Simone Weil found in the concept of the lever, is re-
peated in that of the balance, which is in any case closely 
related to ~t. She brings in both· concepts in referring to 
what she considers to be the illusory notion of choice; as 
soon as one has risen above illusion, to the level of necess-
ity, one sees that there is in fact no choice, •une action est 
imposee par la situation elle-meme clairement aper~ue• (Cl 93). 
Actions accomplished thus are a lever, and the body which 
accomplishes them is a balance: 'Balance juste; c'est le 
corps qui est la balance, car a chaque moment il ne peut faire 
qu'une action. Il est une balance juste quand l'attention 
est egale' (Cl 93-4). The negative aspect of this •action• 
is expressed in the following passage: 
50? 
B.tHiberation--instant de contemplation silencieuse 
des divers partis a prendre sous tous leurs aspects, 
simultanement. Avant celui-la, instant de non-pensee. 
Intuition intellectuelle dans la deliberation. Le 
corps s'y transforme en balance. (Cl 150) 
She implies the same intimate connexion between the balance 
and the cross which has already been mentioned, as she con-
tinues: 'Instant de non-pensee, pole, insertion de l'eternite 
dans le temps' (ibid.). Here 'temps' is identified with the 
desiring self which projects into the future, whereas the de-
created man, the non-desiring man, allows the vertic~l move-
ment of descending grace. In another note she puts succinct-
ly this relationship between the refusal to move forwards in 
time and the notion of a spiritual 'balance': 'En s 1arretant, 
on devient balance juste' (C2 94). 
Another use of the idea of the balance representing 
action is to be found where Simone Weil e~uates action with 
the balance-indicator: 'L'action est 1 1 aiguille indicatrice 
de la balance. Il ne faut pas toucher a l'aiguille, mais 
aux poids! (C2 236). In other words, one must accomplish 
necessary actions, even where they seem less than the best, 
and attempt to alter future actions by fixing attention on 
their spiritual source. The 'aiguille' is, quite precisely, 
the indication of the relative weights in the scale-pans, and 
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it is these that must be corrected. 
This passive acceptance of acts which must necessarily 
be accomplished is contrasted with the positive, 'God-less' 
direction of energy into actions tending towards the future, 
in the following passage: 
Notre arne est une balance. La direction de l'ener-
gie dans les actes est l'aiguille de la balance qui 
marque tel ou tel chiffre. Mais la balance est fausse. 
Quand Dieu, le vrai Dieu, occupe dans une ame toute 
la place qui lui revient, la balance est devenue juste. 
(C3 103) 
When God is the source of action, the indicator shows a correct 
balance. 
The function of the balance rests on the notion of equi-
librium, wh~ch, according to Simone Weil, 'avait toujours ete 
au centre de la pensee grecque' (SS 137). The balance is 
the symbol of equilibrium, in the physical world, in the 
social sphere in the form of justice, and in man's inner being. 
It is not surprising to find Simone Weil using extensively the 
image of water or fluids in general to convey the essential 
idea of equilibrium. She returns frequently to Arcamedes' 
work on the theory of levers and the balance, illustrated by 
the immersion of objects in water. Archimedes' theory, she 
holds, 'revient a considerer les fluides comme un ensemble de 
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leviers superposes ou un axe de symetrie jouerait le role 
de point d 1 appui 1 (SS 136). In this way an object placed 
in water is held up by the water-pressure on the other side, 
as·it were, of a central axis. She illustrates this as an 
image a little later: 
Quelle plus belle image que celle d 1un navire sou-
tenu par la mer, comme un plateau de balance, par une 
masse d 1 eau de mer placee de 1 1 autre cote d 1 un axe, et 
qui change sans mouvement a mesure que le navire avance, 
comme 1 1 ombre d 1 un oiseau qui vole ? ( SS 145 ) 
The perfect equilibrium a~d compensation of contrary 
movements which Simone Weil saw in water (cf. EL 129) she also 
found ~n the highest forms of art, which she likened to water 
because of this. It seems to have been architecture, sculp-
ture and music as the most mathematical of the arts which 
drew her attention on this point. In the greatest periods 
of these arts she considered that the same apparent movement 
and real stillness could be found as was present in water, as 
she notes in the following passage: 
La mer, un mouvement dans 1 1 jmmobilite. Equilibre 
ordre du monde • • •• Dans l 1 art. Cela a l 1 air d 1 et~e 
en~mouvement, et c 1 est immobile. Musique, le mouvement 
s 1 empare de toute 1 1 ame--et ce mouveme.nt, ce n 1 est pas 
autre chose que l 1 immobilite. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
L1 explication archeologique de l 1 immobilite des 
statues comme regle corporative, exemple de choix de la 
stupidite contemporaine. (CS 29) 
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The cor~ect explanation, she held, was to be obtained by 
making the analogy with water (cf. CS 18). She thus traces 
through Greek sculpture the same concern with equilibrium 
which had prompted Archimedes to his theories on levers. 
Simone Weil's enthusiasm for Romanesque architecture 
was based largely on the same insight. The whole edifi~e 
of the Romanesque church was constructed around an invisible 
fulcrum-point, according to her, and in this she seems to 
imply tha~he masons were continuing the tradition of respect 
for the law of equilibrium which was ~t the centre of Greek 
thought. She describes the central inspiration thus: 
L'architecture [roman!/, quoique ayant emprunte 
une forme a Rome, n'a aucun souci de la puissance ni 
de la force, mais uniquement de 1 1 equilibre •••• 
L'eglise romane eax suspendue comme une balance 
autour de son point d'equilibre, un poiD~ d'equilibre 
qui ne repose que sur le vide et qui est sensible sans 
que rien en marque l'emplacement. (EH 8l) 
Her intuition is correct in so far as the builders of the 
-~ 
Romanesque period were obliged to take particular account of 
the laws of equilibrium owing to the relatively simple tech-
niques they employed. It was only the close observance of 
such laws that allowed them to cover their buildings with 
massive stone vaults, differing here from the Gothic builders 
who relied more extensively on advanced techniques with which 
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they were able almost literally to 'defy gravity'. Simone 
Weil might also have mentioned as well as Romanesque archi-
tecture's dependence on the laws of the physical world its 
dependence on the materials to be found therein. Perhaps 
noLtart exhibits quite so well a:total dependence on necessity 
in all its forms and an acceptance ·of this necessity • 
• 
In the light of these observations on Simone Weil's use 
of symbol it is easy to see how for her the whole universe 
was a book in which, given the right disposition of 'attente', 
spiritual truths could be read and revealed. 'L'univers~ 
entier n'est qu'une grande metaphore' (C3 44), she writes, 
much as Baudelaire had done; and one of her greatest concerns 
was to convey this truth to others. The Greeks, she felt, 
had set out on the right road by retaining the spiritual 
significance of science, but their one failing had been that 
they never extended this use of spiritual symbol to work, or 
indeed recognised in work anything of spiritual value at all. 
It was a grave lacuna, and Simone Weil sets out to remedy it 
in her analysis of the application of spiritual symbol to 
both agricultural and factory work. 1 The former is set out 
1The fullest study of Simone Weil's use of symbol in 
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chiefly in the essay 'Le Christianisme et la vie des champs' 
(PSO 21-33), supplemented by certain passages from L'Enracine-
ment. She sees her task as one of bringing together the 
everyday and the spiritual: '!1 s'agit de transformer, dans 
la plus large mesure possible~~ la vie quotidienne elle-meme 
en une metaphore a signification divine, en une parabola' 
(PSO 24). She envisages a mediaeval world in which all 
things spoke of God to man, in which 
Omnia mundi creatura 
Quasi liber et pictura1 Nobis est et speculum. 
As for the mediaeval world, so for Simone Weil this transform-
ation was to be accomplished mainly by the revitalisation of 
biblical parables; thus the peasant in the action of sowing 
his seed would recall the parable on 'si le grain ne meurt ••• •, 
and would be reminded of the necessity for the death of the 
carnal man so that the spiritual man might be born again in 
connexion with;work, and the spiritual use to which she felt 
physical work should be put, is to be found in Bourgeois, ~ 
cit., passim. 
1 Alan of Lille, 'Rhythmus alter' (PL, CCX, 579A). Quot. 
M.-D. Chenu, Nature Man and Socfet in the Twelfth Centur , tr. 




Pour un tel semeur, lea heures de semaille seraient 
des heures d'oraison aussi parfaites que celles de n'im-
porte quel carme dans sa cellule, et cela sans que le 
travail en souffre, puisque son attention serait dirigee 
sur le travail. (PSO 24) 
She continues her analysis with suggestions concerning 
the role of the Eucharist in agricultural work. Christ 
identified himself with bread and wine, and the peasant's 
job is to produce these. But the peasant can only do this 
by a certain expenditure of energy, by transforming his own 
flesh and blood in a certain sense into the bread and wine 
which are the end-products. The pea~t's privilege is thus 
to have a very particular relationship with Christ: 'Son 
chair et son sang, sacrifies au cours d'interminables heures 
de travail, passant a travers le ble et le raisin, deviennent 
eux~memes la chair et le sang du Christ' (PSO 25). She ex-
tends this notion to work in general, and compares man's sacri-
fice in work with Christ's, in the following note: 'Par le 
travail l'homme se fait matiere comme le Christ par l'eucha-
ristie. Le travail est comme une mort' (Cl 126). 
view 
This ... of peasaat-life may well seem utopian, if by 
that one means a desire to return to a period in time when 
things had more significance, before the spiritual meaning 
1 
of certain acts had become obscured and subsequently lost. 
It is to be hoped however that some of the symbols which she 
wished to recapture--that of the death and rebirth of the 
seed, for instance--which constitute so fundamental a part 
of our mythical heritage, are not irretrievably lost. 2 
There may be more room for doubt however concerning 
her attempt to extend the use of symbol to factory-work, 
which she outlines in the essay 'Condition premiere d'un tra-
vail non servile' (CO 261-273). This is a natural result of 
her desire to extend the sacred beyond the bounds usually 
reserved for it by the modern world, into the secular realm. 
She writes of the prese.nce in a church of objects which lead 
the soul towards God, realising how much more necessary it 
is that such objects should exist in the place where the 
workman spends most of his life: 
1 See J. Servier, Histoire de l'utopie (Paris 1967). 
2
simone Weil's ideas on the spiritual value of work are 
similar in some respects to those of Eric Gill, who was writing 
in England at about the same time. In his Autobiography (Lon-
don 1940), p. 163, he criticises capitalist-dominated society, 
where work was done for pro~it rather than to provide 'goods 
for use', and the f.act that 'our irreligious commercialism had 
destroyed the religious basis of society and made all ritual 
and mythology and hagiography seem ridiculous'. 
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Les gens vont dans les eglises pour prier; et 
pourtant on sait qu'ils ne le pourront pas si on ne 
fournit pas a leur attention des· intermediaires pour 
en soutenir !'orientation vera Dieu. L'architecture 
meme de l'eglise, les images dont elle est pleine, les 
mots de la liturgie et des prieres, les gestes rituels 
du pretre sont ces intermediaires. En y fixant !'at-
tention, elle se trouve orientee vera Dieu. Combien 
plus grande encore la necessite de tels intermediaires 
sur le lieu du travail, ou l'on va seulement pour gagner 
sa vie! La tout accroche la pensee ala terre. 
(CO 265-6) 
One cannot however in the nature of things tell workers to 
pray all day. The objects on which they must concentrate 
are matter, instruments, the actions they perform. There-
fore these objects must be transformed into 'miroirs de la 
lumiere' so that 'pendant le travail !'attention soit orientee 
vera la source de toute lumiere' (CO 266). The worker must 
be allowed to read 'les symboles qui sont ecrits dans la ma-
tiere de toute eternite' (ibid.). 
Such symbols for the factory-worker are for example the 
~a 
balanceAthe lever. In the same way that Christ on the Cross 
counterbalanced the universe, so every worker who has to 
carry burdens or manipulate levers becomes a counterbalance 
too. 'Cela est trop lourd, et souvent l'univers fait plier 
le corps et l'ame sous la lassitude. Mais celui qui s'accroche 
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au ciel fera facilement contrepoids' (CO 267). 1 
Other mechanical laws can serve as symbols, for instance 
the law of oscillating movement, which Simone Weil sees as an 
image of our earthly condition (CO 268). She explains the 
symbolism as follows: Man is limited, except for his desire 
which continually tries to break out from earthly limitations: 
1Factory life as it should be would provide this kind of 
symbolism; factory life as Simone Weil .. knew it has already 
been considered (III, §2). The reality of the difference be-
tween the actual and the ideal is illustrated in an unpublished 
letter which Simone Wail wrote to David Garnettl where she com-
pares T. E. Lawrence's self-mortification with her own motives 
for entering factory life: 'Having used men, either enemies or 
servants or allies as material to be grinded for his own ends, 
though the ends were not personal, he could not forgive himself; 
that he had gained glory in this way, and that he found unvol-
untary pleasure in the glory was poison for him. He punished 
himself by degradation to the very level almost of these Turk-
ish slave-soldiers whom he had killed by thousands; and since 
he could not bear inequality nor make or find equality, it only 
remained for him to get down in such a degree that no man could 
be for him an inferior. By nature and by will he had the most 
rare power of making himself at home among any men. 
I think I can the better understand him be-cau-se--though 
of course no comparison is possible--!, in my obscurity, have 
felt such an urge and obeyed it, though weakness of body and 
will prevented me from long endurance. For a year I made my-
self a slave in factories; and at the time (1934-5) the fate 
of working women in Paris factories was as near slavery as can 
be, especially for those who were prevented, as I was, through 
weariness and physical weakness, from making any use of their 
hours of leisure. So the letters that Lawrence wrote in his 
slave-days hurt me as they cannot hurt those who have always 
known liberty and social respectability, but in no way do they 
seem strange to me.' (Simone Weil's English is reproduced here 
with all its remarkably few ~aults.) 
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C'est Dieu qu~ ~mpose a toute chose une limite et 
par qui la mer est enchainee. En Dieu il n'y a qu'un 
acte eternel et sans changement qui se boucle sur soi 
et n'a d'autre objet que soi. Dans les creatures il 
n'y a que des mouvements diriges vera le dehors, mais 
qui par la limite sent contraints d~osciller; cette 
oscillation est un reflet degrade de !'orientation vera 
soi-meme qui est exclusivement divine. Cette liaison 
a pour image dans nos machines la liaison du mouvement 
circulaire et du mouvement alternatif. (CO 268) 
If such symbolism were to become a living reality in the 
minds of the workers, thinks Simone Weil, then the separation 
of intellectual labour, castigated by Marx, would disappear. 
'Le point d'unite du travail intellectual et du travail manuel, 
c'est la contemplation, qui n'est pas un travail' (CO 270), 
and any proposed reforms must aim to foster this ~contemplation'. 
The kind of attention necessary for manual-labour can never be 
the same as that needed for the resolution of a theoretical 
problem, but if each one exercises the kind of attention nee-
essary for his particular task, he will assist the growth and 
development 'd'une autre attention situee au-dessus de toute 
obligation sociale, et qui constitue un lien direct avec Dieu' 
(CO 271). 
The impracticality and remote idealism of Simone Weil's 
scheme are evident (although it depended as she admitted on 
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the formation of the right kind of attention at an early age). 1 
But the simple grandeur of her conception is unquestionable, 
based as it is on a conviction that all human occupations can 
contain spiritual significance because all reflect spiritual 
reality, and that every human being can have access to the 
spiritual realm. 'Attention' which is the basis of genius 
is open to all who possess the necessary humility, and the 
humble'are more likely to find sanctity than the mighty. 
The whole created universe can provide a way to God for those 
who are willing to wait and listen: 
Dieu parle avec une extreme douceur aux enfants et 
ce qu'il a a leur dire, il le leur dit souvent sans 
paroles. La creation lui fournit le vocabulaire dont 
il a besoin, lea feui~les, lea nuages, l'eau qui coule, 
une tache de lumipre. 
• 
1Note the sane reaction of a worker: 'Elle. etait trap 
instruite, et elle ne mangeait pas.• Quat. Albertine The-
venon, CO 9· Bourgeois (Op. cit., pp. 55 & 63) admits that 
for a worker to perceive the symbols inherent in work, he 
would first have had to undergo a very special education. Her 
symbolism is a 'symbolique orientee' dependent on the assimil-
ation of a particular culture. 
2Julien Green, Partir avant le jour (Paris 1963), p. 46. 
Quat. Carrel, op. cit., P• 86. 
III, §5 
SOCIETY AS MEDIATOR 
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If it is true to say that symbols can be 'read' in the natural 
order, and that by virtue of this all human activity can have 
spiritual significance, it is not surprising to find that for 
Simone Weil society itself can and should act as a way of 
mediation towards God, and be a fertile soil in which spirit-
uality may flourish. This is not to claim that society auto-
matically performs this function; the Great Beast is only too 
ready to take control, and history provides a dismal record of 
the eclipsing of spirituality in society. But such a func-
tion is the ideal towards which actual society must strive, 
and Simone Weil's belief in the accomplishment of this ideal 
is indicated in the fact that she spent the last months of her 
life working on a scheme which would provide for the spiritual 
element in society, and which was published under the title 
L'Enracinement. The whole concept of 'enracinement' is based 
on the assumption that society can act as mediator; a society 
which is 'enracinee' will provide nourishment for the souls of 
its members, a society which is not \<1ill leave.· itself exposed 
to the domination of the Great Beast and the practice of idol-
atry. 
These two opposing conceptions of society find literary 
expression in Venise sauvee. This play has already been men-
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tioned in connexion with the idea of redemptive suffering 
(III, §3), but parallel to this theme can be found the equally 
. t t f th f t• f . t 1 1mpor an one o e unc 10n o soc1e y. It is significant 
in this respect that the play was begun in 19l~O, and that 
Simone Weil was working on it until shortly before her death, 
that is, during the same period that saw the elaboration of 
L'Enracinement, when the terrible events of the occupation and 
fall of France, and her subsequent exile, had intensified and 
matured the social consciousness which had always been present. 
The idolatrous concept of society which in historical 
analysis Simone Weil finds to be that of Rome and of other 
societies which she labels 'totalitarian', and which have 
already been discussed at length earlier in this study (II, 
§§2, 3), is in Venise sauvee that of the Spanish Empire. Be-
cause the Great Beast cannot accept that anything else has a 
right to existence (cf. C3 312), Spain has only one possible 
reaction when confronting the flourishing city of Venice; the 
latter must be devoured, absorbed into the Empire, since its 
very existence outside the Empire is a challenge to the Empire's 
hegemony. The link "lith Simone v/eil's interpretation Qf the 
1 See J. P. Little, 1 Society as l·iediator in Simone lr'/eil' s 
Venise sauvee', Modern Language Review, 65, 2 (1970), 298-305. 
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Roman Empire is obvious; in fact there is evidence that Simone 
Weil had in mind the Roman precedent when conceiving the role 
that Spain was to play in her drama. In a note in one of the 
Cahiers reproduced at the beginning of the play, she comments 
on the idea of Empire: 
Dans le premier acte, idee de l'Empire. 
Social sans racines, social sans cite, Empire romain. 
Un Romain pensait toujours ~· (c2 243 , p 44) 
The Spaniard, like the Roman, lost his identity in the great 
collectivity of Empire. 
The expansion of this collectivity however was not con-
sciously willed by the imperial pol'l'ers, but l-tas a law of the 
collectivity itself. The inevitability of expansion is brought 
out clearly in the first act of the play, where it is seen as 
imperative to the peace and unity of Europe that Spain should 
conquer Venice. Renaud urges his confederates to the task 
before them, emphasising the \-'Iars and discord which \iill ensue 
if they do not succeed: 
Si la domination des Habsbourg n'impose pas la paix 
a l'Europe, elle peut etre ravagee par trente ana de 
guerre. La maison d'Autriche est tout pres de la domi-
nation uni verselle; si elle la laisse echapper, ~tdes 
luttes sanglantes, longues et ruineuses s'engageront 
autour. (I. 2) 
And Simone Weil comments in her note: 
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Necessite d'une union de la chretiente etc. Faire 
apparaitre l'Espagne comme poussee a une telle entre-
prise par une necessite exterieure. 
The external necessity to conquer, and the glory which 
would fall to the conspirators as a result of their action, 
are the main motives used by Renaud to encourage his men. It 
is interesting to note that.-..here Simone Weil changes the em-
phasis from that in Saint-Real's narrative. Saint-Real makes 
much of the harsh nature of the Venetian government, of the 
absolute authority trhich the nobility exercised over the people, 
of the sufferings which the war against the Uscoques imposed 
1 
on the poor. According to Saint-Real, 
LCes vexation~ monterent a un tel point que le 
marquis de Bedmar put raisonnablement s'assurer que la 
revolution qu'il meditait serait d'abord aussi agreable 
aux petites gens qu'elle serait funeste aux grands.2 
Renault's speech to'the conspirators is full of the injustices 
from which they are about to save the people of Venice: 'Nous 
detruisons le plus horrible de tousles gouvernements•.3 
1Abbe de Saint-Real, Conjuration des Espagnols centre la 
_i!_e,.P.-u....;.b.-l,_i_..q.-u....;.e..-d-e---.V.-e.-n-i,_s-...e (Paris 1922) , p. 45. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., P• 116. 
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Simone Weil on the other hand speaks of the tyrannical nature 
of the Venetian government only once, and that in a p~ssage 
of rhetorical exhortation by Renaud (I. 1). In any case, 
the forc:e of this is lost later in the play, when he is telling 
to 
Jaffier how important it is/crush the Venetians immediately: 
Car, quoi que j'aie pu dire dans mon discours aux 
conjures, presque tous haissent 1 1 Espa.gne et son t passion-
nement attaches a leur p~trie et a leur liberte, le peuple 
autant que les nobles. (II. 6) 
The process of conquest must necessarily therefore in-
volve the uprooting of people from their past •. As in the 
case of Rome, this uprooting became a precise weapon in the 
hands of the conquerors, a fact which Renaud realises very 
clearly in his advice to Jaffier to l-tipe out Venice's past 
so completely that all thought of rebellion will vanish: 
Il faut que toute leur vie soit changee, leur vie 
d·e chaque jour. Qu'ils sentent chaque jour qu'ils ne 
sent pas chez eux, mais chez autr.ui, ala merci d'autrui; 
ainsi seulement ils obeiront sans effusion de sang ••• 
Il sera bon qu'il y ait beaucoup d'eglises et de fresques 
detruites; on bitira a la place des eglises de style 
espagnol • • •• Il faut que les gens d'ici se sentent 
etrangers chez eux. Deraciner les peuples conquis a 
toujours ete, sera toujours la politique des conquerants. 
(II. 6) 
If Renaud and his conspirators are able to conceive so 
clearly of a policy of 'deracinement', it is because they are 
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'deracines' themselves. Saint-Real mentions that they were 
a band of adventurers, corsairs for the most part, ready for 
gain by whatever means, 1 but Simone Weil emphasises this aspect, 
stresses that their actions are an inevitable result of their 
'deracinement•. In the very fiDst speech of the play, one of 
the officers refers to the conspirators as 'une poignee d'exi-
les', and a little later, in a note, we find: 
Faire apparaitre dans ce discours, et reparaitre 
sans cease comme un theme sous-jacent, des allusions a 
la biographie anterieure des conjures. Presque tous 
des aienturiers, et jetes dans l'aventure par la detresse, 
par des violences subies. (I. 2 ) 
This rootlessness is the basis of their desire to uproot 
others. In a note on the composition of the play she states 
her intentions: 'Dans le ler acte--et le 2e--faire bien 
apparaitre que c'est un complot d'exiles, de deracines. Ils 
haissent les.Venitiens d 1 etre chez eux' (P 43-4). As she 
remarks in L'Enracinement, 'Qui est deracine deracine' (E 49). 
Not only is the Spanish Empire an incarnation of the 
Great Beast for the conspirators, of course; the conspiracy 
itself acts as a collectivity which absorbs the individual to 
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tlie point of removing from him all responsibility for his 
actions: 'L'Espagne, la conjuration est du social pour les 
conjur~s' (P 44). T1r1ice Renaud emphasises ·that they are 
about to make history (I. 2; II. 6); he and Jaffier. are above 
the common run of aeventurers whose only thought is plunder; 
the real glory of such an exploit is that they will not be 
forgotten by history. It is of little significance whether 
the deed is objectively good or bad; what matters is that 
they should be remembered for it. They have resolved the 
contradictions of existence 'en descendant dans l'illimite• 
(C3 140), by total and unconditional allegiance to a partie-
ular social entity. 
The Spanish Empire and the conspiracy form one element 
of the social theory embodied in Venise sauv~e. Venice itself 
represents the other element, the positive function of society 
as mediator. Simone \veil makes clear the distinction bet1r1een 
the two in the following notes: 
Venise est une cite. 
Cit~, cela n'~voque pas le social. 
L'enracinement est autre chose que le social. 
(P 44) 
Et pourtant une cite ••• (Venise ••• ). Mais cela 
n'est pas du social; c'est un milieu humain dent on n'a 
pas plus conscience que de l'air qu'on respire. Un 
contact avec la nature, le passe, la tradition, un~~6. 
(P 46) 
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It becomes transparently clear in these two short passages 
that Venice incarnates for Simone Weil her whole concept of 
the role of society, and is but an artistic expression of the 
theory embodied in L'E~racinement. The true vocation of the 
collectivity is to act as nourishment to the individuals who 
compose it; it is the sum total of the traditions and history 
of that collectivity which give its members a sense of being 
rooted in the past, of belonging to the. terri tory which they 
occupy. Hence Renaud's insistance on the destruction of 
everything in Venice which would remind the inhabitants of 
their past. The~ must become part of a foreign Empire through 
the uprooting of all that distinguished them from that Empire. 
Venice in its independence is a IJEWE;b, a 'ttay of mediation for 
its citizens. Just as food is a means to the physical sur-
vival of the body, but not an end in itself, so the collect-
ivity is a means of spiritual nourishment to the soul: 
On doit le respect a uh champ de ble, non pas pour 
lui-meme, mais parce que c'est de la nourriture pour 
lea hommes. D'une maniere analogue, on doit du respect 
a une collectivite, quelle qu'elle soit--patrie, famille, 
ou toute autre--, non pas pour elle-meme ,~nmais comme 
nourriture d'un certain nombre d'imes humaines. (E 13) 
The collectivity fulfils this role in several different ways: 
firstly it is unique, and if it is destroyed can never be re-
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placed: 
Un sac de ble peut toujours etre substitue a un 
autre sac de ble. La nourriture qu'une collectivite 
fournit a l'ame de ceux qui en sont membres n'a pas 
d'equivalent dans l'univers entier. (E 13) 
Thus if Venice is destroyed as a source of spiritual nounish-
ment to its members, all the might and splendour of the Spanish 
Empire will be unable to replace it. In addition, as we have 
seen, the co~iectivity has its roots in the past, being the 
organ of conservation from generation to generation. In this 
respect of course it also projects into the future, as the 
history and traditions of the collectivity are constantly in 
the making. 
Because of its unique role, the collectivity is thus of 
iramense importance, sufficiently vital to the present and to 
future generations for an individual to give his life in its 
defence. This does not mean, however, that the collectivity 
is above and beyond the ind~vidual human being; the mere 
requirement of sacrifice is not a value-judgement. It happens 
sometimes that a man \'lill give his life to save another in 
danger, but this implies no superiority on the part of the one 
who is helped (E 13). It is in this respect that the collect-
ivity as spiritual nourishment differs from the Great Beast in 
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Simone Weil's eyes; the Great Beast is over and above the 
individuals who compose the collectivity, feeding on them 
instead of providing nourishment for them (cf OL 187). It 
becomes an end in itself, is deified as the source of all good, 
instead of being a means, a way of mediation. In spite of 
the concreteness and substantiality implied in the notion of 
'nourri~ure', society when obeying its true vocation retains 
for Simone Weil a certain transparency. It is a 'way', rather 
than a 'screen', and is defined by its function rather than by 
its material constituents. Like all beautiful things, Venice 
has only the most tenuous links with earthly existence, since 
it is completely apart from the relationships of force govern-
ing worldly phenomena. True beauty is in the end what is 
most easily destroyed: 
Destruction de Troie. Chute de petales d'arbres 
fruitiers en fleur. Savoir que le plus precieux n'est 
pas enracine dans l'existence. Cela est beau. 
(C2 205) 
• 
This frailty which stems from the refusal of force Simone 
Weil also found in another society, the Languedoc civilisation 
of the twelfth century. Like Venice, this civilisation had 
only its beauty to protect it, and in both cases this proved 
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of no avail against the forces of \·lorldly conquest'='-even 1r1hen 
these appeared in the guise of the Church defending the Faith 
against the heretic. The spiritual force of the pe-ople of 
the Languedoc ,.,.as their \•reakness; as Jacques l.fu.daule writes: 
On n'a jamais rencontre chez eux l'ardeur combattive 
des Hussites de Boheme ou des Lutheriens. Telle est, je 
crois, la faiblesse de laquelle ils ont pe~i et qui a 
fait sombrer avec eux l'independence possible du Midi • 
1 
. . . 
It has been suggested that the fact that the ·aathar heresy 
was hunted down and the Languedoc civilisation destroyed made 
this civilisation more interesting to Simone Weil. 2 Since in 
her eyes success and spiritual value, power and truth \"rere in-
compatible, the weak, the afflicted, and the persecuted were by 
definition 'right', and to be exterminated was a sign of high 
spirituality. There is no doubt an element of truth in this 
criticism, since Simone Weil had a natural tendency to defend 
\'leakness. But this was not mere sentimentality; she loved an 
annihiliated civilisation not simply because it was annihilated, 
but for what this annihiliation meant. Dina Dreyfus notes this 
94. 
1Le Drame albigeois et le destin franyais (Paris 1961), p. 
2E.g. E. Borne, 'Simone \<leil etait-elle cathare?', L' Aube, 
16 janv. 1951. 
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tendency in Simone Weil, and concludes that it is the message 
transmitted by dead civilisations which is important to her: 
••• ce message qu'elles nous ont transmis et qui 
constituait leur vocation propre, c'est, sous une forme 
ou sous une autre, l'affirmation absolue de la transcen-
dance et de la misere de la creature; cette vocation ne 
pouvait que les amener a disparaitre devant les puissances 
temporelles athees, devant le gros animal qui met au 
centre du monde le nous, monstrueuse proliferation du · 
moi.l 
An annihilated. civilisation is thus by definition one which 
refuses the use of force. (This argument ignores of course the 
fact that an annihilated civilisation can equally be one which 
resorted to force, but was less successful than the victor.) 
As a result of this it is also one in which there is a high 
degree of spirituality. This consideration goes a long way 
towards explaining Simone Weil's intense interest in the Cathars, 
which many critics have taken to be doctrinal. In fact, al-
though we have already noted certain p~ints of resemblance as 
regards religious practices and speculation, it was Catharism 
as a way of life, with its overflowing into and interdependence 
with the society which nurtured it, for which she had a partie-
ular admiration. She seldom speaks of the Cathar religion 
1
•La Transcendance contre l'histoire chez Simone Weil', 
Mercure de France (mai 1951), 65-80. 
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lr.Tithout referring also to the Languedoc civilisation; for her 
they formed a whole, each being a particular expression of 
what she felt to be the true Christian spirit. In her letter 
to D~odat Roch~ she explains the particular attraction of 
Catharism for her: 
• • • surtout ce qui fait du catharisme une espece de 
miracle, c 1 est qu 1 il s 1agissait d 1 une religion et non 
simplement d 1 une philosophie. Je veux dire qu 1 ~utour 
de Toulouse au XIIe siecle la plus haute pensee vivait 
dans un milieu humain et non pas seulement dans l 1 esprit 
d 1 un certain nombre d 1 individus. (PSO 65) 
She makes here a vi tal distinction bet1r1een philosophy, which 
remains an exercise of the intellect, and religion which is 
thought embodied in a particular human society. It is the 
same thought, but thought incarnate is of higher value than 
purely intellectual thought. She elaborates this notion: 
Une pens~e n 1 atteint la pl~nitude d 1 existence 
qu 1 incarn~e dans un milieu humain, et par milieu j 1en-
tends quelque chose d'ouvert au monde ext~rieur, qui 
baigne dans la societe environnante, qui est en con-
tact avec toute cette soci~te, non pas simplement un · 
groupe ferme de disciples auteur d 1 un maitre. Faute 
de pouvoir respirer l 1atmosphere d 1 un tel milieu, un 
esprit sup~rieur se fait une philosophie; IllfJ~s c 1 est 
la une ressource de deuxieme ordre, la pens~e y attaint 
un degr~ de r~alite moindre. (PSO 65-6) 
And so it is that Catharism represented for Simone Weil 
merely one aspect of a culture which 1r1as truly religious in 
its inspiration, and not merely in this outward manifestation 
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of a religion. She does not examine in detail the relation-
ship between the concept of chivalry which infused the Langue-
doc civilisation, and the Cathar religion, but implies an 
affinity between the two in her consideration of their concept 
of love, based as it was on a refusal of force. Catharism 
was essentially a refusal of force in all its aspects, a 
refusal of 'tout ce qui est charnel et tout ce qui est social' 
(EH 83). This is clearly a surmounting, in Simone Wail's 
terminology, of the laws of gr~vity, of the natural urge to 
fill all available space, and displays the same rejection of 
the need for gratification \'thich Simone ltleil finds in the 
concept of courtly love. As has already been noted (I, §5),. 
she associates courtly love with the _homosexuality practised 
in an·cient Greece, since both were forms of '1' amihur iJI!.pos-
sible 1 • Tha~ in fact there may have been nothing 1 imp.ossible' 
about courtly love she seems to recognise when she elaborates 
the notion of consent in connexion with it: 
L'wnour Courtois avait pour objet un etre humain; 
mais il n'est pas une convoitise. Il n'est qu'une 
attente dirigee vers l'etre aime et qui en appelle le 
consentement. (EH 80) 
The use of the word 'attente' is of great significance here, 
and Simone ',o.feil gives the whole concep·t a religious connotation 
when she continues: 'Le mot de merci par lequel lea troubadours 
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designaient ce consentement est tout proche de la notion de 
grace • (ibid.). Because this love, although its object was 
a human being, was not acquisitive in character, and involved 
a denial, Simone \·ieil concludes that it 'l.'ras in this civilisa-
tion as well as in Greece 'un des pants entre l'homme et Dieu 1 
(ibid.). The beloved took on a sort of transparency \'thich 
allo\"led the love of God to descend to\•tards man. Simone \'leil 
expresses this clearly in a note: 1Un attachement qui enferme 
une impossibilite est un ~E~a~~ 1 (C2 125). 
Rene Nelli indicates that the troubadours themselves saw 
no contradiction between love of God and love of 'la dame• 1 
and quotes their principle 1 qu 1 il faut tendre au ciel par 
1 1amour d 1une femme•. 2 This \Oras not mere rhetoric either; 
the lady's role was to nourish her suitor's desire, at the 
same time keeping him at a distance, so that he might ac~uire 
those virtues necessary to his winning her. Love \'las hence 
a moral discipline. It was not chaste in its desires, which 
were carnal, but in the fact that it necessitated continence. 3 
1L 1Erotique des troubadours (Toulouse 1963), P• 227. 
2Ibid., P• 230. 
3Ibid., P• 241. 
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In this contradiction Nelli sees both its similarities and 
differences in relation to Catharism, which, at least as far 
as the Perfect were concerned, renounced not only marriage 
but also the things of the flesh in their entirety. He con-
eludes in a vein similar to Simone Weil's that the similari-
ties betweem the two were a result of their common background 
rather than of reciprocal 'influence': 
••• les affinites,_parfois profondes, l'espece 
d'alliance que l'on devine entre le catharisme et 
l'erotique d'Oc, s'expliquent moins par une influence 
doctrinale reciproque que ~ le ·fait qu'ils entraicnt 
tous deux comme elements necessaires et concomitants 1 
dans la civilisation occitane de la fin du XIIe siecle. 
It is interesting to note that whereas the Cathars are 
generally considered to have been puritanical in their denial 
of life and procreation, Simone Weil emphasises the sense of 
freedom and joy which pervaded the whole civilisation. And 
indeed, if the Cathar religion sprang from this civilisation 
and represented a genuine facet of it, it is difficult to 
see how an accusation of puritanism can be justified. As 
Simone ~>Ieil says, 'Ce pays qui a accueilli une d·octrine si 
souvent accusee d'etre antisociale fut un example incomparable 
1Ibid., P• 235· 
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d'ordre, de liberte et d 1union des classes' (EH 70). Speaki ng 
of the Chanson de la Croisade she notes 'l'impression de bon-
heur' which emanated from the civilisation (EH 71-2), and the 
strongly developed civic sense which impelled for example the 
Count of Toulouse to consult the citizens before undertaking 
any .course of action. The notion of chivalry prevented this 
civic sense from being a cause of dissension bet\'Jeen cities, 
and allo\·Jed the flo\'Jering of an ardent patriotism l"Jhich united 
these small units against the invading enemy. Simone \'ieil 
notes that the disaster of invasion caused the population to 
persecute neither the Ca thars as t:.e cause of their misfortune, 
nor the Catholics through fear of the invaders (EH 67). 
Although the crusade was a religious issue, men fought out of 
patriotism rather than out of religious partisanship. Nelli 
likewise emphasises that although the troubadours adopted 
anti-clerical attitudes, it is impossible to say in most cases 
whether this sprang from a genuine adherence to the heresy, 
or from political and patriotic motives. 1 
Another aspect of the spiritual freedom which Simone -..Jeil 
saw in the Languedoc civilisation, and wnich has been mentioned 
1
mp. cit., p. 232. 
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in an earlier chapter (II, §2), is their concept of subordin-
ation. It struck her forcibly that here was a society in 
\•lhich hierarchy was not compounded of slave-relationships, and 
in which obedience in no \·tay involved abasement. She defines 
this concept as one 'qui rend le serviteur egal au maitre par 
une fidelite volontaire et lui permet de s'agenouiller, d'obeir, 
de souffrir les chatiments sans rien perdre de sa fierte' (EH 
70). Nelli comments on this unique relationship bet\'/een ruler 
and ruled, and makes an interesting comparison with the whole 
scale of courtly values. Speaking of the troubadour Hontan-
hagol he 1r1ri tes: 
Montanhagol savait que le devouement a leurs comtes 
et aux barons, avait pris parfois, chez les humbles sujets, 
un caractere sacre qui n'etait pas sans rapport. avec 
l'honneur 'amoureux' dont les troubadours entretenaient le 
culte. La mort de Raimon-Roger Trencavel, vicomte de 
. Carcassonne • · •• avait plonge ses sujets dans un desespoi~ 
que ni l'interet ni la raison n'expliquent entierement. 
Les.-bourgeois de Toulouse, qui s'etaient voues avec tant 
d'ardeur a la defense de leurs comtes legitimes, ne s'in-
spiraient d'aucune autre morale que celle di Parage et de 
Courtoisie, fondee toute entiere sur Amour. 
But 'Amour' has no weapons to defend herself against force, 
and no doubt such a civilisation was condemBed from 'the start. 
1Nelli, op. cit., p. 264. 
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Spiritual freedom of the sort that existed in the Languedoc, 
of which Simone Weil could write 'les idees ne s'y heurtaient 
pas, elles y circulaient dans un milieu en quelque sorte con-
tinu' (EH 68) lost for its citizens the habit of fighting for 
their ideas, and consequently, when attacked from the outside, 
the freedom to think them. Its tolerance was its downfall, 
rather than its heresy. As Madaule says, 
La societe meridionale etait tolerante avant l'heure, 
beaucoup plus qu'heretique. C'est la ce qui a cause sa 
perte, en l'opposant aux deux plus grandes puissances du 
siecle.l · 
• 
In the same way as society must become transparent in 
order to function as a way of mediation for the individuals 
that compose it, so these individuals themselves must acquire 
the same transparency in their relationships one with another. 
Transparency is the necessary result of decreation, and is 
intimately linked in Simone Weil' s thought \'lith the re11ouncing 
of the ego which takes place in decreation. The self-regard-
ing, expansive 'I' is seen by Simone ',Jeil as a screen, an 
opaqueness in what should be loving co~nerce between God and 
1 Nadaule, op. cit., p. 247. 
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his creatures: 
Toutes les chases que je vois, entends, respire, 
touche, mange, tous les etres que je rencontre, je 
prive tout cela du contact avec Dieu et je prive Dieu 
du contac·t avec tout cela dans la mesure oil quelque 
chose en moi dit je. 
Je peux faire quelque chose et pour tout cela et 
pour Dieu, a savoir me retirer, respecter le tete-a-
-tete. (C2 357) 
The same notion of interfering in an exchange of confidences 
is contained in another note, where she emphasises that she 
does not wish for insensitivity towards creation, but for the 
means to be a mere channel for creation's 'secrets': 
Je ne desire nullement que ce monde cree ne me soit 
plus sensible, mais que ce ne soit plus a moi qu'il soit 
sensible. A moi il ne peut dire son secr-et, qui est 
trop haut. Que je parte, et la creation et le Createur 
ech~eront leurs secrets. (c3 l6) 
The 'je' here is clearly not bodily being, but the self-centred 
ego. This is made clear in the following note, in which the 
familiar distinction between death and decreation is implied: 
Il ne faut pas desirer mourir pour voir Dieu face 
a face, mais vivre en cessqpt d'exister pour qu'en un 
soi qui n'est plus soi Dieu et sa creation se trouvent 
face a face. (C3 80) 
This implies that God in a sense needs man in order to 
come into contact with his creation, but it is characteristic 
that l'lhat is needed is something essentially negative, i.e. 
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man's renunciatioh of self. God works through man, but not 
in the positive sense of orthodox Christian theology, since 
it is the existence of the self in man which in Simone 1veil' s 
view prevents this happening automatically. Thus if a man 
is truly charitable to his neighbour, it is because his self 
has been decreated, leaving a passage for Christ in his love 
to descend: 
Il ne faut pas secourir le prochain pour le Christ, 
mais par le Christ. Que le moi disparaisse de telle 
sorte que le Christ au moyen de l'intermediaire que 
constituent notre ame et notre corps secoure le prochain. 
(C2 327) 
The emphasis is always on God's love for humanity, on 
his desire to descend, to succour, but Simone ~·leil always 
sees herself as standing in someone's light, in preventing 
the grace of God from reaching its destination. Instead of 
accepting that light for herself, she feels she must disappear. 
She is in the way: 1Dieu aime la perspective de creation qu 1 on 
ne peut voir que d'o~ je suis, et je fais ecran' (CS 16). 
This discretion, which seems superhuman, almost inhuman at 
times, finds a reflection in Simone i;ieil 1 s relationships with 
other people. Her inability to comprehend God's love for 
her is in one note based ~y analogy on the supposed inability 
of other hu~an beings to love her (C2 335). The only form 
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of God's love in relation to her own person which she can 
understand is that noted above, and repeated here, that God 
loves that particular part of creation visible from \ihere she 
is. Her function in life is thus to mediate God's love, and 
not to be an object of it. 1 
As well as the transparency of an individual being a 
means by which God can come into contact 1r1ith his cr-eation, 
creation--and the individuals which compose it--can by being 
transparent provide a way back to God. Supernatural love 
is directed at creation, but in fact reaches God, creation 
acting as a mediator: 
L'amour surnaturel ne touche que les creatures et 
ne va qu'a Dieu. Il n'aime que les creatures--qu 1avons-
-nous d'autre a aimer?--mais comme intermediaires. 
• • • 
Les choses creees ont pour essence d'etre des interme-
diaires. 
Elles sent des intermediaires les unes vers les 
autres, et cela n'a pas de fin. Elles sent des inter-
mediaires vers Dieu. (C3 128) 
1 See however the 'Prologue' to La Connaissance sur-
naturelle, where, speaking of the divine presence she has 
encountered, she concludes: 'Et pourtant au fond de moi quel-
que chose, un point de moi-meme, ne peut pas s'empecher de 
penser en tremblant de peur que peut-etre, malgre tout, il 
m'aime' (CS 10). 
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Although as has been seen Simone \~eil describes crea:].ted 
beings as a vehicle for God's love for his creation, elsewhere 
she implies that this love is in fact God's love for himself. 
'Son amour pour nous est amour pour soi a travers nous' (C3 
303). He only loves in us our consent to abdicate our ego-
centric existence. 11'1ous ne semmes pas a,u-tre chose qu 'un endroit 
par ou passe l'Amour divin de Dieu pour soi-meme' (IP 167), she 
claims, and one can see that such an idea was attractive to 
her. It was not only the result of the personal mistrust of 
herself which has already been noted; with her conviction 
of the misery of the human condition and the transcendence of 
God, she found it difficult to believe ~rl1oleheartedly in the 
miracle of God's love for creation in general. But it seems 
that she did believe in this love; her own experiences were 
proof to her of its reality. Thus she was able to affirm: 
Dieu non seulement s'aime lui-meme a travers les 
creatures, ce qui n'est qu'un prolongement de l'amour 
qu'il porte directement a lui-meme, mais encore il aime 
.la creation a travers les creatures. Pour cela il a 
besoin d'elles. Il ne peut pas l'aimer autrement. 
(C2 290) 
It will have been obvious from the preceding argument 
that, as in the case of society, so it is with man that this 
mediating function is not accorded him automatically. There 
must be renunci~tion, and as in the case of decreation, this 
renunciation must be a voluntary one. Consent is necessary; 
one must abdicate, and not wait to be deposed. 
Nous avons la possibilite d'etre des mediateurs 
entre Dieu et la partie de la creation qui nous est 
confiee. Il faut notre consentement pour qu'a travers 
nous il per~oive sa propre creation. Avec notre con-
sentement il opere cette merveille. (C2 391) 
Again she emphasises both that this consent to be 'used' is 
man's function in the world, and that it is necessary in order 
that God be able to come into contact with his creation, and 
operate in it: 
Chaque creature pensante parvenue a l'obeissance 
parfaite constitue un mode singulier, unique, inimitable, 
irrempla~able de presence, de connaissance, d'operation 
de Dieu dans le monde. (C2 335) 
By this consent to perfect obedience we can become like Christ, 
who was the perfect mediator because perfectly obedient (IP 
163). The imitation of Christ is thus a rejection of the 
oQtrusive personality, and a consent to the will of the Father. 
At one point she seems to suggest that only a being such as 
Christ can truly fulfil the role of mediator, and this would 
be the logical conclusion to her position, since perfe~tion 
for her is transparency, and a~y purely earthly creature must 
neces~arily fall short of this perfection, and screen the 
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light of God from his creation: 
LDieil ne peut aimer le monde visible, et l'ame 
des etres pensants dans sa partie naturelle, que par 
l'intermediaire d'une creature parvenue a l'etat de 
perfection. · 
Incarnation. (C2 290) 
Man is nevertheless capable of transferring the love of God 
to his creation. It is only a question of recognising that 
one is a contingent being, abdicating one's illusory power 
over the universe, and accepting the limited nature of every 
part of creation, including oneself: 
Si je pensais 
il n'y aurait plus 
da je. A travers 
contact. 
tout ce qui est limite comme limite, 
rien dans rna pensee qui procederait 
moi Dieu et la creation seraient en 
(C3 108) 
The paradox of the disappe~ing 'I' and the self which remains 
as passage for God's love is intentional and inevitable: St. 
Paul is conscious of the same paradox when he writes 'I la~oured 
more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of 
God which was with me ' (I (3.or. XV. 10) • Simone Weil uses the 
image of translation for this action by a self totally devoid 
of self; her ·thoughts when she is writing should not seem to 
belong to her, as they are not in fact created by her, any 
more than her actions should be a result of her own personality. 
She puts it succinctly: 'Ecrire comrne un traducteur, et agir 
de meme' (C2 112). 
Simone Heil uses other images to convey this idea of 
being a passage for divine love, or of earthly things being 
a passage towards God. One of these is the blind man's 
stick, which she uses in several different though related 
ways. It is an image firstly of the renunciation of self: 
'Baton d'aveugle. He plus percevoir sa propre existence 
comme telle, mais com:ne vouloir de Dieu' (CS 333). It is also 
an image of the part played by creation in man's relationship 
with God; other created beings form the tangible object of 
our love, but in reality, if that love is supernatural, it 
passes through them towards ;b!m, just as a blind man is in 
contact only with his .stick, but by means of it explores the 
\1/'orld (C3 127). Creation can also be a blind man's stick in 
a profounder sense, and one which accords perfectly with 
Simone Heil's desire for the decreation of her personal exist-
ence. If the whole universe is but an extension of one's 
sensibility, as a blind man's stick is an extension of his arm, 
'another' arm, then personal existence or disappearance is of 
no coneequence: 
J'ai beau mourir, l'univers continue. Cela ne me 
console pas si je suis autre que l 1 univers. Mais si 
l'univers est a mon arne comme un autre corps, ma mort 
cesse d'avoir pour moi plus d'importance que celle d'un 
inconnu. De meme mes souffr~nces. 
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Que l'univers entier soit pour moi, par rapport a 
mon corps, ce qu'est le baton d'un aveugle, pour l'aveugle, 
par rapport a sa main. Il n'a reellement plus sa sensi-
bilite dans sa main, mais au bout du baton. (Cl 37 ) 
In genral, together with analogy, the 'blind man's stick' 
is a means of attaining the non-apprehendable through the 
physical (C2 171). Analogy plays an important part in this 
phenomenon: as the blind man's stick touches what is other-
wise inaccessible to him, so I, through physical objects, 
'touch' the supernatural. But Simone ~1eil emphasises that 
contact itself also plays an important part; contact with the 
perfectly pure in the form of ceremonies, sacran1ents and so 
forth constitutes a genuine conta~t with God, and that not 
merely through analogy (ibid.). (This is clearly a variation 
of the argument stated in the previous chapter, that the sacra-
ments are not merely symbols, but constitute a real presence.) 
A variation of the blind man's stick-image is that of the 
pen or pencil. In this case, the pen or pencil is the medi-
ating instrument by which thoughts are conveyed from the mind 
on to paper, and for Simone ~!eil this image has several rami-
fications. One interpretation which she gives it identifies 
it with the contemplation of necessity; one must be able to 
'read' God behind every event without exception:1 
••• il faut sentir la realite et la presence de 
Dieu a travers toutes les choses exterieures sans excep-
tion, aussi clairement que la main sent la consistance 
du papier a travers le porte-plume et la plume. (AD l4) 
This, naturally, encompasses not only pleasurable events, but 
pain and suffering too: 
••• Il faut aimer Dieu a travers la douleur (sen-
tir sa presence et sa realite par l'organe de l'amour 
suruaturel, le seul qui en soit capable) comme on sent 
la consistance du papier a travers le crayon. (C2 l86) 
These images convey the idea of earthly phenomena being 
a passage towards God. The communication is two-fold, how-
ever, as is indicated in the following note, where the soul 
is seen to be mediator in both directions between the body and 
God: 'Que mon ame soit seulement au corps et aDieu ce qu'est 
ce porte-plume a ma maiR et au papier--un intermediaire' (CS 
81). In fact, the image is used in the direction God-man 
just as frequently as its opposite. It is generally seen as 
an analogy for the charity which man should extend to man, a 
charity which comes from God an~ uses man only as an inter-
mediaty~ 'Etre pousse par Dieu vers le prochain comme le crayon 
est appuye par moi sur le papier' (CS 16). The anonymity and 
1
simone \•ieil uses this image as an analogy of perception,· 
without the religious overtones, as far back as the essay on 
'Science et perception dans Descartes' (1929-30). Cf. SS 89~ 
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'blindmess' of this process is emphasised in the following 
note: 'Comme le crayon est pour moi quand, les yeux fermes, 
je palpe la pointe avec la table--etre cela pour le Christ' 
(C2 391). The impersonality of this kind of charity, which 
may at first sight seem cold, is in Simone i'Teil's eyes the 
only form of giving which truly respects the being of the 
recipient. It completely discounts any recompense for 
'good works', even the kno1.:1ledge that good works have been 
done, because for Simone Weil charity, or love of one's 
neighbour, is no more than strict justice. She comments 
on the synonymity of 'justice' and 'love of onels neighbour' 
in the Gospel (AD 101), and claims that it is we who have 
invented a distinction between the two. 'Il est facile de 
comprendre pourquoi. Notre notion de la justice dispense 
celui qui poss~de de donner. 3'il donne quand meme, il 
croit pouvoir etre content de lui-meme' (ibid.). 
The charitable man is thus a transparent one; he is 
merely a vehicle for the true charity of Christ, the only 
being capable of looking on affliction. A society made up 
of such transparent beings for whom justice was a form of 
love amd the minimum required of man, was clearly Simone ·\ofeil' s 
ideal. That it was not merely an ideal, but capable of em-
bodiment, she attempted to illustrate in her consideration of 
those historical societies which have been discussed in the 
course of this chapter. 
• 
III, §6 
"0 'API9MOE META!T 
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Whereas man and society provide concrete examples of Simone 
Weil's search for mediators between man and God, there is a 
whole area of purely abstract speculation which reflects the 
same preoccupation. This is the field of mathematics, and 
Simone Weil's concern to use mathematics and related subjects 
as a way of mediation will now be discussed. The whole field 
provides a clear illustratian of the complete fusion in her 
mind of intellectual and spiritual research; she is 'la 
mathematicmenne de Dieu•, 1 and the two ends, mathematical 
truth and God, cannot be separated. Like other human activ-
ities, mathematics is pointless if it does not bring the soul 
towards God: 'Ces sciences sont sans valeur en elles-mSmes. 
Ce sont des intermediaires entre l'ame et Dieu' (SG 107). 
This affirmatiol)'1s made in a commentary on the Re·public, 
and it is clear that the idea of mathematical sciences in 
general as a path to spiritual truth was derived from Plato. 2 
Mathematics were in the intermediary rank between what was 
perceptible by the senses and pure thought, or 'dialectic', 
and Simone Weil~is speaking as a Platonist when she comments 
1Andre Rousseaux, 'Mathematicienne de Dieu', Litterature 
du XXe siecle (Paris 1953), IV, 213-57· 
2
cf. Republic, VI, 509-14. 
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on 'un ordre de certitude, a partir des pensees incertaines, 
et facilement saisissables, qui concernant le monde sensible 
jusqu'aux pensees tout a fait certaines et tout a fait insai-
sissables qui concernant Dieu' {IP 125). Mathematics, she 
continues, are at a point mid-way between the two kinds of 
·thought. Elsewhere she refers them to concepts of mediation 
already considered, as when she defines them as a 'baton d'a-
veugle' {C2 171) or when she groups them on the same level as 
the IJ.E'ta~b and '1 'amour' { Cl 77) • Throughout her speculation 
on mathematics there is evident the same conviction that was 
noted in connexion with her consideration of science in gene-
ral, namely that the confusion of the scientific and the re-
ligious was not simply a sign of the 'primitive' mind, not yet 
emancipated from superstition, but a genuine manifestation of 
spirituality, and that the modern world is the poorer for 
having divorced. the two. It is with regret that she makes 
the distinction between the- attitude towards mathematical truth 
current in Plato's day, and that of our own times: 
Ce qu'on venait chercher quand on allait chez Platon, 
c'etait une transformation de l'ime permettant de voir 
et d'aimer Dieu; qui songerait aujourd'hui a employer 
la mathematique a tel usage? {SS 266)1 
1
she is perhaps less than fair to scientists such as 
Poincare who, although he does not formulate it in Simone 
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Apart from mathematics as an intermediary science in 
the Platonic tradition, Simone Weil's aim was to find symbols 
of mediation within mathematics, and more particularly within 
Pythagoreanism. Pythagorean number-mysticism is well-known, 
but what seems to have held her attention above all was the 
development of geometry under Pythagoras and his disciples, a 
development whose echo she found in certain Platonic texts, 
the Epinomis and the Timaeus for example (LR 24). 1 Her cen-
tral contention is that the discovery of geometry was a direct 
Weil's Platonic terms, nevertheless expr~sses a clear link 
between modern science and 'the Good': 'Sciende keeps us in 
constant relation with something which is greater than·our-
selves; it offers us a spectacle which is constantly renewing 
itself and growing always more vast. Behind the great vision 
it affords us, it leads us to guess at something greater still; 
this spectacle is a joy in which we forget ourselves and thus 
it is morally sound. 
He who has tasted of this, who has seen, if only from afar, 
the splendid harmony of the natural laws will be better disposed 
than another to pay little attention to his petty, egoistic i-n-
terests. He will. have an ideal which he will value more than 
bi.mself, and tha-tiis the only ground on which we can build an 
ethics. He will work for this ideal without sparing himself 
and without expecting any of the vulgar rewards which are every-
thing to some persons; and when he has assumed the habit &f 
disinterestedness, this habit will follow him everywhere; his 
entire life will remain as if flavoured with it. 
It is the love of truth even more than passion which in-
spires him. And is not such a love an entire code of morality? 
Is there anything which is more important than to combat lies 
because they are one of the moat common ~ices in primiti~e man 
and one of the most degrading-?~ .Mathematics and Science; Last 
Essafs, trans. from Dernieres pensees (Paris 1913) by J. w. Bol-
duc New York 1963), §8, 'Ethics and Science•. 
1 For the texts in Simone Weil's translation, see IP 111-7. 
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.result of the Greeks' search for mediation, and that there-
fore '!'apparition de la geometrie en Grece est la plus ecla-
tante parmi toutes lea propheties qui ont annonce le Christ' 
(IP 133), a somewhat startling claim which will be elaborated 
in the course of this chapter. 
There are two;;~main features in the Pythagorean system; 
firstly there is their identification of everything with 
number, and secondly there is the use of the opposites--odd 
and even, limiting and limted and so forth--from which all 
things were composed. Both aspects will be relevant to a 
discussion of Simone Weil's use of Pythagorean theory, but we 
shall begin with a consideration of their theory of number. 
It was asserted by Aristotle that~:-the Pythagoreans believed 
1 
all things to be numbers, and this somewhat obscure claim 
has occasioned different interpretationsamong critic~. Caple-
stan considers that it results from the fact that they regarded 
numbers spatially--the tetraktys being a well-known example of 
this. If the number ten was set out as composed of the f~rst 
four integers arranged triangularly, then, says Copleston, it 
becomes easy to understand 'how the Pythagoreans regarded 
-~etaphysics N3, 1090a20, quat. Kirk and Raven, The Pre-
socratic Philosophers (Cambridge 1962f;--·p-:- 24·8:' .. 
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things as being numbers, and not merely as being numerable. 
They transferred their mathematical conception to the order 
of material reality•. 1 The argument is carried further by 
Kirk and Raven, who point to the 'tacit confusion between the 
2 
unit of arithmetic and the point of geometry', so that by 
analogy with the representation of numbers spatially, any 
solid would be composed of a great number of pointa each 
having magnitude. Burnet however considered that the identi-
fic~tion of things with numbers was made as a result of t.he 
~ 
Pythagoreans' musical discoveries, by which they found that 
musical sounds could be reduced to numbers, and expressed 
numerically. 3 That is to say, number is fundamentally re-
lationship or proportion. The strings of the lyre, for in-
stance, were tuned so as to form ratios one with another; 
what mattered was not the pitch of a single string, but its 
relationship to the other strings. 
Simone Weil seems to have had in mind something very 
similar to this in her interpretation of Pythagorean number-
1A History of Philosophy, I: Greece and Rome, Part I (New 
York 1962), P• 51. 
2
op •. cit., p. 255· 
3Early Greek Philosophy (4th edn, London 1930), P• 107. 
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-theory. Writing of number as intermediary between the one 
and the indeterminate, the unlimit•d, she defines what she 
understands by this 'number': 
Ce n'est pas le nombre par lequel on denombre, ni 
celui qu'on forme par addition continuellement repetee, 
qui constitue cet intermediaire, mais plutot le nombre 
en tant qu'il est susceptible de former des rapports. 
(SS 142-3) 
The forming of relationships is of course essential to human 
thought and perception; nothing can b~ 'known' unless it is 
related to other phenomena, and Valery defines genius as the 
ability to establish relationships between things whose con-
tinuity escapes the ordinary mind. 1 But it does not seem to 
be that kind of relationship which Simone Weil has in mind. 
She continues: 
Car un rapport entre d.eux :e.hiffres, chose infiniment 
differente d'une fraction, est en mime temps rapport 
entre une infinite d'autres chiffres choisis convenable-
ment et groupes deux par deux; chaque rapport enveloppe 
des quantites qui croissent d'une maniere illimitee sans 
cesser d'etre fideles a une relation parfaitement definie, 
comme un angle, a partir d'un point, embrasse un eepace 
1
•Le secret--celui de Leonard comme celui de Bonaparte, 
comme celui que possede une fois la plus haute intelligence--
est et ne peut etre que dans les relations qu'ils trouverent 
--qu'ils furent forces de trouver--entre aee chases dent nous 
echappe la loi de continuite. I Introduction a la m.ethode de 
Leonard de Vinci, Variate, in Oeuvres (Bibl. de la Pleiade, 
Paris 1959), I, 1160. 
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qui s'etend infiniment au-dela des plus lointaines 
etoiles. (SS 143) 
The connexion with Pythagoras' spatially extended numbers is 
here obvious, and Simone Weil herself makes the association 
with geometrical figures when she.adds that relationship, to 
be accessible to the mind,·•must leave the domain of the number 
and enter that of the angle, 'car le nombre entier supporte 
mal la substitution du rapport a !'addition; il ne donne 
aucun moyen d'exprimer, sinon en certain cas, la moyenne pro-
portionnelle' (ibid.). In other words, whereas the relation-
ship between for example nine and unity can be expressed numer-
ically as three, its root, there are a great many numbers for 
which this is not possible in terms of whole numbers, and which 
can be better expressed geometrically. 
Number is therefore relationship in the sense of propor-
tion, and this must be borne in mind whenever Simone Weil uses 
one of these three terms. It explains her frequent identific-
ation of &p~S~~ with Aby~ which, she says, 'sont employes 
indifferemment l'un pour l'autre dans la tradition pythagori-
cienne' (SG 111). If&p~S~~ means 'relationship', then it 
is not difficult to identify it w~th Aby~ which does not mean 
number in the normal sense of the word, but relation, proportion, 
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1 
analogy. The lxp1.S1lbc; or the Abyoc; is thus that which est-
ablishes a relationship between a number and unity. In Simone 
Weil's view t~e whole of Greek science was a search for pro-
portion (IP 123), that is, for something which could harmonise 
the opposites of existence. 
These opposites form the basis of the dualistic aspect 
of Pythagoreanism, a& aspect which is in fact implied by the 
notion of proportion, since a proportional mean must by defin-
ition be established between two exterior entities. In the 
Pythagorean 'table of opposites', the prime ones were consid-
ered to be limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurali~y. 2 
It is not our purpose here to discuss the argument as to whether 
these opposites constitute a definite dualism of principles, 
or whether they were preceded by a single and f~ndamental 
principle.3 Simone Weil, faithful to her particular dualism, 
1Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. Abyoc;, B, 
III. Burnet, in his discussion of Greek music, notes the 
ratios between the different strings of the lyre, and gives 
their names as d1.1rA&cJ1.oc; Abyoc; (2:1), nll1.bA1.oc; Abyoc; (3:2) etc. 
Greek Phi~osophy, Part I: Thales to Plato (London 1924), P• 47. 
2Aristotle, Metaphysics A5 986al5, quot. Kirk and Raven, 
op. cit., p. 238. 
3For an account of this argument, see J. E. Raven, Pyth-
agoreans and Eleatics (Cambridge 1948), §II. 
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seems to have identified the one element--the limiting prin-
ciple, the One--with God, and the other opposing element with 
all that is not God. In fact, most of the occasions on which 
sh~ states specifically the unity of God and the One .._ refer 
to Platonic texts, 1 but her account of the Pythagorean doctrine 
of mediation, and the spiritual value of this doctrine, could 
not be maintained without such an assumption. It is simply 
another instance of her embracing of the whole Greek tradition, 
and making no clear distinction between one part of that trad-
ition and another. Her long essay· 'A propos de la doctrine 
pythagoricienne' (IP 108-171) begins 'La pensee pythagoricienne 
est pour nous le grand mystere de la civilisation grecque. On 
la retrouve partout. Elle impregne presque toute la poesie, 
presque toute la philosophie,--et surtout Platon, qu'Aristote 
regardait comme un pur pythagoricien ••• •. Thus when in 
the course of this essay she quotes the Platonic formula 'Le 
nombre est i•intermediaire entre l'un et l'illimite' (Philebus 
16; IP 130) and claims 'le un·supreme est Dieu, et c'est lui 
qui limite' {ibid.), we may be sure that she is ta~king of the 
'Pythagorean tradition•. 2 
1 See also I, §2. Ther·e are exceptions to this; see e.g. 
IP 118, SG 168. 
2The equation by the Pythagoreans of the One with God is 
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This idea of limit is of some importance, and provides 
not only an instance of mediation for Simone Weil, but also 
it gives an added dimension to her theoretical notions of 
creation and of the nature of necessity. The One, the limit 
and the indefinite seem to form a triad, with limit forming 
the mediating principle between the One, God, who imposes the 
limit, and the indefinite-which receives the limit (cf. IP 
141). Li~it is the equivalent of number (CS 31), and number 
is, according to Philolaos, that whichglves a 'body' to things, 
brings them out from indefiniteness (IP 141).. Simone Weil 
expains this use of 'number' by reference to the gnomon, the 
fixed point around which other points revolve (IP 142). No 
percept~on is possible without this fixed point which· repre-
sents.necessity, and which is 'un ensemble de lois de variation 
deter~inees par des rapports fixes et invariants' (ibid.).· 
She uses Lagneau's example of the cube a. *Kki•! to illustrate 
her point; we perceive a cube by taking in successive appear-
attested by late sources only, but is held by W. K. C. Guthrie 
to be very probable. He quotes Aetius to the effect that 
'Of the principles, Pythagoras said that the Monad was God 
and the Good, the true nature of the One, Mind itself; but 
the indetinite dyad is a daimon and evil; concerned with 
material plurality.' A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge 
1962), I, 248. 
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ances of it, none of which is in fact a cube, but which re-
volve around something different from and exterior to these 
appearances, that is, its 'cubeness' (IP 142-3). The cube 
consists of the raEport between itself and th~ success~ve 
stages viewed. 
Limit is lxp1.91J.bc;, and lxp1.S1J.bc; is Abyoc; • But Abyoc; 
is also the Word, 'le Verbe ordonnateur' which has already 
been mentioned (III, §1). It is logical therefore to suppose 
that lxp1.91J.bc; = Verbe, the creative force which ordered the 
universe in the beginning. This co~~ideration reveals how 
profoundly Greek are her ideas on creation; the Pythagorean 
'everything is number' is given added significance by fusion 
with the Stoic Abyoc;, although neither doctrine is present in 
its initial purity. The idea of substituting 'number' for 
'Word' may seem fanciful, but when the particular significance 
of 'number' as 'relationship' is called to mind it will be 
realised that Simone Weil's ideas on creation involve an order-
ing by the establishment o·f a mediating term which brings into 
relationship two opposing elements, and that this mediating 
term may go under several different names. 
That there is no contradiction between this concept of 
creation involving the formation of a bond between creator and 
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created, and the idea of creation being the retreat of God 
from the world, the establishing of a gulf between the two, 
can be seen by reference to the idea of the order or beauty 
of the world, which, itself a mediating form, can only be 
perceived by an individual who has reached a certain stage of 
purification (III, §1). The relationship is there, b~t 
tQ .be real must be perceived • 
• 
A slightly different angle is revealed when we turn to 
what Simone ·Weil considered to be the central preoccupation 
of the Greek philosopher~geometers of the Pythagorean tradition, 
their search for mediation between unity and diversity. The 
notion of proportion here is fundamental; for Simone We~l the 
most significant discovery made by the Pythagoreans was that 
of the Abyo1. lb:oyo1., the 'irrational numbers' , which had: no 
arithmetical proportional l~nk with unity. These must now 
be examined. Burnet holds that the proof of what is known 
as 'Pythagoras' theorem', that the square of the hypotenuse 
is equal to the sum of. the squares on the other two sides of 
the triangle, was probably arithmetical in the first place, 
'and, as he was _acquainted with the 3 4 : 5 triangle, which 
is always a right-angled triangle, he may have started from 
But in the case of many numbers 
their ~quare r.oot is not a whole number, and the theorem can-
not therefore be expressed numerically. 2 This is the case, 
for example, in the isosceles right-angled triangle. The~e 
numbers whose square roots could not be expressed in terms of 
whole numbers were the 'irrational numbers' which Pythagoras 
was said to have hidden from the world because they disproved 
hi·s theory. According to Simone Weil, however, this discov-
ery of the irrationals was of the h*ghest spiritual importance·. 
What could not be expressed·numerically could be expressed 
geometrically. Geometry provided mediation, a 'moyenne pro-
portionnelle', for numbers which were by nature deprived of 
one. Hence the possibility that the Greeks invented geometry 
as a result of their search for mediation (IP 121). 'En tout 
cas, que la geometrie ait eta· ou non des avant sa premiere 
origine une recherche de mediation, elle offrait cette mer~ 
veille d'une mediation pour les nombres qui en etaient naturel-
1Greek Philosophy, P• 54. 
2It is important to realise that the Pythago~eans did not 
recognise any unit smaller than one; the only fractions they 
used represe~ted ratios of whole numbers. See Burnet, ibid., 
p. 85. That this should be so is obvious from their spec·ial 
representation of number, and the identification of the unit 
with an alpha or dot. One cannot have half a dot. 
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lement prives' (IP 122). Clearly for Simone Weil this was 
not merely an intellectual problem to be solved, but was an 
image of spiritual reality; the identity already mentioned 
between God and unity makes the image easily comprehensible: 
La construction d'une moyenne proportionnelle 
entre l'unite et un nombre non carre par l'inscription 
du triangle rectangle dans le cercle etait l'image 
d'une mediation surnaturelle entre Dieu et l'homme. 
(PSO 61) 
Man is not 'a square number'; he is a being between whom and 
God there is no natural mediation (SG 168). A mediator must 
come from outside the natural world, just as geometry, alien 
to number, must intervene to provide mediation with unity for 
1 
numbers which are not square: 
Lea nombres pour lesquels il n'existe aucune media-
tion qui lea relie naturellement a l'unite sent des images 
de notre m1sere; et le cercle qui vient du dehors, d'une 
maniere transcendante par raprt au domaine des nombres, 
apporter une mediation est l'image de l'unique remede a 
cette ·mi6ere. (CO 268) 
Simone Weil indicates here that it is 'le cercle' which 
1The statement that geometry comes 'from outside' to medi-
ate irrational numbers seems to need some qualification in the 
Pythagorean context·at least, given that, as has been shown, 
the dividing line between arithmetic and geometry was not as 
clear-cut for them as it is for us. Number was already con-
ceived geometrically to a certain extent. 
comes from outside to provide medi~tion, and of course this 
is the case, since the right-angled triangle in question can 
be inscribed within a circle, whose diameter is the hypotenuse 
of the triangle. More than that, 'le cercle est necessaire 
a~la construction de toute moyenne proportionnelle entre quan-
tites dont le rapport n'est pas un.;nombre rationnel a la 
puissance seconde' (IP 160). Circular movement presented 
for Simone Weil 'l'image parfaite de l'acte eternel qui con-
stitue la vie de la Trinite' (IP 159), and the to-and-fro 
movement of a point on the diameter 'est l'image du devenir 
d'ici-bas fait de ruptures d'equilibre successives et con-
traires' (ibid.). 1 If now we add a right-angled triangle 
whose hypotenuse is the diameter of the circle, the proportional 
mean which is obtained by dropping a perpendicular from the 
apex of the triangle (at :a~ point on the circle) to the dia-
meter, will 'mediate' between the circle, representing the 
life of God, and the diameter, which represents the life of 
man, at~the same time as 'entering' the diameter at a point 
proportional in terms of quantity to the area of the two 
triangles now formed, mediating between these two (cf. IP 159-60). 
1
on the representation of God as circle see G. Poulet, 
Lea ~etamorphoses du cercle (Paris 1961), Introduction. 
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This proportional mean is an image of the Word. 
The idea of proportion also explains Simone Weil's use 
of 'assimilation', as used by Plato in the Epinomis (990, see 
IP 115). The 'assimilation des nombres non naturellement 
semblables entre eux•, which Plato considers to be given by 
God, is achieved by the use of proportion, and on this analogy 
Simone Weil. bases her theory of contact with God: 
L'assimimation est l'unique contact avec Dieu, et 
la foi da~s la realite de ce contact implique la foi 
dans la possibilite de la mediation. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Epinomis. L'assimilation de deux nombres, c'est 
la decouverte d'une moyenne proportionnelle. Done 
!'assimilation de l'homme a Dieu, c'est la decouverte 
d 1 une mediation. (C2 367) 
There is no common factor between God and man; in order for 
them to be 'made like' there must be a mediating term between 
the two. 
This idea of assimilation is extended by Simone Weil in 
her interpretation of the myterious Pythagorean formula reported 
1 by Aristotle that 'justice is a square number', a formula 
1Magna Moralia, Al ll82all, quot. Kirk & Raven, op. cit., 
p. 248. Aristotle's statement is constructed as a refutation 
of thi~ doctrine: OU yfxp "E<f'E'l.V I) ch.KIXt.OaiJVI'l &pt.9J,lbc; (.crfnu.c; taoc; • 
that is frequently dismissed by critics as mere theosophising. 
For Simone Weil it is rather an image of our relationship to 
God:' "La justice est un nombre a la deuxii~me puissance." 
Autrem_ent dit, la justice est ce entre quoi et Dieu il y a 
naturellement mediation' (SG 168). Or 'Le juste est celui 
entre qui et Dieu la mediation est possible' (C3 287). For 
sinful man however there is no natural mediation with God; 
by a slightly different use of the formula, where 'le juste' 
becomes the mediator rather than the 'square', man is able 
to assimilate himself to God: 
La justice est un carre, i.e. un~nombre dent il 
existe une moyenne geometrique entre lui et l'unite. 
1, 3, 9--meme pensee. 1 est Dieu, le nombre est le 
mediateur 1 le Carre est l'homme qui est au media-
teur comme le mediateur a Dieu, le disciple du Christ. 
(C3 68) 
This interpretation, whether it coincides or not with the 
Pythagoreans' intentions, has the virtues of coherence and 
of intellectual humility in the presence of a~cient writers • 
... 
It was Simone Weil's undoubted merit, when considering the 
ancient world in general and the Greeks in particular, to 
ass"me that they were talking sense, and that if certain feat-
ures of their intellectual systems seemed incoherent or fanci-
ful to us, it was because we have lost the key to their inter-
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pretation. This feature of her thought constitutes one of 
the main benefits of her disbelief in the idea of intellectual 
or spiritual progress; she never treated the ancient world 
as a childish version of the modern. 
Another important ramification of the idea of assimilation 
is to be found in Simone Weil's use of the fragment quoted by 
Diogenes Laertius: 'L'amitie est une egalite faite d'harmonie' 
(IP 118), coupled with the fragment from Philolaos: 'Les choses 
semblables et de meme rang n'ont aucun besoin d'harmonie; 
celles qui ne sent pas semblables, ni de meme racine, ni de 
meme rang,~il est necessaire qu'elles soient enfermees sous 
clef par une harmonie capable de les maintenir dans un ordre 
du monde' (IP 112).1 In order to understand the connexion of 
this with the idea of assimi+ation, it is necessary to realise 
that~·.harmony, for the Greeks, was 'proportion.' or 'l'unite des 
con~raires' (IP 127)o Burnet also records that when the Greeks. 
1stobaeus, Eclogia, I, 21, 8o 6 (B 62), quoto IP 182: 
~ ~tv b~o~a Kat b~b~Aa &p~ovl~ o6dEv ~nEdtoVTo, T& dt &vb~o~a ~~dt 
b~bcpuAa ~~dt laoA ... ~ ~ ,q -ro~a(mx &p~ovlq: O'UXKEME~aScn ora~ 
~iAAeVT~ ~v x6a~ Kcrd:xEa9a~ o 
It is interesting to. see that Giraudoux gives a similar defin-
ition, put into the mouth of Alcmene in Amphitryon 38 (III. v): 
'L'amitie o •• accouple les creatures les plus dissemblables 
et les rend egaleso 1 
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spoke of harmony in relation to.!l'music they were thinking 
• 
primarily of notes sounded in succession and not simultaneous-
1 ly. Historically, harmony means first 'tuning' and then 
'scale •·. Harmony is thus concerned with the ratio betwe-en 
notes, or between the strings of a lyre, and not with two 
concordant notes sounded together. In Simone Weil 1.s partie-
ular interpretation, it was the geometric mean linking oppos-
ites (IP 132), and the 'friendship' formed from this harmony 
is the subject of a long section of the essay on Pythagorean 
doctrine referred to above. She applies it firstly to God, 
and then to the relationship between God and his creatures, 
and finally to the relationship within creation itself, and 
to that between God and matter. 
In each case this involves a pair of opposites. In the 
case of the relationsh~p 'within' God, she takes up the prtmary 
pair of Pythagorean opposites, unity and plurality, and applies 
them to the Trinity. To understand the function of harmony 
here, however, it is necessary to add another definition of 
lGreek Philosophy, p. 45. H. Ottensmeyer notes the same 
point in relation to Simone Weil's use of the term. Le Theme 
de l'amour dans l'muvre de Simone.Weil (Paris 1958), p. 27. 
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harmony: 'La pensee commune des pensants separes'. These 
definitions are appropriate to the Trinity, she continues, 
firstly because if one conceives God as One, then either one 
thinks of him as an object, in which case he cannot be action, 
or as an acting subject, in which case an object is necessary, 
and creation would be the result of necessity and not of love. 
Human creatures can only think of God as perfect if they think 
of him as subject and object at the same time. But God is 
essentially subject, which is why the second definition, 'la 
pensee commune des pensants separes', is appropriate, since 
it implies a plurality of subjects. She concludes: 
Si on interprete la definition de l'amitie comme 
une egalite parfaitel d'harmonie au moyen ·de la defini-
tion de l'harmonie comme la pensee commune des pensants 
separes, c'est la Trinite meme qui est l'amitie par ex- . 
cellence. L'egalite est l'egalite entre un et plusieurs, 
entre un et deux; les contraires dont l'harmonie consti-
tue l'unite sont l'unite et la pluralite, qui sont le . 
premier couple de contraires. (I~ 129) 
The second pair of opposites which Simone Weil considers 
is that of creator and creature, which·she identifies with 
the Pythagorean opposites limit and the unlimited. This 
identification of the creature with the unlimited may seem 
puzzling, but she explains that by the unlimited she means 
1Ms: ~aite. 
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'ce qui re~oit sa li.itation du dehors' (IP 129). Creation 
is matter limited, put in order by God. The limits imposed 
are quantities or something akin to quantity, and so one can 
say that limit is number, the number which is intermediary 
between One and the unlimited (IP 130). The idea of the 
universe being ordered by limiting number accords very well 
of course with the view of the universe which the decreated 
man should have; in a sense decreation is the perception of 
limits. By a complex reasQning_Simone Weil then identifies 
this limit or number with the second term of the opposition 
seen in the Trinity, that of the One and the many. The many 
is this number, and, as limit, appears in the opposition 
creator-creature as the first term. 1 Between God and his 
cr.eation the limit is therefore something like a proportional 
mean, buVin the form of a person (as the second term of the 
opposition forming the Trinity, which is essentially person) .• 
This does not, however, entirely resolve the contradiction 
creator-creation. Creation is basically inert matter, and 
between God and inert matter there is no natural union. This 
1It must be assumed that Simone Weil understands 'limit' 
here as 'the limiting principle', a point which she makes else-
where, e.g. IP 35· 
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union is made in the person of Christ on the Cross, 'quand 
les circanstances prec-edant 1 'agonie ont ete brutales au 
point d'en faire une chose' (IP 131). This point will be 
dealt with more fully in the next chapter, since it involves 
the nature and role of Christ for Simone Wail. For the 
moment it should merely be noted that Christ is conceived 
as the 'proportional mean' who is able to create 'harmony' 
between God and creation by virtue of his nature as God-man. 
The idea of harmony is next applied to the relationship 
bet\-leen me-n. Here Simone Weil anticipates a difficulty, 
since in Philolaos' words, 'Les chases de meme espece, de 
meme racine et de meme rang n'ont pas besoin d'harmonie' (IP 
134). She finds it significant that the Pythagoreans should 
have chosen a definition of 'friendship' that applied more 
readily to God than to man. But friendShip between men is 
possible, because although they are in fact equal, the false 
perspective from which each individual views his neighbours 
makes of him the centre of the world. There are several 
possible results of this situation. Where the relative force 
of two individuals is unequal, the stronger generally causes 
the weaker to submit; the weaker then transfers his 'position 
centrale' outside himself into the other (IP 135). This is 
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the relations~ip of slave to master. In the case where the 
two parties are of equal strength then what Simone Weil calls 
'natural justice' is produced; they agree to a compromise, 
each respecting the egocentricity of the other, but 'sans 
cesser de penser ala premiere personne' (IP 136). This is 
justice, but it is a 'justice sans amitie' (ibid.). Justice 
produced by friendship is of a different order, and supernat-
ural. It occurs at the meeting point of 'cet etre qui est 
le centre du monde et Ld!l cet autre qui est un petit fragment 
dans le.monde' (lP 137), an~n order for it to be accomplished 
it is necessary to recognise 
que rien dans le monde n'est le centre du monde, · 
que le c-entre du monde est hors du monde, que nul ici-
-bas n'a le droit de dire je. Il faut renoncer en· 
faveur de Dieu ••• a ce pouvoir illusoire qu'Il nous 
a accorde de penser a la premiere personne. (IP 137) 
It is not clear however why this renunciation should produce 
~friendship'. in the Pythagorean sense. Simone Weil says that 
·thus 
t~e opposites ..- united are so distant that they can only have 
the~r union in God, but does not explain how God comes to be 
mediator between these opposites of whose nature he does not 
partake. The difficulty can be partly resolved by Simone 
Weil's identification of 'amitie' or 'amour' and 'justice' 
(IP 139), since as we have seen, justice has a natural link 
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with unity. Two just persons would thus find 'amitie' 
through their common relationship with God. Another diff-
iculty is the implication that 'amitie' is only possible 
where there is an unequal relationship of force. Where the 
relationship is equal, it would seem that 'natural justice' 
is inevitable. There is perhaps here~a reflection of Simone· 
Weil' s suspicion of any levelling process and her lov-e of 
hierarchy. The sort of hierarchy existing in the Languedoc 
civilisation of the twelfth century, which h~s already been 
considered (III, §5), would presumably be an example of an 
unequal relationship of force which produces 'amitie' and a 
perfectly free relationship. She bears out this interpret-
ation when she affirms that 'la justice .. ..._ surnaturelle, 
l'amitie ou l'amour se trouvent enfermes dans toutes les re-
lations humaines ou sans qu'il y ait egalite de force et de 
besoin il y a recherche du consentement mutuel' (IP 141). 
God is thus a mediator between himself and himself, b·e-
tween himself and man, between man and man. He is 'l'unique 
principe d'harmonie' (IP 139). What she describes as 'une 
cinquieme forme d'harmmnie•, 1 that between God and matter, 
1It seems in fact to be a fourth rather than a fifth. 
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the limiting principle and that which receives the limit, 
would seem to be included in her analysis of mediation 
between God and creation, involving the number as limit and 
the person of Christ. 
* 
There is however another application of the idea of 
harmony, that produced by the union on a transcendent level 
of oppo·sites within creation. The 'pyramid' thus formed 
can be compared to Simone Weil's use of the idea of harmony 
applied to relationships between men; 'horizontal' epposites i:., •• ;.! .:..~-~ 
are reconciled in God. In her development of the concept 
of the harmony of opposites, Simone Weil is indebted to Hera-
clitus, whose philosophy she sees as one of overall unity 
governing apparent conflict. 1 But since for her Heraclitus 
and the Pythagoreans formed part of the same tradition, this 
'harmony of opposites' is seldom attributed to any one indiv-
idual or school. In any case, the tradition found its most 
complete expression in Plato, for whom the use of contradiction 
formed an essential part of the dialectal method (Cl 76). 
1see J. P. Little, 'Heraclitus and Simone Weil: The Har-
mony of Opposites', Forum for Modern Language Studies, V, 1, 
Jan. 1969, PP• 72-9. 
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Contradiction, as was seen in the first section of this 
study (I, §1), is for Simone ~eil an essential element of 
created existence. 'L'existence, c'est le li•u des contraires' 
(C2 285) forms an echo to Her~plitus' 'La guerre est mere de 
t t ~ . d t. ' • 1 ou es C11oses, re~ne e ou~es cnoses . 'ifJar is fundamental 
to the human condition, but contradiction is also felt within 
the individual as a conflict of aims, a hiatus between 't'lhat \"'e 
desire and the practical consequences of attaining that desire: 
Notre vie est impossibilite, absurdite. Chaque 
chose que nous voulons est contradictoire avec les 
conditions ou les consequences qui y sont attachees, 
chaque affirmation que nous posons implique l'affirmation 
contraire, tous nos sentiments sont fuelanges i leur 
contraire. (C2 407) 
This conociousness of the basic contradictions of exis-
tence leads to a characteristic dialectic of method, where 
any observation must be follO\ved by the contrary assertion, 
in order to obtain a balanced ~iew of the whole. Alain's 
influence is clearly visible when Simone Weil defines her 
method of intellectual procedure: 'Methode d'investigation: 
des qu'on a pense quelque chose, chercher en quel sens le 
contraire est vrai' (Cl 191). 2 This method of course explains 
1Frag. 53 (1st part); see P• 18. 
2cf. Alain: 'J'ai appris ••• que l'opposition est le 
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many·apparent inconsistencies in Simone Weil's th~ught, in the 
Cahiers in particular. As in Plato's use of it, it is a 
means by which one is able to 1 sortir du point de vue' (Cl 
76). We may compare Heraclitus' axiom 'La route qui monte 
et qu~ descend est la seule et la meme•, 1 which may be inter-
preted as meaning that a single object can justify different 
descriptions, each of which depends on the point of view 
2 
adopted. 
The method is clearly for Simone Weil another parallel 
to man's decreation, whereby his personal stance is abandoned 
for a vision of order and unity. But since perfect deere-
ation is only a goal for man, and seldom a reality, man's 
mouvement meme de la pensee et le seul moyen de donner du corps 
aux idees. Cela est' sensible dans ces contraires que Platon 
a dessines comme par jeu, ainsi le chaud et le froid, le lourd 
et le lager, le grand et le petit. A force d'y penser, j'ai~ 
fini par apercevoir que ces contraires etaient inherents l'un 
a 1 1 autre, de fat;;on qu' il soi t:'.impossible de juger qu 'un corps 
est petit si 1' on ne juge en meme temps qu' il est;~·granq., ce 
qui n'est que parcourir toute l'etendue d'un genre et faire 
courir l'idee • • •• Hegel a trouve de merveilleuses idees, 
pleines de matiere et de consistance, a force de chercher en 
chacune son contraire identique a elle.' Histoire de mes 
pensees (Paris 1950), P• 35· 
1Frag. 60: 'Odbc; 5w Kfnw J.liCX KCX\. ~, 
P• 189. 
2
see Kirk & Raven, PP• 190-1. 
quot. Kirk & Raven, 
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natural instinct is to escape the dilemma of contradiction 
and to take refuge in a lie: 'Le mensonge est la fuite de la 
pensee humaine devant une contradiction essentielle, irreme-
diable 1 .( Cl 159) • This 'lie 1 shows itself in idolatry, the 
worship of force, and of the law of gravity. As has been 
shown, 'la force delivre du couple de contraires bien-mal' 
(C3 140). 
There is however a way of esc~ping legitimately from the 
dilemma of the contradiction, that is, by assuming the full 
reality and then the unity of the terms of the contradiction. 
This serves the purpose first of making us cpnscious of the 
true nature of the human condition. Simone Weil's comments 
on the basic conflict within man have a Pascalian ring: 'La 
contradiction est notre misere, et le sentiment de notre misere 
est le sentiment de la realite' (C2 407). But it is not 
simply a question of contemplating the wretchedness of man; 
this consciousness must be used as a means to overcome contra-
diction. Simo.ne Weil uses the lever-image again to describe 
the action of the equilibrium of opposites whose purpose is 
to lift the soul on to a higher plane. A really legitimate 
contradiction, fully accep-ted, is a myst·ery to the rational 
intelligence in that it cannot be either explained or resolved. 
579 
When the mind has gone as far as it can, and meets a contra-
diction, 1alors la notion de mystere, comme un levier, trans-. 
porte la pensee de l'autre cote de l'impasse, de l'autre cote 
de la porte impossible a ouvrir, au dela du domaine de l 1 in-
telligence, au-dessus' (CS 79). The 'porte impossible a 
ouvrir' is also seen as a limit, here representing the highest 
point which the unaided intelligence can reach, rather than 
the limit imposed on matter by the creator, although the two 
could be described as different views of the same concept. 
There are echoes of the Greek ~o~pa; the boundary which 
c.annot be overstepped without paying a price, in the following 
comment: 'Savoir (en toute chose) qu'il y a une limite, et 
qu'on ne la depassera pas sans aide surnaturelle, ou alors 
de tres peu, et en le payant ensuite par un terrible abaisse-
ment' (Cl 213). 
The limit can be passed through rising to unity, or by 
descent into the unlimited (03 140). This limit-point is 
compared by Simone Weil with the highest point of a pyramid, 
of a mountain or a church-spire, which forms the limit to 
matter: 'Une montagne, une pyramide, une fleche d'eglise, 
rendent sensible la transcendance du ciel, en faisant sentir 
que la matiere pesante peut aller jusque-la et non pas plus 
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haut' (C2 406). When this point has been passed, there may 
well be others. Simone Weil sees spiritual progress as a 
series of levels, each with its own particular laws, which 
must be traversed one by one: 
Quand quelque chose semble impossible a obtenir, 
que~que effort que l'on fasse, cela indique une limite 
infranchissable a ce niveau· et la necessite d'un change-
ment de niveau, d'une rupture d~lafond; ainsi s'epuiser 
en efforts a ce niveau degrade. Il vaut mieux accepter 
la limite,lla contempler, et en savourer toute l'amertume. 
(Cl 106} 
Typically, it is an attitude of waiting, of non-active activity 
which brings about the 'rupture de plafond'. Simone Weil 
expresses the same thought in a comparison between a series 
of contradictions and the rungs of a ladder to be mounted. 
Each rung raises the soul to a higher level, 
jusqu'a ce que nous parvenions a un endroit ou 
nous devons penser ensemble les contraires, mais ou 
nous ne pouvons pas avoir acces au plan ou ils sent 
lies. C'est le dernier echelon de l'echelle. La 
nous ne pouvons plus monter, nous devons regarder, 
attendre et aimer. Et Dieu descend. (C2 408) 
As in the contemplation of necessity, there is ~n essen-
tial element of suffering involved. In an account of suffer-
ing and the harmony of opposites which is net always easy to 
follow, Simone Weil explains h0w suffering undoes the harmony 
which had been present in the soul, so that the soul is obliged 
to remake the lost union bettreen opposites: 'La douleur est 
la dissolution de l'harmonie ••• • (C3 192). This is pre-
sumably the process of decreation, a process which is seen 
here to be inevitable to the soul's reunion with God. But 
the nature of the harmony which existed in the soul before 
the dec~eative process began is obscure; why is decreation 
and subsequent reunion with God necessary if harmony between 
the soul and God already exists? The decreative process is 
usually seen .in any case as a destruction of the fal~e harmony 
in the soul, the false perspective that projects the soul into 
the future and gives a man the impression of sovereignty. It 
is clear however from this and from what has gone before that 
suffering is a necessary prelude to the harmony of opposites, 
and this harmony for Simone Weil is nowhere better exemplified 
than in the person of Christ. It is to this central figure 
that we must no~ turn in our final chapter, with a consider-




In her 'autobiographie spirituelle', wishing to be as explicit 
as possible to Fr Perrin on the history of her spiritual devel-
opment, Simone Weil recounts the circumstances of the first 
'meeting' she had with Christ. Having been introduced to 
the English metaphysical poets by a young Englishman whom she 
met at Solesmes, she discovered George Herbert's poem '~ove', 
which she learned by heart and subsequently used to recite as 
a kind of exercise in attention during her head-ache attaclts: 
Je croyais le reciter seulment comme un poeme, mais 
a mon insu cette recitation avait la vertu d'une priere. 
C'est au cours d'une de ces recitations que ••• le 
Christ lui-meme est descendu et m'a prise. (AD 38) 
It is in the light of this fundamental experience, totally 
unexpected, and other subsequent ones, that all her speculation 
on the nature and significance of Christ's role must be seen. 
At the heart of this speculation there lies this I co·ntact reel, 
de personne a personne, ici-bas, entre un etre humain et Dieu' 
(ibid.) which she had experienced, 1 and her love of the 'Dieu 
des philosophes', the God of Plato and the Pythagoreans, must 
be set against her interpretation of these as mystical philo-
sophers. The rational intellect must go as far as it can, 
1on the idea of contact, see Narcy, op. cit., PP• 10 ff. 
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but there comes a point where mystical contact is the only 
form of advance. 
Simone Weil's philosophy is essentially Christocentric, 
not only by virtue of this personal contact \'Ti th Christ which 
she experienced, but also through the fact that her intellect-
ual speculation on religion centred around the 'hub' of the 
figure of Christ. Her great sympathy for the religio~s of 
antiquity should not blind us to the fact that it \•ras never 
Osiris, or Dionysos, or Job, with whom she had mystical con-
tact, but with Christ. Other deities were 'prefigurations' 
of Christ, who, while not as 'complete' as Christ, neverthe-
less possessed the same power for salvation for the society in 
which they were believed_to be incarnate. \-That is of import-
ance here is the degree of love and attention directed towards 
the deity, \'tho ever he may be. 
The central position of the figure of Christ for Simone 
Weil was due to his mediating role. He is the union of all 
mediation themes, 'la mediation meme' (IP 163), and this chap-
ter will attempt to trace, in Simone Weil's interpretation of 
Christ, elements of mediation already considered, beginning 
with the concept of Christ as Saviour-God, and his relationship 
with other Saviour-gods of antiquity. 
The connexion between the Christ-story and myths of 
death and resurrection (III, §3) is an obvious one, and the 
anthropological implications of this connexion have long been 
1 
a subject of study by scholars. But there are radical 
differences too, which Simone Weil does not appear to have 
appreciated fully. Her insistance that there may have been 
'des incarnations Ldu Verb!? anterieures a Jesus' (LR 18) 
implies that, whereas these incarnations may have had the 
value of prophecies, and have been therefore less complete 
than Christ's incarnation, they were nevertheless of the same 
nature as Christ (whether or not they were historical figures; 
i.e. they fulfilled the same function with regard to man lLR 
1£7'). But the nature of the Christian Incarnation is by its 
own definition exclusive. The relation of Jesus to God 
is of such a kind that it could not be repeated in 
one other individual--that to speak, in fact, of its 
being repeated in one other individual is a contradiction 
in terms, since any individual standing in that relation 
to God would be Jesus, and that Jesus, in virtue of this 
relation, has-rhe same absolute claim upon all men's 
\vorship and loyalty as belongs to God.2 
1 See among others J. M. Robertson, Pagan Christs (London 
191l). 
2Edwin Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity (London 1921), 
P• 271, in James, op. cit., PP• 180-1. 
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Simone Weil does not accept this exclusiveness and uniqueness 
and consequently can refer to Dionysos, Apollo, Prometheus, 
Love, Proserpine and so forth, as different names for a single 
deity, 'le Verbe' (LR 20), which had its most complete incarn-
ation in Christ. Her conviction that other traditions praented 
equally authentic spirituality is seen also of course in her 
association of a particular religion with a particular culture, 
and in her belief that changing one's religion was a very 
. 
dangerous thing to do (LR 34). 
If we consider only the mystery-gods, there is another 
important difference between their role and that of Christ, 
which Simone Weil does not seem to have considered significant. 
The function of the Mystery-religions was essentially to assure 
everlasting life for their adherents; the Osirian ritual, for 
example, '"as designed to secure salvation after death for the 
1 
souls of the dead by their assimilation with the god. Ehrist's 
role on the other hand \·las the saving of man from sin through 
belief in his Godhead and in the efficacy of his death and 
resurrection. Simone Weil's interpraation of the Saviour lies 
l s. G. F. Brandon, 'Ritual Technique of Salvation', in 
The Saviour God, p. 18. 
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some\"rhere between the t1110. The Saviour's role is to save 
from sin in the sense of healing the breach bet\V'een God and 
man caused by creation. His function is thus mediatory. 
The emphasis is on distance, and on the need for a mean term 
to close that distance. There is very little emphasis on 
everlasting life, which was one of the least of Simone Weil 1 s 
concerns. 
On the historicity of Christ's incarnation, it is diffi-
cult to be categoric about Simone Weil 1 s precise belief. She 
did not deny the historical Incarnation--her interpretation of 
the symbol of the Cross involves the meeting-point of time and 
eternity in crucifixion--but, as in her lack of interest in 
the Resurrection of Christ which she did not actually deny, 
the impression is given that it was of very little importance 
to her. What mattered was the eternal significance of incarn-
ation, rather than its particular manifestation. The ambi-
valence of her position, and the richness of its possibilities, 
are indicated in the following note: 
L'histoire du Christ est un symbole, une metaphore. 
Mais on croyait autrefois que les metaphores se pro-
duisent comme evenements dans le monda. Dieu est le 
supr&me po~te. (CS 150) 
As in the case of the other mediator-go~considered in an 
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earlier chapter, emphasis is placed, in an evaluation of 
Christ's role, on the part played by suffering. The effi-
cacy of incarnation does not depend on incarnation ae such, 
but on the suffering this entails. In the first ;:.place, in-
carnation necessarily implies suffering, since it involves 
the separation of God from God (CS 27). In addition, Simone 
Weil sees Christ, like Plato's god Love, as leading a life of 
wandering and hardship, 'comme il convient a notre frere' (IP 
69). She lays much emphasis o~ the fact that 'le Christ 
etait pauvre et vagabond' (ibid.), and on his consequent 
identity "lrlith the sufferings of mankind. The connexion \'lhich 
Simone Weil makes between Christ and Prometheus depends on this 
bond between God and man; Prometheus, the 'instituteur des 
hommes', was 'crucified' by Zeus for giving wisdom to man: 
'C'est en crucifiant Promethee que Zeus a ouvert aux hommes 
la route de la sagesse 1 (SG 45). Simone \'Teil associates 
this with the belief of St. John of the Cross when he declares 
that, in Simone Weil's words, 'la participation par la souf-
france a la Croix du Chr~at permet seule de penetrer· dans les 
profondeurs de la sagesse divine' (ibid.). Both are examples 
of the Orphic ~ wa9El ~&9~. She also quotes frequently 
the passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Christ is 
spoken of as being 'made perfect' by his sufferings, and that 
having been made perfect he became 'the author of eternal 
, 
salvation unto all them that obey him'.~ It is thus only by 
assimilation to the suffering Christ, by participation in his 
sufferings, that salvation for man is possible~ The Cross 
for man is consent to death, primarily spiritual death, that 
of the 'partie charnelle de l'ame', but also implying possible 
physical death, as in the case of Christ. Since this suffer-
ing is the path to knowledge, and since this death is only the 
extreme limit of suffering, it can truly be said that 'la 
Croix du Christ est la seule porte de la connaissance' (C3 50). 
The particular significance for Simone \<Jeil of the term 'know-
ledge' has already been considered, but it should perhaps be 
emphasised once again that it is spiritual rather than intell-
actual knO\'Iledge \'lhich is meant. 
By his crucifixion, Christ also fulfils Simone Wail's 
particular definition of a redeemer. Christ is the perfectly 
pure being Y.rho transforms evil into suffering, and thus pre-
vents evil from being further transferred. 'Toute la violence 
criminelle de l'Empire remain ••• s'est heurtee centre le 
1 Heb. V. 9· See e.g. C2 242. 
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Christ, et en lui est devenue pure souffrance' (C3 142); the 
redemptive function here consists in breaking the horizontal 
movement of evil and directing it upwards. In this trans-
formation evil is experienced by Christ, but not as evil: 
Le mal n'e-st senti que dans un etre pur. Hais 
il n'y est pas du mal. Le mal est exterieur a soi-
meme. La ou il est il n'est pas senti. Il est senti 
la ou il n'est pas. Le sentiment du mal n'est pas un 
mal. (C3 13) 
Of the t\'IO forms of evil, sin and suffering, the former is 
thus experienced by those who commit or pass on violence, 
the latter by those who consent to break its monotonous 
chain. Simone Weil emphasises the violence and degradation 
of Christ's death; redemptive suffering is essentially a 
violent injustice inflicted by men on another, and consists 
in submitting to force (C3 143). There was consequently 
nothing glorious about Christ's death: 
Le Christ etait un malheureux. Il n'est pas mort 
comme un martyr;; Il est mort comme un criminal de 
droit commun, melange aux larrons, seulement un peu plus 
ridicule. Car le malheur est ridicule. (AD 88) 
Christ's death represents the ultimate conquest of 
worldly force over spiritual weakness; but had there been 
no crucifixion there could have been no victory of the spirit. 
As \'le have seen, for Simone \'leil worldly achievement or con-
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quest is incompatible with spirituality. This goes a long 
way towards explaining her lack of·interest in the resurrect-
ion, which was in a sense a triumph over Christ's worldly 
enemies. In Simone t,.Jeil' s view the spiritual, although eman-
ating from the one God \'tho is the Good, can never beat worldly 
force on its O\"'n ground. It can by definition offer no resist-
ance, since if it resists it is no longer related to the Good. 
Christ is mediator between God and man by virtue of his 
Incarnation and suffering. There is another form of incarn-
ation, however, and this is to be found in the concept of the 
Eucharist, perfect purity present in matter. God is here 
present in matter in a very direct sense: Christ by his sacri-
fice offers himself as flesh and blood to man. The attitude 
of man towards towards Christ's presence in the Eucharist must 
be one o1 love, rather than one of belief 'pour la partie de 
moi-m~me qui appr~hende les faits' (C2 149). It is this love 
1trhich enables the soul to make contact with God through a 
simple piece of matter, and by love Christ in the 1!.'ucharist 
becomes a mediator: 'Aimer le Christ dans l'eucharistie, c'est 
l'y rencontrer. Baton d'aveugle' (C2 171). This meeting 
with Christ is a source of grace, of spiritual energy, just as 
chlorophyll mediates the sun's energy and transforms it into 
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substance for the nourishment of our own bodies (CO 268; see 
III, §4). 
Besides being mediator beb1een man and God Simone ':Jeil 
considers that Christ is also mediator between man and man, in 
every case where there is pure 'amitie' of the kind described 
in the previous chapter. The consent to the abandonment of 
egocentric interests is automatically consent to the presence 
of Christ; thus 'en quelque point de l'espace et du temps 
que se ·trouvent deux vrais amis, chose extremement rare, le 
Christ est entre eux, quelque Lii£7 soit le nom du dieu 
qu'ils invoquent. Toute amitie vraie passe par le Christ' 
(IP 140). There is clearly here a reference to the idea 
already considered (II~, §6), that the opposites I/another 
are at such a distance from each other that they can only 
have their union in God. 
The exercise of love for one's neighbour also demands 
the presence of Christ. This is sometimes described in 
terms of the in-dwelling of Christ in the 'benefactor's' 
soul; the benefactor is 'porteur du Christ', and thus causes 
Christ to enter the soul of the one in need, along with the 
food which he is given. '3i ce don est bien donne et bien 
re~u, le passage d'un marceau de pain a un autre est quelque 
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chose comme une vraie communion' (AD 101). Sometimes the 
movement of Christ towards the needy one is described as a 
three-term combination, in vrhich, as has been seen, the self. 
of the benefactor disappears in order that Christ and the 
other should come into contact. 'Il ne faut pas secourir 
le prochain pour le Christ, mais par le Christ' (C2 327). 
If acts are accomplished thus, then one cannot ayoid bene-
ficial acts; one does not do things with half an eye on God, 
but because ~ttention focused on the plight of the needy one 
has removed all possibility of acting otherwise. Simone 
Ueil comments on the attitude of those vtho clothed the naked 
Christ: 
Ils etaient dans un etat tel quI ils ne pouvaie'nt 
pas s'empecher de nourrir ceux qui avaient faim, d'habil-
ler ceux qui etaient nus; ils ne le faisaient aucunement 
pour le Christ, ils ne pouvaient pas s'empecher de le 
faire parce que la compassion du Christ etait en eux. 
(C3 37) 
• 
3o far the roles ascribed by Simone Weil to Christ have 
been ones which belong in one form or another vii thin the 
Christian theological tradition. She is less orthodox 
ho\'rever in the relationship which she establishes betvreen 
Christ and the various mathematical mediators seen in the 
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previous chapter. Christ is, firstly, the proportional 
mean. This is indicated according to Simone l'leil in Christ's 
use of the various formulae describing Christ's relationship 
with man in terms of God's relationship with Christ, for ex-
ample 'as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you' (John 
XX. 21). Such a formula can be compared with passages where 
Plato describes mediation between God and matby me~s of pro-
portion (SG 167) and indicates that Christ thought of him-
self in these terms, giving at the same time an added prophetic 
significance to Greek geometry. Eliade also takes up this 
comparison of Christ's relationship to God and man's relation-
ship to Christ, but gives it a different ·interpretation.· For 
him it is primarily a question of example to be imitated, an 
example which has the virtue of conferring salvation on those 
that follow it: 
L'humilite n'est qu'une vertu; mais celle qui 
s 1 exerce d'apres 1 1 exemple du Sauveur est un acte reli-· 
gieux et un moyen de salut: •co~~e je vous ai aimes, 
vous aussi, aimez-vous les uns les autres•. 1 
This interpretation does not invalidate Simone '1/eil 's 1 
but gives the concept a different emphasis. If one thinks of 
Christ as an example, then clearly for the example to be effi-
1Le 1'-iythe de 1 1 eternel retour (Paris 1949) , p • 47 • 
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cacious it must be followed, there must be a conscious choice 
on the part of man to model his life on Christ's. The con-
cept is thus primarily ethical. For Simone Weil however, 
proportion is established, and contact between men and God 
made possible, by the very fact of Christ's mediation which, 
as l'le noted earlier, is not really dependent on Christ 1 s 
incarnation in time. Reconciliation with God is thus in 
a sense automatic, since mediation has existed from the be-
ginning of time. It should be stressed however that this 
is only the logical extension of Simone Weil's application 
of mathematical concepts to the figure of Christ. Clearly 
mathematical concepts are eternal and independent of human 
history and ethical considerations, but it would be wrong to 
suppose that Simone Weil considered salvation automatic or 
independent of morality. The difficulty seems to stem from 
the comparison itself. ltlhereas in religious tern1s Simone 
vieil was convir1ced that for mediation to be efficacious man 
must become Christ-like, in mathematical terms a number has 
an automatic relationship with unity, \llhen once a proportional 
mean has been constructed. 
The srune observations apply to a concept related in 
Simone ~.,reil 1 s mind to that of proportion: assimilation. 
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Simone Weil takes as the basic expression of this the passage 
in the Epinomis where Plato speaks of 'l'assimilation des 
nombres non naturellement semblables entre eux', adding that 
'il est manifeste que Dieu a produit cette merveille et non 
1 les hommes'. Assimilation is thus the making alike, through 
proportion, of numbers l'lhich have no natural connexion. In 
theological terms, 
l'assimilation est l'unique contact avec Dieu, et 
la foi dane la realite de ce contact implique la fo.i 
dans la possibilite de la mediation. 
. . . 
• • • l'assimilation de l'homme a Dieu, c'est la 
decouverte de la mediation. (C2 367) 
If Christ is considere~ as the supreme mediator, then his in-
carnation will automatically ensure the assimilation of man 
to God. There is no essential difference bet\'reen geometrical 
assimilation and the assimilation which is made possible by 
Christ 1 s histor·ical incarnation. The unity between the two 
is made clear in the following comraent: 
1L 1 amitie est une egalite faite d 1 harmonie'. Si 
on prend harmonie au sens de moyenne geometrique, si on 
1 - l. -~. " 990, in IP 115: 'tCXUTCX dk 1JCX9bV't'1. -rob-ro1.c; .:;cpE~rtc; .:;(JTl.V o 
xaAo~1. IJkV acpbdpa yEAotov ~VOIJCI yEOIJETptav, ~v o6K ~v~v dk b1-1ot~v 
&AA~Ao1.c; dbaEl. &p1.S~v ~ot~1.c; npbc; ~v ~v l:n1.ntd~v IJOL~V yEyovu~& 
~a-r1. d1.a~c;· b d~ 9au1Ja o6K &vS~1.vov &A~ yEyovbc; 9El.OV ~Epbv 
Qy y{yvol.TO 'tii dUVCXIJEVlf? O'WVOE~V. 
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con~oit que la seule mediation entre Dieu et l'homme 
est un etre a la fois Dieu et homme, on passe directe-
ment de cette formule pythagoricienne aux merveilleuses 
formules de l'Evangile de saint Jean. Par l'assimila-
tion avec le Christ, qui ne fait qu'un avec Dieu, l'etre 
humain, gisant tout au fond de sa misere, atteint une 
espece d'egalite avec Dieu, une egalite qui est amour. 
(IP 132) 
Simone Weil's interpretation of the logos doctrine runs 
along similar lines. We have already seen how she identified 
Aby~ with &p~9~~' and gave to both.the meaning of 'relation-
ship' (III, §6). Developing this concept, she considers that 
Abyoc; in a Christian context should al\'rays be translated 'J.I.'ledi-
ation' rather than 'Hord' (SG 162). Christ was given the name 
of 'relationship' by St. John, she claims (IP 166). Her 
version of the beginning of John's Gospel thus reads 'A l'ori-
gine etait la l~iediation, et la :t<lediation etait aupres de Dieu, 
et la Mediation etait Dieu' (SG 167). She is implicitly 
denying here all connexion of the term with the Hebrew ~ord' 
or 'Wisdom' of God, 1 and the genius ·of John in bridging in a 
single word the gulf between the Jewish and Greek 11rorlds. 2 
1see e.g. E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and 
Usages on the Christian Church, Hibbert Lectures (1888), PP• 
199-200. 
2H. Chadwick however does not consider the case for re-
garding John's Gospel 'as an apologia to the non-Jewish world' 
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For Simone Weil the Aby~ was Greek, and lost none of its 
earlier significance on entering the strictly Christian 
tradition. When she claims that Heraclitus and Cleanthes 
gave the name Aby~ to God (SG 159) it is clear that this is 
a prefiguration of Christ, the supreme Aby~, and she would 
certainly have approved Justin's definition of Heraclitus as 
a 'Christian before Christ' because of his discovery of the 
immanent Aby~. 1 
The idea of the mediation of Christ reaches ite culmin-
ation in the concept of harmony, that harmony between opposites 
which is the result of proportion. Christ is in the first 
place harmony within himself; as the perfectly just redeemer 
he is the union of perfect justice with the appearance of 
perfect injustice, and thus reconciles these two opposites 
(C2 367). He is also harmony within God: 'Dans la Trinite 
il est l'objet, et l'objet est mediateur entre le sujet et 
1 1acte I (CS 87). This note should presumably be inter-
preted in the light of the writing on the Trinity already con-
to be very strong. Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition (London 1966), P• 4. 
1charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Cul-
ture (New York 1957), p. 230. 
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sidered; the 'thought' of God must be another thinking being, 
since God should not be referred to in the pass±~e voice. 
Hence the 'thought' of God is the Son, or the Image, or the 
Wisdom of God, who is mediator between God ..a the subject 
and God the object thought (IP 128). The difficulty arising 
here of course is that the 'objet pense' should, according to 
Simone Weil, also be a thinldng being, as it is the third per-
son of the Trinity, but this is clearly impossible. 
The harmony \'thich Christ establishes between the opposites 
God and man has already been considered to a large extent in 
the concept of Christ as proportional mean. A variation on 
this can be seen in Simone 'lr/eil 1 s ~use of the image of Christ 
as the 'key', uniting those things which, according to Philo-
laos, had no cownon bond and had therefore to be locked to-
gether in harmony (IP 164). Christ was the key to this bond 
holding together Creator and creation (ibid.), the Aby~ re-
conciling the unlimited with the limiting (SG 172). He was 
also a key in the sense. of the key of kno\'lledge, since know-
ledge is a reflection of being. Simone Weil interprets in 
this highly Platonic fashion Christ's lvarning to the Pharisees: 
'\1oe unto you, la\'lyers! for ye have taken away the key of know-
ledge' (Luke XI. 52): 
Cette clef, c'etait lui-meme, que les siecles 
anterieurs a lui avaient aime d'avance, et que les 
Pharisiens avaient nie et allaient faire mourir. 
(IP 164) 
600 
Christ is mediator between God and man, and God and ere-
ation in general, but he also mediates between God and inert 
matter. This form of mediation seems linked in Simone Weil's 
mind·to that between the principle of limitation, God, and 
that which receives its limitation from the outside, the 'in-
determinate' (see IP 130). It forms for .Simone Weil a speeial 
case, since God and matter have nothing in comn1on; God can 
only come into contact with a person, and so all three terms, 
God, matter, and the principle of union between the two must 
be persons. The difficulty is resolved in the crucifixion, 
where God in the person of Christ was reduced on the Cross to 
mere inert matter; 'cette intersection, c'est un etre humain 
au moment de l'agonie, quand les circonstances precedant l'ago-
nie ont ete brutales au point d'en faire une chose' (IP 131). 
If considering Christ on the Cross to be a 'mere thing' seems 
to take away the point of the divine sacrifice, it must be 
remembered that here Simone Weil is expressing what for her 
was a genuine contradiction, a true 'mystery', and that the 
nature of language is such that both terms of the contradiction 
601 
cannot be expressed simultaneously. Simone vleil cannot mean 
that Christ 1r1as only inert matter, since if he had been his 
mediating function would have been destroyed. He is God and 
matter, reconciling those supreme opposites in what for Simone· 
Weil was the only way possible, through the sufferings of the 
Cross. 
The reconciliation of God and matter through the Cross is 
only one aspect of the supreme harmony of opposites, that 
between God and Christ at the moment when he cried, 'My God, 
why hast thou forsaken me?' God forsaken by God gives the 
maximum of harmony in the Pythagorean sense, the maximum of 
unity--for God is eternally One--and the maximum of distance. 
Simone Weil implies that this distance and separation was for 
a moment complete, so that there might be a perfect model of 
the harmony of opposites: 
Pour qu'il y ait un modele parfait, absolu, de 
re-un~~ication des contraires, il faut qu'il y ait 
dissolution de l'unite des deux contraires supremes. 
Le Saint-Esprit s'est retire un moment du Christ. 
C'est ainsi que la Passion est Redemption. (C3 192 ) 
But this moment of abandonment is also a moment of supreme 
love, ' ce moment est la perfection incomprehensible de l'amour. 
C'est l'amour qui passe toute connaissancc' (IP 131). As in 
human affliction, where the real~sation that there is no answer 
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to the soul's 'why?' is the path to mystical ltnowledge, so 
Christ's agonised appeal to his Father and the Father's 
silence form the 'supreme harmonia' of which the universe is 
merely the vibration (IP 168-9). The universe is thus 
grounded in the love between Father and Son which at the 
moment of crucifixion triumphs over the distance between God 
and God composed of the totality of time and spade. It is a 
love based on affliction and on the supreme weakness and power-
lessness of God. This supreme harmony is a model of that 
established betl-reen the t\oro extreme opposites, betl-reen the 
God \otho seems so remote that in some \•rays it is more accurate 
to deny his existence, and man subject to necessity and incap-
able of independent spiritual progress, which opposites find 
their resolution in a Christ-figure who is unbounded by a 
single historical irruption in time, who is 'l'agneau egorge 
depuis la constitution du monde' (IP 27). The harmony of 
opposites is a perpetual cosmic process, and at their point 




Christ, the supreme mediator, bridges the gulf which creation 
has set between man and God. Other creatures and objects 
can perform this function in so far as, in their several 1t1ays, 
they imitate Christ. But it must be emphasised once again 
that in this concept of mediation there is no 'once and for 
all', no moment at which the conflict God-man, Good-necessity 
is finally resolved. The exigencies of language and of logic 
have obliged us to present this study in the form of a dia-
lectic, where the statement of opposition and of duality is 
eventually resolved in mediation. This indicates a historic-
al progression t·o"rards unity \"thich is misleading, since in 
Simone "Vleil 1 s thought duality and mediation are different 
facets of the same reality. As we saw (III, §6), contradic-
tion becomes a mediator by being accepted as contradiction, 
and not by being resolved into non-existence. Any resolution 
must be above and beyond the contradiction itself. 
The concept of paradox is obviously of fundamental im-
portance here. Duality and its resolution in mediation are 
so inextricably bound together that the apprehension of the 
one almost necessarily involves the apprehension of the other. 
To realise the distance beh1een the Good and necessity is al-
ready a sort of resolution of duality, but a resolution which 
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in no way compromises the two poles of the contradiction. 
I Savoir que Dieu est separe I c I est le cheniin pour l:e trouver. I 1 
Distance itself becomes a b~idge, just as the separation of 
Father and Son forms the supreme harmony. Conversely, the • 
very notion of bridge implies a gulf to be crossed, a gulf 
which is not abolished by the buildinc of the bridge. The 
definition of 'bridge' involves the concept of 'the bridgeable'. 
This contradiction is the basis of the 'knowledge' upon 
which Simone \nfeil insisted as a means of salvation. It l'lill 
be obvious that it is not a question of intellectual knowledge 
alone, that salvation invoLves the redemption of the \"Ihole man, 
and not merely of his reasoning power. The concept of the 
bridge with its associated dualism is a profoundly moral one 
as \'lell as a purely religious one, affecting the way man views 
his condition, and the possibilities for progress within this 
l'Torld, as well as the concept he forms of the Divine Being. 
To one who grasps clearly the gulf betv1een the Good and the 
necessary, and dr~ws the correct conclusion, the necessity of 
a mediator, the confusion between means and ends is impossible, 
·the earth and its creatures become a way, and the sense of 
1 DP, p. 276. 
exile is complemented by the certainty of the reality--though 
not necessarily the existence--of the Good. 
Another conclusion can be drawn from our analysis. If 
the concept of mediation depends on the perception of funda-
mental duality, it becomes clear that mediators have no objec-
tive existence as such. Theu exist of course as objects of 
perception, but for them to perform the function of mediators 
it is necessary for man to become conscious of the [!;ulf be-
tween the Good and the necessary, a consciousness which brings 
with it the need for mediation, and hence mediators themselves. 
Hediation thus depends on a \'lay of looking at things, rather 
than on objective reality, another proof if proof there need 
be that the v-ray of kno\"tledge is not the l!tay of intellect alone. 
The 'unreal' objects of the cave, therefore, which have reality 
as objects of perception but not as objects of love, take on a 
nevr reality as r.1ediators, as bearers of man's love tovrards its 
true object. 
The role of creatures as mediators is hidden from man, 
because of his natural tendency to self-expansion, to spill 
over into things so that he does not see their essential 
purity. In this way,the concept of mediation implies neces-
sarily a renunciation, a retreat of the 'I' so that man can 
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perceive the infinitely fragile and precious existence of 
other beings. This is the root of Simone Weil's asceticism, 
and it is a bitter comment on accepted values that this affirm-
ation of the absolute right of other creatures to exist, and 
of their fundamental goodness as means tO\'iards the absolute 
Good, should be the most criticised aspect of her thought. 
If her concept of salvation necessarily implies suffering, it 
is only because in a world ruled by force any renunciation of 
the power to wield force will be experienced aG a tearing 
apart of man's whole being. 
So the perception of God in the world, in beauty, in ob-
jects and creatures of absolute purity, can only follo\'1 and 
not precede the experience of total isolation from God. Only 
the soul that has appreciated its complete exile in the \'lorld, 
and has underg~ne the dark night of the soul, can experience 
the true preeence of God. That this presence, resulting from 
the apprehension of absence , li'Ias a reality to Simone Weil, 
cannot be doubted. Her expression of the mystical union lfrith 
God through his mediation in this world reaches its climax in 
the following joyful affirmation: 
Quand on sait /ii"u'il y a identite entre 'le rapport' 
et 'la mediation divine•?, on sait qu'on vit dans la 
mediation divine, non comme un poisson dans la mer, mais 
comme une goutte d'eau 
de nous, ici-bas, dans 
il n'y a autre chose. 
ment la meme chose que 
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dans lamer. En nous, hors 
le royaume de Dieu, nulle part 
Et la mediation, c'est exacte-
l'Arnour. (IP 166) 
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'Un peu d'histoire a propos du Haroc• 1 
Dans tous les milieux, dans toute la presse, de l'extreme 
droite a l'extreme gauche, on s'est beaucoup emu au sujet du 
Maroc, il n'y a pas encore bien longtemps. A present que le 
calme est provisoirement revenu, il est utile de rappeler 
quelques faits historiques. Il s'agit, bien entendu, de 
faits averes, verifies, inconteatables. 
C'est apres la defaite de 1871 que des hommes d'Etat 
Franqais, en quete de compensations de prestige, se tournerent 
vers les conquetes coloniales. Le gouvernement alle:nand les 
encourageait, voyant la un derivatif a l'esprit de revanche; 
Bismarck, comme d'ailleurs beaucoup de nationalistes franqais 
a cette epoque, ne comprenait pas l'importance des colonies. 
Quand l'Allemagne s'interessa a son tour aux colonies, la 
F'rance l'avait devancee de tres loin. 
Au debut du siecle, l'Etat fran~ais, qui possedait l'Al-
gerie depuis 1847, la Tuniaie depuis 1881, songeait au Maroc. 
Le I-iaroc etait depuis 1881 l'objet d'une convention internatio-
nale qui gar.antissait des droits economiques egaux aux Etats 
europeens. 
En 1904 fut signe un traite franco-anglais, le traite 
etait le resultat d'un marchandage. Jusque la, la France 
avait defendu centre l'Angleterre l'independance du peuple 
1
syndicats, no. 17, 4 fevr. 1937· In this article Simone 
Weil gives expression to some of the ideas on the colonial 
question outlined in II, §3. It is included here because of 
its relative inaccessibility. 
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egyptien, au nom des grands principes; en 1904, elle livra 
le peuple egyptien a l'Angleterre en echange du Maroc. Le 
traite, dans ses clauses publiques, garantissait l'indepen-
dance du Maroc, tout en accordant ala France le droit d'y 
'maintenir l'ordre'; les clauses secretes, devoilees plus 
tard, prevoyaient le partage du fliaroc entre la France et 
l'Espagne. 
L'Allemagne reagit vigoureusement. Elle affirmait que 
le statut du Maroc, objet d'une convention internationale, ne 
pouvait ~tre modifie que par une conference internationale. 
La folle intransigeance de Delcasse, ministre fran~ais des 
Affaires etrangeres, amena l'Europe au bord meme de la guerre. 
Il fut debarque juste a temps. Son successeur ceda. La 
conference internationale eut lieu. 
Il en sortit l'Acte d 1 Algesiras (1906), qui garantissait 
une fois de plus l 1 independance du Maroc, accordait des droits 
a peu pres egaux aux divers Etats europeens, et confiait ex-
clusivement la tache de maintenir l'ordre a une police maro-
caine, que devaient diriger pendant cinq ans des instructeurs 
fran~ais et espagnols. 
En mai 1911, la France envoya une expedition militaire 
occuper Fez, capitale du Maroc. La raison invoquee etait une 
menace de troubles, qui, disait-on, mettait en danger la vie 
des Europeens. Be telles affirmations sont toujours impossi-
bles a verifier apres coup. En tout cas !'occupation mili-
taire de Fez etait une violation criante de l'Acte d'Algesiras. 
L'Allemagne n'avait pas tente de s'opposer a cette violation, 
ce qu'elle desirait, c'etait mains empecher le partage du 
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l1aroc qu' y a voir sa part. 
reserves. 
Elle fit pourtant de serieuses 
Une fois 1 1 ordre retabli, la France continua d 1 occuper 
Fez, ce qui constituait une seconde violation de l 1 Acte encore 
plus grave. En juillet, l 1 Allemagne, en guise de riposte, 
envoya un navire de guerre devant la cote marocaine, a Agadir. 
Une deuxieme fois, l'Europe etait au bord de la guerre. 
Caillaux venait d'arriver au pouvoir. Entre··lui et le gou-
vernement allemand il y eut de longs pourparlers, pendant les-
quels la guerre sembla plusieurs fois imminente; mais de part 
et d 1 autre on preferait alors l'eviter. Un traite fut signe 
le 4 novembre 1911. L I Allemagne abandonnai t le i•laroc a la 
France, et recevait en echange une partie du Congo fran~ais, 
qui venait s 1 ajouter l son Cameroun. 
Ce traite, succes eclatante pour 1~ diplomatie fran~aise, 
fut ressenti en Allemagne comme une defaite et une humiliation 
nationale. Le ministre allemand des colonies demissionna. 
On peut penser que la guerre de 1914 fut pour une part un 
simple prolongement de ce conflit de 1911. C'etait du moins 
l'avis de Jaures, qui a dit dans son discours supreme, le 25 
juillet 1914: 'Penetrer par la force, par les armes, au l<jaroc, 
c'etait ouvrir a l'Europe l 1 ere des ambitions, des convoitises, 
et des conflits. 1 
Aujourd 1 hui, ou l'Allemagne s 1 apprete a remettre en ques-
tion les clauses coloniales du Traite de Versailles, peut-il y 
avoir de nouveau un probleme franco-allemand du Haroc '? 
11 y aurait bien des chases l dire l ce sujet. Ce n 1 est 
pas le moment. Hais il y a une question qu 1 on ne peu·t s' em-
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pecher de poser, et de poser avec angoisse et honte. 
L 1 histoire va-t-elle se recommencer ? 
se recommencer? 
La laisserons-nous 
S. ltieill ~ 
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Extract from a letter to Dermenghem (1940) 1 
Je me permets de m'adresser a vous maintenant parce que 
je compte aller en Afrique du Nord et, si possible, au Haroc. 
J'y ai demande d'ailleurs un poste dans l'enseignement; je 
ne compte guere l'obtenir; mais, de toutes manieres, je vais 
tenter d'y aller. J'aspire depuis longtemps a connaitre 
autre chose que l'Europe; les evenements actuels ne sont pas 
faits pour affaiblir ce desir. Depuis quelque temps, je me 
sens de plus en plus attiree vers ce qui reste encore de cul-
tures orientales, et notamm.ent vers les chases muaulmanes. 
Je vous serais infiniment reconnaissante si vous pouviez me 
fournir quelques indications sur les chases et les hommes 
qu' il y a interet a tenter de connaitre au i''laroc. En ce qui 
concerne les hommes, je pense aux Fran~ais et aux .\.rubes, mais 
surtout, bien entendu, a ces derniers. 
Je desirerais me ~endre compte principalement de deux 
choses: quel est le veritable caract~re du regime impose a 
la population, et quels effets il produit sur les ames; 
qu'est-ce qui reste encore de vivant, d 1 authentique, de vrai-
ment interessant, trace d'un passe plus glorieux et presage 
peut-etre d 1un meilleur avenir, par dessous la conquete. 
Car je ne pense pas, commc beaucoup des hornmes de bonne 
volonte qui s'interessent aux populations colonisees, que 
l'ideal fGt pour elles de devenir des provinces fran~aises 
1This unpublished letter, besides indicating Simone Weil's 
concern with the colonial problem (see II, §3), shows how her 
interest in the Arab 1r10rld and in Islam was developing to1r1ards 
the end of her life (see II, §4). 
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peuplees de Fran~ais moyens. La consideration des droits 
des individus, si importante qu'elle soit, ne me parait pas 
plus importante que la conservation de tresors collectifs 
constitues par les traditions, les moeurs et l'esprit des 
populations soumises a la conquete coloniale. On peut ima-
giner peut-etre--c'est du mains matiere a doute--des situations 
au l'influence occidentale se combinerait aux traditions pour 
donner quelque chose d'original et de vivant. Nais raeme au 
temps ou les Fran~ais etaient des citoyens, avoir un empire 
faj_t de 110 millions de citoyens fran~ais 1 au lieu de 40 
millionsmillions de citoyens et 70 millions de sujets, ne 
m'aurait pas paru une solution souhaitable. 
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Letter to Jean Wahl (1942) 1 
Cher ami, 
Je voulais vous ecrire depuis longtemps. On s 1 est 
manque de peu l Marseille (une lettre de vous, envoyee d 1 Aix, 
m1 a suivie ici). On se manque encore ici. Sonunes-nous 
destines a nous revoir un jour a Paris ? Ou jamais ? L I in-
certitude qui enveloppe toutes chases contraint de vivre soit 
au jour le jour, soit dans l 1 eternite, soit des deux manieres 
i la fois, ce qui est le mieux. 
Vous me dites des chases obscures qui semblent impliquer 
que certains repandent des bruits bizarres sur moi? Affir-
merai t-on par hasard que j I ai des sympathies du cote de Vichy? 
Si c 1est cela, vous pouvez dementir. En juin 1940, j 1ai 
ardemment desire qu 1 on dtHende Paris, et je ne suis partie 
qu'apres avoir vu avec consternation sur les murs l 1 affiche 
declarant la ville ouverte. Je me suis arretee a Nevers dans 
1 1 espoir qu 1 il y aurait un front sur la Loire. J 1 ai appris 
avec consternation aussi la nouvelle de l 1 armistice, et j 1 ai 
immediatement decide que je tenterais de passer en Angleterre. 
J'ai essaye toutes les possibilites qui s 1 offraient a moi a 
cet effet, y compris des moyens dangereux. Je n 1 ai quitte 
1Deucalion, No. l~ (oct. 1952), 253-7· Although this 
letter has appeared in published form, it is reproduced here 
because of its relative inaccessibility. It shows clearly 
Simone Weil's reactions to her exile, and the subjects which 
occupied her mind at the time, particularly in the field of 
religious philosophy. For extracts already quoted, see II, 
§§3, 4. 
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la France qu•avec cette pens6e. ED attendant, avant mon 
d6part de France, de participais A la diffusion de la litt6-
rature ill6gale. Auaait8t arriv6e ici, j*ai fatigu6 tout 
le monde par mea supplications pour· obt·enir d • etre envo;y6e 
en Angleterre. Ja para entin, grAce a Andr6 Phil~p,-~ui 
m•embauche dana sea services (aoit dit en paasant, c'eat 
quelqu 1un de tr6a, tr6a bien, tout A fait de premier ordre). 
Depu:l.a le jour ol, aprea une lutte 1nt6rieure tree dura, j'ai 
d6cid6 en moi•mJme que malgr6 mea inclinations paoifiatea la 
premiere des oblisationa aerait d6aor.maia a mea yeux de pour-
auivre la destruction d'Bitler avec ou sana eapoir de r6Maair, 
dapuia ce a our je n • ai. jaaais var16; at ca jour ae place au 
moment de l'entr6e d'Bitler a Prague, c'eat-a-dire, si je me 
souviena bien, en mai 19'9· 0'6tait peut-ltre tardit. J 1ai 
peut-ltre pris cette attitude trop tard. Je le croia, at je 
me le reproohe amerement. Maia, antiD, depuis que je l'ai 
prise, je n 1 en ai pas boug6. Je vous prie doac de d6ment1r 
cat6goriquement tous lea bruits contrairea. 
Ce qui a pu donner lieu A cas bruits, o'eat que je n'aime 
pas beaucoup entendre dee seas parfait~ment confortables ici 
traiter de lAches at de t~a!tre• ceux qui-en France sa d6-
brouillent comma ils peuvent dana une situat1on.terr1ble. Il 
;y • un petit aombre de Fraa~aia aeulemant pour qui 11 soit a 
peu pres sur que oes adjectifa aont m6r1t6s; on ne devrait 
pas lea 6tendre au-dell. Il y a eu una lachet6 1 una trahison 
collective, A savoir l 1armist1ce1 toute .la nation en porte la 
reaponaab1lit6, 1 compria Paul Reynaud, qui n 1aurait j_&lllfd.s dd 
d6mias1onner. Pour moi, l'armiatice m'a constern6e des 1e 
d6buta maia malgr6 cela je penae que chaque Fraa~aila, mo1 1 
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compris, en porte la responsabilite autant que Petain; car 
sur le moment, ace que j'ai vu, la nation dans son ensemble 
a accueilli l'armistice avec soulagement; et il en resulte 
une responsabilite nationale indivisible. D'autre part, 
depuis lors, je crois que Petain a fait A peu pr~s tout ce 
que la situation generale et son propre etat physique et mental 
lui permettaient de faire pour limiter les degits. On ne 
devrait employer le mot de traitre que pour designer ceux dont 
on est certain qu'ils desirent la victoire de l'Allemagne et 
font ce qu'ils peuvent a cet effet. Quant aux autres, cer-
tains de ceux qui acceptant de travailler avec Vichy ou mente 
avec les Allemands peuvent avoir des motifs honorables repon-
dant a.-'des situations determinees. D'autres peuvent etre 
l'objet de pressions telles qu'ils ne pourraient resister sans 
heroisme. Or, la plupart des gens qui s'erigent en juges ici 
n'ont jamais eu l'occasion d'eprouver s'ils sont eux-memes des 
heros. J'ai horreur des attitudes faciles, injustes et fausses, 
surtout quand la pression generale semble les rendre presque 
obligatoires. 
J'aurais beaucoup desire vous voir, principalement pour 
savoir si vos experiences personnelles ont modifie votre 'Welt-
anschauung', et comment. Je suppose qu'apr~s tout cela le mot 
'Dasein' doit avoir pour vous une autre resonance qu'auparavant. 
11 n'y a rien de tel que la mauvaise fortune pour manner le 
sentiment de 1' existence. Excepte quand elle donne lEf sentiment 
de l'irrealite. L'un ou l'autre peuvent se produire. Ou meme 
l'un et l'autre. En tout cas, il me semble que de telles expe-
riences doivent donner une autre signi.fication a tous les mots 
du vocabulaire philosophique. 
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Je ne peux pas me detacher assez des evenements actuels 
pour faire des efforts de redaction, de composition, etc; et 
pourtant une partie de mon esprit est perpetuellement occupee 
a des choses absolument etrangeres a l'actualite (quoique les 
problemes actuels y aient un rapport indirect). Je m1 en tire 
en remplissant cahier apr~s cahier de reflexions notees a la 
hate, sans ordre et sans suite. 
Je crois qu'une pensee identique se trouve exprimee d'une 
maniere tres precise et avec des modalites a peine differentes, 
dans les mythologies antiques; dans la philosophie de Phere-
kydes, Thales, Anaximandre, Heraclite, Pythagore, Platen et des 
stoiciens grecs; dans la poesie grecque de la grande epoque; 
dans le folk-lore universel; dans lea Upanishads et la Bhaga-
vad-Gita; dans les ecrits des Taoistes chinois et dans certains 
courants boudhistes; dans ce qui reste des ecritures sacrees 
d'Egypte; dans lea dogmes de la foi chretienne et les ecrits 
des plus grands mystiques chretiens, surtout St. Jean de la 
Croix; dans certaines heresies, surtout la tradition cathare 
et manicheenne. Je crois que cette pensee est la verite, et 
qu'elle a besoin aujourd'hui d'une expression moderrie et occi-
dentale. C'est-a-dire qu'elle a besoin d'etre exprimee a tra-
vers la ~le chose a peu pres bonne que nous ayons en propre, 
a savoir la science. Cela fait d 1 autant moins de difficulte 
qu'elle est. elle-meme l'origine de la science. Il y u quel-
ques textes qui indiquent avec certitude que la geometrie 
grecque a son origine dans une pensee religieuse; et il semble 
bien qu'il s'agisse d 1 une pensee proche du christ~isme 
presque jusqu'a l'identite. 
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Quant aux Juifs, je pense que Hoise a connu cette sagesse 
et l'a refusee, parce que, comme Maurras, il cencevait la re-
ligion cmmne un simple instrument de grandeur nationale; mais 
quand la nation juive a ete detruite par Uabuchodonosor, les 
Juifs, completement desorientes et melanges a toutes sortes de 
nations, ont re~u cette sagesse sous forme d'influences etran-
geres, et l'ont fait entrer dans les cadres de leur religion 
autant que c'etait possible. De la viennent, dans l'Ancien 
Testament, le livre de Job (que je crois etre une traduction 
mutilee et remaniee d'un livre sacre concernant un Dieu incarne, 
souffrant, mis a mort et ressuscite), la plupart des Psaumes, 
le Cantique des Cantiques, les livres sapientiaux (qui viennent 
peut-etre du meme courant qui a produit les ouvrages dits her-
metiques; les ecrits attribues a Denys l'Areopagite en vierment 
peut-etre aussi), ce qu'on nomme le 'second Isaie', certains 
des petits prophetes, le livre de Daniel et celui de Tobie. 
Presque tout le reste de l'Ancien Testament est un tissu d'hor-
reurs. 
Je pense que les 11 premiers chapitres de la Genese (jus-
quI a Abraham) ne peuven t etre quI une tradliJ.Ction deformee et 
remaniee d'un livre sacre egyptien; qu'Abel, Henoch et Noe 
sont des dieux, et que Noe est identique a Osiris, Dionysos, 
et Prometliee. Que Sem, Japhet et Cham correspondent, sinon 
a trois races,. du moins a trois familles humaines, trois modes 
de civilisation; et que Cham seul a vu la nudite et l'ivresse 
de Noe, c'est-a-dire re~u la revelation de la pensee mystique. 
Sont rattaches a Cham, d'apres la Genese, les Sumeriens, les 
Ethiopians, les Egyptiens, les Fheniciens '· les Egeo-cretois 
(Philistins); il convient sans doute d'y ajouter les Iberes .• 
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Les peuples ~attaches a Japhet et a Sem ont partout conquis 
et detruit ceux rattaches a Cham, mais n'ont eu de vie spiri-
tuelle que quand ils ont consenti a adopter la pensee religieuse 
et philosophique de ces vaincus. C'est ce qu'ont fait presque 
tous les Hellenes; les Celtes; les Babylonians; une partie 
des Hebreux apres le VIe siecle. Ceux qui par orgueil et 
volonte de puissance ont refuse d'etre instruits, comme les 
Spartiates, les Romains, les Hebreux avant Nabuchodonosor, 
probablement les Assyriens, sont restes des brutes sans vie 
spirituelle et presque sans vie intellectuelle. 
Le courant de la pensee 'hamitique' {pour adopter la forme 
allemande du nom de Cham) se retrouve com.me un fil lumineux 
partout a travers la prehistoire et l'histoire. Il s'est me~e 
infiltre dans la mythologie germanique (dans l'histoire de 
Baldi, dans celle d'Odin pendu a l'Arbre du Monde). hais par-
tout l'orgueil et la volonte de domination, l'esprit de Japhet 
et de Sem, tentent de detruire cette pensee. Elle etait pres• 
que detruite dans toute l'etendue de l'empire romain quand est 
ne le Christ qui en a ete une expression parfaits et par suite 
divine, autant qu'on peut juger d'apres les ecrits inspires 
par lui. Aujourd'hui !Iitler et beaucoup d'autres tentent de 
l'abolir totalement sur toute la surface de la terre. 
Je ne vous cacherai pas que le courant de pensee 'existen-
tialiste', pour autant que je le connais, me parait etre du 
mauvais cote; du cote des pensees ~trangeres a la revelation 
re~ue et tran~mise par Noe, ou quel que soit son nom; du cote 
de la force. 
Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est la a peu pres !'orientation de 
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celles de mes preoccupations qui ne se rattachent pas directe-
ment a l'actualite. Cela ne m'empeche pas, simultanement, 
de penser a l'actualite d'une maniere continuelle. 
Voila, je crois, plus que des 'hints•. J 1 aurais plaisir 
a man tour de savoir a peu pres ce que vous pensez, avant man 
depart qui est presque immediat. 
Je souhaite que l'exil ne vous soit pas trap penible. 




'Les Pythagoriciens, Platon et le christianisme• 1 
Quand les Pythagoriciens :parlent de·nombre, il faut 
savoir qu'ils ont toujours dans l'es~rit les rapports geo-
metriques aussi bien qu'arithmetiques, comme les mathemati-
cians modernes quand ils parlent de nombre generalise. Ce 
que les Pythagoriciens nommaient nombre, c'est le rapport de 
quantite, et d'une maniire generale c'est tout rapport. 
Ap~S~b~ et Aby~ sont synonymes dana leur langage. 
Logos signifie bien parole, et aussi raison, sagesse, 
mais avant tout rapport, essentiellem~nt rapport de mediation. 
C1 est bien le sens que ce mot a dans Saint-Jean. 'Au co~~ence­
ment etait le Mediateur, et le Mediateur etait chez Dieu, et 
le Mediateur etait Dieu.' 
Philon, ~ ce qu'on dit (je ne l'ai pas lu), avait l'idee 
d I un .,.media teur I ma.is cliff eren t de Dieu I infetieur a Dieu. Ce 
n'est pas la pensee de Platen. Car il dit: dans la proper-
tion l'intermediaire devient premier et dernier; le premier 
et le dernier deviennent tous deux intermediaires. Cela n'a 
aucun sens applique a la proportion numerique dont en apparence 
il est en train de parler, comme 1 1 3, 9. Si on pose: 1 est 
a 3 CODliUe 3 a 9 1 d 1 aucune maniere 1 et 9 deviennent interme-
diaires. En revanche ces mots sont lumineux si on les appli-
1 • -p• 1 s~mone etrement s 
possibly intended for La 
some of the mathematical 
title. This unpu.blished fragment, 
Source grecgue, is an elaboration o£ 
meditations considered in III, §6. 
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que a l'Incarnation. Le Christ est Dieu et il est homme. 
Etant donne que lea trois Personnes sont un seul Dieu, par 
l'lncarnation Dieu est devenu homme-Dieu. D'autre part 
l'homme devient tel par la foi et l'amour qu'il ne vit plus 
en lui, mais c'est le Christ qui vit en lui. Platon dit 
aussi que le lien le plus beau est celui qui a la plus grande 
capacite de rendre un lui-meme et lea termes lies. Ce lien 
lui-meme doit done etre unite. Autrement dit il est Dieu. 
Quand Platon dit que l'Amour est au milieu de Dieu et de 
l'homme, il ne s'agit pas d'une egalite de distance. Il 
s'agit d'une mediation geometrique telle que celle qui apparait 
dans d'e si nombreuses formules de Saint-Jean com.me constituant 
la fonction du Christ. Il y a une inspiration pythagoricienne 
dans l'evangile de Saint-Jean. 
Dans la construction geometrique de la proportion, pour 
avoir une proportion o~ le terme intermediaire soit identique 
au premier, il suffit de prendre pour premier terme un point. 
Le second est un diamAtre moins un point, c'est a dire le 
diametre. La moyenne geometrique entre lea deux est alors 
un point, le point meme qui est le premier terme. 
Cette interpretation theologiqae de la geometrie, qui 
d'ailleurs est simple et lumineuse en elle-meme, est appuyee, 
non seulement par le passage de Proclus cite plus haut, mais 
encore par un autre fragment de Philolaos extremement etrange 
pour notre mentalite actuelle, et qui montre que depuis la 
Grece il s'est opere a un moment donne un retournement. Ce 
moment se place sans ~oute au cours de la Renaissance (non au 
debut). Il s'agirait d'operer le retournement inverse. 
tdo~~ dt xu o6 ~bvou lv ~o~~ da~~ovlo~~ xul SEto~~ np&y~aa~ ~v ~ 
lxp~S~ cpba~v xul dbva~~v la.xWuaav, &>.>.& xal lv ~o~~ ixvSp!l'n~xo~~ 
~pyo~~ xut Abyo~~ naVTU xul xa~ ~~ dn~~oupy~~ ~ ~Exv~x&~ n&aa~ 
xat Ka~ ~v ~oua~Khv. 
On peut voir quelle force a l'essence et la vertu du 
nombre, non pas seulement dans les choses de Dieu, mais aussi 
partout dans les actes et les raisonnement des how..mes et dans 
toutes les operations des diverses techniques et dans la musi-
que. 
La metaphore de laporte 'Je suis la porte ••• • et celle 
de la clef 'Vous avez ote la clef de la connaissance' rappelle 
un des plus beaux textes pytha~oriciens sur la mediation entre 
Dieu et la nature 'Les choses qui ne sont pas semblables, ni 
de meme origine, ni de meme rang doivent etre enfermees en-
semble sous clef par une harmonie qui puisse les entretenir 
en un ord:re du monde. ' 
Les noms de Logos et Pneuma sont ceux de la •.rrinite 
pythagoricienne et stoicienne, car les stoiciens nommaient 
Pneuma le feu divin. D'autre part Logos dans le langage 
pythagoricien et platonicien veut dire avant tout rapport et 
est synonyme de nombre; et le nombre ou rapport est la media-
tion entre l'un, qui est Dieu, et l'illimit~, qui est la nature. 
Bien entendu, plusieur~ passages de Platon peuvent etre 
regardes comme des_r propluHies. Ainsi 'Si la Sagesso devenait 
visible, elle susciterait d'etranges amours', et le passage de 
la Republique sur le juste parfait, humilie et torture, et 
neanmoins parfaitement .... bienheureux, qui est 'a tous egards 
la meme ChOSe que la Justice en SOi I 1 C I est a dire la J·ustiCe 
divine. 
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Un poeme scandinave, qui se trouve dans un recueil 
posterieur a l'introduction du christianisme, mais est tres 
prcbablement anterieur, etant donne que des textes du Xe 
siecle semblent y faire allusion, commence: (c'est Odin qui 
parle) 
£MS ends heri7 
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